WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

15

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

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V. I. LENIN

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PREFACE

Volume 16 contains works written by V. I. Lenin during the period from March 1908 to August 1909.

The volume contains articles and other items by Lenin published in the newspapers *Proletary* and *Sotsial-Demokrat*; documents of the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. and the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*.

In his writings: "On to the Straight Road", "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution", "On the 'Nature' of the Russian Revolution", "The Assessment of the Present Situation", "On the Road", Lenin gives an analysis of the coup d'état of June 3, 1907, outlines the tasks and tactics of the Party during the period of the Stolypin reaction, and exposes the liquidationism of the Mensheviks.

His articles "Two Letters", "On the Article 'Questions of the Day'", "A Caricature of Bolshevism", "The Liquidation of Liquidationism" and the documents of the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* are directed against "liquidationism from the left"—otzovism, ultimatumism and god-building.

In his works: "The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century", "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the Russian Revolution. Autoabstract", "P. Maslov in Hysterics", "Some Remarks on the 'Reply' by P. Maslov", "From the Editorial Board" and "How Plekhanov and Co. Defend Revisionism", Lenin defends and develops Marxist theory on the agrarian question.

In the articles "Inflammable Material in World Politics", "Bellicose Militarism and the Anti-Militarist Tactics

of Social-Democracy", "Events in the Balkans and in Persia" and "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", Lenin discusses the most important international events and defines the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy in the struggle against militarism.

This volume includes six documents printed for the first time in Lenin's *Works*. In the article, "British and German Workers Demonstrate for Peace" Lenin exposed the predatory aspirations of the capitalists and their war preparations, and showed the rise of the revolutionary working-class movement. Two documents, "Statement by the Bolsheviks" and "To the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Labour Party", are devoted to the struggle of the Bolsheviks against the Menshevik liquidators at the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. Two speeches at the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* and the "Draft Letter of the Bolshevik Centre to the Council of the School on Capri" are directed against the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders.

ON TO THE STRAIGHT ROAD[1]

Published in the newspaper
Proletary, No. 26,
March 19 (April 1), 1908

Published according
to the text in the newspaper

ON TO THE STRAIGHT ROAD[1]

Published in the newspaper
Proletary, No. 26,
March 19 (April 1), 1908

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The dissolution of the Second Duma[2] and the coup d'état of June 3, 1907[3] were a turning-point in the history of our revolution, the beginning of a kind of special period or zigzag in its development. We have spoken more than once of the significance of this zigzag from the standpoint of the general relation of class forces in Russia and the tasks of the uncompleted bourgeois revolution. We want now to deal with the state of our Party work in connection with this turn of the revolution.

More than six months have passed since the reactionary coup of June 3, and beyond doubt this first half-year has been marked by a considerable decline and weakening of all revolutionary organisations, including that of the Social-Democrats. Wavering, disunity and disintegration—such have been the general features of this half-year. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, because the extreme intensification of reaction and its temporary triumph, coupled with a slowing-down in the direct class struggle, were bound to be accompanied by a crisis in the revolutionary parties.

Now there can be observed, and quite plainly, a number of symptoms showing that the crisis is coming to an end, that the worst is over, that the right road has already been found and that the Party is once again entering the straight road of consistent and sustained guidance of the revolutionary struggle of the socialist proletariat.

Take one of the very characteristic (by far not the most profound, of course, but probably among the most visible) external expressions of the Party crisis. I mean the flight of the intellectuals from the Party. This flight is strikingly characterised in the first issue of our Party's Central Organ,[4] which appeared in February this year. This issue, which provides a great deal of material for assessing the Party's internal life, is largely reproduced in this number. "Recently *through lack* of intellectual workers the area organisation has been dead," writes a correspondent from the Kulebaki

Works (Vladimir area organisation of the Central Industrial Region). "Our ideological forces are melting away like snow," they write from the Urals. "The elements who avoid illegal organisations in general ... and who joined the Party only at the time of the upsurge and of the *de facto* liberty that then existed in many places, have left our Party organisations." And an article in the Central Organ entitled "Questions of Organisation" sums up these reports, and others which we do not print, with the words: "The intellectuals, as is well known, have been deserting in masses in recent months."

But the liberation of the Party from the half-proletarian, half-petty-bourgeois intellectuals is beginning to awake to a *new life* the new *purely proletarian* forces accumulated during the period of the heroic struggle of the proletarian masses. That same Kulebaki organisation which was, as the quotation from the report shows, in a desperate condition—and was even quite "dead"—has been resurrected, it turns out. "Party nests among the workers [we read]* scattered in large numbers throughout the area, in most cases without any intellectual forces, without literature, even without any connection with the Party Centres, don't want to die.... The number of organised members is not decreasing but increasing.... There are no intellectuals, and the workers themselves, the most class-conscious among them, have to carry on propaganda work." And the general conclusion reached is that "in a number of places responsible work, owing to the flight of the intellectuals, is passing into the hands of the advanced workers" (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1, p. 28).

This reconstruction of the Party organisations on, so to speak, a different class foundation is of course a difficult thing, and it is not likely to develop without some hesitations. But it is only the first step that is difficult; and that has already been made. The Party has already entered the straight road of leadership of the working masses by advanced "intellectuals" drawn from the ranks of the workers themselves.

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* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

Work in the trade unions and the co-operative societies, which was at first taken up gropingly, is now assuming definite shape. Two resolutions of the Central Committee, about the trade unions and the co-operative societies respectively, *both* adopted *unanimously*, were already suggested by the developing local activities. Party groups in all non-party organisations; their leadership in the spirit of the militant tasks of the proletariat, the spirit of revolutionary class struggle; "from non-party to Party ideology" (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 1, p. 28)—this is the path upon which the working-class movement has entered in this field too. The correspondent of a Party organisation in the remote little provincial town of Minsk, reports: "The more revolutionary-minded workers are drawing apart from them [from the legal unions topsy-turvified by the administration] and are more and more sympathetic to the formation of illegal unions."

In the same direction, "from non-party to Party ideology", is developing the work in quite a different sphere, that of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. Strange though it may sound, it is a fact that we cannot all at once raise the work of our parliamentary representatives to a Party level—just as we did not all at once begin to work "in a Party way" in the co-operatives. Elected under a law which falsifies the will of the people, elected from the ranks of Social-Democrats who have preserved their legality, ranks which have thinned very greatly as a result of persecution during the first two Dumas, our Duma Social-Democrats *in effect* inevitably were at first non-party Social-Democrats rather than real members of the Party.

This is deplorable, but it is a fact—and it could hardly be otherwise in a capitalist country entangled by thousands of bonds inherited from serfdom and with a legal workers' party that has been in existence for only two years. And it was not only non-party people who wanted on this fact to base their tactics of setting up a non-revolutionary Social-Democracy, but also those "Bezzaglavtsi"[5] Social-Democrat-like intellectuals who clustered around the Duma group like flies round a honey-pot. But it seems as if the efforts of these worthy followers of Bernstein are suffering defeat! It seems as if the work of the Social-Democrats has

begun to straighten itself out in this sphere, too. We will not undertake to prophesy, nor shall we close our eyes to what vast efforts are still required to organise more or less tolerable parliamentary Social-Democratic work in our conditions. But we may note that in the first issue of the Central Organ there is Party criticism of the Duma group, and a *direct resolution* of the Central Committee about better direction for its work. We do not by any means consider that the criticism in the Central Organ covers all the defects. We think, for example, that the Social-Democrats should not have voted, either for placing the land taxes at the disposal of the Zemstvos[6] in the first instance, nor for *purchase* at a low price of urban land rented by the poor (No. 1 of the Central Organ, p. 36). But these are, comparatively speaking, minor questions. What is basic and most important is that the transformation of the Duma group into a really Party organisation now features in all our work, and that consequently the Party will achieve it, however hard this may be, and however the road may be beset with trials, vacillations, partial crises, personal clashes, etc.

Among the same signs that really Social-Democratic and genuinely Party work is being straightened out there is the obviously outstanding fact of the increase in illegal publications. "The Urals are publishing eight papers," we read in the Central Organ. "There are two in the Crimea, one in Odessa, and a paper is starting soon in Ekaterinoslav. Publishing activity in St. Petersburg, in the Caucasus and by the non-Russian organisations is considerable." In addition to the two Social-Democratic papers appearing abroad, the Central Organ has been issued in Russia, in spite of quite extraordinary police obstacles. A regional organ, *Rabocheye Znamya*,[7] will appear soon in the Central Industrial Region.

From all that has been said, one can form a quite definite picture of the path on which the Social-Democratic Party is firmly entering. A strong illegal organisation of the Party Centres, systematic illegal publications and—most important of all—local and particularly factory Party groups, led by advanced members from among the workers themselves, living in direct contact with the masses; such is the foundation on which we were building, and

have built, a hard and solid core of a revolutionary and Social-Democratic working-class movement. And this illegal core will spread *its* feelers, *its* influence, incomparably wider than ever before, both through the Duma and the trade unions, both in the co-operative societies and in the cultural and educational organisations.

At first sight there is a remarkable similarity between this system of Party work and that which was established by the Germans during the Anti-Socialist Law (1878-90).[8] The distance which the German working-class movement covered during the thirty years following the bourgeois revolution (1848-78), the Russian working-class movement is covering in three years (from the end of 1905 to 1908). But behind this outward similarity is hidden a profound inward difference. The thirty-year period which followed the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Germany completely fulfilled the objectively necessary tasks of *that* revolution. It fulfilled itself in the constitutional parliament of the early sixties, in dynastic wars which united the greater part of German-speaking territories, and in the creation of the Empire with the help of universal suffrage. In Russia the three years which have not yet passed since the first great victory and the first great defeat of the bourgeois-democratic revolution not only have not fulfilled its tasks but, on the contrary, have for the first time spread realisation of those tasks among *broad* masses of the proletariat and the peasantry. What has been outlived during these two odd years is constitutional illusions and belief in the democratism of the liberal lackeys of Black-Hundred[9] tsarism.

A crisis on the basis of the unfulfilled objective tasks of the bourgeois revolution in Russia is inevitable. Purely economic, specifically financial, internal political and external events, circumstances and vicissitudes may make it acute. And the party of the proletariat—having entered the straight road of building a strong illegal Social-Democratic organisation, possessed of more numerous and more varied implements for legal and semi-legal influence than before—will be able to meet that crisis more prepared for resolute struggle than it was in October and December 1905.

ON THE "NATURE" OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Drive Nature out of the door and she will fly in at the window, exclaims the Cadet *Rech*[10] in a recent editorial. This valuable admission of the official organ of our counter-revolutionary liberals needs to be particularly emphasised, because what is referred to is the *nature* of the Russian revolution. And one cannot sufficiently insist on the force with which events are confirming the basic view of Bolshevism as to this "nature" of the *peasant* bourgeois revolution, which can win only *in opposition to* wavering, wobbling, counter-revolutionary bourgeois liberalism.

At the beginning of 1906, prior to the First Duma, Mr. Struve wrote: "The peasant in the Duma will be a Cadet." At that time this was the *bold* assertion of a liberal who *still dreamt* of re-educating the muzhik from a naïve monarchist into a supporter of the opposition. It was at a time when *Russkoye Gosudarstvo*,[11] the organ of the bureaucracy, the newspaper of the lackeys of Mr. Witte, was assuring its readers that "the muzhik will help us out", i.e., that broad representation of the peasants would prove favourable for the autocracy. Such opinions were so widespread in those days (remote days! two whole years divide us from them!) that even in the Mensheviks' speeches at the Stockholm Congress[12] kindred notes were clearly heard.

But the First Duma had dispelled these illusions of the monarchists and *the illusions of the liberals* completely. The most ignorant, undeveloped, politically virgin, unorganised muzhik proved to be *incomparably more left* than the Cadets.[13] The struggle of the Cadets against the "Trudovik spirit" and Trudovik politics[14] formed the main content of liberal "activity" during the first two Dumas. And when

LE PROLETAIRE, organe russe social-démocrate. hebdomadaire

ЕЖЕНЕД ГАЗЕТА ВЫХОДИТЪ ПО СРЕДАМЪ

№ 27.

ПРОЛЕТАРІЙ

Российская Социалъ-демократическая Рабочая Партія.

GENEVE. СРЕДА, (8 апр.) 26 МАР. 1908 г.

Органъ С.-Петербургскаго и Московскаго комитетовъ Р. С. Д. Р. П.

О „природѣ" русской революціи

Къ дебатамъ о расширеніи бюджетныхъ правъ Думы.

Front page of the newspaper *Proletary*, No. 27, March 26 (April 8), 1908, featuring Lenin's articles "On the 'Nature' of the Russian Revolution", and "The Debate on the Extension of the Duma's Budgetary Powers"

Reduced

Front page of the newspaper Proletary, No. 27, March 26 (April 8), 1908, featuring Lenin's articles "On the 'Nature' of the Russian Revolution", and "The Debate on the Extension of the Duma's Budgetary Powers"

Reduced

after the Second Duma had been dissolved, Mr. Struve—an advanced man among the liberal counter-revolutionaries—hurled his angry judgements on the Trudoviks, and proclaimed a crusade against the "intellectualist" leaders of the peasantry who were "playing at radicals", he was thereby expressing the *utter bankruptcy* of liberalism.

The experience of the two Dumas brought liberalism a complete fiasco. It *did not succeed* in "taming the muzhik". It did not succeed in making him modest, tractable, ready for compromise with the landlord autocracy. The liberalism of the bourgeois lawyers, professors and other intellectualist trash could not "adjust itself" to the "Trudovik" peasantry. It turned out to be politically and economically far *behind* them. And the whole historic significance of the first period of the Russian revolution may be summed up as follows: liberalism has *already* conclusively demonstrated its counter-revolutionary nature, its incapacity to lead the peasant revolution; the peasantry has not *yet* fully understood that it is only along the path of revolution and republic, under the guidance of the socialist proletariat, that a real victory can be won.

The bankruptcy of liberalism meant the triumph of the reactionary landlords. Today, intimidated by those reactionaries, humiliated and spat upon by them, transformed into a serf-bound accomplice of Stolypin's constitutional farce, liberalism will shed an occasional tear for the past. Of course the fight against the Trudovik spirit was hard, unbearably hard. But ... all the same ... may we not win a second time, if that spirit rises again? May we not then play the part of a broker more successfully? Did not our great and famous Pyotr Struve write, even before the revolution, that the middle parties always gained from the sharpening of the struggle between extremes?

And lo, the liberals, exhausted in struggle with the Trudoviks, are playing against the reactionaries the card of a revival of the Trudovik spirit! "The Land Bills just introduced into the Duma by the Right-wing peasants and the clergy," writes *Rech* in the same editorial, "reveal the old Trudovik spirit: Trudovik and not Cadet." "One Bill belongs to the peasants and is signed by 41 members of the Duma. The other belongs to the clergy. The former is more

radical than the latter, but the latter, too, in some respects [listen to the Cadet *Rech*!] leaves the Cadet draft of agrarian reform far behind." The liberals are obliged to admit that, after all the filtering of the electors undertaken and carried out in accordance with the notorious law of June 3, this fact (as we already noted in No. 22 of *Proletary*) is evidence not of some accident, but of the *nature* of the Russian revolution.*

The peasants, writes *Rech*, have a distributable land reserve not in the sense of a transmitting agency, "but in the sense of a permanent institution". The Cadets admit this, but modestly keep silent about the fact that they themselves, while playing up to the reactionaries and cringing to them, in the interim between the First and Second Dumas threw the distributable land reserve out of their programme (i.e., in one way or another, the recognition of land nationalisation) and adopted Gurko's[15] point of view, namely, full private ownership of the land.

The peasants, writes *Rech*, buy land at a fair valuation (i.e., in the Cadet fashion) but—and a momentous "but" this is—the valuation is to be made by the local land institutions "elected by the whole population of the locality concerned".

And once again the Cadets have to keep quiet about one aspect. They have to keep quiet about the fact that this election by the whole population obviously resembles the well-known "Trudovik" Bill in the First Duma and the Second—the Bill providing for local land committees elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. They have to keep quiet about how the liberals in the first two Dumas carried on a disgusting struggle against this Bill, which was the only possible one from a democratic point of view: how abjectly they turned and twisted, wishing *not to say* from the Duma rostrum everything they had said in their press—in the leading article of *Rech* later reprinted by Milyukov ("A Year of Struggle"), in Kutler's draft and in Chuprov's article (the Cadet "Agrarian Question", Volume 2). And what they admitted in their press was that according to their idea the

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 455-59.—*Ed.*

local land committees should consist of an equal number of representatives of the peasantry and of the landlords, with *a representative of the government* as a third party. In other words, the Cadets were betraying the muzhik to the landlord, by assuring that everywhere the latter would have the majority (the landlords plus a representative of the landlord autocracy are always in a majority against the peasants).

We quite understand the swindlers of parliamentary bourgeois liberalism *having* to keep quiet about all this. They are wrong, though, in thinking that the workers and peasants are likely to forget these most important landmarks on the road of the Russian revolution.

Even the clergy—those ultra-reactionaries, those Black-Hundred obscurantists purposely maintained by the government—have gone further than the Cadets in their agrarian Bill. Even they have begun talking about lowering the "artificially inflated prices" of land, and about a progressive land tax in which holdings not exceeding the subsistence standard would be free of tax. Why has the village priest—that policeman of official orthodoxy—proved to be *more* on the side of the peasant than the bourgeois liberal? Because the village priest has to live side by side with the peasant, to depend on him in a thousand different ways, and sometimes—as when the priests practice small-scale peasant agriculture on church land—even to be in a peasant's skin himself. The village priest will have to return from the most police-ridden Duma into his own village: and however greatly the village has been purged by Stolypin's punitive expeditions and chronic billeting of the soldiery, *there is no return to it* for those who have taken the side of the landlords. So it turns out that the most reactionary priest finds it more difficult than the enlightened lawyer and professor to betray the peasant to the landlord.

Yes, indeed! Drive Nature out of the door and she will fly in at the window. The nature of the great bourgeois revolution in peasant Russia is such that only the victory of a peasant uprising, unthinkable without the proletariat as guide, is capable of bringing that revolution to victory in the teeth of the congenital counter-revolutionism of the bourgeois liberals.

It remains for the liberals either to disbelieve the strength of the Trudovik spirit—and that is impossible when the facts stare them in the face—or else to pin their faith on some new political trickery. And here is the programme of that piece of trickery in the concluding words of *Rech*: "Only serious practical provisions for this kind of reform [namely, agrarian reform "on the broadest democratic basis"] can cure the population of utopian attempts." This may be read as follows. Mr. Stolypin, Your Excellency, even with all your gallows and your June Third laws you have not "cured" the population of its "utopian Trudovik spirit". Allow us to try just once more. We shall promise the people the widest democratic reform, and in practice will "cure" them by means of buying out the land from the landlords and giving the latter a majority in the local land institutions!

On our part, we shall thank Messrs. Milyukov, Struve and Co. from the bottom of our hearts for the zeal with which they are "curing" the population of its "utopian" belief in peaceful constitutional methods. They are curing it and, in all probability, will effect a final cure.

Proletary, No. 27,
March 26 (April 8), 1908

Published according
to the text in *Proletary*

MARXISM AND REVISIONISM

Written not later than
April 3 (16), 1908

Published in 1908 in the
symposium *Karl Marx—1818-1883*
Signed: *Vl. Ilyin*

Published according
to the symposium

MARXISM AND REVISIONISM

Written not later than
April 3 (16), 1908

Published in 1908 in the
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Signed: VI. Ilyin

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There is a well-known saying that if geometrical axioms affected human interests attempts would certainly be made to refute them. Theories of natural history which conflicted with the old prejudices of theology provoked, and still provoke, the most rabid opposition. No wonder, therefore, that the Marxian doctrine, which directly serves to enlighten and organise the advanced class in modern society, indicates the tasks facing this class and demonstrates the inevitable replacement (by virtue of economic development) of the present system by a new order—no wonder that this doctrine has had to fight for every step forward in the course of its life.

Needless to say, this applies to bourgeois science and philosophy, officially taught by official professors in order to befuddle the rising generation of the propertied classes and to "coach" it against internal and foreign enemies. This science will not even hear of Marxism, declaring that it has been refuted and annihilated. Marx is attacked with equal zest by young scholars who are making a career by refuting socialism, and by decrepit elders who are preserving the tradition of all kinds of outworn "systems". The progress of Marxism, the fact that its ideas are spreading and taking firm hold among the working class, inevitably increase the frequency and intensity of these bourgeois attacks on Marxism, which becomes stronger, more hardened and more vigorous every time it is "annihilated" by official science.

But even among doctrines connected with the struggle of the working class, and current mainly among the proletariat, Marxism by no means consolidated its position all at once. In the first half-century of its existence (from

the 1840s on) Marxism was engaged in combating theories fundamentally hostile to it. In the early forties Marx and Engels settled accounts with the radical Young Hegelians whose viewpoint was that of philosophical idealism. At the end of the forties the struggle began in the field of economic doctrine, against Proudhonism. The fifties saw the completion of this struggle in criticism of the parties and doctrines which manifested themselves in the stormy year of 1848. In the sixties the struggle shifted from the field of general theory to one closer to the direct labour movement: the ejection of Bakuninism from the International. In the early seventies the stage in Germany was occupied for a short while by the Proudhonist Mühlberger, and in the late seventies by the positivist Dühring. But the influence of both on the proletariat was already absolutely insignificant. Marxism was already gaining an unquestionable victory over all other ideologies in the labour movement.

By the nineties this victory was in the main completed. Even in the Latin countries, where the traditions of Proudhonism held their ground longest of all, the workers' parties in effect built their programmes and their tactics on Marxist foundations. The revived international organisation of the labour movement—in the shape of periodical international congresses—from the outset, and almost without a struggle, adopted the Marxist standpoint in all essentials. But after Marxism had ousted all the more or less integral doctrines hostile to it, the tendencies expressed in those doctrines began to seek other channels. The forms and causes of the struggle changed, but the struggle continued. And the second half-century of the existence of Marxism began (in the nineties) with the struggle of a trend hostile to Marxism within Marxism itself.

Bernstein, a one-time orthodox Marxist, gave his name to this trend by coming forward with the most noise and with the most purposeful expression of amendments to Marx, revision of Marx, revisionism. Even in Russia where—owing to the economic backwardness of the country and the preponderance of a peasant population weighed down by the relics of serfdom—non-Marxist socialism has naturally held its ground longest of all, it is plainly passing into

revisionism before our very eyes. Both in the agrarian question (the programme of the municipalisation of all land) and in general questions of programme and tactics, our Social-Narodniks are more and more substituting "amendments" to Marx for the moribund and obsolescent remnants of their old system, which in its own way was integral and fundamentally hostile to Marxism.

Pre-Marxist socialism has been defeated. It is continuing the struggle, no longer on its own independent ground, but on the general ground of Marxism, as revisionism. Let us, then, examine the ideological content of revisionism.

In the sphere of philosophy revisionism followed in the wake of bourgeois professorial "science". The professors went "back to Kant"—and revisionism dragged along after the neo-Kantians. The professors repeated the platitudes that priests have uttered a thousand times against philosophical materialism—and the revisionists, smiling indulgently, mumbled (word for word alter the latest *Handbuch*) that materialism had been "refuted" long ago. The professors treated Hegel as a "dead dog",[16] and while themselves preaching idealism, only an idealism a thousand times more petty and banal than Hegel's, contemptuously shrugged their shoulders at dialectics—and the revisionists floundered after them into the swamp of philosophical vulgarisation of science, replacing "artful" (and revolutionary) dialectics by "simple" (and tranquil) "evolution". The professors earned their official salaries by adjusting both their idealist and their "critical" systems to the dominant medieval "philosophy" (i.e., to theology)—and the revisionists drew close to them, trying to make religion a "private affair", not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class.

What such "amendments" to Marx really meant in class terms need not be stated: it is self-evident. We shall simply note that the only Marxist in the international Social-Democratic movement to criticise the incredible platitudes of the revisionists from the standpoint of consistent dialectical materialism was Plekhanov. This must be stressed all the more emphatically since profoundly mistaken attempts are being made at the present time to smuggle in

old and reactionary philosophical rubbish disguised as a criticism of Plekhanov's tactical opportunism.*

Passing to political economy, it must be noted first of all that in this sphere the "amendments" of the revisionists were much more comprehensive and circumstantial; attempts were made to influence the public by "new data on economic development". It was said that concentration and the ousting of small-scale production by large-scale production do not occur in agriculture at all, while they proceed very slowly in commerce and industry. It was said that crises had now become rarer and weaker, and that cartels and trusts would probably enable capital to eliminate them altogether. It was said that the "theory of collapse" to which capitalism is heading was unsound, owing to the tendency of class antagonisms to become milder and less acute. It was said, finally, that it would not be amiss to correct Marx's theory of value, too, in accordance with Böhm-Bawerk.[17]

The fight against the revisionists on these questions resulted in as fruitful a revival of the theoretical thought in international socialism as did Engels's controversy with Dühring twenty years earlier. The arguments of the revisionists were analysed with the help of facts and figures. It was proved that the revisionists were systematically painting a rose-coloured picture of modern small-scale production. The technical and commercial superiority of large-scale *production* over small-scale production not only in industry, but also in agriculture, is proved by irrefutable facts. But commodity production is far less developed in agriculture, and modern statisticians and economists are, as a rule, not very skilful in picking out the special branches (sometimes even the operations) in agriculture which indicate that agriculture is being progressively drawn into the process of *exchange* in world economy. Small-scale produc-

* See *Studies in the Philosophy of Marxism* by Bogdanov, Bazarov and others. This is not the place to discuss the book, and I must at present confine myself to stating that in the very near future I shall prove in a series of articles, or in a separate pamphlet, that *everything* I have said in the text about neo-Kantian revisionists essentially applies also to these "new" neo-Humist and neo-Berkeleyan revisionists. (See present edition, Vol. 14.—*Ed.*)

tion maintains itself on the ruins of natural economy by constant worsening of diet, by chronic starvation, by lengthening of the working day, by deterioration in the quality and the care of cattle, in a word, by the very methods whereby handicraft production maintained itself against capitalist manufacture. Every advance in science and technology inevitably and relentlessly undermines the foundations of small-scale production in capitalist society; and it is the task of socialist political economy to investigate this process in all its forms, often complicated and intricate, and to demonstrate to the small producer the impossibility of his holding his own under capitalism, the hopelessness of peasant farming under capitalism, and the necessity for the peasant to adopt the standpoint of the proletarian. On this question the revisionists sinned, in the scientific sense, by superficial generalisations based on facts selected one-sidedly and without reference to the system of capitalism as a whole. From the political point of view, they sinned by the fact that they inevitably, whether they wanted to or not, invited or urged the peasant to adopt the attitude of a small proprietor (i.e., the attitude of the bourgeoisie) instead of urging him to adopt the point of view of the revolutionary proletarian.

The position of revisionism was even worse as regards the theory of crises and the theory of collapse. Only for a very short time could people, and then only the most short-sighted, think of refashioning the foundations of Marx's theory under the influence of a few years of industrial boom and prosperity. Realities very soon made it clear to the revisionists that crises were not a thing of the past: prosperity was followed by a crisis. The forms, the sequence, the picture of particular crises changed, but crises remained an inevitable component of the capitalist system. While uniting production, the cartels and trusts at the same time, and in a way that was obvious to all, aggravated the anarchy of production, the insecurity of existence of the proletariat and the oppression of capital, thereby intensifying class antagonisms to an unprecedented degree. That capitalism is heading for a break-down—in the sense both of individual political and economic crises and of the complete collapse of the entire capitalist system—

has been made particularly clear, and on a particularly large scale, precisely by the new giant trusts. The recent financial crisis in America and the appalling increase of unemployment all over Europe, to say nothing of the impending industrial crisis to which many symptoms are pointing—all this has resulted in the recent "theories" of the revisionists having been forgotten by everybody, including, apparently, many of the revisionists themselves. But the lessons which this instability of the intellectuals had given the working class must not be forgotten.

As to the theory of value, it need only be said that apart from-the vaguest of hints and sighs, *à la* Böhm-Bawerk, the revisionists have contributed absolutely nothing, and have therefore left no traces whatever on the development of scientific thought.

In the sphere of politics, revisionism did really try to revise the foundation of Marxism, namely, the doctrine of the class struggle. Political freedom, democracy and universal suffrage remove the ground for the class struggle—we were told—and render untrue the old proposition of the *Communist Manifesto* that the working men have no country. For, they said, since the "will of the majority" prevails in a democracy, one must neither regard the state as an organ of class rule, nor reject alliances with the progressive, social-reform bourgeoisie against the reactionaries.

It cannot be disputed that these arguments of the revisionists amounted to a fairly well-balanced system of views, namely, the old and well-known liberal-bourgeois views. The liberals have always said that bourgeois parliamentarism destroys classes and class divisions, since the right to vote and the right to participate in the government of the country are shared by all citizens without distinction. The whole history of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the whole history of the Russian revolution in the early twentieth, clearly show how absurd such views are. Economic distinctions are not mitigated but aggravated and intensified under the freedom of "democratic" capitalism. Parliamentarism does not eliminate, but lays bare the innate character even of the most democratic bourgeois republics as organs of class oppression. By helping to enlighten and to organise immeasurably wider

masses of the population than those which previously took an active part in political events, parliamentarism does not make for the elimination of crises and political revolutions, but for the maximum intensification of civil war during such revolutions. The events in Paris in the spring of 1871 and the events in Russia in the winter of 1905 showed as clearly as could be how inevitably this intensification comes about. The French bourgeoisie without a moment's hesitation made a deal with the enemy of the whole nation, with the foreign army which had ruined its country, in order to crush the proletarian movement. Whoever does not understand the inevitable inner dialectics of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy—which leads to an even sharper decision of the argument by mass violence than formerly—will never be able on the basis of this parliamentarism to conduct propaganda and agitation consistent in principle, really preparing the working-class masses for victorious participation in such "arguments". The experience of alliances, agreements and blocs with the social-reform liberals in the West and with the liberal reformists (Cadets) in the Russian revolution, has convincingly shown that these agreements only blunt the consciousness of the masses, that they do not enhance but weaken the actual significance of their struggle, by linking fighters with elements who are least capable of fighting and most vacillating and treacherous. Millerandism in France—the biggest experiment in applying revisionist political tactics on a wide, a really national scale—has provided a practical appraisal of revisionism that will never be forgotten by the proletariat all over the world.

A natural complement to the economic and political tendencies of revisionism was its attitude to the ultimate aim of the socialist movement. "The movement is everything, the ultimate aim is nothing"—this catch-phrase of Bernstein's expresses the substance of revisionism better than many long disquisitions. To determine its conduct from case to case, to adapt itself to the events of the day and to the chopping and changing of petty politics, to forget the primary interests of the proletariat and the basic features of the whole capitalist system, of all capitalist evolution, to sacrifice these primary interests for the

real or assumed advantages of the moment—such is the policy of revisionism. And it patently follows from the very nature of this policy that it may assume an infinite variety of forms, and that every more or less "new" question, every more or less unexpected and unforeseen turn of events, even though it change the basic line of development only to an insignificant degree and only for the briefest period, will always inevitably give rise to one variety of revisionism or another.

The inevitability of revisionism is determined by its class roots in modern society. Revisionism is an international phenomenon. No thinking socialist who is in the least informed can have the slightest doubt that the relation between the orthodox and the Bernsteinians in Germany, the Guesdists and the Jaurèsists (and now particularly the Broussists) in France, the Social Democratic Federation and the Independent Labour Party in Great Britain, Brouckère and Vandervelde in Belgium, the Integralists and the Reformists in Italy, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia, is everywhere essentially similar, notwithstanding the immense variety of national conditions and historical factors in the present state of all these countries. In reality, the "division" within the present international socialist movement is now proceeding along the *same* lines in all the various countries of the world, which testifies to a tremendous advance compared with thirty or forty years ago, when heterogeneous trends in the various countries were struggling within the one international socialist movement. And that "revisionism from the left" which has taken shape in the Latin countries as "revolutionary syndicalism",[18] is also adapting itself to Marxism, "amending" it: Labriola in Italy and Lagardelle in France frequently appeal from Marx who is understood wrongly to Marx who is understood rightly.

We cannot stop here to analyse the ideological content of *this* revisionism, which as yet is far from having developed to the same extent as opportunist revisionism: it has not yet become international, has not yet stood the test of a single big practical battle with a socialist party in any single country. We confine ourselves therefore to that "revisionism from the right" which was described above.

Wherein lies its inevitability in capitalist society? Why is it more profound than the differences of national peculiarities and of degrees of capitalist development? Because in every capitalist country, side by side with the proletariat, there are always broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie, small proprietors. Capitalism arose and is constantly arising out of small production. A number of new "middle strata" are inevitably brought into existence again and again by capitalism (appendages to the factory, work at home, small workshops scattered all over the country to meet the requirements of big industries, such as the bicycle and automobile industries, etc.). These new small producers are just as inevitably being cast again into the ranks of the proletariat. It is quite natural that the petty-bourgeois world-outlook should again and again crop up in the ranks of the broad workers' parties. It is quite natural that this should be so and always will be so, right up to the changes of fortune that will take place in the proletarian revolution. For it would be a profound mistake to think that the "complete" proletarianisation of the majority of the population is essential for bringing about such a revolution. What we now frequently experience only in the domain of ideology, namely, disputes over theoretical amendments to Marx; what now crops up in practice only over individual side issues of the labour movement, as tactical differences with the revisionists and splits on this basis—is bound to be experienced by the working class on an incomparably larger scale when the proletarian revolution will sharpen all disputed issues, will focus all differences on points which are of the most immediate importance in determining the conduct of the masses, and will make it necessary in the heat of the fight to distinguish enemies from friends, and to cast out bad allies in order to deal decisive blows at the enemy.

The ideological struggle waged by revolutionary Marxism against revisionism at the end of the nineteenth century is but the prelude to the great revolutionary battles of the proletariat, which is marching forward to the complete victory of its cause despite all the waverings and weaknesses of the petty bourgeoisie.

ON THE BEATEN TRACK!

Assessment of the Russian revolution, i.e., of its three first years, is the topic of the day. Unless the class nature of our political parties is ascertained, unless the interests and the mutual relations of classes in our revolution are taken into account, no step forward can be made in defining the immediate aims and tactics of the proletariat. We intend in this article to draw the attention of our readers to one attempt at such an assessment.

In issue No. 3 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*,[19] F. Dan and G. Plekhanov have written, the one a systematic assessment of the results of the revolution, the other summarised conclusions about the tactics of the workers' party. Dan's assessment amounts to this, that hopes of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry were bound to prove illusory. "The possibility of new revolutionary mass action of the proletariat ... depends to a great extent on the position of the bourgeoisie." "In the first stages [of such upsurge], so long as the mounting revolutionary working-class movement has not stirred up the town middle class, and the development of revolution in the towns has not lit a conflagration in the countryside—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will find themselves face to face as the principal political forces."

On the tactical conclusions to be drawn from this kind of "truth" F. Dan is obviously reticent. He was evidently ashamed to say, in so many words, what follows automatically from his statement, namely, that the working class should be recommended to adopt the famous tactics of the Mensheviks, that is, support of the bourgeoisie (recall the blocs with the Cadets, support of the watchword of a Cadet

Ministry, Plekhanov's Duma with full powers, etc.). But Plekhanov supplements Dan by ending his article in issue No. 3 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* with the words: "It would be a good thing for Russia if the Russian Marxists in 1905-06 had been able to avoid these mistakes made by Marx and Engels in Germany more than half a century ago!" (He is referring to underestimation of the capacity of capitalism at the time to develop further, and overestimation of the capacity of the proletariat for revolutionary action.)

Nothing could be clearer. Dan and Plekhanov are trying ever so carefully, not calling things directly by their proper names, to justify the Menshevik policy of proletarian dependence on the Cadets. So let us look more closely at the "theoretical case" they try to make out.

Dan argues that the "peasant movement" depends on the "growth and development of the urban revolution in its bourgeois and proletarian channels". Therefore the rise of the "urban revolution" was followed by the rise of the peasant movement, while after its decline "the internal antagonisms of the countryside, held in check by the rise of revolution, once again began to become acute", and "the government's agrarian policy, the policy of dividing the peasantry, etc., began to enjoy a relative success". Hence the conclusion we have quoted earlier—that in the first stages of the new upsurge the main political forces will be the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. "This situation," in Dan's opinion, "can and must be made use of by the proletariat for such a development of the revolution as will leave far behind the *point of departure* of the new upsurge, and will lead to the complete democratisation of society under the badge [*sic*!] of a radical [!!] solution of the agrarian question."

It is not difficult to see that this whole argument is based on a *radical* failure to understand the agrarian question in our revolution, and that this incomprehension is badly covered up by cheap and empty phrases about "complete democratisation", "under the badge" of a "solution" of the question.

F. Dan imagines that "hopes of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" depend and depended on Narodnik prejudices, on forgetting the internal antagonisms in the countryside and the individualist character of the

peasant movement. These are the usual Menshevik views, long known to everyone. But hardly anyone yet has revealed all their absurdity so strikingly as F. Dan has done in the article in question. Our most worthy publicist has contrived *not to notice* that *both* the "*solutions*" of the agrarian question which he contrasts are in keeping with the "individualist character of the peasant movement"! For the Stolypin solution, which in Dan's opinion is enjoying "relative success", is in fact founded on the individualism of the peasants. That is unquestionable. Well, and what about the other solution, which F. Dan called "radical" and bound up with "the complete democratisation of society"? Does the most worthy Dan imagine, by any chance, that it is *not founded* on the individualism of the peasants?

The trouble is that Dan's empty phrase about "the complete democratisation of society under the badge of a radical solution of the agrarian question" serves to conceal a radical piece of stupidity. Unthinkingly, groping like a blind man, he *bumps up* against two objectively possible, and historically not yet finally chosen, "solutions" of the agrarian question, without being able clearly and precisely to grasp the nature of *both* solutions, and the conditions in which one and other are feasible.

Why can Stolypin's agrarian policy enjoy "relative success"? Because within our peasantry capitalist development has long ago brought into being two hostile classes—a peasant bourgeoisie and a peasant proletariat. Is the complete success of Stolypin's agrarian policy possible, and if so, what does it mean? It is possible, if circumstances develop exceptionally favourably for Stolypin, and it means the "solution" of the agrarian question in bourgeois Russia in the sense of the *final* (up to the proletarian revolution) consolidation of private property over *all* the land both that of the landlords and that of the peasants. This will be a "solution" of the *Prussian* type, which will certainly ensure the capitalist development of Russia, but an incredibly slow development, endowing the Junker with authority for many years, and a thousand times more agonising for the proletariat and the peasantry than the other, objectively *possible* and also capitalist, "solution of the agrarian question".

This other solution Dan has called "radical", without thinking of what it implies. It is a cheap catchword, and there is not the very germ of an idea in it. Stolypin's solution is also very radical, since it is radically breaking up the old village commune and the old agrarian system in Russia. The real difference between the *peasant* solution of the agrarian question in the Russian bourgeois revolution, and the *Stolypin-Cadet* solution, is that the first destroys the landlords' private property in land beyond question, and peasant private property very probably (we shall not deal here with this particular question of the peasants' allotment land, because all Dan's arguments are wrong even from the standpoint of our present "municipalising" agrarian programme).

Now one may ask, is it true that this second solution is objectively possible? Beyond doubt. All thinking Marxists are in agreement on this, for *otherwise* the support by the proletariat of the small proprietor's striving to confiscate large-scale landed property would be a reactionary piece of charlatanry. In no other capitalist country will a single Marxist draw up a programme supporting the *peasants*' aspiration to confiscate large-scale landed property. In Russia both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks are in agreement as to the necessity of such support. Why? Because *objectively*, for Russia *another* path of capitalist agrarian development is possible—not the "Prussian" but the "American", not the landlord-bourgeois (or Junker) but the peasant-bourgeois path.

Stolypin and the Cadets, the autocracy and the bourgeoisie, Nicholas II and Pyotr Struve are all agreed that there must be a capitalist "cleansing" of the decaying agrarian system in Russia by preserving the landed property of the landlords. All they differ on is how best to preserve it, and how much of it to preserve.

The workers and peasants, the Social-Democrats and the Narodniks (Trudoviks, Popular Socialists, Socialist-Revolutionaries included) are all agreed that there should be a *capitalist* "cleansing" of the decaying agrarian system in Russia by means of the forcible abolition of the landed property of the landlords. They differ in this, that the Social-Democrats understand the capitalist character in

present society of any agrarian revolution, however ultra-radical it may be—municipalisation and nationalisation, socialisation and division—while the Narodniks don't understand this, and wrap up their struggle for peasant-bourgeois agrarian evolution against landlord-bourgeois evolution in philistine and utopian phrases about equalisation.

All the muddle and shallow thinking of F. Dan are due to the fact that he has radically failed to understand the economic basis of the Russian bourgeois revolution. The differences between Marxist and petty-bourgeois socialism in Russia on the question of the economic content and significance of the peasants' struggle for the land in this revolution loomed so large for him that he has "*failed to notice*" the struggle of the real forces in society for one or other of the objectively possible roads in capitalist agrarian evolution. And he has covered up this complete incomprehension with phrases about the "relative success" of Stolypin and "the complete democratisation of society under the badge of a radical solution of the agrarian question".

Actually, the situation in regard to the agrarian question in Russia today is this. The success of Stolypin's policy would involve long years of violent suppression and extermination of a mass of peasants who refuse to starve to death and be expelled from their villages. History has known examples of the *success* of such a policy. It would be empty and foolish democratic phrase-mongering for us to say that the success of such a policy in Russia is "impossible". It is possible! But our business is to make the people see clearly at what a price such a success is won, and to fight with all our strength for another, shorter and more rapid road of capitalist agrarian development *through* a peasant revolution. A peasant revolution under the leadership of the proletariat in a capitalist country is difficult, very difficult, but it is possible, and we must fight for it. Three years of the revolution have taught us and the whole people not only that we must fight for it but also how to fight for it. No Menshevik "methods of approach" to the policy of supporting the Cadets will drive these lessons of the revolution out of the consciousness of the workers.

To proceed. What if, in spite of the struggle of the masses, Stolypin's policy holds good long enough for the "Prussian" way to succeed? Then the agrarian system in Russia will become completely bourgeois, the big peasants will grab nearly all the allotment land, agriculture will become capitalist, and no "solution" of the agrarian question under *capitalism*—whether radical or non-radical—will be possible any more. Then Marxists who are honest with themselves will straightforwardly and openly throw all "agrarian programmes" on the scrap-heap altogether, and will say to the masses: "The workers have done all they could to give Russia not a Junker but an American capitalism. The workers call you now to join in the social revolution of the proletariat, for *after* the 'solution' of the agrarian question in the Stolypin spirit *there can be no other* revolution capable of making a serious change in the economic conditions of life of the peasant masses."

That is how the question of the relationship between a bourgeois and a socialist revolution in Russia stands today—a question muddled up particularly by Dan in his German version of his Russian article (*Neue Zeit*,[20] No. 27).

Bourgeois revolutions are possible, even inevitable, in Russia as well on the basis of Stolypin-Cadet agrarian policies. But in *such* revolutions, as in the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848, there could be no question of "the complete democratisation of society under the badge of a radical solution of the agrarian question". Or, more precisely, in such revolutions only petty-bourgeois quasi-Socialists will still babble about a "solution" (and especially a "radical" solution) of an agrarian question which has already been solved in a country where capitalism is fully developed.

But in Russia a capitalist agrarian system is very far as yet from having been developed. This is clear not only to us, both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, not only for people who sympathise with the revolution and hope that it may rise again; it is clear even to such consistent, conscious and frankly outspoken enemies of the revolution and friends of the Black-Hundred autocracy as Mr. Pyotr Struve. If he "cries with a loud voice" that we need a Bismarck, that we need the transformation of reaction into revolution

from above, it is because Struve sees in Russia *neither* a Bismarck *nor* revolution from above. Struve sees that the Stolypin reaction and a thousand gallows alone are not enough to create a landlord-bourgeois Russia, made safe for the *Knecht*. You need something more, something like the solution (albeit a Bismarckian solution) of the historic tasks of the nation, like the unification of Germany, the introduction of universal suffrage. But Stolypin can only unite Dumbadze with the heroes of the Riga museum![21] He even *has to* abolish the franchise introduced by Witte under the law of December 11, 1905![22] Instead of peasants contented with Dan's "relative success" of the agrarian policy, Stolypin is forced to hear "Trudovik" demands put forward even by the peasant deputies of the Third Duma!

How can Pyotr Struve, then, not "cry with a loud voice", not groan and weep, when he sees clearly that *it isn't working*—that we are still not getting anything like a well-regulated, modest, moderate and precise, curtailed but stable "constitution"?

Struve knows very well where he is going. But F. Dan has learned nothing and forgotten nothing during the three years of revolution. He is still, like a blind man, seeking to drag the proletariat under the wing of the Struves. He is still muttering the same reactionary Menshevik speeches about our proletariat and bourgeoisie being able to appear as "the principal political forces" ... against whom, most worthy Dan? Against Guchkov, or against the monarchy?

The incredible lengths to which Dan goes here in painting the liberals in rosy colours is revealed by his German article He is not ashamed even to tell the German public that in the Third Duma the petty bourgeoisie in the towns chose "progressive electors" (meaning the Cadets) while the peasants gave 40 per cent of reactionary electors! Long live the "progressive" Milyukovs and Struves, applauding Stolypin! Long live the alliance of the Dans and the Milyukovs against the "reactionary" peasants, displaying their Trudovik spirit in the Third Duma!

And Plekhanov falsifies Engels to serve the purpose of the same reactionary Menshevik theories. Engels said that

the tactics of Marx in 1848 were *correct*, that they and only they really provided reliable, firm and unforgettable lessons for the proletariat. Engels said that these tactics were unsuccessful *in spite of* their being the only correct tactics. They were unsuccessful because the proletariat was insufficiently prepared, and capitalism was insufficiently developed.[23] While Plekhanov, as though he were trying to make fun of Engels, as though to gladden the heart of the Bernsteins and the Streltsovs,[24] interprets Engels as though he "regretted" Marx's tactics, as though he later admitted them to be mistaken, and declared his preference for the tactics of supporting the German Cadets!

Will not G. Plekhanov tomorrow tell us that in regard to the risings in 1849 Engels came to the conclusion that "they should not have taken to arms"?

Marx and Engels taught the proletariat revolutionary tactics, the tactics of developing the struggle to its very highest forms, the tactics which rally the peasantry behind the proletariat—and not the proletariat behind the liberal traitors.

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A BLOC OF THE CADETS AND THE OCTOBRISTS?

A private telegram from St. Petersburg to the *Frankfurter Zeitung*[25] of April 1 (14) states: "Since the end of March secret negotiations have been going on between the Octobrists,[26] the moderate Rights, the Cadets and the Party of Peaceful Renovation[27] about whether they can form a *bloc*. The plan was initiated by the Octobrists, who can no longer count on the support of the extreme Right. The latter, particularly dissatisfied with the Octobrists on account of their interpellation regarding Dumbadze, intend to vote with the opposition against the Centre. Such a manoeuvre would render difficult the work of the Duma since a combination of the extreme Right and the opposition would command 217 votes against the 223 of the Centre and moderate Rights. The first talk (about a bloc) took place on April 12 (March 30, O. S.), and was attended by 30 representatives, chosen on a proportional basis. The talks led to no result, and it was decided to hold a new consultation during the coming week."

How reliable this information may be, we do not know. In any case the silence of the Russian newspapers does not prove that it is wrong, and we think it necessary to inform our readers about this report in the foreign press.

In principle there is nothing incredible in the fact that secret negotiations are going on. By all their political history, beginning with Struve's visit to Witte in November 1905, continuing with the backstairs talks with Trepov and Co. in the summer of 1906,[28] and so forth and so on, the Cadets have *proved* that the essence of their tactics

is to slip in at the backdoor for talks with those in power. But even if this report about negotiations proved to be untrue, it remains beyond doubt that *in practice* in the Third Duma there *exists* a tacit bloc of the Cadets and the Octobrists on the basis of the former taking a turn to the right. A number of Cadet votes in the Third Duma have proved this irrefutably, quite apart from the Cadet speeches and the character of their political activities.

In the Third Duma, we said even before it had been convened, there are *two* majorities (see *Proletary* and the resolution of the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in November 1907).* And we were already demonstrating then that to evade recognition of this fact, as the Mensheviks were doing, and above all to evade a *class* description of the *Cadet-Octobrist* majority, means to let oneself be dragged at the tail of bourgeois liberalism.

The class nature of the Cadets is showing itself more and more clearly. Those who would not see this in 1906 are being obliged by facts to *recognise* it today, or else sink completely into opportunism.

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 123-32 and 144-46.—*Ed*.

THE ASSESSMENT OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION[29]

No one in Russia would now dream of making a revolution according to Marx. This, or approximately this, was recently announced by a liberal—even an almost democratic—even an almost Social-Democratic—(Menshevik) paper, *Stolichnaya Pochta*.[30] And to be quite fair to the authors of this pronouncement, they have successfully caught the *essence* of the current political mood and of the attitude to the lessons of our revolution which undoubtedly prevail among the widest circles of the intellectuals, half-educated philistines and probably in many sections of the quite uneducated petty bourgeoisie as well.

This pronouncement does not only express hatred of Marxism in general, with its unswerving conviction of the revolutionary mission of the proletariat and its wholehearted readiness to support any revolutionary movement of the masses, to sharpen their struggle and to go through with it. It expresses also hatred of the methods of struggle, the forms of action, and the tactics which have been tested *quite recently* in the *actual practice* of the Russian revolution. All those victories—or half-victories, quarter-victories, rather—which our revolution won, were achieved entirely and exclusively thanks to the direct revolutionary onset of the proletariat, which was marching at the head of the non-proletarian elements of the working people. All the defeats were due to the weakening of such an onset, to the tactics of avoiding it, tactics based on the absence of it, and sometimes (among the Cadets) on directly seeking to eliminate it.

And today, in the period of sweeping counter-revolutionary repressions, the philistines are adapting themselves

in cowardly fashion to the new masters, currying favour with the new caliphs for an hour, renouncing the past, trying to forget it, to persuade themselves and others that no one in Russia now dreams of making a revolution according to Marx, no one is dreaming of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and *so forth*.

In other revolutions of the bourgeoisie, the physical victory of the old authorities over the insurgent people always aroused despondency and demoralisation among wide circles of "educated" society. But among the bourgeois parties which had made a real fight for liberty, which had played any appreciable part in real revolutionary events, there were always to be traced illusions the reverse of those which now prevail among the intellectualist petty bourgeoisie in Russia. They were illusions about an inevitable, immediate *and* complete victory of "liberty, equality and fraternity", illusions about a republic not of the bourgeoisie but of all humanity, a republic which would introduce peace on earth and good will among men. They were illusions about the absence of class differences within the people oppressed by the monarchy and the medieval order of things, about the impossibility of conquering an "idea" by methods of violence, about the absolutely opposite nature of the feudalism that had outlived its day and the new free democratic republican system, the bourgeois nature of which was not realised at all, or was realised only very vaguely.

Therefore in periods of counter-revolution representatives of the proletariat who had worked their way through to the standpoint of scientific socialism had to fight (as, for example, Marx and Engels did in 1850) against the illusions of the bourgeois republicans, against an idealist conception of the traditions of the revolution and of its essence, against superficial phrases which were replacing consistent and serious work within a definite class.[31] But in Russia the exact opposite prevails. We don't see any illusions of primitive republicanism hindering the essential work of continuing revolutionary activity in the new and changed conditions. We see no *exaggeration* of the meaning of a republic, the transformation of this essential watchword of the struggle against feudalism and the monarchy into

a watchword of each and every struggle for the liberation of all those that work and are exploited. The Socialist-Revolutionaries[32] and the groups akin to them, who were encouraging ideas *similar* to these, have remained a mere handful, and the period of the three years' revolutionary storm (1905-07) has brought them—instead of widespread enthusiasm for republicanism—a new party of the *opportunist* petty bourgeoisie, the Popular Socialists, a new increase in anti-political rebelliousness and anarchism.

In petty-bourgeois Germany, the day after the first onset of the revolution in 1848 the illusions prevalent among the petty-bourgeois republican democrats were strikingly in evidence. In petty-bourgeois Russia, on the day after the onset of the revolution in 1905, there was striking evidence, and there is still evidence, of the illusions of petty-bourgeois opportunism, which hoped to achieve a compromise without a struggle, feared a struggle and after the first defeat hastened to renounce its own past, poisoning the public atmosphere with despondence, faint-heartedness and apostasy.

Evidently this difference arises from the difference in the social system and in the historical circumstances of the two revolutions. But it is not a question of the mass of the petty-bourgeois population in Russia finding itself in less sharp opposition to the old order. Just the reverse. Our peasantry in the very first stage of the Russian revolution brought into being an agrarian movement incomparably more powerful, definite, and politically conscious than those that arose in the previous bourgeois revolutions of the nineteenth century. The trouble is that the social stratum which formed the core of the revolutionary democrats in Europe—the master craftsmen in the towns, the urban bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie—*were bound* in Russia to turn to counter-revolutionary liberalism. The class-consciousness of the socialist proletariat, moving hand in hand with the international army of socialist revolution in Europe, the extreme revolutionary spirit of the muzhik, driven by the age-old yoke of the feudal-minded landlords to a state of utter desperation and to the demand for confiscation of the landed estates—these are the circumstances which threw Russian liberalism into the arms of counter-

revolution much more powerfully than ever they did the liberals of Europe. And therefore on the Russian working class there has devolved with particular force the task of preserving the traditions of revolutionary struggle which the intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie are hastening to renounce, developing and strengthening these traditions, imbuing with them the consciousness of the great mass of the people, and carrying them forward to the next inevitable upsurge of the democratic movement.

The workers themselves are spontaneously carrying on just such a struggle. Too passionately did they live through the great struggle in October and December. Too clearly did they see the change which took place in their condition *only* as a result of that direct revolutionary struggle. They talk now, or at any rate they all feel, like that weaver who said in a letter to his trade union journal: "The factory owners have taken away what we won, the foremen are once again bullying us, *just wait, 1905 will come again*."

Just wait, 1905 will come again. That is how the workers look at things. For them that year of struggle provided a model of *what has to be done*. For the intellectuals and the renegading petty bourgeois it was the "insane year", a model of *what should not be done*. For the proletariat, the working over and critical acceptance of the experience of the revolution must consist in learning how to apply the *then* methods of struggle *more successfully*, so as to make the same October strike struggle and December armed struggle more massive, more concentrated and more conscious. For counter-revolutionary liberalism, which leads the renegading intelligentsia on a halter, assimilating the experience of the revolution is bound to consist in finishing for ever with the "naïve" impulsiveness of "untamed" mass struggle, and replacing it by "cultured and civilised" *constitutional* work, on the basis of Stolypin's "constitutionalism".

Today all and sundry are talking about the assimilation and critical evaluation of the experience of the revolution. Socialists and liberals talk about it. Opportunists and revolutionary Social-Democrats talk about it. But not all understand that it is between the two opposites *above-mentioned* that all the multiform recipes for assimilation of the experience of the revolution fluctuate. Not all put

the question clearly: is it the experience of the revolutionary struggle which we must assimilate, and help the masses to assimilate, for the purpose of a more consistent, stubborn and resolute fight; or is it the "experiment" of Cadet betrayal of the revolution that we must assimilate and pass on to the masses?

Karl Kautsky has approached this question in its fundamental theoretical aspect. In the second edition of his well-known work *The Social Revolution*, which has been translated into all the principal European languages, he made a number of additions and amendments touching on the experience of the Russian revolution. The preface to the second edition is dated October 1906: therefore the author already had the material to judge, not only of the *Sturm und Drang* of 1905, but also of the chief events in the "Cadet period" of our revolution, the period of universal (almost universal) enthusiasm over the electoral victories of the Cadets and the First Duma.

What problems in the experience of the Russian revolution, then, did Kautsky consider sufficiently outstanding and basic, or at least sufficiently important to provide *new* material for a Marxist studying *in general* "the forms and weapons of the social revolution" (the heading to paragraph seven in Kautsky's work, as supplemented in keeping with the experience of 1905-06)?

The author has taken two questions.

First, the question of the class composition of the forces which are *capable* of winning victory in the Russian revolution, making it a really victorious revolution.

Secondly, the question of the importance of those higher forms of mass struggle—higher in the direction of their revolutionary energy and in their aggressive character—which the Russian revolution brought forth, namely, the struggle in December, i.e., the armed uprising.

Any socialist (and especially a Marxist) studying at all attentively the events of the Russian revolution is bound to recognise that these really are the root and fundamental questions in assessing the Russian revolution, and also in assessing the line of tactics dictated to a workers' party by the present state of affairs. Unless we fully and clearly realise what classes are *capable*, in the light of objective

economic conditions, of making the Russian bourgeois revolution victorious, all our words about seeking to make that revolution victorious will be empty phrases, mere democratic declamation, while our tactics in the bourgeois revolution will inevitably be unprincipled and wavering.

On the other hand, in order concretely to determine the tactics of a revolutionary party at the stormiest moments of the general crisis which the country is living through, it is obviously insufficient merely to indicate the classes capable of *acting* in the spirit of a victorious completion of the revolution. Revolutionary periods are distinguished from periods of so-called peaceful development, periods when economic conditions do not give rise to profound crises or powerful mass movements, precisely in this: that the *forms* of struggle in periods of the first type inevitably are *much more varied*, and the direct revolutionary struggle of the masses predominates rather than the propaganda and agitation activities conducted by leaders in parliament, in the press, etc. Therefore if, in assessing revolutionary periods, we confine ourselves to defining the *line* of activity of the various classes, without analysing the *forms* of their struggle, our discussion in the scientific sense will be incomplete and undialectical, while from the standpoint of practical politics it will degenerate into the *dead letter of the raisoneur* (with which, we may say in parenthesis, comrade Plekhanov contents himself in nine-tenths of his writings on Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian revolution).

In order to make a genuinely Marxist assessment of the revolution, from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, it has to be assessed as the struggle of live social forces, placed in particular objective conditions, acting in a particular way and applying with greater or less success particular forms of struggle. It is on the basis of such an analysis, and only on that basis of course, that it is appropriate and indeed essential for a Marxist to assess the *technical* side of the struggle, the technical questions which arise in its course. To recognise a definite form of struggle and not to recognise the necessity of studying its technique, is like recognising the necessity of taking part in *particular* elections while ignoring the law which lays down the technique of *these* elections.

Let us go on now to the reply given by Kautsky to both the above-stated questions, which, as we know, aroused a very prolonged and heated dispute among the Russian Social-Democrats *throughout* the revolution, beginning with the spring of 1905, when the Bolshevik Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in London[33] and the simultaneous Menshevik conference in Geneva laid down the basic principles of their tactics in precise resolutions, and ending with the London Congress of the United R.S.D.L.P. in the spring of 1907.[34]

To the first question Kautsky gives the following reply. In Western Europe, he says, the proletariat constitutes the great mass of the population. Therefore the victory of democracy in present-day Europe means the political supremacy of the proletariat. "In Russia, with her predominantly peasant population, this cannot be expected. Of course, the victory of Social-Democracy in the foreseeable (in German, *absehbar*) future is not ruled out in Russia either: but that victory could be only the result of an alliance (*Koalition*) of the proletariat and the peasantry." And Kautsky even expresses the opinion that such a victory would inevitably give a tremendous impetus to proletarian revolution in Western Europe.

Thus we see that the concept of bourgeois revolution is not a sufficient definition of the forces which may achieve victory in such a revolution. Bourgeois revolutions are possible, and have occurred, in which the commercial, or commercial and industrial, bourgeoisie played the part of the chief motive force. The victory of such revolutions was possible as the victory of the appropriate section of the bourgeoisie over its adversaries (such as the privileged nobility or the absolute monarchy). In Russia things are different. The victory of the bourgeois revolution is impossible in our country *as the victory of the bourgeoisie*. This sounds paradoxical, but it is a fact. The preponderance of the peasant population, its terrible oppression by the semi-feudal big landowning system, the strength and class-consciousness of the proletariat already organised in a socialist party—all these circumstances impart to *our* bourgeois revolution a *specific* character. This peculiarity does not eliminate the bourgeois character of the revo-

lution (as Martov and Plekhanov attempted to present the case in their more than lame remarks on Kautsky's attitude). It only determines the counter-revolutionary character of our bourgeoisie and the necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry for victory *in such* a revolution. For a "coalition of the proletariat and the peasantry", winning *victory* in a bourgeois revolution, happens to be nothing else than the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

This proposition is the point of departure of the tactical differences which arose in the ranks of the Social-Democrats during the revolution. Only if this is taken into account can one understand all the disputes on particular questions (support of the Cadets in general, a Left bloc and its character, etc.) and the clashes in individual cases. It is only this basic tactical divergence—and not at all the question of "boyevism"[35] or "boycottism", as uninformed people sometimes think—that is the *source* of the differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in the first period of the revolution (1905-07).

And one cannot sufficiently urge the necessity of studying this source of the differences with every attention, and of examining *from this point of view* the experience of the First and Second Dumas and of the direct struggle of the peasantry. If we don't do this work *now*, we shall not be able to take a single step in the tactical field, when the next upsurge comes, without awakening old disputes or creating group conflicts and dissensions within the Party. The attitude of Social-Democracy to liberalism and to peasant bourgeois democracy must be determined on the basis of the experience of the Russian revolution. Otherwise we shall have no principle or consistency in the tactics of the proletariat. "The alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry", let us note in passing, should not in any circumstances be understood as meaning the fusion of various classes, or of the parties of the proletariat and the peasantry. Not only fusion, but any prolonged agreement would be destructive for the socialist party of the working class, and would *enfeeble* the revolutionary-democratic struggle. That the peasantry inevitably avers between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat follows from its position as a class;

and our revolution has provided many examples of this in the most varied fields of struggle (the boycott of the Witte Duma; the elections; the Trudoviks in the First and Second Dumas, etc.). Only if it pursues an unquestionably independent policy as vanguard of the revolution will the proletariat be able to split the peasantry away from the liberals, rid it of their influence, rally the peasantry behind it in the struggle and thus bring about an "alliance" *de facto*—one that emerges and becomes effective, when and to the extent that the peasantry are conducting a revolutionary fight. It is not flirtations with the Trudoviks, but merciless criticism of their weaknesses and vacillations, the propaganda of the idea of a republican and revolutionary peasant party, that can give effect to the "alliance" of the proletariat and the peasantry for *victory* over their common enemies, and not for playing at blocs and agreements.

This specific character of the Russian bourgeois revolution which we have pointed out distinguishes it from the other bourgeois revolutions of modern times, but identifies it with the *great* bourgeois revolutions of former times, when the peasantry played an outstanding revolutionary part. In this respect the greatest attention should be paid to what Frederick Engels wrote in his remarkably profound and thought-stimulating article "On Historical Materialism" (the English introduction to *Socialism*: *Utopian and Scientific*, translated into German by Engels himself in *Neue Zeit*, 1892-93, 11th year, Vol. 1). "Curiously enough," says Engels, "in all the three great bourgeois risings [the Reformation in Germany and the Peasant War in the sixteenth century; the English revolution in the seventeenth century; the French revolution in the eighteenth century] the peasantry furnishes the army that has to do the fighting; and the peasantry is just the class that, the victory once gained, is most surely ruined by the economic consequences of that victory. A hundred years after Cromwell, the yeomanry of England had almost disappeared. Anyhow, had it not been for that yeomanry and for the plebeian element in the towns, the bourgeoisie alone would never have fought the matter out to the bitter end, and would never have brought Charles I to the scaffold. In order to secure even those conquests of the bourgeoisie that were ripe for

gathering at the time, the revolution had to be carried considerably further exactly as in 1793 in France and 1848 in Germany. This seems, in fact, to be one of the laws of evolution of bourgeois society." And in another passage in the same article Engels points out that the French revolution was the first uprising "that was really fought out up to the destruction of one of the combatants, the aristocracy, and the complete triumph of the other, the bourgeoisie".[36]

Both these historical observations or general conclusions by Engels have been remarkably confirmed in the course of the Russian revolution. It has also been confirmed that only the intervention of the peasantry and the proletariat—"the plebeian element in the towns"—is capable of substantially pushing forward the bourgeois revolution. (Whereas in sixteenth-century Germany, seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century France the peasantry could be put in the front rank, in twentieth-century Russia the order must decidedly be reversed, since without the initiative and guidance of the proletariat the peasantry counts for nothing.) It has also been confirmed that the revolution must be taken *very much further* than its direct, immediate and already fully-matured bourgeois aims, if *those* aims are really to be achieved, and if even minimum bourgeois conquests are to be irreversibly consolidated. We can judge therefore with what scorn Engels would have treated the philistine recipes for squeezing the revolution beforehand into a directly bourgeois, narrowly bourgeois framework—in order not to frighten off the bourgeoisie", as the Mensheviks in the Caucasus said in their 1905 resolution, or in order that there should be "a guarantee against a restoration", as Plekhanov said in Stockholm.

Kautsky discusses the other question, the assessment of the insurrection of December 1905, in the preface to the second edition of his booklet. He writes: "I can now no longer assert as definitely as I did in, 1902 that armed uprisings and barricade fighting will not play the decisive part in the coming revolutions. Too clear evidence to the contrary is provided by the experience of the street battles in Moscow, when a handful of men held up a whole army for a week in barricade fighting, and would have almost gained the victory, had not the failure of the revolutionary

movement in other cities made it possible to dispatch such reinforcements to the army that in the end a monstrously superior force was concentrated against the insurgents. Of course, this relative success of the struggle on the barricades was possible only because the city population energetically supported the revolutionaries, while the troops were completely demoralised. But who can affirm with certainty that something similar is impossible in Western Europe?"

And so, nearly a year after the insurrection, when there could be no question of any desire to cheer the spirits of the fighting men, such a careful investigator as Kautsky firmly recognises that the Moscow insurrection represents a "relative success" of struggle on the barricades, and thinks it necessary to amend his previous general conclusion that the role of street battles in future revolutions cannot be a great one.

The struggle of December 1905 *proved* that armed uprising *can* be victorious in modern conditions of military technique and military organisation. As a result of the December struggle the whole international labour movement must henceforth reckon with the probability of similar forms of fighting in the coming proletarian revolutions. These are the conclusions which really follow from the experience of our revolution: these are the lessons which the broadest masses of the people should assimilate. How remote are these conclusions and these lessons from that *line* of argument which Plekhanov opened up by his famous Herostratean comment on the December insurrection: "They should not have taken to arms." What an ocean of renegade comment was called forth by that assessment! What an endless number of dirty liberal hands seized upon it, in order to carry demoralisation and a spirit of petty-bourgeois compromise into the ranks of the workers!

There is not a grain of historical truth in Plekhanov's assessment. If Marx, who had said six months before the Commune that an insurrection would be madness, nevertheless was able to sum up that "madness" as the greatest mass movement of the proletariat in the nineteenth century, then with a thousand times more justification must the Russian Social-Democrats inspire the masses with the con-

viction that the December struggle was the most essential, the most legitimate, the greatest proletarian movement since the Commune. And the working class of Russia will be trained up in such views, whatever individual intellectuals in the ranks of Social-Democracy may say, and however loudly they may lament.

Here perhaps one remark is necessary, bearing in mind that this article is being written for the Polish comrades. Not being familiar, to my regret, with the Polish language, I know Polish conditions only by hearsay. And it may be easy to retort that it is precisely in Poland that a whole party strangled itself by impotent guerrilla warfare, terrorism and fireworky outbreaks, and those precisely in the name of rebel traditions and a joint struggle of the proletariat and the peasantry (the so-called Right wing in the Polish Socialist Party[37]). It may very well be that from this standpoint Polish conditions do in fact radically differ from conditions in the rest of the Russian Empire. I cannot judge of this. I must say, however, that nowhere except in Poland have we seen such a senseless departure from revolutionary tactics, one that has aroused justified resistance and opposition. And here the thought arises unbidden: why, it was precisely in Poland that there was no mass armed struggle in December 1905! And is it not for this very reason that in Poland, and only in Poland, the distorted and senseless tactics of revolution-"making" anarchism have found their home, and that conditions did not permit of the development there of mass armed struggle, were it only for a short time? Is it not the tradition of just *such* a struggle, the tradition of the December armed uprising, that is at times the only serious means of overcoming anarchist tendencies within the workers' party—not by means of hackneyed, philistine, petty-bourgeois moralising, but by turning from aimless, senseless, sporadic acts of violence to purposeful, mass violence, linked with the broad movement and the sharpening of the direct proletarian struggle?

The question of evaluating our revolution is important not only theoretically by any means. It is important directly, practically, in the everyday sense. All our work of propaganda, agitation and organisation is indissolubly bound

up at the present time with the process of the assimilation of the lessons of these three great years by the widest mass of the working class and the semi-proletarian population. We cannot now confine ourselves to the bare statement (in the spirit of the resolutions adopted by the Tenth Congress of the P.S.P. Left wing) that the data available do not allow us to determine at present whether it is the path of revolutionary explosion or the path of long, slow, tiny steps forward that lies ahead of us. Of course, no statistics in the world can at present lay that down. Of course, we must carry on our work in such a way that it should be all imbued with a general *socialist* spirit and content, whatever painful trials the future has in store. But that is not all. To halt at this point means not to give any effective leadership to the proletarian party. We must frankly put and firmly answer the question, in what direction will we now proceed to assimilate the experience of the three years of revolution? We must proclaim openly, for all to hear, for the behoof of the wavering and feeble in spirit, to shame those who are turning renegade and deserting socialism, that the workers' party sees in the direct revolutionary struggle of the masses, in the October and December struggles of 1905, the greatest movements of the proletariat since the Commune; that only in the development of such forms of struggle lies the pledge of coming successes of the revolution; and that these examples of struggle must serve as a beacon for us in training up new generations of fighters.

Carrying on our daily work in that direction, and remembering that only years of serious and consistent preparatory activity ensured the Party its full influence on the proletariat in 1905, we shall be able to reach the point that, whatever the turn of events and the rate of disintegration of the autocracy, the working class will continue to grow stronger and develop into a class-conscious, revolutionary Social-Democratic force.

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CADETS OF THE SECOND GENERATION

The report from Russia printed in this issue under the heading of "News from the Intellectuals", deserves the particular attention of the reader. Just before our paper appeared, we received confirmation of the facts about which our correspondent writes, and must dwell on them in greater detail.

A new political organisation is coming into existence. The social movement is taking a new turn. There is a grouping of elements among the bourgeois democrats who want to be "more left than the Cadets", and who are attracting Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. It seems as though some dim realisation is breaking through that the Cadet opposition in the Third Duma is a decaying corpse, and that "something must be done" apart from it.

Such are the facts. They are anything but conspicuously definite as yet, but they already anticipate events that are understandable and inevitable from the standpoint of the lessons provided by the first three years of the revolution.

The Cadets of the first generation appeared on the open stage of the revolution in the spring of 1905. They have managed during this period of nearly three years to fade without ever having blossomed. Now they are being replaced by Cadets of the second generation. What is the meaning of this generation, and with what problems does it face the workers' party?

The Cadets of the first generation made a noise at their banquets in 1904, carried on the Zemstvo campaign,[38] and expressed the beginnings of the social upswing at a time when relations between the various classes and the

autocracy, and among themselves, were still quite undetermined, i.e., up to the time when the open struggle of the masses and the policy of classes, not of little groups, determined those relations. The Cadets at that time grouped together all sorts of elements in bourgeois, so-called educated society, beginning with the landlord who was not so keen on a constitution as he was on getting a slice of cake for himself, and ending with the working, salaried intellectuals. The Cadets were preparing to act as *mediators* between the "historic authorities", i.e., the tsarist autocracy, and the struggling masses of the working class and the peasantry. The deputation to the tsar in the summer of 1905 was the beginning of this toadyism—for the Russian liberals understand no other form of mediation than toadyism. And since then there has literally not been a single, at all important, stage of the Russian revolution when the bourgeois liberals did not "mediate" by the same method of toadying to the autocracy and to the servants of the Black-Hundred landlord clique. In August 1905 they opposed the revolutionary tactics of boycotting the Bulygin Duma. In October 1905 they formed the openly counter-revolutionary party of the Octobrists, while at the same time sending Pyotr Struve into Witte's ante-room and preaching moderation and accurate behaviour. In November 1905 they condemned the post and telegraph workers' strike and voiced their condolences at the "horrors" of the soldiers' revolts. In December 1905 they fearfully stuck close to Dubasov,[39] in order next day to hit out against (perhaps one ought to say, to take a kick at) "the madness". At the beginning of 1906 they hotly defended themselves against the "shameful" suspicion that they were capable of campaigning abroad against the 1,000-million ruble loan to strengthen the autocracy. In the First Duma the liberals mouthed phrases about the people's freedom, while on the sly they ran to Trepov's backdoor and fought the Trudoviks and the workers' deputies. By the Vyborg Manifesto[40] they sought to kill two birds with one stone, manoeuvring in such a way that their behaviour could be interpreted, as the occasion required, either in the spirit of support of the revolution or in the spirit of fighting the revolution. Needless to speak of the Second and Third Dumas, where

the liberalism of the Cadets stood revealed in its true Octobrist colours.

During these three years the Cadets have done their job so thoroughly that attempts at a new revival are linked from the very outset with the slogan "more left than the Cadets"! The Cadets of the first generation have *made themselves impossible*. They have buried themselves by their continuous betrayal of the people's freedom.

But are not the Cadets of the second generation, who are replacing those of the first, infected with the same poison of putrefaction? Are not the "Social-Cadets", the Popular Socialist gentry, who are making a particular fuss around the new organisation, intending to repeat the old evolution of which we have had three years' experience?

One has to answer this question not with guesses about the future but by analysis of the past. And this analysis irrefutably shows that the "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks", the Popular Socialist gentry, really did play the part of Cadets in that Trudovik, peasant political organisation—or to be more accurate, political movement—in which they were functioning in their "heydays", for example in the period of the First Duma. Remember the main facts in the history of the "party" (group?) of Popular Socialists in the Russian revolution. They received their baptism in the *Osvobozhdeniye* League.[41] At the congress of the S.R. party in December 1905 they, wavering eternally between the Cadets and the S.R.s, took a stupid middle-of-the-road stand, wishing to be both together with and separate from the Socialist-Revolutionaries. During the period of liberties in October they ran their political newspapers in a bloc with the S.R.s. And the same in the period of the First Duma—"high" diplomacy, "skilful" concealment of differences from the eyes of the world ! After the dissolution of the First Duma, after the failure of the second wave of insurrections, after the suppression of the Sveaborg rising,[42] these gentlemen *take their decision*—to turn to the right. They "legalise" their party, for no other purpose, naturally, than to denounce the idea of insurrection quite legally in the press, and to prove the untimeliness of active republican propaganda. In face of the peasant deputies in the First Duma they win a

victory over the Socialist-Revolutionaries, collecting 104 signatures to their Land Bill[43] as against the 33 for the S.R. Bill.[44] The "sober" bourgeois aspirations of the peasant small proprietor for nationalisation of the land get the upper hand over the vagueness of "socialisation". Instead of striving for the political and revolutionary organisation of the peasants, organisation for insurrection, we see the Social-Cadets striving to play at legality and parliamentarism, striving towards the parochialism of the intellectualist circles. The wavering of the Russian peasant between the Cadet and the intellectualist Popular Socialist opportunist on the one hand, and the intellectually unsteadfast revolutionary S.R. on the other, reflects the dual position of the petty tiller of the soil, his incapacity for conducting a consistent class struggle without guidance by the proletariat.

And if today the Popular Socialist gentlemen are once again beginning their "affair" without the Left Cadets, dragging in their wake the slow-witted Mensheviks and S.R.s, this means that the whole lot of them have learned nothing during the three years of the revolution. They say that economic demands lead to disunity. They want to unite on the basis of more immediate demands—political demands. They have understood absolutely nothing in the course of the revolution, which in Russia, as in other countries, has demonstrated that only the mass struggle is strong, and that such a struggle can develop only in the name of serious economic changes.

That the Mensheviks and the S.R.s keep trailing after the Left Cadets is no news. This happened at the elections to the Second Duma in St. Petersburg. This happened on the question of a Cadet Ministry and a Duma with full powers, with some of them, and on the question of a secret bloc with the Popular Socialists with others. There are evidently profound reasons which rouse among the petty-bourgeois intellectuals "a passion akin to sickness", a passion for coming under the wing of the liberal bourgeoisie.

They cover up this passion, of course, in the usual way—with speeches about making use of the revival, or new grouping of forces, and so forth.

To be sure, gentlemen, we also stand for making use ... of a corpse—only not for its "revival", but to fertilise the

soil with it; not to encourage rotten theories and philistine moods, but that it may play the part of "devil's advocate". We shall use this new, good, excellent example of the Popular Socialists and the Left Cadets to teach the people, to teach them what not to do, and how to avoid Cadet treachery and petty-bourgeois flabbiness. We shall closely follow the growth and development of this new little freak (if it is not still-born), hourly reminding people that every such foetus, *if not still-born*, inevitably and unavoidably signifies in present-day Russia the heralding of the mass struggle of the working class and the peasantry. The *Osvobozhdeniye* League is being reborn. If that is so, it means that the people at the top are beginning to anticipate something: and if that is so, it means that after the beginning will come the continuation, after the fussing of the intellectuals will come the proletarian struggle.

And it is the lessons of struggle, the lessons of revolutionary alignment only in struggle and only with the peasant masses fighting for revolution, that we shall teach the people, in connection with the appearance on the stage of the Cadets of the second generation.

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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN RUSSIA TOWARDS THE CLOSE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY[45]

First published in 1918 as
a separate pamphlet
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The object of this article is to give a brief outline of the sum total of the social and economic relations in Russian agriculture. A work of this kind cannot bear the character of a special research. It must sum up the results of Marxist research, it must indicate the place of every more or less important feature of our agricultural economy in the general scheme of the Russian national economy, it must trace the general line of development of agrarian relations in Russia and ascertain the class forces which determine that development, one way or another. Therefore we shall examine from this point of view the system of landownership in Russia, then the landlord and peasant systems of farming, and lastly draw general conclusions as to what our evolution during the nineteenth century has led to, and what tasks it has bequeathed to the twentieth century.

I

We are able to outline the system of landownership in European Russia towards the close of the nineteenth century according to the returns of the latest land statistics of 1905 (published by the Central Statistical Committee, St. Petersburg, 1907[46]).

The total area of registered land in European Russia according to this investigation was 395.2 million dessiatines.* This area was divided into three main groups as follows:

* *Dessiatine* = 2.7 acres.—*Tr.*

	Mill. dess.
1st group: Privately-owned land	101.7
2nd group: Allotment land	138.8
3rd group: State lands, etc.	154.7
Total in European Russia	395.2

It should be said that our statistics include among state lands more than one hundred million dessiatines in the Far North, in the Archangel, Olonets and Vologda gubernias.* A great part of the state lands must be excluded, once we are dealing with the real area of agricultural lands in European Russia. In my work on the agrarian programme of the Social-Democrats in the Russian revolution (written at the end of 1907, but delayed in publication through circumstances beyond the control of the author), I estimate the actual area of agricultural lands in European Russia at approximately 280 million dessiatines.** This figure includes not 150 million but 39.5 million dessiatines of state land. Hence, *less than one-seventh* of the total land area in European Russia is not in the possession of the landlords and the peasants. Six-sevenths are in the hands of the two antagonistic classes.

Let us examine the way the land is owned by these classes, which differ from each other also as social-estates, since the greater part of the privately-owned lands belongs to the nobility, while the allotment lands are held by the peasants. Out of 101.7 million dessiatines of privately-owned land, 15.8 million dessiatines belong to societies and associations, while the remaining 85.9 million dessiatines belong to private individuals. The following table shows the distribu-

* *Gubernia*, *uyezd*, *volost*—Russian administrative-territorial units. The largest of these was the gubernia, which had its subdivisions in uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system of districting continued under the Soviet power until the introduction of the new system of administrative-territorial division of the country in 1929-30.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 13, p. 221.—*Ed.*

tion of the latter category of land according to social-estates in 1905, and the parallel figures for 1877:

Social-estate of owners	1905		1877		Incr. or decr. in 1905	
	Mill. dess.	%	Mill. dess.	%	Mill. dess.	How many-fold
Nobility	53.2	61.9	73.1	79.9	– 19.9	– 1.40
Clergy	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.2	+0.1	+1.74
Merchants and notable citizens	12.9	15.0	9.8	10.7	+3.1	+1.30
Urban petty bourgeois .	3.8	4.4	1.9	2.1	+1.9	+1.85
Peasants	3.2	15.4	5.8	6.3	+7.4	+2.21
Other social-estates . . .	2.2	2.5	0.3	0.3	+1.9	+8.07
Foreign subjects	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	–0.1	–1.52
Total belonging to private owners	85.9	100.0	91.5	100.0	–5.6	–1.09

Thus the principal private owners of land in Russia are the nobility. They own an enormous amount of land. But the trend of development is towards a decline in landownership by the nobility. Landownership by people irrespective of the social-estate they belong to is increasing, and increasing very rapidly. The speediest increase in the period between 1877 and 1905 was in landownership by "other social-estates" (eightfold in the 28 years), and then by peasants (more than twofold). The peasants are consequently increasingly crystallising out social elements which are turning into private owners of land. This is a general fact. And in our analysis of peasant farming we shall have to ascertain the social and economic mechanism which is carrying out this crystallisation. For the time being, we must definitely establish the fact that private ownership of land in Russia is developing away from social-estate to non-social-estate ownership. At the end of the nineteenth century, feudal landownership of the nobility still embraced the overwhelming majority of all privately-owned lands, but the trend of development is obviously towards the creation of bourgeois private landownership. Private ownership of land acquired by inheritance from the olden-time

armed retainers, manorial landowners, and tenants by service, etc., is on the decline. Private ownership of land acquired purely and simply with money is on the increase. The power of land is declining, the power of money is growing. Land is being drawn more and more into the stream of commerce; and later on we shall see that this process is going on to a far greater extent than the mere statistics of landownership indicate.

But to what extent the "power of the land", that is to say, the power of medieval landlordism, was still strong in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century is strikingly shown by the figures of the distribution of privately-owned land according to size of properties. The source from which we quote the figures specifies in particular detail the data concerning private landownership on the biggest scale. The following is the distribution according to size of properties:

Groups of properties	Number of properties	Total area of land (dess.)	Average dess. per property
10 dess. and less	409,864	1,625,226	3.9
10 to 50 dess.	209,119	4,891,031	23.4
50 to 500 "	106,065	17,326,495	163.3
500 to 2,000 "	21,748	20,590,708	947.0
2,000 to 10,000 "	5,386	20,602,109	3,825.0
Over 10,000 "	699	20,798,504	29,754.0
Total over 500 dess.	27,833	61,991,321	2,227.0
Grand total for European Russia	752,881	85,834,073	114.0

These figures show that small properties represent an insignificant share of the land owned by private individuals. Six-sevenths of all landowners—619,000 out of 753,000—possess 6.5 million dessiatines of land in all. On the other hand enormous latifundia exist: *seven hundred* owners possess, *on the average*, *30,000 dessiatines of land* each. These seven hundred people possess three times as much land as do 600,000 small owners. And in general the

latifundia represent a distinguishing feature of Russian private landownership. If we take all properties over 500 dessiatines, we get 28,000 owners, possessing 62 million dessiatines, or an average of 2,227 dessiatines each. These 28,000 possess three-fourths of all the privately-owned land.* Taken from the angle of the social-estates to which their owners belong, these enormous latifundia are mainly the property of the nobility. Of 27,833 properties, 18,102, i.e., almost two-thirds, belong to members of the nobility, who possess 44.5 million dessiatines of land, i.e., more than 70 per cent of the total latifundia land. Thus it is clear that in Russia, at the end of the nineteenth century, an enormous amount of land—and the best land at that—was concentrated as before (in the medieval way) in the hands of that privileged social-estate, the nobility, in the hands of the serf-owning landlords of yesterday. Below we shall describe in detail the forms of economy that are taking shape on these latifundia. For the moment we shall merely allude briefly to the well-known fact, strikingly described by Mr. Rubakin, that high-ranking members of the bureaucracy figure, one after another, among these owners of latifundia held by the nobility.[47]

Let us now pass to allotment holdings. Except for 1.9 million dessiatines, not allocated according to size of holding, all the rest of the land, totalling 136.9 million dessiatines, belongs to $12\frac{1}{4}$ million peasant households. On the average this is 11.1 dessiatines per household. But allotment land too is distributed unevenly: almost half, i.e., 64 million out of 137 million dessiatines, belongs to 2.1 million households rich in land, i.e., to *one-sixth* of the total number.

Here are the returns showing the distribution of allotment land in European Russia:

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* In order not to overburden the text with quotations, let us state now that most of our data are taken from the above-mentioned work and from *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, 2nd ed., St. Petersburg, 1908. (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 21-607.—*Ed.*)

Groups of households	Number of households	Total dess.	Average dessiatines per household
Up to 5 dess.	2,857,650	9,030,333	3.1
5 to 8 dess.	3,317,601	21,706,550	6.5
Total up to 8 dess.	6,175,251	30,736,883	4.9
8 to 15 dess.	3,932,485	42,182,923	10.7
15 to 30 dess.	1,551,904	31,271,922	20.1
Over 30 dess.	617,715	32,695,510	52.9
Total for European Russia	12,277,355	136,887,238	11.1

Thus more than half of the allotment households, 6.2 million out of 12.3, have up to 8 dessiatines per household. Taken on the average for Russia as a whole, this amount of land is absolutely insufficient to maintain a family. In order to judge the economic condition of these households, let us recall the general returns of the army-horse censuses (the only statistics which periodically and regularly cover the whole of Russia). In 48 gubernias of European Russia, i.e., excluding the Don Region and Archangel Gubernia, a count taken in the years 1896-1900 showed a total of 11,112,287 peasant households. Of these, 3,242,462, i.e., 29.2 per cent, had no horses, and 3,361,778, or 30.3 per cent, had one horse each. We know what a horseless peasant in Russia is (of course we are dealing here with gross figures and not with exceptional districts specialising in suburban dairy farming or tobacco-growing, etc.). We also know of the poverty and want suffered by the peasant who owns one horse. Six million households stand for a population of from 24 to 30 million. And this whole mass consists of paupers, who have been allotted paltry strips of land which can provide no livelihood, and on which one can only die of starvation. If we assume that in order to make ends meet on a more or less solvent farm not less than 15 dessiatines are required, then we get 10 million peasant households below that standard, possessing 72.9 million dessiatines of land.

To proceed. In regard to allotment holdings, a very important feature must be noted. The unevenness in the distribution of allotment land among the peasants is immeasurably less than that in the distribution of privately-owned

land. On the other hand, among the allotment-holding peasants there is a host of other distinctions, classifications and divisions. These are the distinctions between the various categories of peasants that have arisen historically, in the course of many centuries. In order to give a graphic illustration of these divisions, let us first take the total returns for the whole of European Russia. The statistics for 1905 give the following main categories: peasants who formerly were landlords' serfs—on the average, 6.7 dessiatines of allotment land per household; peasants who formerly were state serfs—12.5 dessiatines; peasants who formerly were crown-land serfs—9.5 dessiatines; colonists—20.2 dessiatines; Chinsh peasants—3.1 dessiatines; Rezeshi—5.3 dessiatines; Bashkirs and Teptyars[48]—28.3 dessiatines; Baltic peasants—36.9 dessiatines; Cossacks—52.7 dessiatines. From this alone it is clear that peasant allotment landownership is purely medieval. Serfdom still lives on in this multiplicity of divisions which have survived among the peasants. The various categories differ from each other, not only in the amount of land they possess, but also in the size of redemption payments, terms of purchase, character of landownership, etc. Instead of taking all-round figures for the whole of Russia, let us take the figures for a single gubernia, and we shall see what all these divisions mean. Take the Zemstvo Statistical Returns for Saratov Gubernia.[49] Apart from the categories for Russia as a whole, i.e., those already enumerated above, we find that local investigators distinguish the following additional categories: gift-land peasants; full owners; state peasants with communal holdings; state peasants with quarter holding; state peasants who formerly were landlords' serfs; state-land tenants; colonist freeholders; settlers; manumitted peasants; peasants who do not pay quitrent; free tillers; former factory-bound peasants, etc.[50] This system of medieval divisions is carried so far that sometimes peasants living in one and the same village are divided into two quite distinct categories, like peasants "formerly owned by Mr. N. N." and "formerly owned by Madame M. M.". This fact is usually ignored by our writers of the liberal-Narodnik camp, who are incapable of seeing Russian economic relations in development, as the replace-

ment of the feudal order by the bourgeois order. As a matter of fact, unless the full significance of this is appreciated, one cannot begin to understand the history of Russia in the nineteenth century, and particularly the direct results of that history, the events in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. A country in which exchange is growing and capitalism is developing cannot but undergo crises of all kinds if in the principal branch of the national economy medieval relations constitute an obstacle and hindrance at every step. The notorious village commune[51]—the significance of which we shall have to discuss later—does not save the peasant from turning into a proletarian, yet in practice acts as a medieval barrier dividing the peasants, who are, as it were, chained to small associations and to categories which have lost all "reason for existence".

Before proceeding to draw our final conclusions about the ownership of land in European Russia, we must refer to yet another aspect of the question. Neither the figures of the amount of land belonging to the "upper 30,000" landlords and to the millions of peasant households, nor the data concerning the medieval divisions in peasant landownership are sufficient to enable us to estimate the actual degree to which our peasant is "hemmed in", oppressed and crushed by these living survivals of serfdom. In the first place, the lands allotted to the peasants after that expropriation of the peasants for the landlords' benefit which is called the Great Reform of 1861,[52] are of incomparably inferior quality to the land in the possession of the landlords. This is borne out by all the vast literature describing and investigating local conditions issued by the Zemstvo statisticians. It is supported by a mass of irrefutable evidence showing the lower yield on peasant land as compared with that on the landlords' land; it is generally admitted that this difference is due primarily to the inferior quality of the allotment lands, and only secondarily to inferior cultivation and the deficiencies of beggarly peasant farming. Moreover, in a host of cases when the peasants were "freed" from the land by the landlords in 1861, the land was allocated in such a way that the peasants found themselves ensnared by "their" landlords. Russian Zemstvo statistical literature has enriched the science of political economy

with descriptions of the remarkably original, truly native method, hardly to be found anywhere else in the world, of conducting landlord economy. This is the method of farming *by means of cut-off lands*. The peasants were "freed" in 1861 from the watering-places for cattle, from pastures, etc., necessary for their farms. The peasants' lands were wedged in between those of the landlords in such a way as to provide these gentry with an exceedingly reliable—and exceedingly noble—source of revenue in the shape of fines for damages caused by stray cattle, etc. "There's no room to turn a chicken out"—this bitter peasant truth, this grim "humour of the gallows-bird" describes better than any long quotations that peculiar feature of peasant landownership which is beyond the power of statistics to express. Needless to say, this peculiar feature is serfdom pure and simple, both in its origin and in the effect it has upon the method of organisation of landlord economy.

We will now draw our conclusions regarding landownership in European Russia. We have shown the conditions of landlord and peasant landownership taken separately. We must now examine them in their interrelation. In order to do so let us take the approximate figure, quoted above, of the size of the land area in European Russia—280 million dessiatines—and see how all this land is distributed among the various types of holdings. We shall describe the various types in detail later on; for the moment, running somewhat ahead, we will take tentatively the main types. Holdings up to 15 dessiatines per household we shall place in the first group—ruined peasants, crushed by feudal exploitation. The second group will consist of the middle peasantry—holdings ranging from 15 to 20 dessiatines. The third group—well-to-do peasants (peasant bourgeoisie) and capitalist landowners—holdings ranging from 20 to 500 dessiatines. The fourth group consists of feudal latifundia, exceeding 500 dessiatines. By combining in these groups the peasant and landlord holdings, and by rounding off the figures somewhat,* and making approximate calcula-

* For example, among the latifundia are included, besides the 62 million dessiatines of landlords' land, 5.1 million dessiatines of demesne lands and 3.6 million dessiatines of land belonging to 272 trading and industrial companies, each owning more than 1,000 dessiatines.

tions (which I have indicated in detail in the work mentioned above), we get the following picture of Russian landownership towards the close of the nineteenth century:

Landownership in European Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century

Group	Number of holdings (millions)	Total area in dessiatines	Average dess. per holding
(a) Ruined peasantry, crushed by feudal exploitation . .	10.5	75.0	7.0
(b) Middle peasantry	1.0	15.0	15.0
(c) Peasant bourgeoisie and capitalist landownership .	1.5	70.0	46.7
(d) Feudal latifundia	0.03	70.0	2,333.0
Total	13.03	230.0	17.6
Not classified according to size of property	—	50.0	—
Grand total	13.03	280.0	21.4

We repeat: the correctness of the economic description of the groups taken will be proved later on. And if particular details of this picture (which cannot but be approximate) give rise to criticism, we shall ask the reader to take good care that this criticism of details is not used as a screen for denying the *substance* of the matter. And the substance of the matter is that at one pole of Russian landownership we have 10.5 million households (about 50 million of the population) with 75 million dessiatines of land, and at the other pole *thirty thousand families* (about 150,000 of the population) with 70 million dessiatines of land.

To finish with the question of landownership we must now go beyond the confines of European Russia proper and examine, in general outline, the significance of colonisation. In order to give the reader some idea of the total land area in the Russian Empire (excluding Finland) let us refer to the figures compiled by Mr. Mertvago. For the sake of clarity we give the figures in tabulated form, adding the figures of the population according to the census of 1897.

	Total land area		Including		Including				Population in 1897	
	Square versts (thousands)	Dessiatines (millions)	Lands of which no data are available (mill. dess.)	Lands registered (mill. dess.)	Arable	Meadows	Forests	Total	Total (thousands)	Per sq. verst
					Million Dessiatins					
10 gubernias in Kingdom of Poland . . .	111.6	11.6	—	11.6	7.4	0.9	2.5	10.8	9,402.2	84.3
38 gubernias west of the Volga	1,755.6	183.0	—	183.0	93.6	18.7	34.0	146.3	—	—
12 gubernias north and east of the Volga . .	2,474.9	258.0	—	258.0	22.3	7.1	132.0	161.4	—	—
Total for 50 gubernias of European Russia .	4,230.5	441.0	—	441.0	115.9	25.8	166.0	307.7	93,442.9	22.1
Caucasus	411.7	42.9	22.1	20.8	6.5	2.2	2.5	11.2	9,289.4	22.6
Siberia	10,966.1	1,142.6	639.7	502.9	4.3	3.9	121.0	129.2	5,758.8	0.5
Central Asia	3,141.6	327.3	157.4	169.9	0.9	1.6	8.0	10.5	7,746.7	2.5
Total for Asiatic Russia	14,519.4	1,512.8	819.2	693.6	11.7	7.7	131.5	150.9	—	—
Total for Russian Empire	18,861.5	1,965.4	819.2	1,146.2	135.0	34.4	300.0	469.4	125,640.0	6.7

These figures clearly show how little we know as yet about the outlying regions of Russia. Of course it would be the height of absurdity to think of "solving" the agrarian question in Russia proper by migration to outlying regions. There is not the slightest doubt that only charlatans could propose such a "solution", that those contradictions between the old latifundia in European Russia and the new conditions of life and economy in that same European Russia to which we referred above, will have to be "solved" by a radical change of one kind or another *within European Russia*, and not outside it. The point is not that of delivering the peasants from the survivals of feudalism by means of migration. The fact is that, side by side with the agrarian question of the centre of Russia, we have the agrarian question of colonisation. The point is not that of covering up the crisis in European Russia with the question of colonisation, but of showing the disastrous effects of the feudal latifundia *both* in the centre *and* in the outlying districts. Russian colonisation is being *hindered* by the remnants of serfdom in the centre of Russia. Except by an agrarian revolution in European Russia, except by liberating the peasants from the oppression of the feudal latifundia there *can be no* clearing the way for, and regulation of, Russian colonisation. This regulation must consist not of bureaucratic "concern" for migration nor of the "organisation of migration", about which the writers in the liberal-Narodnik camp like to talk, but of eliminating the conditions which condemn the Russian peasant to ignorance, squalor, and backwardness in a state of permanent bondage to the owners of latifundia.

In his pamphlet (*How Much Land There Is in Russia and How We Use It*, Moscow, 1907), written in conjunction with Mr. Prokopovich, Mr. Mertvago justly points out that the advance of agriculture turns bad land into good land. Academicians Baer and Helmersen, experts on the subject wrote in 1845 that the Taurida Steppe "owing to the climate, and the scarcity of water will *always* be one of the poorest and least suitable regions for cultivation!"[53] At that time the population of Taurida Gubernia produced 1.8 million chetverts* of grain. Sixty years later the population had doubled,

* Chetverts = 5.77 bushels.—*Ed.*

and produces 17.6 million chetverts, i.e., almost ten times as much.

That is a true and important observation, but Mr. Mertvago forgot one thing: the principal factor making for the rapid colonisation of Novorossia was the *fall of serfdom* in the centre of Russia. Only the upheaval in the centre made it possible to settle and industrialise the South rapidly, extensively, in the American way (a very great deal has been said about the *American* growth of southern Russia after 1861). And now, too, only a radical change in European Russia, only the complete elimination of the remnants of serfdom there, the deliverance of the peasantry from the grip of the medieval latifundia, can *really* open a new era of colonisation.

The colonisation question in Russia is a subordinate one in relation to the agrarian question in the centre of the country. The end of the nineteenth century confronts us with the alternative: either the survivals of serfdom are decisively abolished in the "primordial" gubernias of Russia, in which case rapid, extensive, American-style development in the colonisation of our outlying regions is assured; or the agrarian question in the centre drags on, in which case development of the productive forces will necessarily be long delayed, and feudal traditions will be preserved in colonisation as well. In the first case, agriculture will be carried on by a free farmer; in the second case by a debt-bound muzhik and by a gentleman "carrying on" by means of "cut-off" lands.

II

Let us now examine the organisation of the landlord economy. It is generally known that the main feature of this organisation is the combination of the capitalist system ("free hire") and labour-service economy. What is this labour-service system?

To answer this question we must glance back to the organisation of landlord economy under serfdom. Everyone knows what serfdom was legally, administratively and domestically. But seldom do people ask themselves, what essentially were the economic relations between the landlords and the peasants under serfdom? At that time the landlords allotted land to the peasants. Sometimes they loaned the peasants

other means of production too, for example, wood lots, cattle, etc. What did this allotment of the landlords' land to the serf peasants mean? The allotment at that time was *a form of wages*, to employ a term applicable to present-day relationships. In capitalist production, wages are paid to the workers in money. The profit of the capitalist is realised in the form of money. Necessary labour and surplus-labour (i.e., the labour that pays for the maintenance of the worker and the labour that yields unpaid surplus-value to the capitalist) are combined in the single process of labour in the factory, in a single working day at the factory, etc. The situation is different in the corvée economy. Here, too, there is necessary labour and surplus-labour, just as there is in the system of slavery. But these two kinds of labour are separated in time and space. The serf peasant works three days for his lord and three days for himself. He works for his lord on the latter's land or on the production of grain for him. For himself he works on allotted land, producing for himself and for his family the grain that is necessary for maintaining labour-power for the landlord.

Consequently, the feudal or corvée system of economy is similar to the capitalist system in that under both systems the one who works receives only the product of necessary labour, and turns over the product of surplus-labour gratis to the owner of the means of production. Serfdom, however, differs from the capitalist system in the three following respects. First, serf economy is natural economy, whereas capitalist economy is money economy. Secondly, in serf economy the instrument of exploitation is the *tying* of the worker to the land, the allotting of land to him, whereas under the capitalist economy it is the releasing of the worker from the land. In order to obtain an income (i.e., surplus-product), the serf-owning landlord must have on his land a peasant who possesses an allotment, implements and live-stock. A landless, horseless, non-farming peasant is useless as an object of feudal exploitation. In order to obtain an income (profit), the capitalist must have before him precisely a worker without land and without a farm, one who is compelled to sell his labour-power on a free labour-market. Thirdly, the allotment-holding peasant must be *personally dependent* upon the landlord, because he will not, possessing

land, work for the landlord except *under coercion*. This system of economy gives rise to "non-economic coercion", to serfdom, juridical dependence, lack of full rights, etc. On the other hand, "ideal" capitalism implies the fullest freedom of contract on a free market—between the property-owner and the proletarian.

Only if we are clear in our minds as to this economic substance of serf economy, or what is the same thing, corvée economy, can we understand the historical place-and significance of labour service. Labour service is the direct and immediate survival of the corvée. Labour service is the transition from the corvée to capitalism. The substance of labour service is this: the landlord's land is cultivated by the peasants *with their own implements* in return for pay partly in cash and partly in kind (for land, for cut-off land, for use of pastures, for loans granted in the winter, etc.). The form of economy known as the métayer system is a variety of labour service. The landlord economy based on labour service *requires* a peasant who has an allotment, as well as implements and livestock if only of the poorest kind; it requires also that the peasant be weighed down by want and place himself in bondage. Bondage instead of free hire is the necessary concomitant of labour-service economy. Here the landlord acts not as a capitalist entrepreneur who owns money and the sum total of the instruments of labour, but—in a system of labour-service economy—as a usurer, taking advantage of the poverty of his peasant neighbour to acquire his labour for next to nothing.

To illustrate this point more clearly, let us take the data of the Department of Agriculture—a source above all suspicion of being unfriendly towards the landowning gentlemen. The well-known publication, *Freely Hired Labour on Farms*, etc. (Issue V, "Agric. and Stat. Inf. Obtd. from *Agricultural Employers*", St. Petersburg, 1892),[54] gives information concerning the Central Black-Earth Belt over eight years (1883-91). The average payment for the complete cultivation of a dessiatine of winter grain by a peasant using his own implements should be reckoned as 6 rubles. If we calculate the cost of the same amount of work performed by freely hired labour—says the same publication—we get 6 rubles 19 kopeks for the work of the man

alone, *not counting* the work of the horse, which cannot be put at less than 4 rubles 50 kopeks (ibid., p. 45, quoted in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, p. 141*). Consequently, the price of freely hired labour amounts to 10 rubles 69 kopeks, while under labour service it is 6 rubles. How is this phenomenon to be accounted for, if it is not something accidental or exceptional, but normal and usual? Words like "bondage", "usury", "extortion", etc., describe the form and nature of the transaction, but do not explain its economic substance. How is a peasant able over a number of years to perform work that is worth 10 rubles 69 kopeks for 6 rubles? He *is able* to do it because his allotment covers part of the expenditure of his family and *makes it possible* for his wage to be forced down below the "free-hire" level. The peasant is compelled to do so precisely because his wretched allotment ties him down to his landlord neighbour, for it does not enable him to live off his own farm. Of course, this phenomenon can be "normal" only as one of the links of the process by which the corvée system is eliminated by capitalism. For the peasant is inevitably ruined by these conditions, and is slowly but surely being transformed into a proletarian.

The following are similar, but slightly more complete data concerning Saratov Uyezd. The average price for tilling one dessiatine of land, and for reaping, carting and threshing the grain, is 9 rubles 60 kopeks if contracted in the winter, 80 to 100 per cent of the wage being paid in advance. The price is 9 rubles 40 kopeks when the job is done as labour service for the lease of land. In the case of freely hired labour it is 17 rubles 50 kopeks! Reaping and carting done as labour service is valued at 3 rubles 80 kopek's per dessiatine, and in the case of freely hired labour at 8 rubles 50 kopeks, etc. Each of these figures tells its long story of the peasant's endless poverty, bondage and ruin. Each of these figures shows to what extent feudal exploitation and the survivals of the corvée *persist* in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century.

It is very difficult to calculate to what extent the labour-service system is prevalent. Usually, on the landed estates the

* See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 202.—*Ed.*

labour-service system is combined with the capitalist system, and both are applied to various operations in agriculture. An inconsiderable part of the land is tilled by hired labourers using the landlords' implements. The greater part of the land is rented to peasants on a métayer and labour-service basis. The following are a few illustrations taken from the detailed work by Mr. Kaufman, who has compiled some of the latest data on privately-owned estates.* Tula Gubernia (the data refer to 1897-98): "the landlords have retained the old three-field system ... the outlying land is taken by the peasants"; the cultivation of the landlords' land is extremely unsatisfactory. Kursk Gubernia: "the distribution of land to the peasants in dessiatines, which was profitable owing to the high prices prevailing ... has led to the exhaustion of the soil." Voronezh Gubernia: ...the medium and small proprietors "largely run their economies exclusively with the aid of peasants' implements, or lease them out ... on most estates the methods practised are distinguished for the complete absence of any improvements".

Statements like these show that the general description of the various gubernias of European Russia given by Mr. Annensky in his book *The Influence of Harvests*, *etc.*, as regards the prevalence of the labour-service or the capitalist systems can be fully applied to the conditions prevailing at the end of the nineteenth century. We shall quote this description in tabular form:

	Number of gubernias			
	Black-Earth Belt	Non-Black-Earth Belt	Total	Total privately-owned arable (thousand dess.)
I. Gubernias where the capitalist system prevails .	9	10	19	7,407
II. Gubernias where a mixed system prevails	3	4	7	2,222
III. Gubernias where the labour-service system prevails	12	5	17	6,281
Total	24	19	43	15,910

* *The Agrarian Question*. Published by Dolgorukov and Petrunkevich, Vol. II, Moscow, 1907, pp. 442-628, "Regarding the Cultural and Economic Significance of Private Landownership".

Thus labour service definitely prevails in the Black-Earth Belt, but yields place in the total of the 43 gubernias included in the above table. It is important to note that group I (the capitalist system) includes areas which are not representative of the central agricultural regions, viz.: the Baltic gubernias, those in the south-west (sugar-beet area) and in the South, and the gubernias of the two capital cities.

The influence of the labour-service system on the development of the productive forces in agriculture is graphically illustrated by the material compiled in Mr. Kaufman's book. "There cannot be any doubt," he writes, "that small peasant renting of land and métayage represent one of the conditions which most of all retard the progress of agriculture." ... In the reviews of agriculture covering Poltava Gubernia, repeated reference is made to the fact that "the tenants till the land badly, sow it with poor seed and allow it to become overgrown with weeds".

In Mogilyov Gubernia (1898), "any improvement in farming is hindered by the inconveniences of the métayer system". The existence of *skopshchina*[55] is one of the main reasons why "agriculture in Dnieper Uyezd is in such a state that it is futile to expect any innovations or improvements". "Our data," writes Mr. Kaufman (p. 517), "definitely point to the fact that even within the bounds of one and the same estate, old and obsolete farming methods continue to be employed on land that is rented out, whereas new and improved methods have already been introduced on land that is cultivated by the owners." For example, on the land that is rented out, the three-field system is retained, sometimes even without the land being manured; on lands farmed on economic lines, however, crop rotation has been introduced. Métayage hinders grass cultivation, the extended use of fertilisers, and the employment of the best agricultural implements. The result of all this is strikingly reflected in the yield figures. For example, on a large estate in Simbirsk Gubernia, the rye crop in the part cultivated on economic lines is 90 poods per dessiatine, wheat 60 poods, oats 74 poods; in the métayer lands it is 58, 28 and 50 poods respectively. Here are general figures for a whole uyezd (Gorbatov Uyezd, Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia).

Yield of rye in poods per dessiatine

Soil grades	Allotment land	Economic crops	Privately-owned lands: Métayer	Privately-owned lands: Rented
I	62	74	—	44
II	55	63	49	—
III	51	60	50	42
IV	48	69	51	51
All grades	54*	66	50	45*

Thus, *landlords'* lands cultivated in feudal fashion (on a métayer basis and rented out in small lots) produce *smaller* yields than allotment lands! This is a fact of tremendous importance, because it irrefutably proves that the main and fundamental cause of Russia's agricultural backwardness, of the stagnation of the whole of the national economy and the degradation of the tiller of the soil to a degree unparalleled anywhere else in the world, is the *labour-service system*, i.e., the direct survival of serfdom. No credits, no land reclamation, no "aid" to the peasant, none of the measures of "assistance" beloved of the bureaucrats and liberals, will yield results of any importance so long as there remains the yoke of the feudal latifundia, traditions, and systems of economy. On the other hand, an agrarian revolution which abolishes landlordism and breaks up the old medieval village commune (the nationalisation of the land, for example, will break it up, not in the police and bureaucratic manner), would unfailingly serve as the basis for remarkably rapid and really wide progress. The incredibly low yield on métayer and rented lands is due to the system of working "for the squire". If this same farmer were relieved of the duty of working "for the squire", yields would increase not only on these lands, but would inevitably increase on the allotment lands as well, simply because of the elimination of the feudal hindrances to farming.

As things are at present, there is, of course, some capitalist progress on the privately-owned economies, but it is exceedingly slow, and inevitably burdens Russia for many

* In Mr. Kaufman's book, p. 521, there is obviously a misprint in these two figures.

years to come with the political and social domination of the "wild landlord".[56] We shall now examine how this progress manifests itself, and try to define some of its general results.

The fact that the yield of the "economic" crops, i.e., the landed estates cultivated on capitalist lines, is higher than on the peasant lands is an indication of the technical progress of capitalism in agriculture. This progress is due to the transition from the labour-service to the wage-labour system. The ruin of the peasants, the decline in horse ownership, the loss of implements, the proletarisation of the tiller, *compel* landlords to change over to cultivating their land with their own implements. Increased use is being made in agriculture of machinery, which raises the productivity of labour and inevitably leads to the development of purely capitalist relations of production. Agricultural machinery was imported into Russia to the value of 788,000 rubles in 1869-72, 2.9 million rubles in 1873-80, 4.2 million rubles in 1881-88, 3.7 million rubles in 1889-96, and 15.2 and 20.6 million rubles respectively in 1902 and 1903. The output of agricultural machinery in Russia was (approximately, according to rough industrial statistics) 2.3 million rubles in 1876, 9.4 million in 1894 and 12.1 million in 1900-03. It is indisputable that these figures indicate progress in agriculture, and precisely capitalist progress, of course. But it is similarly indisputable that this progress is exceedingly slow compared to what is possible in a modern capitalist state: for example, in America. According to the census of June 1, 1900, the acreage of farms in the United States was 838.6 million acres, i.e., about 324 million dessiatines. The number of farms was 5.7 million, the average acreage per farm being 146.2 acres (about 60 dessiatines). Now, the production of agricultural implements for these farms amounted to *157.7 million dollars* in 1900 (in 1890, 145.3 million dollars, in 1880, 62.1 million dollars).* The Russian figures are ridiculously small by comparison, and they are small because the feudal latifundia in Russia are great and strong.

The extent to which improved agricultural implements

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* *Abstract of the Twelfth Census*, 1900, third edition, Washington, 1904, pp. 217 and 302—agricultural implements.

were employed by landowners and peasants respectively was the subject of a special questionnaire circulated by the Ministry of Agriculture in the middle of the nineties of last century. The results of this enquiry, which are given in detail in Mr. Kaufman's book, can be summarised in the following table.

District	Percentage of replies indicating extensive employment of improved agricultural implements	
	Landlords	Peasants
Central Agricultural	20-51	8-20
Middle Volga	18-66	14
Novorussia	50-91	33-65
Byelorussia.	54-86	17-41
Priozyorny	24-47	1-21
Moscow	22-51	10-26
Industrial	4-8	2

The average for all these districts is 42 per cent among the landlords and 21 per cent among the peasants.

In regard to the employment of manure, all the statistical data irrefutably prove that "in this respect the landlords' farms have always been, and still are, far ahead of the peasant farms" (Kaufman, p. 544). Moreover, it was a widespread practice in post-Reform Russia for the landlord to purchase manure from the peasant. That is the result of direst poverty among the peasants. Recently this practice has been on the decline.

Finally, precise and abundant statistics are available on the level of agricultural technique on landlord and peasant farms respectively as regards grass cultivation (Kaufman, p. 561). The following are the principal conclusions.

Year	Area under fodder grasses in European Russia	
	On peasant farms (dess.)	On landlords' estates (dess.)
1881	49,800	499,000
1901	491,600	1,046,000

What is the effect of all these differences between landlord and peasant farming? All we have to go on here are the yield figures. Throughout the whole of European Russia, the average yield over a period of eighteen years (1883-1900) was as follows (in chetverts):

	Rye	Winter wheat	Spring wheat	Oats
Landlords . . .	6.0	5.75	5.0	8.5
Peasants . . .	5.0	5.0	4.25	7.0
Difference . . .	16.7%	13.0%	15.0%	17.6%

Mr. Kaufman is quite right when he says that the "difference is very slight" (p. 592). We must bear in mind not only that the peasants were left with the *worst land* in 1861, but also that general averages for the whole of the peasantry conceal (as we shall see in a moment) big differences.

The general conclusion we must arrive at from the examination of landlord farming is the following. Capitalism is quite obviously paving a way for itself in this field. Farming on a corvée basis is being replaced by farming on the basis of freely hired labour. Technical progress in capitalist agriculture compared with labour-service and petty-peasant farming is definitely in evidence in all directions. But this progress is exceptionally slow for a modern capitalist country. The end of the nineteenth century finds in Russia the most acute contradiction between the requirements of social development as a whole and serf agriculture which, in the shape of the latifundia owned by the landed nobility and the labour-service system, is a brake on economic evolution and a source of oppression, barbarism, and of innumerable forms of Tatarism in Russian life.

III

Peasant farming is the focal point of the agrarian question today in Russia. We have shown above the conditions of peasant landownership and now we must deal with the organisation of peasant farming—not in the technical sense, but from the standpoint of political economy.

In the forefront we encounter here the question of the peasant commune. A very extensive literature has been devoted to this question, and the Narodnik trend in Russian social thought connects the main points of its world-outlook with the national peculiarities of this "equalitarian" institution. In this respect it should be said, in the first place, that in the literature on the Russian land commune two distinct

aspects of the question are constantly interwoven and very often confused; these are the aspect relating to agricultural methods and mode of life, on the one hand, and the politico-economic aspect, on the other. In most works on the village commune (V. Orlov, Trirogov, Keussler, V. V.),[57] so much space and attention is devoted to the first aspect of the question that the second is left completely in the shade. This method of treating the subject is absolutely wrong. That agrarian relations in Russia differ from those in other countries is beyond doubt, but no two purely capitalist countries, generally recognised as such, will be found, where village life, the history of agrarian relations, the forms of ownership and use of the land, etc., do not differ to the same degree. It is by no means the aspect relating to agricultural methods nor that of village life which have made the question of the Russian land commune so important and acute and have, since the second half of the nineteenth century, divided the two main trends in Russian social thought, i.e., the Narodnik and the Marxist. Possibly local investigators have had to devote so much attention to this aspect of the question in order both to be able to make a comprehensive study of local peculiarities in the agricultural mode of life and to repel the ignorant and brazen attempts of the bureaucracy to introduce petty-detailed regulation permeated with a police spirit. But it is quite impermissible, for an economist at any rate, to allow the study of the various forms of land redistribution, the technique of this redistribution, etc., to obscure the question of what *types of economies* are emerging *within* the commune, how these types are developing, what sort of relations are building up between those who hire workers and those who hire themselves out as labourers, between the well-to-do and the poor, between those who are improving their farms and introducing better techniques, and those who are being ruined, who are abandoning their farms, and fleeing from the village. No doubt it was awareness of this truth that induced our Zemstvo statisticians—who have contributed invaluable material for the study of the national economy of Russia—to abandon, in the eighties of last century, the *official* grouping of the peasantry according to commune, allotment, the number of "registered souls"[58]

or available males, and to adopt the only scientific grouping, according to *economic strength* of households. It should be remembered that at that time, when interest in the economic study of Russia was particularly great, even a writer like V. V., such a "party" man on this subject, heartily welcomed "the new type of local statistical publication" (the title of V. V.'s article in *Severny Vestnik*,[59] No. 3 for 1885) and declared: "These statistics must be adapted, not to such an agglomeration of the most varied economic groups of the peasantry as the village or the commune, but to these groups themselves."

The fundamental feature of our commune, which lent it special importance in the eyes of the Narodniks, is equalised land tenure. We shall leave aside entirely the question of how the village commune achieves this equalisation, and address ourselves directly to the economic facts, to the results of this equalisation. As we have shown above on the basis of precise data, the distribution of the total allotment land in European Russia is by no means equalitarian. Nor is the distribution of land among the various categories of peasants, among the peasants of different villages, even among the peasants belonging ("formerly belonging") to different landlords in the same village in the least equalitarian. Only within the small communes does the machinery of redistribution create the equalisation of these small, exclusive associations. Let us examine the Zemstvo statistics regarding the distribution of allotment land among households. In doing so, of course, we must take the grouping of households not according to the size of families, not according to the number of those working, but according to the *economic strength* of the different households (crop area, number of draught animals, number of cows, etc.). For the entire essence of the capitalist evolution of small farming lies in the creation and intensification of inequality of property within patriarchal associations, and further in the transformation of simple inequality into capitalist relationships. Hence we should be obscuring all the peculiar features of the new economic evolution if we did not set out to make a special study of the differences in economic strength within the peasantry.

Let us take, at first, one typical uyezd (house-to-house

investigations by Zemstvo statisticians with detailed combined tables, adapted to separate uyezds), and then state the reasons that oblige us to apply the conclusions which interest us to the peasants of the whole of Russia. The material is taken from *The Development of Capitalism*, Chapter II.*

In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, where peasant landownership is entirely communal, allotment land is distributed as follows:

	Per household	
	Persons of both sexes	Allotment land (dess.)
Cultivating no land	3.5	9.8
" up to 5 dessiatines	4.5	12.9
" 5 to 10 "	5.4	17.4
" 10 to 20 "	6.7	21.8
" 20 to 50 "	7.9	28.8
" over 50 "	8.2	44.6
Total	5.5	17.4

We see that with the improvement in the economic strength of the household, the size of the family increases with absolute regularity. Clearly, a large family is one of the factors in peasant well-being. That is indisputable. The only question is, to what social and economic relations does this well-being lead in the present state of the national economy as a whole? As far as allotment land is concerned, we see unevenness in distribution, although not too considerable. The more prosperous a peasant household is, the more allotment land it has *per head*. The lowest group has less than 3 dessiatines of allotment land per head of both sexes; in the next groups, nearly 3 dessiatines, 3 dessiatines, nearly 4, and 4 dessiatines respectively; and finally, in the last, the highest group, over 5 dessiatines of allotment land per head of both sexes. Hence large families and the greatest possession of allotment land serve as the basis of the prosperity of a *small minority* of the peasants. For the two highest groups cover only *one-tenth* of the total number of households. The following table shows as percentages the

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 70-187.—*Ed.*

number of households, the population, and the distribution of allotment land among the different groups:

Groups of households	Percentages of total		
	Households	Population of both sexes	Allotment land
Cultivating no land	10.2	6.5	5.7
" up to 5 dessiatines	30.3	24.8	22.6
" from 5 to 10 dessiatines. . . .	27.0	26.7	26.0
" from 10 to 20 dessiatines . .	22.4	27.3	28.3
" from 20 to 50 dessiatines . .	9.4	13.5	15.5
" over 50 dessiatines.	0.7	1.2	1.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

These figures clearly show that there is proportion in the distribution of allotment land, and that we do take into account the result of communal equalisation. The ratios of the population and of allotment land according to groups are fairly close to each other. But here, too, the economic strength of the different households begins to take effect: among the lower groups the ratio of land is *less* than the ratio of the population, and among the higher groups it is *greater*. And this is not an isolated phenomenon, relating to just one uyezd, but is true for the whole of Russia. In the work mentioned above, I have combined similar data for 21 uyezds of 7 gubernias in the most varied parts of-Russia. These data, which cover half a million peasant households, show the same relations in all places. Well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, account for 26.1 to 30.3 per cent of the population and have 29.0 to 36.7 per cent of the allotment land. The poorest households, constituting 50 per cent of the total, account for 36.6 to 44.7 per cent of the population and have 33.0 to 37.7 per cent of the allotment land. We have this ratio in the distribution of the allotment land everywhere, but at the same time the *trend* of the village commune everywhere *is* towards the peasant bourgeoisie: departures from the ratio proceed in all cases in favour of the higher groups of the peasantry.

Hence it would be a profound mistake to think that, in studying the grouping of the peasantry according to economic strength, we ignore the "equalising" influence of the commune. On the contrary, by means of precise data we establish the real economic significance of this equalisation. We demonstrate just how far it extends, and what the whole system of land redistribution leads to in the *final analysis*. Even if this system provides the best distribution of land of various qualities and various categories, it is an indisputable fact that the position of the well-to-do peasants is superior to that of the poor peasants *also* in the matter of the distribution of allotment land. The distribution of other, non-allotment land, as we shall see in a moment, is immeasurably more uneven.

The importance of rented land in peasant farming is well known. The need for land gives rise to an extraordinary variety of forms of bondage relations on this basis. As we have already stated above, very often the renting of land by peasants is in effect a labour-service system of landlord farming—a feudalist way of securing hands for the squire. Thus the feudalist character of land renting by our peasants is beyond doubt. But since we have before us the capitalist evolution of this country, we must make a special study of the question as to how *bourgeois* relations manifest themselves, and whether they do manifest themselves, in peasant land renting. Here again we need data on the various economic groups of the peasantry and not on entire communes and villages. For example, in his *Results of Zemstvo Statistical Investigations*, Mr. Karyshev had to admit that rents in kind (i.e., rentings of land for which payment is made not in money but by métayage or by labour service) as a general rule are *everywhere* more costly than money rent, and very much more costly at that, sometimes twice as much; further, that rent in kind is *most widespread among the poorest groups of the peasantry*. The peasants who are at all well-to-do try to rent land for money. "The tenant takes advantage of every opportunity to pay his rent in money and thus reduce the cost of using other people's land" (Karyshev, op. cit., p. 265).[60]

Hence the whole weight of the feudal features of our land-renting system falls upon the poorest peasants. The well-

to-do peasants try to escape from the medieval yoke, and they succeed in doing so only to the extent that they have sufficient money. If you have money, you can rent land for cash at the ordinary market price. If you have no money, you go into bondage and pay three times as dear for the land, either by métayage or by labour service. We have seen above how many times lower are the prices of work done by labour service than those of work done by freely hired labourers. And if the terms of renting are different for peasants of different economic strength, it is clear that we cannot confine ourselves (as Karyshev constantly does) to grouping the peasants according to their allotment, since such a method of grouping *artificially* lumps together households of different economic strength, and mixes up the rural proletariat with the peasant bourgeoisie.

As an illustration, let us take the figures covering Kamyshin Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia, which consists almost entirely of communes (out of 2,455 communes in this gubernia, 2,436 hold the land in communal tenure). The following table shows the ratio between the various groups of households in regard to the renting of land.

Groups of householders	Percentage of household	Dessiatines per households	
		Allotment land	Rented land
With no draught animals	26.4	5.4	0.3
" 1 " animal	20.3	6.5	1.6
" 2 " animals	14.6	8.5	3.5
" 3 " "	9.3	10.1	5.6
" 4 " "	8.3	12.5	7.4
" 5 " " and more	21.1	16.1	16.6
Total	100.0	9.3	5.4

The distribution of allotment land is a familiar picture: the prosperous households are better provided with land per head of the population than the poor ones. The distribution of rented land is *dozens of times* more uneven. The highest group has three times as much allotment land as the lowest group (16.1 as against 5.4); but in regard to rented land the highest group has *fifty times* as much as the lowest group (16.6 as against 0.3). Thus, renting does not even out

differences in the peasants' economic strength, but intensifies, increases them dozens of times over. The opposite conclusion, which is repeatedly met with in the writings of the Narodnik economists (V. V., Nik.—on,[61] Maress, Karyshev, Vikhlayev and others), is due to the following error. They usually take the peasants grouped according to the size of allotment land, and show that those with small allotments rent more than those with large allotments—and there they stop. They do not mention that it is largely the well-to-do households in village communes with small allotments that rent land and that, therefore, seeming communal equalisation merely covers up the tremendous unevenness of distribution within the commune. Karyshev himself, for example, admits that "large amounts of land are rented by (a) the categories less provided with land, but (b) by the more well-to-do groups within these categories" (op. cit. p. 139). Nevertheless, he does not systematically study the distribution of rentings by groups.

In order to bring out more clearly the mistake of the Narodnik economists, let us cite the example of Mr. Maress (in his book *The Influence of Harvests and Grain Prices*, Vol. I, p. 34). From data covering Melitopol Uyezd he draws the conclusion that "the distribution of rented land per head is approximately equal". How does he arrive at this? In this way: if households are grouped according to the number of male workers in them, it will be found that households with no workers rent "on the average" 1.6 dessiatines per renting household, those with one worker rent 4.4 dessiatines, those with two workers, 8.3 dessiatines, those with three workers, 14.0 dessiatines per household. But the point is that these "averages" cover households of absolutely different economic strength; that among the households having one worker, for example, there are those which rent four dessiatines, cultivate five to ten dessiatines and have two or three draught animals, and households which rent 38 dessiatines, cultivate more than 50 dessiatines and have four and more draught animals. Consequently, the equality Mr. Maress arrives at is *fictitious*. As a matter of fact, in Melitopol Uyezd the richest households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, notwithstanding the fact that they are best provided with both allotment and purchased land, account for 66.3 per cent, i.e.,

two-thirds of all the rented land, leaving only 5.6 per cent as the share of the poorest households which constitute *one-half* of the total.

To proceed. If we see, on the one hand, households with no horses, or with only one horse, renting one dessiatine, or even part of a dessiatine, and, on the other hand, households with four or more horses, renting from 7 to 16 dessiatines, it is clear that here quantity is turning into quality. In the first case renting is the result of poverty, and amounts to bondage. The "tenant" placed in such conditions cannot but become an object of exploitation by means of labour service, winter hiring,[62] money loans, etc. On the other hand, the household that has from 12 to 16 dessiatines of allotment land and, *over and above this*, rents from 7 to 16 dessiatines, obviously does so not because it is poor, but because it is well off, not to subsist but to get rich, to "make money". We have here a clear example of the conversion of land renting into capitalist farming, of the rise of capitalist enterprise in agriculture. Such households, as we shall see further on, do not get along without hiring agricultural labourers.

The question now arises: to what extent is this obvious entrepreneur renting of land a general phenomenon? Below we shall quote data which show that the growth of entrepreneur farming varies in different districts of commercial farming. For the moment let us quote a few more examples and draw our general conclusions regarding the renting of land.

In Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, households cultivating 25 dessiatines and over comprise 18.2 per cent of the total number. These have from 16 to 17 dessiatines of allotment land and rent from 17 to 44 dessiatines per household. In Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, households having five draught animals and more represent 24.7 per cent of the total. They cultivate averages of 25, 53, and 149 dessiatines, and rent respectively 14, 54, and 304 dessiatines of non-allotment land per household (the first figure refers to the group with from 5 to 10 draught animals, representing 17.1 per cent of the households; the second to the group with from 10 to 20 draught animals, representing 5.8 per cent of the households; the third to the group with 20 and more draught animals, representing 1.8 per cent of the households). These households rent averages of 12, 29, and 67 dessiatines respec-

tively of allotment land from other communities, and 9, 21, and 74 dessiatines in their own communities. In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, 10.1 per cent of the total households cultivate 20 and more dessiatines per household. These have 28 to 44 dessiatines of allotment land per household and rent 14 to 40 dessiatines of arable land and 118 to 261 dessiatines of grassland. In two uyezds in Orel Gubernia (Yelets and Trubchevsk), households with four horses and more comprise 7.2 per cent of the total. They have 15.2 dessiatines per household of allotment land, and by purchasing and renting land they bring up the amount of land they use to 28.4 dessiatines. In Zadonsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia, the corresponding figures are: 3.2 per cent of the households averaging 17.1 dessiatines of allotment land, and 33.2 dessiatines as the total area in use per household. In three uyezds in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia (Knyaginin, Makaryev and Vasil), 9.5 per cent of the households possess three horses and more. These households average from 13 to 16 dessiatines of allotment land but farm a total of 21 to 34 dessiatines.

From this it is evident that entrepreneur renting of land among the peasantry is no isolated or casual phenomenon, but is general and universal. Everywhere there emerge in the village communes well-to-do households, which always constitute an insignificant minority and always organise capitalist farming with the aid of entrepreneur renting of land. For this reason general phrases about subsistence and capitalist renting can do nothing to clear up questions relating to our peasant farming; a study must be made of the *concrete facts* regarding the development of feudal features in the renting of land, and regarding the formation of capitalist relations *within this very renting of land*.

We quoted figures above showing what ratios of the population and of allotment land are accounted for by the most well-to-do peasant households, comprising 20 per cent of the total. Now we may add that these concentrate in their hands from 50.8 to 83.7 per cent of all the land rented by the peasantry, leaving to the poorest groups, comprising 50 per cent of all households, from 5 to 16 per cent of the total rented land. The conclusion to be drawn from this is clear: if we are asked what kind of renting preponderates in Russia, subsistence or entrepreneur renting, renting through poverty

or renting by well-to-do peasants, feudal renting (based on labour service and bondage) or bourgeois renting, there can be only one answer. Among the households which rent land, undoubtedly the majority do so because of poverty. For the overwhelming majority of the peasants renting means bondage. If we take the quantity of land rented, undoubtedly not less than half of it is in the hands of well-to-do peasants, the rural bourgeoisie, who are organising agriculture on capitalist lines.

Usually statistics of the prices of rented land are only given in "averages", covering the total number of tenants and the total amount of land. The extent to which these averages *camouflage* the extreme poverty and oppression of the peasantry can be seen from the Zemstvo statistics for Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, which, by a lucky exception, show the rental prices paid by the various groups of peasants, viz.:

Groups of households	Percentage of households renting land	Arable in dess. per renting household	Price per dess. in rubles
Cultivating up to 5 dessiatines	25	2.4	15.25
" from 5 to 10 dessiatines. . . .	42	3.9	12.00
" from 10 to 25 dessiatines . .	69	8.5	4.75
" from 25 to 50 dessiatines . .	88	20.0	3.75
" over 50 dessiatines.	91	48.6	3.55
Total	56.2	12.4	4.23

Thus, the "average" rental price of 4 rubles 23 kopeks per dessiatine is an outright distortion of the real situation; it obscures the contradictions which are the very crux of the matter. The poor peasants are compelled to rent land at a ruinous price, more than three times the average. The rich buy up land "wholesale" at advantageous prices, and, of course, as occasion offers, lease it to their needy neighbour at a profit of 275 per cent. There is renting and renting. There is feudal bondage, there is Irish renting, and there is trading in land, capitalist farming.

The phenomenon of peasants leasing their allotment land reveals still more strikingly the capitalist relations within the village commune, the pauperisation of the poor and the enrichment of a minority at the expense of this peasant mass which is being reduced to ruin. The renting and letting of land are phenomena in no way connected with the village commune and communal equalisation. Of what significance in real life will this equalised distribution of allotment land be, if the poor are forced to *let* to the rich the land allotted to them on the basis of equalisation? And what more striking refutation of "communalist" views can one imagine than this fact, that real life *circumvents* the official, the register-established equalisation of allotments? The impotence of any kind of equalisation in face of developing capitalism is clearly demonstrated by the fact of the poor letting their allotments and of the rich concentrating rented land in their hands.

How prevalent is this practice of letting allotment land? According to the now obsolete Zemstvo statistical investigations made in the eighties of the last century, to which we have perforce to confine ourselves for the time being, the number of households letting their land and the percentage of allotment land thus let appear to be small. For example, in Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, 25.7 per cent of the householders let their allotment land, the amount of allotment land let representing 14.9 per cent of the total. In Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, 12 per cent of the households let their land. In Kamyshin Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia, the amount of land let represents 16 per cent of the total. In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, allotment arable land is let by 8,500 householders out of a total of 23,500, i.e., more than one-third. The allotment land let amounts to 50,500 dessiatines out of a total of 410,000 dessiatines, i.e., about 12 per cent. In Zadonsk Uyezd, Voronezh Gubernia, 6,500 dessiatines of allotment land out of a total of 135,500 dessiatines are let, i.e., less than 5 per cent. In three uyezds of Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, 19,000 out of a total of 433,000 dessiatines are let, i.e., also less than 5 per cent. But all these figures only seem insignificant because such percentages tacitly assume that the householders in all groups let their land more or less evenly. But such an assumption is quite

contrary to the facts. What is more important than the absolute figures of renting and letting, than the average percentages of the amount of land let or of the householders letting their land, is the fact that it is the poor peasants who mostly let their land, and that the largest amount of land is rented by the well-to-do peasants. The data of the Zemstvo statistical investigations leave no doubt whatever on this score. The most well-to-do households, comprising 20 per cent of the total, account for from 0.3 to 12.5 per cent of the total land let. On the other hand, the poor groups, comprising 50 per cent of the total households, let from 63.3 per cent to 98.0 per cent of the total land let. And, of course, it is the self same well-to-do peasants who rent the land let by the poor peasants. Here again it is clear that the significance of land-letting varies in the different groups of peasants: the poor peasant lets his land out of poverty, as he is unable to cultivate his land, having no seed, no cattle, no implements, and being desperately hard up for money. The rich peasants let little land: they either exchange one plot of land for another more suitable for their farm, or directly trade in land.

The following are concrete figures for Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia:

	Percentages of	
	householders letting allotment land	allotment land let
Cultivating no land	80	87.1
” up to 5 dessiatines	30	38.4
” 5 to 10 ”	23	17.2
” 10 to 25 ”	16	8.1
” 25 to 50 ”	7	2.9
” over 50 ”	7	13.8
In the uyezd	25.7	14.9

Is it not clear from these figures that the abandonment of the land and proletarisation on a huge scale are combined here with trading in land by a handful of rich people? Is it not characteristic that the percentage of allotment land let rises precisely among those big cultivators who have an average of 17 dessiatines of allotment land per household, 30 dessiatines of purchased land and 44 dessiatines of rented land? All in all, the entire poor group in Dnieper Uyezd, i.e., 40 per cent of the total number of households, having 56,000

dessiatines of allotment land, rents 8,000 and lets 21,500 dessiatines. The well-to-do group, on the other hand, which represents 18.4 per cent of the households, and has 62,000 dessiatines of allotment land, lets 3,000 dessiatines of allotment land and rents 82,000 dessiatines. In three uyezds in Taurida Gubernia, this well-to-do group rents 150,000 dessiatines of allotment land, i.e., three-fifths of the total allotment land let! In Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, households possessing no horse (47 per cent of all households) and those having one horse (13 per cent of the total) let allotment land, while owners of ten and more draught animals, i.e., only 7.6 per cent of all households, rent 20, 30, 60 and 70 dessiatines of *allotment* land.

In regard to purchased land, almost the same thing has to be said as in regard to rented land. The difference is that in the renting of land there are feudal features, that in certain circumstances renting is on the basis of labour service and of bondage, i.e., it is a method of binding impoverished neighbouring peasants to the landed estate as farm-hands. Whereas the purchase of land as private property by peasants who have allotment land represents a purely bourgeois phenomenon. In the West, farm-hands and day-labourers are sometimes tied to the land by selling them small plots. In Russia, a similar operation was officially carried out long ago in the shape of the "Great Reform" of 1861, and at the present time the purchase of land by peasants solely expresses the crystallisation out of the village commune of members of the rural bourgeoisie. The way in which the purchase of land by peasants developed after 1861 has been dealt with above in our examination of the statistics of landownership. Here, however, we must point out the enormous concentration of purchased land in the hands of a minority. The well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, have concentrated in their hands from 59.7 to 99 per cent of land purchased. The poorest households, 50 per cent of the total, possess from 0.4 to 15.4 per cent of all the land purchased by peasants. We can safely say, therefore, that out of the 7,500,000 dessiatines of land which have become the private property of peasants in the period from 1877 to 1905 (see above), from two-thirds to three-fourths are in the hands of an insignificant minority of well-to-do

households. The same applies, of course, to the purchase of land by peasant societies and associations. In 1877, peasant societies owned 765,000 dessiatines of purchased-land and in 1905 the figure was 3,700,000 dessiatines, while peasant associations in 1905 were the private owners of 7,600,000 dessiatines. It would be a mistake to think that land purchased or rented by societies is distributed differently from that purchased or rented individually. The facts prove the contrary. For example in the three mainland uyezds of Taurida Gubernia, statistics collected on the distribution of land rented from the state by peasant *societies* showed that 76 per cent of the rented land was in the hands of the well-to-do group (about 20 percent of the households), while the poorest households, constituting 40 per cent of the total, had only 4 per cent of the total rented land. The peasants divide rented or purchased land only according to "money put down".

IV

Taken all round, the figures quoted above concerning peasants' allotment land, rented land, land purchased and let, lead to the conclusion that with every passing day *the actual use of land* by the peasantry corresponds less and less to the official description of peasant allotment landownership. Of course, if we take gross figures, or "averages" then the amount of allotment land that is let will be balanced by the amount that is rented, the rest of the land rented and purchased will be distributed equally, as it were, among all the peasant households, and the impression will be created that the actual use of land is not very much different from the official, i.e., allotment landownership. But such an impression would be pure fiction, because the actual use of land by the peasantry departs most of all from the original equalised distribution of allotment land *precisely in the extreme groups*: so that "averages" inevitably distort the picture.

As a matter of fact, in the lower groups the total land used by the peasants is relatively—and sometimes absolutely—less than the allotment distribution (letting of land; insignificant share of rented laud). For the higher groups, on the contrary, the total land in use is always both rela-

tively and absolutely larger than the land held as allotments, owing to the concentration of purchased and rented land. We have seen that the poorest groups, constituting 50 per cent of all households, hold from 33 to 37 per cent of the allotment land, but only from 18.6 to 31.9 per cent of the total land used by the peasants. In some cases the drop is almost 50 per cent; for example, in Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, the percentage of allotment land is 37.4, while that of total land in use is 19.2. The well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, hold from 29 to 36 per cent of the allotment land, but from 34 to 49 per cent of the total land in use. Here are some concrete figures illustrating these relations. In Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, the poorest households, constituting 40 per cent of the total, have 56,000 dessiatines of allotment land, but they use only 45,000 dessiatines, i.e., 11,000 dessiatines *less*. The well-to-do group (18 per cent of the households) holds 62,000 dessiatines of allotment land, but uses a total of 167,000 dessiatines, i.e., 105,000 dessiatines more. The following table gives the figures for three uyezds in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia.

	Dessiatines per household	
	Allotment land	Total land in use
Peasants with no horse	5.1	4.4
” ” 1 ”	8.1	9.4
” ” 2 horses . . .	10.5	13.8
” ” 3 ”	13.2	21.0
” ” 4 ” and more	16.4	34.6
Total	8.3	10.3

Here, too, as a result of renting and letting, there is an absolute decline in the amount of land in actual use by the lowest group. And this lowest group, i.e., the horseless peasants, comprises fully 30 per cent of the households. Nearly one-third of the households *suffer* an absolute loss as a result of renting and letting land. The one-horse households (37 per cent of the total) have increased their use of land, but to an exceedingly small extent, proportionately less than the average increase in the use of land by the peasants (from 8.3

to 10.3 dessiatines). Hence the *share* of this group in the total land used has diminished: it had 36.6 per cent of the allotment lands in all the three uyezds, now it accounts for 34.1 per cent of the total land in use. On the other hand, an insignificant minority constituting the higher groups have increased their use of land far above the average. Those owning three horses (7.3 per cent of the households) increased the amount of land in their possession by half as much again: from 13 to 21 dessiatines; and those owning many horses (2.3 per cent of the total households) more than doubled the amount of land in use: from 16 to 35 dessiatines.

We see, therefore, as a general phenomenon, *a decline in the role of allotment land in peasant farming*. This decline is taking place at both poles in the countryside, in different ways. Among the poor peasants the role of allotment land is declining because their growing poverty and ruin *compel* them to let their land, to abandon it, to *reduce* the land under cultivation because they lack livestock, implements, seed, and money, and either to hire themselves out on some job or ... to enter the kingdom of heaven. The lower groups of peasants are dying out; famine, scurvy, typhus are doing their work. Among the higher groups of peasants the importance of allotment land is declining because their expanding farms are forced far beyond the bounds of this allotment land, and they have to base themselves on a new type of landownership, not bonded but tree, not of the ancient-tribal kind but bought in the market: on the purchase and renting of land. The richer the peasants are in land, the fainter are the traces of serfdom; the more rapidly economic development proceeds, the more energetic is this emancipation from allotment land, the drawing of all land into the sphere of commerce, the establishment of commercial farming on rented land. Novorossia is a case in point. We have just seen that farming by the well-to-do peasants is done there to a greater extent on purchased and rented land than on allotment land. This may seem paradoxical, but it is a fact: in the part of Russia where land is available in the greatest quantities, the well-to-do peasants, possessing the biggest allotments (from 16 to 17 dessiatines per household) are shifting the centre of gravity of their farming from allotment land to *non-allotment land*!

The fact that the role of allotment land is declining at both rapidly progressing poles of the peasantry is, by the way, of enormous importance in appraising the conditions of that agrarian revolution which the nineteenth century has bequeathed to the twentieth, and which gave rise to the struggle of classes in our revolution. This fact graphically demonstrates that the *break-up* of the old system of landownership—both landlord and peasant ownership—has become *an absolute economic necessity*. This break-up is absolutely inevitable, and no power on earth can prevent it. The struggle is about the form of this break-up and how it is to be effected—in the Stolypin way, by preserving landlordism and by the plunder of the communes by the kulaks, or in the peasant way, by abolishing landlordism and removing all medieval obstacles from the land through its nationalisation. We shall, however, deal with this question in greater detail further on. Here it is necessary to point out the important fact that the decline in the role of allotment land is leading to an extremely uneven distribution of peasant dues and obligations.

It is well known that the dues and obligations falling on the Russian peasant bear very strong traces of the Middle Ages. We cannot here go into the details of Russia's financial history. It is sufficient to mention redemption payments—that direct continuation of medieval quit-rent, that tribute paid to the serf-owning landlords, extracted with the aid of the police state. Suffice it to recall how unequally the lands of the nobility and the peasantry are taxed, the obligations in kind, etc. We quote only total figures of dues and obligations, from the data of the Voronezh *peasant budget* statistics.[63] The average gross income of a peasant family (according to data of 66 typical budgets) is given at 491 rubles 44 kopeks; the gross expenditure, 443 rubles. Net income, 48 rubles 44 kopeks. The total of dues and obligations per "average" household, however, is 34 rubles 35 kopeks. Thus, dues and obligations amount to 70 per cent of the *net income*. Of course, these are only dues in their form, but in fact they are the former feudal exploitation of the "*bonded social-estate*". The net money income of the average family amounts in all to 17 rubles 83 kopeks, i.e., the "taxes" drawn from the Russian

peasant are *double* his net money income—and this is according to the statistics of 1889, not 1849!

But in this case, too, average figures camouflage the peasant's poverty, and present the position of the peasantry in a much better light than it really is. The statistics of the distribution of dues and obligations among the various groups of peasants according to their economic strength show that those paid by the horseless or one-horse peasants (i.e., *three-fifths* of the total peasant families in Russia) are many times in excess not only of their net money income, but even of their net gross income. Here are the figures:

	Budget figures (rubles per household)			
	Gross income	Expenditure	Dues and obligations	Also as percentage of expenditure
a) With no horse	118.10	109.08	15.47	14.19
b) Owning 1 horse . . .	178.12	174.26	17.77	10.20
c) " 2 horses . . .	429.72	379.17	32.02	8.44
d) " 3 " . . .	753.19	632.36	49.55	7.83
e) " 4 " . . .	978.66	937.30	67.90	7.23
f) " 5 " and more	1,755.79	1,593.77	86.34	5.42
Average	491.44	443.00	34.35	7.75

The horseless and one-horse peasants pay in the form of dues *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of all their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf quit-rent was as high as that: the inevitable ruin of the mass of the peasants belonging to him would not have been to the advantage of the landlord. As to the uneven allocation of the dues it is, as we see, enormous. In proportion to their income, the well-to-do peasants pay three to two times less. What is the cause of this inequality? The cause is that the peasants divide the bulk of the dues according to the amount of allotment land held. For the peasant the share of dues and the share of allotment land merge into the single concept—"head". And if, in our example, we calculate the amount of dues and obligations for different groups per dessiatine of allotment land, we will get the following: (a) 2.6 rubles; (b) 2.4 rubles; (c) 2.5 rubles; (d) 2.6 rubles; (e) 2.9 rubles; (f) 3.7 rubles. With the exception of the highest

group, which owns large industrial establishments that are assessed separately, we see an approximately even distribution of the dues. Here, too, the share of allotment land corresponds, as a whole, to the share of dues paid. This phenomenon is a direct survival (and direct proof) of the feudal character of our village commune. From the very conditions of the labour-service system of farming, this could not be otherwise: the landlords could not have provided themselves with bonded labourers from among the local peasants for half a century after the "emancipation" had these peasants not been tied to starvation allotments and not been obliged to pay three times as dear for them. It must not be forgotten that *at the end of the nineteenth century* it has been no rare thing in Russia for the peasant to have to *pay in order to get rid* of his allotment land, to pay "extras" for giving up his allotment, i.e., to pay a certain sum to the person who took over his allotment. For example, Mr. Zhbankov describing the life of the Kostroma peasants in his book *Women's Country* (Kostroma, 1891),[64] says that, among Kostroma folk who leave their holdings in search of work, "it is rare that peasants receive for their land some small part of the dues; usually they let their land on the sole condition that the tenants make some use of it, the owner himself paying all the dues". In *The Survey of Yaroslavl Gubernia*, which appeared in 1896, we find quite a number of similar references to the fact that peasants who become migratory workers have to pay to get rid of their allotments.

Of course, we will find no *such* "power of land" in the purely agricultural gubernias. But even in these gubernias the phenomenon of the declining role of allotment land at both poles in the countryside is undoubtedly to be observed in another form. This fact is universal. That being the case, the distribution of taxes according to the amount of allotment land inevitably gives rise to increasing inequality in taxation. From all sides and by diverse ways economic development is leading to the break-down of the medieval forms of landownership, the scrapping of the social-estate divisions (allotment, landlords' and other lands), to the rise of new forms of economy, evolving indifferently out of fragments of the one and the other type of landownership. The nineteenth century bequeaths to the twentieth century the

imperative and obligatory task of completing this "clearing away" of the medieval forms of landownership. The fight is whether this "clearing" will be done in the form of peasant nationalisation of the land, or in the form of the accelerated plunder of the communes by the kulaks and of the transformation of landlord into Junker economy.

Continuing our examination of the data concerning the present-day system of peasant economy, let us pass from the question of land to the question of livestock raising. Here again we have to establish that, as a general rule, the distribution of livestock among peasant households is *much more* uneven than the distribution of allotment land. Here, for example, we see the extent of livestock raising among the peasants in Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia:

	Per household	
	Allotment land (dess.)	Total livestock (head)
Cultivating no land	6.4	1.1
" up to 5 dessiatines	5.5	2.4
" 5-10 "	8.7	4.2
" 10-25 "	12.5	7.3
" 25-50 "	16.6	13.9
" over 50 "	17.4	30.0
Average	11.2	7.6

The difference in number of livestock between the extreme groups is *ten times* greater than in the amount of allotment land held. The data for livestock raising, too, show that the actual size of the property has little resemblance to what is usually believed to be the case when only average figures are used, and when it is assumed that the allotment determines everything. No matter what uyezd we take, everywhere the distribution of livestock is found to be much more uneven than the distribution of allotment land. The well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, and having from 29 to 36 per cent of the allotment land, have concentrated in their hands from 37 to 57 per cent of all livestock owned by the peasants in the given uyezd or group of uyezds. The lower groups, constituting 50 per cent of the total households, own 14 to 30 per cent of all the livestock.

But these figures by no means fully reveal the actual differences. No less important, and sometimes even more important than the question of the quantity of livestock, is the question of their *quality*. It goes without saying that the half-ruined peasant, with his poverty-stricken farm, enmeshed on all sides in the toils of bondage, is not in a position to acquire and keep livestock at all good in quality. If the owner (owner indeed!) starves, his livestock must starve; it cannot be otherwise. Budget statistics for Voronezh Gubernia illustrate with extraordinary clarity the wretched condition of livestock raising by the horseless and one-horse peasants, i.e., *three-fifths* of the total peasant farms in Russia. We quote below some extracts from these statistics in order to characterise the state of peasant livestock raising.

	Total livestock per household, in terms of cattle	Average annual expenditure (in rubles)	
		For acquisition and repair of implements and purchase of cattle	Cattle feed
(a) With no horse	0.8	0.08	8.12
(b) Owning 1 horse	2.6	5.36	36.70
(c) " 2 horses	4.9	8.78	71.21
(d) " 3 "	9.1	9.70	127.03
(e) " 4 "	12.8	30.80	173.24
(f) " 5 " and more	19.3	75.80	510.07
Average	5.8	13.14	98.91

In the period from 1896 to 1900 there were in European Russia $3\frac{1}{4}$ million horseless peasant households. One can imagine the state of their "farms" if they spent *eight kopeks* per annum on livestock and implements. One-horse households numbered $3\frac{1}{3}$ millions. With an expenditure of five rubles per annum for buying livestock and implements they can only linger on in a state of everlasting, hopeless poverty. Even in the case of two-horse peasants ($2\frac{1}{2}$ million households) and three-horse peasants (1 million households), expenditure on livestock and implements amounts to only 9-10 rubles per annum. Only in the two higher groups (in

the whole of Russia there are 1 million households of this type out of a total of 11 million) does expenditure on livestock and implements come anywhere near that required for carrying on proper farming.

Quite naturally, in these conditions, the quality of the livestock cannot be the same in the different groups of farms. For example, the value of a draught horse belonging to a one-horse peasant is estimated at 27 rubles, that of a two-horse peasant at 37 rubles, that of a three-horse peasant at 61 rubles, that of a four-horse peasant at 52 rubles and that of a peasant owning many horses at 69 rubles. The difference between the extreme groups is more than 100 per cent. And this phenomenon is general for all capitalist countries where there is small- and large-scale farming. In my book, *The Agrarian Question* (Part I, St. Petersburg, 1908),* I have shown that the investigations made by Drechsler into the conditions of farming and livestock raising in Germany revealed exactly the same state of affairs. The average weight of the average animal on large estates was 619 kilogrammes (op. cit., 1884, p. 259); on peasant farms of 25 and more hectares, 427 kilogrammes, on farms of $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 25 hectares, 382 kilogrammes, on farms of $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $7\frac{1}{2}$ hectares, 352 kilogrammes, and finally on farms up to $2\frac{1}{2}$ hectares, 301 kilogrammes.

The quantity and quality of the livestock also determine the manner in which the land is tended, particularly the way it is manured. We showed above that all the statistics for the whole of Russia attest that the landlords' land is better manured than the peasants' land. Now we see that this division, which was proper and legitimate for the days of serfdom, is now obsolete. Between the various categories of peasant farms lies a deep gulf, and all investigations, calculations, findings and theories based on the "average" peasant farm lead to absolutely wrong conclusions on this question. Zemstvo statistics, unfortunately, very rarely study the various groups of households and are confined to figures covering the commune. But as an exception to the

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 183-94.—*Ed.*

rule, during a house-to-house investigation made in Perm Gubernia (Krasnoufimsk Uyezd) the following precise data as to the manuring of land by the various peasant households were collected:

	Percentage of farms manuring land at all	Number of cart-loads of manure per manure-using household
Cultivating up to 5 dess.	33.9	80
" from 5 to 10 "	66.2	116
" from 10 to 25 "	70.3	197
" from 25 to 50 "	76.9	358
" more than 50 "	84.3	732
Average	51.7	176

Here we see types of farm that differ in agricultural methods according to the size of farm. And investigators working in another area who paid attention to this question arrived at similar conclusions. Statisticians in Orel Gubernia report that the amount of manure obtained per head of cattle on the farms of well-to-do peasants is almost twice the amount obtained on the farms of needy peasants. In the group with an average of 7.4 head of livestock per household, 391 poods of manure are obtained, while in the group with 2.8 head of livestock per household 208 poods are obtained. The "normal" amount is considered to be 400 poods, so that only a small minority of well-to-do peasants are able to reach this norm. The poor peasants are obliged to use straw and manure for fuel, and sometimes even to sell manure, etc.

In this connection we must examine the question of the increase in the number of horseless peasants. In 1888-91 there were, in 48 gubernias of European Russia, 2.8 million horseless households, out of a total of 10.1 million households, i.e., 27.3 per cent. After approximately nine or ten years, in 1896-1900, out of a total of 11.1 million households, 3.2 million, or 29.2 per cent, were horseless. The increasing expropriation of the peasantry is, therefore, beyond doubt. But if one examines this process from the agronomical point of view, one arrives at a conclusion which at first sight is paradoxical. This was the conclusion arrived at by the well-

known Narodnik writer, Mr. V. V., as early as 1884 (*Vestnik Yevropy*,[65] 1884, No. 7), when he compared the number of dessiatines of arable per horse on our peasant farms with that in the "normal" three-field farm—normal from the point of view of agronomy. It turned out that peasants keep *too many* horses: they plough only 5 to 8 dessiatines per horse, instead of 7 to 10 as required by agronomy. "Consequently," concluded Mr. V. V., "the decline in horse-ownership among a section of the population in this part of Russia [the Central Black-Earth Belt] must, to a certain extent, be regarded as the restoration of the normal ratio between the number of draught animals and the area to be cultivated." In reality, the paradox is due to the fact that decline in horse-ownership is accompanied by the concentration of land in the hands of the well-to-do households, who arrive at a "normal" ratio between the number of horses and the cultivated area. This "normal" ratio is not "restored" (for it never existed in our peasant economy) but is achieved only by the peasant bourgeoisie. The "abnormality", on the other hand, boils down to the fragmentation of the means of production on the small peasant farms: the amount of land cultivated by a million one-horse peasants, with the aid of a million horses, is better and more thoroughly cultivated by well-to-do peasants with the aid of one-half or three-quarters of a million horses.

In regard to implements on the peasant farms, a distinction must be drawn between ordinary peasant implements and improved agricultural implements. Generally speaking, the distribution of the first category corresponds to the distribution of draught animals; we shall find nothing new in statistics of this kind to characterise peasant farming. Improved implements, on the other hand, which are much more expensive, and are a paying proposition only on larger farms, are introduced only on successfully developing farms, and are immeasurably more concentrated. Data concerning this concentration are extremely important, because they alone enable us to judge precisely in what direction, and in what social conditions, there is *progress* in peasant farming. There is no doubt that a step forward has been made in this direction since 1861, but very often the capitalist character of this progress, not only in landlord farming, but also in peasant farming, is contested or called in question.

The following Zemstvo statistical data show the distribution of improved implements among the peasantry:

	Improved agricultural implements per 100 households	
	Two uyezds of Orel Gubernia	One uyezd of Voronezh Gubernia
With no horses	0.01	—
" 1 horse	0.2	0.06
" 2-3 horses	3.5	1.6
" 4 horses and more . . .	36.0	23.0
Average	2.2	1.2

In these localities, improved implements are comparatively little to be found among the peasants. The proportion of households possessing such implements is quite insignificant But the lower groups hardly employ them at all, whereas among the higher groups they are in regular use. In Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, only 13 per cent of the peasants have improved implements: but the percentage rises to 40 per cent in the group owning 5 to 20 draught animals and to 62 per cent in the group owning 20 and more animals. In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia (three districts of this uyezd), there are 10 improved implements for every hundred farms—this is the general average; but for every hundred farms cultivating from 20 to 50 dessiatines there are 50 improved implements and for every hundred farms cultivating 50 dessiatines there are as many as 180 implements. If we take the ratios we used earlier to compare the data of different uyezds, we find that the well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, possess from 70 to 86 per cent of all the improved implements, whereas the poor households, which constitute 50 per cent of the total, account for from 1.3 to 3.6 per cent. Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the progress made in the spread of improved implements among the peasantry (reference to this progress is made, by the way, in the above-mentioned work of the year 1907 by Mr. Kaufman) is the progress of the well-to-do peasantry. Three-fifths of the total peasant households, the horseless and one-horse peasants, are almost completely unable to employ these improvements.

V

In examining peasant farming, we have up till now taken the peasants mainly as proprietors; at the same time we pointed to the fact that the lower groups are being continuously squeezed out of that category. Where do they land? Evidently in the ranks of the proletariat. We must now investigate in detail how this formation of the proletariat, particularly the rural proletariat, is actually taking place, and how the market for labour-power in agriculture is being formed. In the case of the labour-service system of farming the typical class figures are the feudal landlord and the bonded peasant who has been allotted land; in capitalist farming the typical figures are the employer-farmer and the farm-hand or the day-labourer who hires himself out. We have shown how the landlord and the well-to-do peasant are transformed into employers of labour. Now let us see how the peasant is transformed into a hired labourer.

Is the employment of hired labour by well-to-do peasants widespread? If we take-the average percentage of households employing farm-hands among the total peasant households (as is usually done), the percentage will not be very high: in Dnieper Uyezd, Taurida Gubernia, it is 12.9 per cent; in Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, 9 per cent; in Kamyshin Uyezd, Saratov Gubernia, 8 per cent; in Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, 10.6 per cent; two uyezds in Orel Gubernia, 3.5 per cent; one uyezd in Voronezh Gubernia, 3.8 per cent; three uyezds in Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia, 2.6 per cent. But statistics of this kind are, strictly speaking, fictitious, since they express the percentage of households employing farm-hands to the total number of households—including those which provide the farm-hands. In every capitalist society the bourgeoisie constitute an insignificant minority of the population. The number of households employing hired labour will always be "small". The question is, whether it means that a special type of farm is arising, or whether the employment of labour is a chance affair. To this question, too, a very definite answer is provided by Zemstvo statistics, which in all cases show the percentage of households employing farm-hands to be immeasurably larger in the groups of well-to-do peasants than the average for the

uyezd as a whole. Let us quote the figures for Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, which, as an exception to the rule, give information not only about the hiring of farm-hands, but also about the hiring of day-labourers, i.e., the form of hiring that is more typical of agriculture.

		Percentage of farms hiring labours			
	Number of male workers per household	Hired for definite periods	For mowing	For reaping	For threshing
Cultivating no land	0.6	0.15	0.6	—	—
" up to 5 dessiatines	1.0	0.7	5.1	4.7	9.2
" 5 to 10 dessiatines	1.2	4.2	14.3	20.1	22.3
" 10 to 20 dessiatines	1.5	17.2	27.2	43.9	25.9
" 20 to 50 dessiatines	1.7	50.0	47.9	69.6	33.7
" more than 50 dessiatines	2.0	83.1	64.5	87.2	44.7
Average	1.2	10.3	16.4	24.3	18.8

It will be seen that a distinguishing feature of the well-to-do households is that they have larger families, they have more of their own family as workers than the poor households have. Nevertheless, they employ incomparably more hired labourers. "Family co-operation" serves as a basis for extending the scale of farming and is thus transformed into capitalist co-operation. In the higher groups, the hiring of labourers is obviously becoming a system, a condition for conducting expanded farming. Moreover, the hiring of day-labourers turns out to be very considerably widespread even among the middle group of peasants: in the two higher groups (constituting 10.3 per cent of the households) the majority of the households hire labourers, while in the group cultivating from 10 to 20 dessiatines (22.4 per cent), *more than two-fifths* of the households hire labourers for reaping. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the well-to-do peasants could not exist if there were not a vast army of agricultural labourers ready to serve them. And if, as we have seen, the data concerning the average percentages of households hiring

labourers show considerable fluctuations for the different uyezds, what is universal is the concentration of households employing agricultural labourers in the higher groups of the peasantry, that is to say, the transformation of the well-to-do households into employers of labour. The well-to-do households, constituting 20 per cent of the total, account for from 48 to 78 per cent of the total number of households employing labourers.

In regard to the other pole in the countryside, statistics do not usually indicate the number of households which provide hired labour of all kinds. On quite a number of questions our Zemstvo statistics have made considerable progress compared with the old, official statistics given in governors' reports and issued by various departments. But in one question, the old, official point of view has been retained even in Zemstvo statistics, and that is in regard to the so-called peasant "employments". Farming on his allotment is regarded as the peasant's real occupation; all other occupations are classed as side "employments" or "industries" and in doing so economic categories are lumped together that should be entered separately by anyone knowing the ABC of political economy. For example, the category "agricultural industrialists" includes, together with the mass of wage-labourers, also entrepreneur farmers (for example, melon growers); next to them, also in the category "households with employments", will be included beggars and traders, domestic servants and master-craftsmen, etc. Clearly, this crying political and economic muddle is a direct survival of serfdom. Indeed, it was a matter of indifference to the feudal landlord what occupation *his* quit-rent peasant followed on the side, whether that of a trader, a hired labourer or a master-industrialist. All the serfs were equally bound to pay quit-rent, all were regarded as being temporarily or conditionally absent from their real occupation.

After the abolition of serfdom, this point of view came, with every passing day, into increasingly sharp conflict with reality. Most of the peasant households having earnings on the side undoubtedly belong to the category of households which provide wage-labourers; but we cannot obtain a really exact picture of the situation, because the minority who are *master*-industrialists are included in the general total and

embellish the position of the needy ones. Let us quote an example to illustrate the point. In Novouzensk Uyezd, Samara Gubernia, the statisticians have singled out the category of "agricultural industries" from the general mass of "industries".[66] Of course, this term is not exact either, but the list of occupations at least indicates that out of a total of 14,063 "industrialists" of this kind, 13,297 are farm-hands and day-labourers. Thus wage-labourers predominate very largely. The distribution of agricultural industries is found to be the following:

	Percentage of male peasants engaged in agricultural industries
Having no draught animals	71.4
" 1 draught animal	48.7
" 2 to 3 draught animals . . .	20.4
" 4 " " . . .	8.5
" 5 to 10 " " . . .	5.0
" 10 to 20 " " . . .	3.9
" 20 draught animals and more	2.0
In the uyezd	25.0

Thus seven-tenths of the horseless peasants and almost half the one-horse peasants are hired labourers. In Krasnoufimsk Uyezd, Perm Gubernia, the average percentage of households whose members engage in agricultural industries is 16.2; but of those which do not cultivate their land 52.3 per cent engage in agricultural industries, and of those which cultivate up to five dessiatines, 26.4 per cent. In other uyezds, where the agricultural industries are not specified, the position is not quite so clear; nevertheless, it remains the general rule that "industries" and "employments" are, broadly speaking, the speciality of the lower groups. The lower groups, constituting 50 per cent of the total households, account for from 60 to 93 per cent of the households with "employments".

We see from this that, in the general scheme of the national economy, the position of the lower groups of the peasantry, particularly the one-horse and horseless households, is that of *farm-hands and day-labourers* (more broadly—hired labourers) *possessing allotments*. This conclusion is confirmed by the statistics showing the increase in the employment of hired labour since 1861 over the whole of Russia,

by the investigations made into the budgets of the lower groups to trace the sources of their incomes, and finally by the statistics on the standard of living of these groups. We shall dwell in somewhat greater detail on this threefold proof.

General statistics regarding the growth in the number of rural hired labour in the whole of Russia are available only for migratory workers, without indicating whether they are engaged in agricultural or non-agricultural occupations. The question as to whether the former or the latter preponderate in the total number was decided in Narodnik literature in favour of the former, but we shall give below the reasons for an opposite point of view. There is no doubt whatever that the number of migratory workers among the peasantry increased rapidly after 1861. All evidence goes to prove this. An approximate statistical expression of this phenomenon is found in the returns dealing with passport revenue and the number of passports issued. Passport revenue amounted to 2,100,000 rubles in 1868; 3,300,000 rubles in 1884, and 4,500,000 rubles in 1894. This shows a more than doubled revenue. The number of passports and certificates issued in European Russia was 4,700,000 in 1884, 7,800,000 in 1897 and 9,300,000 in 1898. In thirteen years, as we see, the number doubled. All these figures correspond, on the whole, with other estimates, for example, with that made by Mr. Uvarov, who summarised the figures of Zemstvo statistics—for the most part obsolete—for 126 uyezds in 20 gubernias and arrived at the likely total of 5,000,000 migratory workers.[67] Mr. S. Korolenko, on the basis of data on the number of surplus local workers, arrived at the figure of 6,000,000.

In the opinion of Mr. Nikolai—on, the "overwhelming majority" of these are engaged in agricultural industries. In *The Development of Capitalism** I showed in detail that the statistics and investigations of the sixties, eighties and nineties fully prove this conclusion to be wrong. The majority, although not the overwhelming majority, of the migratory workers are engaged in non-agricultural occupations. The following are the fullest and latest data concerning the dis-

* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 568-81—*Ed.*

tribution, by gubernias, of residential permits issued in European Russia in 1898:

Groups of gubernias	Total residential permits of all kinds issued in 1898
(1) 17 gubernias with predominance of non-agricultural migration	3,369,597
(2) 12 gubernias, intermediate	1,674,231
(3) 21 gubernias with predominance of agricultural migration	2,765,762
Total for 50 gubernias	7,809,590

If we assume that in the intermediate gubernias half are workers in agricultural jobs, then the *approximate*, the most probable distribution will be as follows: about 4,200,000 non-agricultural hired labourers and *about 3,600,000 agricultural hired labourers*. Alongside this figure should be placed the figure given by Mr. Rudnev,[68] who in 1894 summed up the returns of Zemstvo statistics for 148 uyezds in 19 gubernias and arrived at the approximate figure of 3,500,000 agricultural wage-workers. This figure, based on the returns for the eighties, includes both local and migratory agricultural workers. At the end of the nineties, there were so many migratory agricultural workers alone.

The growth in the number of agricultural wage-workers is directly connected with the development of that capitalist enterprise in agriculture which we have traced in landlord and peasant economy. Take, for example, the use of machinery in agriculture. We have quoted precise data proving that, so far as concerns the well-to-do peasants, it signifies the transition to capitalist enterprise. As for landlord economy, the use of machinery, and in general of improved implements, means inevitably the squeezing out of the labour-service system by capitalism. The implements of the peasant are replaced by the implements of the landlord; the old three-field system is supplanted by new farming methods connected with the change in the implements employed; the bonded peasant is not suitable for work with improved implements and his place is taken by the farm-hand or the day-labourer.

In the region of European Russia where the use of machinery developed most after the Reform, the employment of hired labour from outside is also most widespread. This

region comprises the southern and eastern borderlands of European Russia. The influx of agricultural labourers into that region has given rise to extremely typical and clearly expressed capitalist relations. These relations deserve to be dealt with, in order to compare the old and hitherto predominant system of labour-service economy with the new tendencies increasingly coming to the fore. First of all, it must be noted that the southern area is distinguished by the highest wages paid in agriculture. According to statistics for a whole decade (1881-91), which preclude any casual fluctuations, the highest wages in Russia are paid in Taurida, Bessarabia and Don gubernias. Here the wages of a labourer hired by the year, including keep, amount to 143 rubles 50 kopeks, and those of a seasonal labourer (for the summer), 55 rubles 67 kopeks. Next highest wages are those paid in the most highly industrial area—St. Petersburg, Moscow, Vladimir and Yaroslavl gubernias. Here the wages of an agricultural labourer hired for the year amount to 135 rubles 80 kopeks, and those of a seasonal worker 53 rubles. The lowest wages are paid in the central agricultural gubernias—Kazan, Penza, Tambov, Ryazan, Tula, Orel and Kursk, i.e., the principal districts where labour service, bondage and all sorts of survivals of serfdom prevail. Here the labourer hired for the year receives only 92 rubles 95 kopeks, a third less than the wages paid in the most highly capitalist gubernias, and the seasonal worker 35 rubles 64 kopeks, 20 rubles less for the summer than is paid in the south. It is precisely from this central district that we see an enormous migration of workers. Every spring more than one and a half million people leave this district, partly to seek agricultural employment (mainly in the south, and partly, as we shall see below, in the industrial gubernias), and also to seek non-agricultural employment in the capital cities and in the industrial gubernias. Between this principal area of egress and the two principal areas of ingress (the agricultural south and the capital cities with the two industrial gubernias) there are zones of gubernias in which average wages are paid. These gubernias attract part of the workers from the "cheapest" and most hunger-stricken central area, while in their turn supplying part of the workers for districts where higher wages are paid. In Mr. S. Korolenko's book, *Freely Hired Labour*, the author

uses very extensive material to give a detailed description of this process of workers' migration and of the shifts in population. In this way capitalism achieves a more even distribution of the population (even, of course, from the point of view of the requirements of capital); levels wages throughout the country; creates a really single, national labour-market; gradually cuts the ground from under the old modes of production by "enticing" the bonded peasant with high wages. Hence the endless complaints of the landed gentry about the local workers becoming corrupted, about the debauchery and drunkenness created by migration, about the workers being "spoilt" by the towns, etc., etc.

By the end of the nineteenth century fairly large capitalist agricultural enterprises were established in the districts to which the greatest number of workers migrated. Capitalist co-operation arose in the employment, for example, of machines like threshers. Mr. Tezyakov, in describing the conditions of life and labour of agricultural workers in Kherson Gubernia,[69] points out that the horse-drawn threshing-machine requires from 14 to 23 and more labourers, while the steam thresher requires from 50 to 70. Some farms employed between 500 and 1,000 workers—an extremely high figure for agriculture. Capitalism made it possible to replace more costly male labour by female and child labour. For example, in the small town of Kakhovka—one of the chief labour-markets in Taurida Gubernia, where as many as 40,000 workers used to gather, and where, in the nineties of the last century, there were between 20,000 and 30,000, the number of women in 1890 comprised 12.7 per cent of all the registered workers, while in 1895 the percentage was already 25.6. Children, in 1893, constituted 0.7 per cent of the total, and in 1895 already 1.69 per cent.

Collecting workers from all over Russia, the capitalist farms sorted them out according to their requirements, and created something akin to the hierarchy of factory workers. For example, the following categories are indicated: full workers and semi-workers, these again being subdivided into "workers of great strength" (16 to 20 years of age) and semi-workers of "little assistance" (children between the ages of 8 and 14). No trace here remains of the old, so-called "patriarchal" relations between the landlord and "his" peas-

ant. Labour-power becomes a commodity like any other. The "truly Russian" type of bondage disappears, yielding place to weekly wage payment, fierce competition, bargaining between workers and employers. The accumulation of enormous masses of workers in the labour-markets, and incredibly arduous and insanitary working conditions, have given rise to attempts to establish public control over the big farms. These attempts are characteristic of "large-scale industry" in agriculture, but of course they cannot be durable so long as political liberties and legal labour organisations are lacking. How hard the working conditions of the immigrant workers are may be judged by the fact that the working day ranges from $12\frac{1}{2}$ to 15 hours. Injuries to workers tending machines have become a common occurrence. Occupational diseases have spread (for example, among workers tending threshing-machines, etc.). All the "charms" of purely capitalist exploitation in the most developed, American, form are to be observed in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, side by side with purely medieval labour-service and corvée systems of economy, which have long ago disappeared in the advanced countries. The whole great variety of agrarian relations in Russia amounts to the interweaving of feudal and bourgeois methods of exploitation.

To complete this account of the conditions of hired labour in Russian agriculture, we may quote statistics regarding the budgets of peasant farms in the lower groups. Wage-labour is included here under the euphemistic heading of "employments" or "industries". In what relation does the income from these "employments" stand to the income from agriculture? The budgets of the horseless and one-horse peasants in Voronezh Gubernia give an exact answer to this question. The gross income of a horseless peasant from all sources is estimated at 118 rubles 10 kopeks, of which 57 rubles 11 kopeks is from farming and 59 rubles 4 kopeks from "industries". The latter sum is made up of 36 rubles 75 kopeks income from "personal industries" and 22 rubles 29 kopeks miscellaneous income. Included in the latter item is *income from the letting of land*! The gross income of a one-horse peasant is 178 rubles 12 kopeks, of which 127 rubles 69 kopeks is from farming and 49 rubles 22 kopeks from "industries" (35 rubles

from personal industries, 6 rubles carting, 2 rubles from "commercial and industrial establishments and enterprises" and 6 rubles miscellaneous income). If we subtract the expenditure on farming, we will get 69 rubles 37 kopeks income from farming, as against 49 rubles 22 kopeks income from "industries". That is how three-fifths of the peasant households in Russia obtain their livelihood. Naturally, the standard of living of these peasants is no higher, and sometimes even lower, than that of farm-hands. In this same Voronezh Gubernia the average yearly wage of a farm-hand (during the decade 1881-91) was 57 rubles, plus keep, which cost 42 rubles. Yet the cost of maintaining a *whole family* of four persons amounted to *78 rubles per annum* in the case of a horseless peasant and 98 rubles per annum for a family of five in the case of a one-horse peasant. The Russian peasant has been reduced by labour service, taxes, and capitalist exploitation to such a miserable, starvation standard of life as seems incredible in Europe. In Europe such social types are called *paupers*.

VI

To sum up all that has been said above concerning the differentiation of the peasantry, we will first of all quote the only printed summary statistics for the whole of European Russia, enabling us to judge of the various groups existing within the peasantry at various periods. These are the returns of the army-horse censuses. In the second edition of my book, *The Development of Capitalism*,* I summarised these returns for 48 gubernias in European Russia for the periods 188-91 and 1896-1900. The following is an abstract of the most important results:

	Number of peasant households (in millions)			
	1888-91		1896-1900	
	Total	%	Total	%
Horseless	2.8	27.3	3.2	29.2
Having 1 horse	2.9	28.5	3.4	30.3
" 2 horses. . . .	2.2	22.2	2.5	22.0
" 3 "	1.1	10.6	1.0	9.4
" 4 horses and more	1.1	11.4	1.0	9.1
Total	10.1	100.0	11.1	100.0

* See present edition, Vol. 3, p. 146.—*Ed.*

As I have already mentioned, incidentally, above, these figures evidence the increasing expropriation of the peasantry. The one-million increase in the number of households went entirely to enlarge the two lowest groups. The total number of horses declined in this period from 16.91 to 16.87 millions, that is to say, the peasantry as a whole became somewhat poorer in horses. The highest group also became poorer in horses: in 188-91 it had 5.5 horses per household compared with 5.4 in 1896-1900.

It is easy to draw the conclusion from these figures that no "differentiation" is taking place among the peasantry; the poorest group increased most, whereas the richest group diminished most (in number of households). This is not differentiation, but levelling up of poverty! And such conclusions, based on similar methods, can very often be found in the literature on the subject. But if we ask: have the relations between the groups within the peasantry changed?—we see something different. In 1888-91 the lowest groups, constituting half the households, owned 13.7 per cent of the total number of horses, and in 1896-1900 the percentage was exactly the same. The most well-to-do groups, which constituted one-fifth of the households, owned 52.6 per cent of the total number of horses in the first period, and 53.2 per cent in the second period. Clearly, the relations between the groups remained almost unchanged. The peasantry became poorer, the well-to-do groups became poorer, the crisis of 1891 made itself felt very seriously, but the relations between the rural bourgeoisie and the peasantry that was being driven to ruin did not change as a result, nor could they change essentially.

This circumstance is often overlooked by those who undertake to judge of the differentiation of the peasantry on the basis of fragmentary statistics. It would be ridiculous to imagine, for instance, that isolated statistics on the distribution of horses are able to explain anything at all in regard to the differentiation of the peasantry. This distribution proves absolutely nothing, if it is not taken together with *the entire sum total* of data on peasant farming. If, in examining these data, we have established what is common among the groups in regard to distribution of the renting and the letting of land, improved implements and manure, earnings and

purchased land, hired labourers and numbers of livestock, if we have proved that all these various aspects of the phenomenon are inseparably interconnected, and reveal in fact the formation of opposite economic types—a proletariat and a rural bourgeoisie—if we have established all this, and only to the extent that we have established this, we can take isolated figures showing, say, the distribution of horses, to *illustrate* all that has been said above. On the other hand, if we are referred to this or that case of diminution in the number of horses owned by the well-to-do group, say, over a given period, it would be sheer nonsense to draw any general conclusions *from this alone* as to the relation within the peasantry between the rural bourgeoisie and the other groups. In no single capitalist country, in no single branch of economy, is there, or can there be (the market being predominant) an even process of development: capitalism *cannot* develop otherwise than in leaps and zigzags, now rapidly advancing, now dropping temporarily below the previous level. And the crux of the matter concerning the Russian agrarian crisis and the forthcoming upheaval is not what degree of development has been reached by capitalism, or what the rate of that development is, but whether it is, or is not, a capitalist crisis and upheaval, whether it is, or is not, taking place in conditions in which the peasantry is being transformed into a rural bourgeoisie and a proletariat, and whether the relations between the various households within the commune are, or are not, bourgeois relations. In other words: the primary object of any study of the agrarian question in Russia is to establish the basic data for characterising the class substance of agrarian relations. And only after we have established what classes and what trend of development we are dealing with, can we take up particular questions about the rate of development, the various modifications in the general trend of development, etc.

Marxist views on post-Reform peasant economy in Russia are grounded on the recognition of this economy as petty-bourgeois in type. And the controversy which economists in the Marxist camp have waged with the Narodnik economists has revolved primarily (and cannot but do so, if the real nature of the differences between them is to be ascertained) around the point as to whether this characterisation is

correct, whether it is applicable or not. Unless *this* point is quite definitely cleared up, no progress whatever can be made towards more concrete or practical questions. For example, it would be an absolutely hopeless and confusing task to examine the different ways of solving the agrarian question bequeathed by the nineteenth century to the twentieth century, if we have not first cleared up in what general direction our agrarian evolution is proceeding, what classes stand to gain should events take this or that course, etc.

The detailed figures on the differentiation of the peasantry quoted above reveal precisely that foundation of all the other questions of the agrarian revolution without an understanding of which it is impossible to proceed. The sum total of the relations between the various groups of the peasantry which we have studied in detail at opposite ends of Russia, reveals to us precisely what is the essence of the social and economic relations existing within the commune. These relations strikingly reveal the petty-bourgeois nature of peasant economy in the present historical situation. When the Marxists used to say that the small producer in agriculture (irrespective of whether he cultivates allotment or any other land) is inevitably, with the development of commodity economy, a petty bourgeois, this proposition caused astonishment; it was said to be a mechanical, groundless attempt to apply outside models to our own original conditions. But the data on the relations between the groups, on the way the rich members of the commune outbid the poorer members for possession of the rented land, on the employment of farm-hands by the former and the conversion of the latter into hired labourers, etc., etc.—all these data confirm the theoretical conclusions of Marxism and render them incontrovertible. The question of the significance of the commune in the trend of Russia's economic development *is decided irrevocably* by these data, because it is this actual trend of the actual (and not imaginary) commune that our data indicate. Despite all the equalised distribution of allotment land and despite the redistributions, etc., *it turns out* that the trend of the real economic development of members of the peasant commune consists precisely in the formation of a rural bourgeoisie and in the squeezing-out of the mass of the poorest peasants into the ranks of the proletariat. As we shall see

further on, both the Stolypin agrarian policy and the nationalisation of the land demanded by the Trudoviks are in line with this trend of development, even though there is an enormous difference between these two forms of "solution" of the agrarian question from the point of view of the rapidity of social development, the growth of productive forces and the maximum observance of the interests of the masses.

We must now also examine the question of the development of commercial farming in Russia. The foregoing exposition included, as a premise, the well-known fact that the whole of the post-Reform period is distinguished by the growth of trade and exchange. We think it is quite superfluous to cite statistics in confirmation of this. But we must show, first, precisely to what extent present-day peasant economy is already subordinated to the market and, secondly, what *special* forms agriculture assumes as it becomes subordinated to the market.

The most precise data on the first question are contained in the budget statistics of the Voronezh Zemstvo. From these statistics we are able to separate the money expenditure and income of a peasant family from the total expenditure and income (gross incomes and expenditures were given above). Here is a table showing the role of the market:

	What percentage of his total expenditure and income is the peasant's money expenditure and income?	
	%	%
With no horse	57.1	54.6
" 1 horse	46.5	41.4
" 2 horses	43.6	45.7
" 3 "	41.5	42.3
" 4 "	46.9	40.8
" 5 " and more	60.2	59.2
Average	49.1	47.9

Thus, even the farm of the *middle* peasant—leave alone that of the well-to-do and of the impoverished, semi-proletarian, peasants—is subordinated to the market to a very powerful extent. Hence all arguments about peasant farming which ignore the predominant and growing role of the market, of exchange, of commodity production, are fundamentally wrong. The abolition of the feudalist latifundia and of

landlordism—a measure upon which all the thoughts of the Russian peasantry were concentrated at the end of the nineteenth century—will *increase* and not diminish the power of the market, for the growth of trade and commodity production *is retarded* by labour service and bondage.

In regard to the second question, it must be pointed out that the penetration of capital into agriculture is a distinctive process which cannot be properly understood if we confine ourselves to bald figures covering the whole of Russia. Agriculture becomes commercial not suddenly, and not to an equal degree on different farms and in different parts of the country. On the contrary, the market usually subordinates to itself one aspect of the complex economy of agriculture in one locality and another aspect in another, the remaining aspects not disappearing, but adapting themselves to the "main", i.e., the money, aspect. For example, in one area it is mainly commercial grain farming that develops: the staple produced for sale is grain. Livestock raising plays a subordinate role in such farming, and further—in extreme cases of the one-sided development of grain farming—almost disappears. The Far-West "wheat factories" in America, for instance, were sometimes organised for one summer, almost without livestock. In other areas it is mainly commercial stock-farming that develops: the staples produced for sale are meat or dairy produce. Purely crop farming adapts itself to stock-farming. Of course, both the size of the farm and the methods of farm organisation will differ in each case. Suburban dairy farming cannot be judged by the area of land under cultivation. The same measure of what is large and small farming cannot be applied to the steppe farmer, the market gardener, the tobacco-grower and the "dairy farmer" (to use an English term), etc.

The penetration of exchange and trade into agriculture gives rise to its specialisation, and this specialisation steadily increases. The same economic indexes (the number of horses, for example) acquire a different significance in different regions of commercial agriculture. Among the horseless peasants in the environs of the capital cities there are, for example, big farmers who possess, say, dairy cattle, do a big volume of business and employ wage-labour. Of course, the number of such farmers among the mass of horseless and

one-horse peasants is absolutely insignificant; but if we take just the gross figures covering the whole country we shall not be able to trace the special type of capitalism in agriculture.

This circumstance deserves special notice. If it is ignored, a correct picture of the development of capitalism in agriculture cannot be obtained, and it is easy to fall into the error of vulgarisation. The full complexity of the process can be grasped only by taking into account the real specific features of agriculture. It is utterly wrong to say that, owing to its specific features, agriculture is not subject to the laws of capitalist development. It is true that the specific features of agriculture hinder its subordination to the market; nevertheless, everywhere and in all countries the *growth of commercial agriculture* is proceeding apace. But the forms in which this formation of commercial agriculture takes place are indeed distinctive, and call for special methods of study.

To illustrate what has been said, let us take graphic examples from various regions of commercial agriculture in Russia. In the commercial grain farming regions (Novorossia, Trans-Volga region) we see an extremely rapid increase in the harvest of cereals. In 1864-66 these gubernias were behind the Central Black-Earth gubernias, with a net harvest of only 2.1 chetverts per head of population; in 1883-87 these gubernias were ahead of the central area with a net harvest of 3.4 chetverts per head. The most characteristic feature of this region in the post-Reform period is expansion of the area under crops. Very often the methods of tilling the land here are of the most primitive kind; attention is concentrated exclusively on sowing the largest possible area. In the second half of the nineteenth century something similar to the American "wheat factories" developed here. One can judge quite well from the area under crops (which among peasants in the higher groups attained 271 dessiatines per household) as to the size and type of farm. In another region—the industrial, and particularly in the environs of the capital cities—such an expansion of the crop area is out of the question. It is not commercial grain farming, but commercial stock-farming, that is particularly characteristic here. In this case a proper picture of the farm cannot be got from the number of dessiatines tilled or the number of horses employed. A much more suitable gauge is the number of cows

(dairy farming). A change in crop rotation, grass cultivation and not the expansion of the crop area, are the characteristic indications here of progress in large-scale farming. The number of households with many horses is smaller here; a smaller number of horses may sometimes even be a sign of progress. On the other hand, the peasants in these parts are better off for cows than in the rest of Russia. Mr. Blagoveshchensky, in summing up the Zemstvo statistics, considered the average to be 1.2 cows per household; in 18 uyezds of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver and Smolensk gubernias, we have 1.6, and in St. Petersburg Gubernia alone 1.8 per household.[70] Both commercial capital and capital invested in production are applied mainly to livestock produce. The size of income depends largely on the number of milch cows owned. Dairy farms are developing. The hiring of agricultural labourers by well-to-do peasants is developing; we have already mentioned that people migrate from the impoverished central area to the *industrial* gubernias to take up *agricultural* work. In a word, the very same socio-economic relations manifest themselves here in an altogether different form, under farming conditions that do not resemble purely crop-raising conditions.

And if we take the cultivation of special crops, like tobacco-growing, or the combination of agriculture and technical processing of the produce (distilling, beet-sugar refining, oil seed-pressing, potato-starch making and other industries), the forms in which capitalist relations manifest themselves will resemble neither those which exist in commercial grain farming nor those which develop in commercial livestock farming. In this case we must take as our gauge either the area under special crops, or the size of the undertaking connected with the given farm, which is engaged in processing the produce.

Gross agricultural statistics, which deal only with the sizes of land plots or with the number of cattle, do not by a long way take account of all this variety of forms, so that conclusions based only on statistics of this kind quite often prove to be wrong. Commercial farming is growing much more rapidly, the influence of exchange is wider, and capital is transforming agriculture much more profoundly than one might suppose from aggregate figures and abstract averages.

VII

Let us now sum up what has been said above about the essence of the agrarian question and the agrarian crisis in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century.

What is the essence of this crisis? M. Shanin, in his pamphlet *Municipalisation or Division for Private Property* (Vilna, 1907), insists that our agrarian crisis is a crisis of agricultural methods, and that its root cause lies in the need for raising the technique of agriculture, which is incredibly low in Russia, in the need for changing over to more efficient methods of arable farming, etc.

This opinion is wrong, because it is too abstract. Undoubtedly a change over to higher techniques is necessary, but, in the first place, this transition has actually been going on in Russia since 1861. However slow the progress, it is beyond all doubt that both landlord farming and peasant farming, as represented by the well-to-do minority, have been going over to grass cultivation, to the use of improved implements, to more systematic and careful manuring of the soil, etc. And since this slow progress in agricultural technique has been a general process since 1861, it is obvious that it is not enough to quote it as an explanation of the universally admitted intensification of the agricultural crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. Secondly, both forms of "solution" of the agrarian question that have been advanced in practice—both the Stolypin solution *from above*, by preserving landlordism and finally doing away with the commune, by having the kulaks plunder it, and also the peasant (Trudovik) solution *from below*, by abolishing landlordism and by nationalising all the land—both these solutions, each in its own way, facilitate the transition to a higher technique and promote agricultural progress. The only difference is that one solution bases this progress on accelerating the process of forcing the poor peasants out of agriculture, while the other bases it on accelerating the process of eliminating labour service by abolishing the feudalist latifundia. That the poor peasants farm their land very badly is an undoubted fact. Undoubtedly, therefore, if their land is allowed to be sacked and plundered by a handful of well-to-do peasants, agricultural technique advances to a higher level. But it is just as

undoubted a fact that the landed estates worked on the basis of the labour-service system and bondage, are cultivated very badly, *worse than the allotment lands* (recall the figures quoted above: 54 poods per dessiatine from allotment land; 66 from landed estates farmed on capitalist lines, 50 from estates cultivated on the métayer system, and 45 from land rented by peasants by the year). The labour-service system of landlord economy means the preservation of incredibly obsolete methods of cultivation, the perpetuation of barbarism both in agricultural technique and in the entire life of society. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that if labour service is rooted out, i.e., if landlordism is completely abolished (and without redemption), then agricultural technique will advance to a higher level.

Consequently, in the agrarian question and the agrarian crisis the heart of the matter is not simply the removal of obstacles to the advance of agricultural technique, but *what way* these obstacles are to be removed, what class is to effect this removal and by what methods. And it is absolutely necessary to remove the obstacles to the development of the country's productive forces—necessary not only in the subjective sense of the word, but also in the objective sense, i.e., this removal is inevitable, and no power on earth can prevent it.

The mistake made by M. Shanin, as well as by many others who write on the agrarian question, is that he approached the correct thesis of the need to raise the level of farming technique in too abstract a fashion, failing to take account of the peculiar forms in which feudalist and capitalist features are interwoven in Russian agriculture. The main and fundamental obstacle to the development of the productive forces in Russian agriculture is the survivals of serfdom, i.e., primarily labour service and bondage, then feudalist taxes, the peasant's inequality in the matter of civic rights, his degraded status in relation to the higher estate of society, etc., etc. The elimination of these survivals of serfdom has long become an economic necessity, and the crisis in agriculture at the end of the nineteenth century has become so intensely aggravated precisely because the process of emancipating Russia from medievalism has been dragging out too long, because labour service and bondage have lingered too long.

They have been dying out since 1861 so slowly that the new organism has come to need violent means for ridding itself of them quickly.

What is this new economic organism of Russian agriculture? We have tried above to show this in particular detail, because the economists in the liberal-Narodnik camp have particularly wrong ideas on this subject. The new economic organism that is hatching out of its feudalist shell in Russia is commercial agriculture and capitalism. The economics of landlord farming, when it is not being conducted on the basis of labour service or the bondage of the allotment-holding peasant, clearly reveal capitalist features. The economics of peasant farming—in so far as we are able to look inside the commune and see what is going on in real life despite the official equalisation of allotment land—again reveal purely capitalist features everywhere. Commercial agriculture is steadily growing in Russia in spite of all obstacles, and this commercial agriculture is inevitably being transformed into capitalist agriculture, although the forms of this transformation are diverse in the highest degree and vary from district to district.

What should constitute that violent elimination of the medieval shell, which has become necessary for the further free development of the new economic organism? The abolition of medieval forms of landownership. In Russia, to this very day, ownership both by the landlords and, to a considerable extent, by the peasants is medieval. We have seen how the new economic conditions are breaking down this medieval framework and divisions in landowning, compelling the poor peasant to let his allotment which he has held from time immemorial, compelling the well-to-do peasant to build up his own comparatively large farm out of the fragments of different types of land: allotments, purchased land, land rented from the landlord. On the landed estate, too, its division into lands cultivated on the basis of labour service, rented to peasants on annual leases, and farmed on capitalist lines, shows that new systems of farming are being built up outside the framework of the old, medieval system of landownership.

That system can be abolished at one stroke by a determined break with the past. Such a measure would be the nation-

alisation of the land, which all the representatives of the peasantry were demanding, more or less consistently, in the period between 1905 and 1907. The abolition of private property in land in no way changes the bourgeois basis of commercial and capitalist landowning. There is nothing more erroneous than the opinion that the nationalisation of the land has anything in common with socialism, or even with equalised land tenure. Socialism, as we know, means the abolition of commodity economy. Nationalisation, on the other hand, means converting the land into the property of the state, and such a conversion does not in the least affect private farming on the land. The system of farming on the land is not altered by whether the land is the property or "possession" of the whole country, of the whole nation, just as the (capitalist) system of farming by the well-to-do muzhik is not altered by whether he buys land "in perpetuity", rents land from the landlord or the state, or "gathers up" the allotment plots of impoverished, insolvent peasants. So long as exchange remains, it is ridiculous to talk of socialism. The exchange of agricultural produce and means of production does not depend upon the forms of landowning at all. (I will remark in parenthesis that I am setting forth here only the economic significance of nationalisation, not advocating it as a programme; that I have done in the work referred to above.*)

As to equalisation, we have already shown above how it is applied in practice in the distribution of allotment land. We have seen that, within the commune, allotment land is distributed fairly equally, with only a slight tendency in favour of the rich peasants. But in the long run very little trace is left of this equalisation, owing to the fact that the poor let their land and that rented land is concentrated in the hands of the rich. Clearly, no equalisation of landholding is able to eliminate inequality in the actual use of the land, so long as there exist property differences among the peasants and a system of exchange which aggravates these differences.

The economic significance of nationalisation does not lie at all where it is very often sought. It does not consist in the fight against bourgeois relationships (as Marx showed long ago,[71] nationalisation is a highly consistent bourgeois

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 294-325.—*Ed.*

measure), but in the fight against feudalist relationships. The multiplicity of medieval forms of landowning hampers economic development; the social-estate divisions hamper trade; the disparity between the old system of landowning and the new economy gives rise to sharp contradictions; owing to the latifundia, the landlords prolong the existence of labour service; the peasants are shut up, as in a ghetto, within the allotment system, the framework of which is being broken down in practice at every step. Nationalisation makes a clean sweep of all medieval relations in landowning, does away with all artificial barriers on the land, and makes the land really free—for whom? For every citizen? Nothing of the kind. The freedom of the horseless peasant (i.e., $3\frac{1}{4}$ million households) consists, as we have seen, in letting his allotment land. The land becomes free *for the farmer*, for the one who really wants, and is *able*, to cultivate it according to the requirements of modern farming in general and of the world market in particular. Nationalisation would hasten the death of serfdom and the development of purely bourgeois farming on land free of all medieval lumber. That is the real historical significance of nationalisation in Russia—what it has come to mean by the end of the nineteenth century.

As for the other, objectively not impossible, road to clear up landowning for capitalism, it consists, as we have seen, in the accelerated plundering of the commune by the rich, and in consolidating private landed property among the well-to-do peasantry. This way leaves the principal source of labour service and bondage untouched; the landlord latifundia are left intact. Obviously, this method of clearing the way for capitalism guarantees free development of the productive forces to a far lesser degree than the first one. Once the latifundia are retained, this inevitably means also the retention of the bonded peasant, of métayage, of the renting of small plots by the year, the cultivation of the "squire's" land with the implements of the peasants, i.e., the retention of the most backward farming methods and of all that Asiatic barbarism which is called patriarchal rural life.

The two ways I have indicated of "solving" the agrarian question in developing bourgeois Russia correspond to the

two paths of development of capitalism in agriculture. I call these two paths the Prussian and the American paths. The characteristic feature of the first is that medieval relations in landowning are not liquidated at one stroke, but are gradually adapted to capitalism, which because of this for a long time retains semi-feudal features. Prussian landlordism was not crushed by the bourgeois revolution; it survived and became the basis of "Junker" economy, which is essentially capitalistic, but involves a certain degree of dependence of the rural population, such as the *Gesindeordnung*,[72] etc. As a consequence, the social and political domination of the Junkers was consolidated for many decades after 1848, and the productive forces of German agriculture developed far more slowly than in America. There, on the contrary, it was not the old slave-holding economy of the big landowners that became the basis of capitalist agriculture (the Civil War smashed the slave-owners' estates), but the free economy of the free farmer working on free land—free from all medieval fetters, from serfdom and feudalism on the one hand, and from the fetters of private property in land, on the other. Land was given away in America, out of its vast resources, at a nominal price; and it is only on a new, fully capitalist basis that private property in land has now developed there.

Both these paths of capitalist development quite clearly emerged in Russia after 1861. The progress of landlord farming is undoubted, and the slowness of this progress is not accidental, but inevitable so long as the survivals of serfdom remain. It is also beyond doubt that the freer the peasants are, the less they are weighed down by the remnants of serfdom (in the south, for example, all these favourable conditions exist), and finally, the better, all in all, the peasants are provided with land, the greater is the differentiation among the peasantry and the more rapid is the process of forming a class of rural capitalist farmers. The whole question of the further development of the country boils down to this: which of the two paths of development will ultimately prevail, and, correspondingly, which class will carry through the necessary and inevitable change—the old landowning gentry or the free peasant farmer?

It is often thought in Russia that nationalisation of the land means removing the land from the sphere of commerce.

This, undoubtedly, is the point of view of the majority of the advanced peasants and of ideologists of the peasantry. But this view is deeply fallacious. The very opposite is the case. Private property in land is an obstacle to the free investment of capital in land. Therefore, where the free renting of land from the state exists (and this is the essence of nationalisation in bourgeois society) the land is drawn *more energetically* into the sphere of commerce than is the case where private property in land prevails. There is much more freedom of capital investment in land, and freedom of competition in agriculture, where land is freely rented than where land is private property. Nationalisation of the land is, as it were, landlordism without the landlord. And what landlordism in the capitalist development of agriculture means is explained in the remarkably profound arguments of Marx in his *Theories of Surplus-Value*. I have quoted these arguments in my work on the agrarian programme mentioned above, but in view of the importance of the question, I take the liberty of repeating them here.*

In the paragraph on the historical conditions of Ricardo's theory of rent (*Theorien über den Mehrwert*, II. Band, 2. Teil, Stuttgart, 1905, S. 5-7), Marx says that Ricardo and Anderson "start out from the view, regarded as very strange on the Continent", viz., they presume that "no landed property exists as an obstacle to any investment of capital in the land". At first sight this would seem a contradiction, because it is precisely in England that feudal landed property is considered to have been preserved more completely than anywhere else. But Marx explains that it was in England of all countries that capital "dealt so ruthlessly with the traditional relations of agriculture". England is in this respect "the most revolutionary country in the world". "All historically inherited relations—not only the position of the villages but the very villages themselves, not only the habitations of the agricultural population, but this population itself, not only the ancient economic centres, but the very economy itself—have been ruthlessly swept away where they were in contradiction to the conditions of capitalist production in agriculture, or did not correspond to those conditions. The

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 272-76.—*Ed.*

German [continues Marx] finds economic relations determined by the traditional common-land relations [*Feldmarken*], the position of economic centres, and particular conglomerations of the population. The Englishman finds that the historical conditions of agriculture have been progressively created by capital since the fifteenth century. The technical expression customary in the United Kingdom, the 'clearing of estates', does not occur in any continental country. But what does this 'clearing of estates' mean? It means that, without regard for the local population—which is driven away, for existing villages—which are levelled to the ground, for farm buildings—which are torn down, for the kind of agriculture—which is transformed at a stroke, being converted for example from tillage to pasture, all conditions of production, instead of being accepted as they are handed down by tradition, are historically *fashioned* in the form necessary under the circumstances for the most profitable investment of capital. To that extent, therefore, *no landed property exists*; it allows capital—the farmer—to manage freely, since it is only concerned about the money income. A Pomeranian landowner [Marx refers to Rodbertus, whose theory of rent he refutes brilliantly and in detail in this work], his mind full of his ancestral common lands, economic centres, and the agricultural collegium, etc., is quite likely, therefore, to hold up his hands in horror at Ricardo's 'unhistorical' views on the development of agricultural relations." As a matter of fact, "the English conditions are the only ones in which modern landed property, i.e., landed property *modified* by capitalist production, has developed adequately [in ideal perfection]. Here the English theory [i.e., Ricardo's theory of rent] is the classical one for the modern, i.e., capitalist mode of production."

In England, the clearing of the estates proceeded in revolutionary forms, accompanied by the violent break-up of peasant landowning. The break-up of the old and obsolete order is absolutely inevitable in Russia too; but the nineteenth century (and the first seven years of the twentieth) have not yet settled the question as to which class will do the breaking-up that we need, and in what form. We have shown above what the basis of the distribution of land is

in Russia at the present time. We have seen that $10\frac{1}{2}$ million peasant households with 75 million dessiatines of land are confronted by 30,000 owners of latifundia with 70 million dessiatines. A possible outcome of the struggle, which cannot help breaking out on this basis, is that the holding of land by the ten million households will be almost doubled while the holding of land by the upper 30,000 will disappear. Let us examine this possible outcome from the purely theoretical point of view, from the point of view of the state of the agrarian question in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century. What should be the results of such a change? From the standpoint of landowning relations, it is obvious that the medieval ownership of allotments and medieval landlordism would be completely refashioned. The old order would be utterly swept away. Nothing traditional would be left in landowning relations. What factor, however, would determine the new agrarian relations? The "principle" of equalisation? That is what the advanced peasant, affected by Narodnik ideology, is inclined to believe. That is what the Narodnik thinks. But it is an illusion. In the commune the "principle" of equalisation, recognised by law and hallowed by custom, leads, in fact, to landownership becoming adapted to differences in property status. And on the basis of this *economic fact*, confirmed a thousand times over both by Russian and West-European data, we assert that hopes of equalisation would be shattered as an illusion, and that the *refashioning of landownership would be the only durable result*. Would the significance of *such* a result be great? Very great, because no other measure, no other reform, no other transformation could give such complete guarantees for the most rapid, wide and free progress of agricultural technique in Russia, and for the disappearance from our life of all traces of serfdom, social-estates, and the Asiatic way of life.

Progress of technique?—some may object. But has it not been proved above by means-of precise data that landlord farming is on a higher level than peasant farming in regard to grass cultivation, the employment of machines the manuring of the soil, and, of course, the quality of livestock, etc.? Yes, it has been proved, and this fact is absolutely beyond doubt. But it must not be forgotten that *all*

these differences in economic organisation, technique, etc., are summed up in *yield*. And we have seen that the yield on the landlords' lands *cultivated by peasants on a métayer or other such basis* is lower than the yield on allotment land. That is the point nearly always overlooked when the agricultural level of landlord and peasant farming in Russia is discussed. Landlord farming is on a higher level *insofar* as it is conducted on capitalist lines. And the whole point is that this "insofar", at the end of the nineteenth century, has left the labour-service system as the predominant system of farming in our central districts. *Insofar* as the landlords' lands are still cultivated by the bonded peasant with his antiquated implements, methods, etc., *to that extent* landlordism is the principal cause of backwardness and stagnation. The change in the system of landownership that we are discussing would increase the yield on métayer and rented land (at the present time the yield on such land—see the figures above—is 50 and 45 poods as compared with 54 poods on allotment land and 66 poods on landlords' land cultivated on capitalist lines). Even if this yield were increased *only* to the allotment-land level, the progress would be tremendous. Needless to say, the yield on allotment land would also increase, both as a result of the peasant being freed from the yoke of the feudal latifundia, and also because the allotment lands, like the rest of the land in the state, would then become free land, equally accessible (not to all citizens, but to citizens owning agricultural capital, i.e.—) to farmers.

This conclusion follows not at all from the data we have quoted concerning yield. On the contrary, these data have been quoted merely to give a graphic illustration of the conclusion that follows from the *sum total* of data concerning the evolution of Russian landlord and peasant farming. To refute this conclusion, one has to refute the fact that the history of Russian agriculture in the second half of the nineteenth century is the history of the replacing of feudal by bourgeois production relations.

By sticking to the data concerning the number of peasant farms at the present time we may get the impression that the agrarian transformation we are examining would lead to a considerable fragmentation of agriculture. Just think of it! Thirteen million households on 280 million dessiatines

of land! Is not this a monstrous splitting up of the land? To this we reply: it is *now* that we see such a tremendous splitting up of the land, for it is *now* that thirteen million farms are *operating* on an area of *less* than 280 million dessiatines! Consequently, the change we are interested in would not make things worse at all in this respect. More than that. We would ask further whether there are any grounds for thinking that in the event of this change the number of farms will remain unchanged? That is the view usually taken by those who are influenced by Narodnik theories or by the opinions of the peasants themselves, whose every thought and striving is drawn to the land and who can even dream of the industrial workers being converted into small tillers of the soil. Undoubtedly, a certain number of Russian industrial workers at the end of the nineteenth century also adhere to this peasant point of view. The question, however, is whether this point of view is *correct*, whether it conforms to the *objective* economic conditions and to the course of economic development. One merely has to put this question clearly in order to see that the peasant point of view is conditioned by the obsolescent and irrevocable past, and not by the growing future. The peasant point of view is *wrong*. It represents the ideology of yesterday, whereas economic development is, *in effect*, leading not to an increase but to a diminution of the agricultural population.

The change in landownership relations that we are examining will not and cannot abolish this process of diminution of the proportion of the agricultural population, a process common to all countries of developing capitalism. I may be asked, in what way could this change bring about a diminution of the agricultural population, once the land becomes freely accessible to all? I shall reply to this question with a passage from a speech delivered in the Duma by a peasant deputy Mr. Chizhevsky (Poltava Gubernia). Speaking on May 24, 1906, he said: "In our district, the peasants, the electors who sent us here, figured things out like this: 'If we were a little better off, and if every one of our families could afford to spend five or six rubles a year on sugar—then in every uyezd where it is possible to grow sugar-beet several sugar refineries would be built, in addition to those which already exist.' It is quite natural that if these sugar refine-

ries were built, what a mass of hands would be needed if production were intensified! The output of the sugar refineries would increase, etc." (Verbatim Reports, p. 622.)

This is a very characteristic admission by a local leader. Had he been asked his opinion on the significance of agrarian reform in general, he would probably have expressed Narodnik views. But once it was a question not of "opinions" but of the *concrete* consequences of reform, *capitalist truth* immediately prevailed over *Narodnik utopia*. For what the peasants told their deputy Mr. Chizhevsky is precisely the capitalist truth, the truth of capitalist reality. There really would be a tremendous increase in the number of sugar refineries and in their productivity in the event of any appreciable improvement in the condition of the mass of small tillers of the soil. And it goes without saying that not only the beet-sugar industry, but all the manufacturing industries—textile, iron, engineering, building, etc., etc.—would receive a tremendous impetus, and would need a "mass of hands". And this economic necessity would prove stronger than all the fond hopes and dreams about equalisation. Three and a quarter million horseless households will not become "farmers" *as a result of any* agrarian reform, or any changes in landownership, or any "allotting of land". These millions of households (and quite a few of one-horse households), as we have seen, *struggle* on their patches of land, *let their allotments*. An American development of industry would *inevitably* divert from agriculture the majority of such farmers, whose position in capitalist society is hopeless, and no "right to the land" will be able to prevent this. Thirteen million small farmers with the most miserable, beggarly and obsolete implements, scratching away at their allotment and the landlords' land—that is the reality of today; that is *artificial* over-population in agriculture, artificial in the sense of the forcible retention of those feudalist relations which have long outlived their day, and which *could not* be maintained for a single day without floggings, shootings, punitive expeditions, etc. Any tangible improvement in the condition of the masses, any serious blow to the survivals of serfdom, would *inevitably* strike at the roots of this over-population of the countryside and would immensely accelerate the process (which is taking

place slowly even now) of diverting the population from agriculture into industry, reduce the number of farms from 13 million to a much lower figure, and would lead Russia forward in the American and not in the Chinese manner, as is the case now.

The agrarian question in Russia towards the close of the nineteenth century has imposed upon the classes of society the task of putting an end to the old feudal past and sweeping clear the landowning system, sweeping clear the whole way for capitalism, for the growth of the productive forces, for the free and open struggle of classes. And this very struggle of classes will determine the manner in which this task will be accomplished.

July 1 (new style), 1908

SOME FEATURES OF THE PRESENT COLLAPSE

We have repeatedly had occasion to comment on the ideological and organisational collapse *on the right*, in the camp of the bourgeois democrats and the socialist opportunists, a collapse which is inevitable among parties and trends where petty-bourgeois intellectuals predominate, in a period when counter-revolution is rampant. But the picture of collapse would be incomplete if we did not also dwell on collapse "*on the left*", in the camp of the petty-bourgeois "Socialist-Revolutionaries".

Of course one can use the expression "on the left" in this case only in a very relative sense, to characterise those who are inclined to *play* at Leftism. We have already pointed out in *Proletary* more than once that it was just the period of the Russian revolution at its highest peak which brought out particularly clearly, in open mass politics, all the instability, lack of firmness and of principle of S.R. "revolutionism". It is sufficient to recall only the most outstanding events. The autumn upswing in 1905; the S.R.s are in a secret bloc with the Popular Socialists, who are all for a legal "Popular Socialist Party". The congress of the S.R. Party in December 1905 rejects the "plan" to form such a double of the S.R. Party, but in the spring and summer upswing of 1906 we *again* see the S.R.s in the daily papers, i.e., in the main mouthpieces for agitation among the people, working in a bloc with the Popular Socialists. The latter openly renounce the revolution in the autumn of 1906, after the Sveaborg and Kronstadt[73] defeat, and come out openly as opportunists—yet nevertheless the elections to the Second Duma in St. Petersburg (in the spring of 1907) again revive the Narodnik bloc" of S.R.s, Popular Socialists and Trudoviks.

In short, the revolution has fully and finally revealed the absence of any definite class foundation for the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, reduced it in practice to the role of an adjunct or wing of the petty-bourgeois peasant democrats and *forced* it constantly to waver between verbal revolutionary impulses and Popular Socialist and Trudovik diplomacy. The separating out of the Maximalists, who all through the revolution were constantly separating out of the Socialist-Revolutionaries but could not get fully separated, only confirmed the class instability of Narodnik revolutionism. There remains nothing for the S.R. Centre, the "pure" S.R.s, to do—we had written in issue No. 4 of *Proletary*, in the article entitled "Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks"—but to defend themselves against both the "new" trends in Socialist-Revolutionism with arguments borrowed from the Marxists.* While the Social-Democrats emerged from the revolution with one definite class, the proletariat, rallied securely behind it, and with two trends, characteristic of all international Social-Democracy—opportunist and revolutionary—sharply defined, the Socialist-Revolutionaries emerged without any direct basis, without any defined border-line to divide them on the one hand from the Trudoviks and the Popular Socialists, linked with a mass of petty proprietors, or on the other hand from the Maximalists, as a terrorist group of intellectuals.

And now, when Maximalism has disappeared (possibly only for a time) we see the revival of a kindred trend in a new dress. *Revolutsionnaya Mysl*,[74] the mouthpiece of a "group of Socialist-Revolutionaries", draws apart (No. 1, April 1908, No. 2, June 1908) from the "official organ of the S.R. Party", i.e., from the central organ, *Znamya Truda*,[75] and announces the "*revision* of our [i.e., S.R.] theoretical outlook, our S.R. methods of struggle and organisation". Of course all this "revision", all this "critical creative work" promised by the new paper is sheer phrase-mongering. In reality there is no question of any revision of theory, nor can there be, since the new paper has no theoretical outlook whatever—all it has is the re-echo, in a thousand different keys, of appeals for terrorism, and a clumsy, inexpert, naïve

* See present edition, Vol. 11, p. 199.—*Ed.*

adaptation of their views on revolution, on the mass movement, on the meaning of parties in general, etc., to this allegedly new but in reality old, and indeed very old, method. The amazing poverty of such "theoretical" acquirements stares one in the face when comparing them with the bombastic promises to revise, criticise and create. The complete confusion of theoretical views both of the "new" and of the "old" tendencies in Socialist-Revolutionism is all the more striking in that *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* itself underlines "the evolution taking place in the views of those in charge of the official organ of the S.R. Party"—an evolution consisting in the most intensified emphasising of "systematic central political terror" in order "to precipitate events". That is a quotation from No. 8 of *Znamya Truda*. And in No. 10-11 (February-March 1908) we find exactly the same talk about "straining the efforts of the whole party" for "central political terror", about the necessity of finding "large funds" for this purpose, and together with this a "delicate hint" as to the possible source of such funds. "All parties," writes *Znamya Truda*, pp. 7-8, "including the Cadets and the Peaceful Renovators, will enjoy the immediate benefits of this activity. And therefore the party has the right to count on the very widest public aid in this its struggle."

The reader can see that there is nothing new in what the new paper says. The only characteristic thing about it is that it provides instructive material for the assessment of *political collapse*, covered up by "Left" and supposedly revolutionary phrases. The Mensheviks in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (No. 1) justify their collection of funds among the liberals on the grounds that there is a certain political solidarity in their aims. The S.R.s in *Znamya Truda* say to the Cadets and the Peaceful Renovators: why, you will enjoy the benefits. Extremes meet. Both petty-bourgeois opportunism and petty-bourgeois revolutionism, albeit from different sides, "make eyes" at the Cadets and the Peaceful Renovators.

And it is not only in this that the extremes meet. The revolution has brought disillusionment to both the Mensheviks and the "revolutionary" Narodniks. Both are ready to dismiss the Party principle, the old Party traditions, and the revolutionary mass struggle. "The mistake common to

nearly all the revolutionary parties," writes *Revolutsionnoye Nedomyslie*,* "a mistake which has played a harmful role in the present crisis, consists in an exaggerated belief in the possibility and necessity of a mass rising of the people.... Events have not justified the expectations of the party." In vain, it appears, did the Socialist-Revolutionaries build "a socialist programme according to the Marxist model", build up "a conception of the revolution which identified it with a mass movement and mass insurrection caused by economic needs, with a correction being made, however, for a minority with initiative". Instead of corrections, one must develop "the theory and practice of the active functioning of an initiating minority" (No. 1, pp. 6-7). One must exalt the significance "of the spontaneous feeling which grips the revolutionary and the ideals which inspire him" (No. 2, p. 1); as for theoretical questions, philosophy, scientific socialism—all these are nonsense, in the opinion of the "new" social-revolutionary obscurantists. "Is there hope of an armed uprising in the more or less immediate future?" (that's how they put it: "more or less immediate")—asks *Revolutsionnoye Nedomyslie*, and answers itself: "All are agreed that there is no such hope" (No. 2, p. 2). The conclusion is that in Russia "a political revolution cannot be carried out except by a revolutionary minority" (p. 7). "The reasons for the failure of the revolutionary parties during the last three years were not accidental, and depended in our view not only on objective conditions and not only on tactical mistakes, but lay also in the very conception of their organisation" (p. 10). The revolutionaries, you see, set themselves the "impossible tasks" of really leading the masses. The Social-Democrats *confused* the S.R.s and induced them, to the detriment of their real job of terrorist struggle, to think about organising the peasantry and preparing it for a universal armed uprising (p. 11). Extreme centralisation of the parties—"rule by generals", "the spirit of authoritarianism" (p. 12)—there is the evil. "In a large and strong party the revolutionaries saw the only

* Lenin is sarcastically calling *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* (Revolutionary Thought) by the title, which means "Revolutionary Thoughtlessness, Stupidity".—*Ed.*

means and guarantee for achieving the object aimed at, and did not notice either the practical impossibility in our Russian conditions of creating such a party or all its dark sides" (p. 12).

This is enough, we think! The mental chaos that reigns in *Revolutsionnaya Mysl*, the obscurantism it preaches, the mean philistine despair, timidity and disheartenment in face of the first encountered difficulties on which its allegedly revolutionary programme is built, are not worth wasting words on. The quotations we have made speak for themselves.

But let not the reader think that these arguments are pure nonsense, accidentally blurted out by an unknown and insignificant little group. No, such a view would be mistaken. There is logic here, the logic of disillusionment in their party and in a people's revolution, disillusionment in the capacity of the *masses* for direct revolutionary struggle. It is the logic of the keyed-up intellectual, of hysteria, of incapacity for steady, stubborn work, of inability to apply the basic principles of theory and tactics to altered circumstances, of inability to carry on the work of propaganda, agitation and organisation in conditions sharply differing from those which we recently experienced. Instead of exerting every effort to fight the spirit of philistine chaos which is penetrating not only the upper classes but the lower classes as well; instead of gathering together more firmly the scattered party forces to defend tried revolutionary principles; instead of this, unbalanced people, detached from any class connection with the masses, throw overboard all they ever learned, and proclaim "a revision", i.e., a return to the old rubbish-heap, to revolutionary rule-of-thumb methods, to the sporadic petty group activities. No heroism on the part of these groups or individuals in the terrorist struggle will alter the fact that their activity as members of a *party* is an expression of *collapse*. And it is extremely important to grasp the truth, confirmed by the experience of all countries which have undergone the defeat of a revolution, that one and the same psychology, one and the same class peculiarity (that of the petty bourgeoisie, for example) is displayed both in the dejection of the opportunist and in the desperation of the terrorist.

"All are agreed that there is no hope of an armed uprising in the more or less immediate future." Meditate over this flashy and hackneyed phrase. These people have evidently never stopped to consider the objective conditions which at first give rise to a full-scale political crisis, and then, when the crisis becomes acute, to civil war. These people have *learned by heart* the "*slogan*" of armed uprising, without having *understood* the meaning of this slogan or its applicability. That is why, after the first defeats of the revolution they so lightly throw aside their ill-digested slogans, taken on trust. Whereas if these people valued Marxism as the only revolutionary theory of the twentieth century, if they had studied the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, they would have seen the difference between phrase-mongering and the development of really revolutionary slogans. The Social-Democrats did not put forward the "slogan" of insurrection either in 1901, when demonstrations caused Krichevsky and Martynov to begin shouting about "the assault", or in 1902 and 1903, when the late Nadezhdin called the plan of the old *Iskra*[76] "literary exercises". They put forward the slogan of insurrection only after January 9, 1905,[77] when not a single person could doubt any longer that a general political crisis *had broken out*, that it was growing more acute daily and hourly, by the direct movement of the masses. And within a few months this crisis *led to* insurrection.

What lesson follows from this? The lesson that we must now carefully follow the new political crisis that is now brewing, teach the masses the lessons of 1905 and the inevitability of every acute crisis developing into an insurrection, and strengthen the organisation that will release this slogan at the moment the crisis arrives. But it is a barren occupation to ask, "is there hope in the immediate future"? The state of affairs in Russia is such that no thoughtful socialist will venture to prophesy. All that we *know* and can say amounts to this, that without reconstructing agrarian relations, without completely breaking up the old land system, Russia cannot live—but live she will. The struggle is about whether Stolypin will succeed in breaking it up the landlords' way, or whether the peasants, under the leadership of the workers, will do it *themselves* to suit their own purpose. The business

of the Social-Democrats is to imbue the masses with a clear understanding of this *economic* foundation of the growing crisis, and to train up a serious party organisation which could help the people to assimilate the abundant lessons of the revolution, and would be capable of *leading* them in struggle, when the maturing forces become fully ripe for a new revolutionary "campaign".

But this reply, of course, will seem "vague" to people who regard "slogans", not as a practical conclusion from a class analysis and assessment of a particular moment in history, but as a charm with which a party or a tendency has been provided once and for all. Such people don't understand that incapacity to adapt their tactics to the differences between fully defined and not yet defined moments is the result of political inexperience and narrowness of outlook. To strengthen organisation, indeed! Our heroes of the revolutionary "screech" turn up their noses at such a humble, innocent task, which does not promise "immediately", at once, tomorrow morning, to provide a roar and a crash. "Events have not justified the expectations of the party." And this is said after three years of revolution, which gave unexampled *confirmation* of the role and significance of strong parties. It was the Russian revolution which in its very first period demonstrated that it was *possible* even under the Plehve regime[78] to create a *party* that was really capable of leading *classes*. In the spring of 1905 our Party was a league of underground circles; in the autumn it became the party of the *millions* of the proletariat. Did this happen "all at once", gentlemen, or did it take ten years of slow, steady, unobtrusive and quiet work to *prepare* and ensure such a result? And if at such a moment as the present one, the official and unofficial S.R. gentlemen are putting regicide *to the fore* and not the task of setting up a *party* organisation among the peasant masses capable of hammering out something more solid, more ideologically consistent, something more firm and staunch, out of the jelly-like revolutionism of the Trudovik current of opinion, we shall say that Narodnik socialism in Russia is dying, that it has long since died, that its leaders are dimly aware of their "bankruptcy" as Narodniks after the very first campaign of a people's revolution.

We did not expect that peasants would display capacity for a leading role, or even an independent role, in the revolution; and we shall not lose heart at the failure of the first campaign, which revealed the vast extent to which revolutionary-democratic ideas had spread among the peasantry, even though these ideas were extremely hazy and sloppy. And we will be able to work again as consistently and stubbornly as we did before the revolution in order that the Party tradition should not be broken, in order that the Party should grow stronger and be able in the *second* campaign to lead, not two or three million proletarians, but five times or ten times as many. You don't believe in this task? You find it dull? Well, the door is open, worthy friends; you are not revolutionaries, you are simply ranters!

And your official organ treats the question of taking part in the Third Duma in the same hysterical way.* In *Znamya Truda*, No. 10-11, one such hysterical writer sneers at the *mistakes* of our Social-Democratic deputies in the Third Duma, and exclaims about their statements: "Who knows anything about these statements, about these votings and abstentions?" (p. 11).

We say to this: "Yes, our Social-Democratic deputies in the Third Duma have made many mistakes. And this very example the S.R.s chose to quote demonstrates the difference in the attitude of *a workers' party* and *a group of intellectuals*. A workers' party understands that in a period of political lull and collapse the latter must inevitably show itself in the Duma group too, since in the Third Duma it was even less capable than in the Second of assembling large party

* For a detailed analysis of S.R. boycottism, see the article on "Parliamentary Cretinism Inside Out" in *Proletary*, No. 18. In the autumn of 1907, seemingly appealing to a genuinely revolutionary boycottist tradition, the S.R.s were already in practice degrading this tradition, cancelling it out, replacing the revolutionary *boycott-assault* by pitiful and impotent "refusal to participate". They were already assuring a credulous public then that to "turn one's back" on the reactionary Duma meant inflicting "a big moral" defeat on the government, and taking "the first serious step to changing the general political picture".

Then, too, we already exposed the true character of these "revolutionary rhetorics ... of gentry who do not scruple to muddle the heads of the masses for the sake of naïve self-advertisement of their party".

forces. Therefore the workers' party criticises and corrects the mistakes of its deputies. Every organisation, by discussing each speech and arriving at the conclusion that such-and-such a statement or speech was a mistake, provides material for political action by the masses. Don't worry, gentlemen of the S.R. Party: at the moment when the political crisis becomes acute, our group—and in any case members of our Duma group—*will know how to do their duty*. And our criticism of their mistakes is done publicly, and openly, before the masses. Our deputies learn from this criticism, the classes learn, the Party learns—the Party which has seen hard times, and knows that it is not by ranting but only by the stubborn and steadfast work of *all* organisations is it possible to emerge with honour from a difficult situation. Even *Proletary*, which, as a newspaper published abroad, realised that it was under an obligation to give its advice from afar with care, openly proposed measures for improving the work of the group. Our open Party criticism, added to the work of the group, achieves the result that the masses know both the Duma statements and the *nature* of the Party's corrections to them. And failure to appreciate the Duma word at a time when Party organisations and the Party press are facing the effects of the deep collapse, is a sign of boundless intellectualist irresponsibility.

The S.R.s don't understand the importance of open socialist speeches which are frankly criticised and corrected in the Party press. The S.R.s prefer to hush up the mistakes of *their* representatives: one more reminder of this was in No. 10-11 of *Znamya Truda*, when it abused us for making "philistine" statements about Gershuni's love of the Cadets. We long ago expressed our opinion on this question,* and would not start repeating it now, so soon after the death by torture at the hands of the tsar's executioners of a man who earned deep respect by his loyalty to a revolutionary organisation. But since the S.R.s have raised the question, we shall give our reply. You can answer us in no way except by abuse, gentlemen; you cannot say, frankly and openly, which of you approves or does not approve of Gershuni's

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 153-60.—*Ed.*

stand at the February (1907) Congress of the S.R. Party. You cannot reply on the substance of the matter and show up the mistakes of your leaders, the number of their supporters, etc., because you do not have a *party*, you attach no value to educating the masses by open criticism of persons, statements, tendencies and shades of opinion.

The working class will know how to train up and harden its organisations by open criticism of its representatives. Not all at once, not without friction, not without struggle and not without hard work—but *we shall solve* the difficult problem which the difficult turn of events has confronted us with, namely, to combine open speeches in the Duma with illegal Party activity. In the working out of this problem will be revealed the maturity of a party which has gone through the first campaign of the revolution. And the working out of this problem will provide a guarantee that in the second campaign the proletariat will be able, under the leadership of Social-Democracy, to fight more ably and more unitedly, and to gain more decisive victories.

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THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION[79]

AUTOABSTRACT

In response to the request of the Polish comrades, I will try briefly to set forth here the contents of my book bearing the above title which was written in November 1907, but which has not yet appeared for reasons *not* under my control.*

In the first chapter of this book I examine the "economic basis and nature of the agrarian revolution in Russia". Comparing the latest data about landownership in Russia (1905 figures) and defining in round figures the land area in all the fifty gubernias of European Russia at 280 million dessiatines, I arrive at the following picture of the distribution of all landed property, both allotment land and privately-owned:

	Number of holdings	Total area in dessiatines (millions)	Average dessiatines per holding
(a) Ruined peasantry crushed by feudal exploitation	10.5	75.0	7.0
(b) Middle peasantry	1.0	15.0	15.0
(c) Peasant bourgeoisie and capitalist landownership	1.5	70.0	46.7
(d) Feudal latifundia	0.03	70.0	2,333.0
Total	13.03	230.0	17.6
Unclassified holdings	—	50.0	—
Grand Total	13.03	280.0	21.4

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431.—*Ed.*

Anyone at all familiar with social statistics will understand that this picture can be only approximately accurate. For us, however, what is important is not the details, in which economists of the liberal-Narodnik trend usually flounder themselves and submerge the essence of the question, but the class content of the process. My picture brings out this content, showing what the struggle in the Russian revolution is about. Thirty thousand landowners—mainly the nobility, but also the state—possess 70 million dessiatines of land. This basic fact should be regarded in the light of another fact: $10\frac{1}{2}$ million peasant households and smallest proprietors possess 75 million dessiatines.

This second group could *double* their possessions at the expense of the first: such is the objectively inevitable *tendency* of the struggle, irrespective of the various views about it held by various classes.

The economic essence of the agrarian crisis emerges from this picture quite clearly. Millions of petty, ruined, impoverished peasants, oppressed by poverty, ignorance and the survivals of feudalism, *cannot* live otherwise than in semi-feudal dependence on the landlord, tilling his land with their own agricultural implements in exchange for pasturage, commonage, watering-places, for "land" in general, loans in the winter, etc., etc. On the other hand, the owners of vast latifundia *cannot* in such conditions manage otherwise than with the help of the labour of their ruined local peasants, since that kind of management does not require any investment of capital or new systems of cultivation. There necessarily arises what has been described many times in Russian economic literature as the labour-service system of economy. This system is merely *the further development of serfdom*. The basis of exploitation is not the separation of the worker from the land, but the compulsory attachment of the ruined peasant to it; not the proprietor's capital but his land; not the implements belonging to the owner of latifundia, but the age-old wooden plough of the peasant; not the progress of agriculture but ancient, centuries-old routine; not "freely hired labour", but enslavement to the money-lender.

The results of this state of affairs in the sphere of agricul-

ture may be expressed in the following figures. Harvest yield on allotment land is 54 poods per dessiatine; on landlord's land, with sowing in separate farms, and worked at the expense of the landlord, using his implements and employing hired labour, it is 66 poods; on the same landlord's land under the métayer system it is 50 poods; and, finally, on land rented by the peasants from the landlord it is 45 poods. Thus landlords' lands worked on a *feudalist-money-lending* basis (the above-mentioned métayage and renting by the peasantry) produce worse yields than the exhausted and qualitatively worse allotment lands. This falling into bondage, consolidated by the feudally-run latifundia, is becoming the *main* obstacle to the development of Russia's productive forces.

Another thing that emerges from the picture drawn above is that this development in a capitalist country *may* take place in two different ways. Either the latifundia remain, and gradually become the basis of capitalist economy on the land. This is the Prussian type of agrarian capitalism, in which the Junker is master of the situation. For whole decades there continue both his political domination and the oppression, degradation, poverty and illiteracy of the peasant. The productive forces develop very slowly, as they did in Russian agriculture between 1861 and 1905.

Or else the revolution sweeps away the landed estates. The basis of capitalist agriculture now becomes the free farmer on *free* land, i.e., land clear of all medieval junk. This is the *American* type of agrarian capitalism, and the *most rapid development of productive forces* under conditions which are more favourable for the mass of the people than any others under capitalism.

In *reality* the struggle going on in the Russian revolution is not about "socialisation" and other absurdities of the Narodniks—this is merely petty-bourgeois ideology, petty-bourgeois phrase-mongering and nothing more—*but about* what road capitalist development of Russia will take: the "Prussian" or the "American". Without ascertaining this *economic* basis of the revolution, it is absolutely impossible to understand *anything* about an agrarian programme (as Maslov has not understood it, because he examines the abstractly desirable, without ascertaining the economically inevitable).

Shortage of space prevents me from setting forth the rest of the first chapter: I will sum up in a few words. All the Cadets do their utmost to obscure the essence of the agrarian revolution, while the Prokopoviches *help* them in this. The Cadets mix up ("reconcile") the two main *types* of agrarian programme in the revolution—the landlord and the peasant types. Then (also in a few words): in Russia both types of capitalist agrarian evolution already made their appearance in the years between 1861 and 1905—both the Prussian (the *gradual* development of landlord economy in the direction of capitalism) and the American (differentiation of the peasantry and a rapid development of productive forces in the more free South, with its abundance of land). Finally, there is the question of colonisation which I deal with in this chapter, and which I shall not be able to dwell on here. I will only mention that the *main* obstacle in Russia to putting into use hundreds of millions of dessiatines is the feudal latifundia persisting in Central Russia. Victory over these landlords will give such a powerful impetus to the development of technique and scientific cultivation that the area of arable land will increase ten times faster than it did after 1861. Here are a few figures. Out of the total area throughout the Russian Empire—1,965 million dessiatines—there is *no* information whatever about 819 million dessiatines. Thus, only 1,146 million dessiatines are available for consideration—of which 469 million dessiatines are in use, but they include 300 million dessiatines of forest. A vast amount of land that is not fit for anything now will become useful in the immediate future *if* Russia *frees herself* from the latifundia.*

Chapter II of my book is devoted to the testing of the agrarian programmes of the R.S.D.L.P. by the revolution. The principal error of all previous programmes has been an

* The liberal-Narodnik economists argue in this way: *in view* of the lack of land in the centre, *in view* of the unsuitability of Siberia, Central Asia, etc., for colonisation, it is *necessary* to allot supplementary lands to the peasantry. This means that there would be no need to hurry with the latifundia, but for the lack of land. Marxists have to argue quite differently: *so long as* the latifundia are not abolished, a rapid development of the productive forces is impossible, either in the centre or in the colonies (in Russia's borderlands).

insufficiently concrete idea of what the *type* of capitalist agrarian revolution in Russia can be. And this mistake was repeated by the Mensheviks, who were victorious at the Stockholm Congress, and gave the Party a programme of *municipalisation*. It was precisely the *economic aspect* of the question—the most important aspect—that at Stockholm *was not examined at all*. Instead, it was "political" considerations, the manoeuvres of politicians and not Marxist analysis, that prevailed. An explanation of this can only *partially* be found in the actual moment when the Stockholm Congress met, when the assessment of December 1905 and the First Duma of 1906 claimed all the attention of the Congress. That was why Plekhanov, who at *Stockholm* carried Maslov's plan for municipalisation, gave no thought at all to the *economic content* of a "peasant agrarian revolution" (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 42, the words of Plekhanov) in a capitalist country. Either this was a mere phrase, and "capturing" the peasants by means of demagogy and deception ("*Bauernfang*") unworthy of a Marxist; or there exists the *economic* possibility of the most rapid development of capitalism through *the victory of the peasantry*. And in that case it is essential clearly to realise the kind of victory, the kind of path of agrarian capitalism, the kind of system of relations in landownership, which correspond to that victory of the "peasant agrarian revolution".

The main argument of the most influential "municipalisers" in Stockholm was based on the assertion that the peasants are *hostile* to the nationalisation of the allotment lands. John,[80] who was *reporting* for the supporters of municipalisation, exclaimed: "We would have not one Vendée,[81] but a general revolt of the peasantry [how terrible!] against attempts by the state to interfere with the peasants' *own* allotments, against attempts to 'nationalise' the latter" (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 40). Kostrov[82] exclaimed: "To go to the peasants with it [nationalisation] means antagonising them. The peasant movement will go on apart from or against us, and we shall find ourselves thrown overboard in the revolution. Nationalisation deprives Social-Democracy of its strength, isolates it from the peasantry and thus also deprives the revolution of its strength" (p. 88).

That is clear, it would seem. The peasants are hostile to nationalisation: this is the main argument of the Mensheviks. And *if this is true*, is it not obvious that it is ridiculous to carry out "a peasant agrarian revolution" *against the will* of the peasants?

But is it true? In 1905 P. Maslov wrote: "Nationalisation of the land as a means of solving the agrarian problem in Russia at the present time cannot be accepted, first of all [note this "first of all"] because it is hopelessly utopian.... But will the peasants ... agree?" (P. Maslov, *A Critique of Agrarian Programmes*, 1905, p. 20.)

But *in March 1907*: "All the Narodnik groups [the Trudoviks, the Popular Socialists, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries] are advocating nationalisation of the land in one form or another" (the journal *Obrazovaniye*,[83] 1907, No. 3, p. 100). And who wrote this? *That same P. Maslov!*

There's your new Vendée! There's your revolt of the peasantry against nationalisation! And instead of honestly admitting his mistake, instead of making an *economic* study of the reason why the peasants should declare in favour of nationalisation, Maslov acted like Ivan the Forgetful. He *preferred to forget* his own words and all the speeches at the Stockholm Congress.

Not only that. In order to cover up the traces of this "unpleasant occurrence", Maslov invented the fable that the Trudoviks had declared for nationalisation for petty-bourgeois reasons, "*placing their hopes in the central authority*" (ibid.). The following comparison shows that this is a fable. The agrarian Bill moved by the Trudoviks in both the *First* and the *Second* Dumas says in Clause 16: "The management of the national lands must be entrusted to local self-governing bodies elected by universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot, which shall act independently within the limits laid down by the law."

The agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P., carried by the Mensheviks, proclaims that the R.S.D.L.P. demands ... "(4) the confiscation of privately-owned lands, except small holdings, which shall be placed at the disposal of large local self-governing bodies (comprising urban and rural districts, as per Point 3) to be elected on democratic principles".

The essential difference between these programmes is not in the words "management" and "disposal",* but on the question of purchase (which at the Stockholm Congress was rejected by *Bolshevik* votes against Dan and Co. and which the Mensheviks again tried to drag in after the Congress) and on the question of the *peasant* lands. The Mensheviks separate them, the Trudoviks do not. *The Trudoviks have demonstrated to the municipalisers that I was right.*

There can be no doubt that the programme of the Trudoviks brought forward in the First and Second Dumas is the programme of the peasant masses. The literature of the peasant deputies, their signatures to the Bills and the gubernias- they come from, all prove this quite convincingly. In 1905 Maslov wrote that the homestead peasants "in particular" could not agree to nationalisation (p. 20 of the pamphlet I have already quoted). This turned out to be "*particular*" nonsense. In Podolsk Gubernia, for example, the peasants are homesteaders, yet 13 Podolsk peasants in the First Duma, and 10 in the Second, signed the Land Bill of the "104" (the Trudovik Bill quoted above).

Why, then, did the peasants declare for nationalisation? Because they instinctively realised the necessity of *abolishing* all medieval forms of landed property much better than did short-sighted so-called Marxists. Medieval landed property *must* be abolished in order to clear the way for capitalism in agriculture; and in various countries and to various degrees capital *has abolished* the old medieval landownership, subordinating it to the requirements of the market and transforming it in keeping with the conditions of commercial agriculture. Marx already pointed out in the third volume of *Capital* that the capitalist mode of production *finds* landed property in historical forms incompatible with capitalism (clan ownership, communal, feudal, patriarchal, etc., ownership) and re-creates them in keeping with the new economic demands.[84]

In the paragraph, "The historical conditions of Ricardo's theory of rent", in his *Theories of Surplus-Value*** Marx

* An amendment proposing to replace the words "placed at the disposal" by the words "made the private property" was *rejected at Stockholm by the Mensheviks*. (Minutes, p. 152.)

** *Theorien über den Mehrwert*. II Band, 2. Teil, Stuttgart, 1905.

developed this conception with the clarity of genius. He wrote: "Nowhere in the world has capitalist production, since Henry VII, dealt so ruthlessly with the traditional relations of agriculture and so adequately moulded its conditions and made them subject to itself. England is in this respect, the most revolutionary country in the world.... But what does this 'clearing of estates'* mean? It means that without regard for the local population—which is driven away, for existing villages—which are levelled to the ground, for farm buildings—which are torn down, for the kind of agriculture—which is transformed at a stroke, being converted, for example, from tillage to pasture, all conditions of production, instead of being accepted as they are handed down by tradition, are historically *fashioned* in the form necessary under the circumstances for the most profitable investment of capital. To that extent, therefore, *no landed property exists*; it allows capital—the farmer—to manage freely, since it is only concerned about the money income" (pp. 6-7).

Such are the conditions for the speediest possible abolition of forms inherited from the Middle Ages and for the freest possible development of capitalism—the *abolition* of all the old system of landowning, the abolition of private property in land, as an obstacle to capital. In Russia, too, such a revolutionary "*clearing*" of the medieval landowning system is *inevitable*, and no power on earth can stave it off. The question is *only*, and the *struggle* is *solely*, about whether this "clearing" will be done by the *landlords* or by the *peasants*. The "clearing" of medieval landowning by the landlords is the robbery of the peasants that took place in 1861 and the Stolypin agrarian reform of 1906 (legislation under Article 87). *The peasant "clearing" of lands for capitalism is nationalisation of the land.*

It is this *economic* substance of nationalisation in a *bourgeois* revolution carried out by workers and peasants, which Maslov, Plekhanov and Co. have completely failed to understand. They drew up their agrarian programme not for a struggle against medieval landowning as one of the most important survivals of serfdom, not to clear the way

* These words are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

completely for capitalism, but for a *pitiful philistine attempt* to combine "harmoniously" the old with the new, landed property which arose as a result of the system of allotment and the latifundia of the feudalists confiscated by the revolution.

In order, finally, to demonstrate all the reactionary philistine character of the *idea* of municipalisation, I quote data about the leasing of land. (I pointed out the importance of the question of leasehold in my dispute with Maslov in 1906, in my pamphlet, *Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*.*) In Kamyshin Uyezd of Saratov Gubernia**:

Groups of householders	*Dessiatines per household*			
	Allotment land	Rented land	Leased land	Total crop area
With no draught animals . . .	5.4	0.3	3.0	1.1
" 1 " animal . . .	6.5	1.6	1.3	5.0
" 2 " animals . . .	8.5	3.5	0.9	8.8
" 3 " " . . .	10.1	5.6	0.8	12.1
" 4 " " . . .	12.5	7.4	0.7	15.8
" 5 draught animals and more	16.1	16.6	0.9	27.6
Average	9.3	5.4	1.5	10.8

Take a look at the *real* economic relationship between *allotment* land, which the most sage Maslov and Plekhanov leave to the peasants as their property, and the non-*allotment* land (rented land) which they "municipalised". The horseless peasants—and in 1896-1900 there were in all $3\frac{1}{2}$ million such households out of 11.1 million—*lease ten times more* land than they rent themselves. Their area under crops is five times less than their "allotments". Among the peasants owning one horse (3.3 million households in all Russia) the amount of rented land *scarcely exceeds the amount* of land which they lease, and their crop area is *less* than their "allotment". In all the higher groups, i.e., among the minority of the peasants, the land they rent is several times larger than the land they lease, and the wealthier the peasants

* See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 165-95.—*Ed.*

** *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. 2nd ed, pp. 51, 54 and 82 (See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 93, 97, 130-31.—*Ed.*).

the more does their crop area exceed the size of their "allotment".

Relations like this prevail *throughout* Russia. Capitalism is destroying the agricultural commune; it is *liberating* the peasants from the yoke of the "allotment"; it is diminishing the role of the allotment lands at both poles in the countryside—yet the profound Menshevik thinkers exclaim: "The peasants will revolt against nationalisation of the allotment lands."

It is not only landlord property that dates from the Middle Ages in Russia, but also the peasants' allotment property—a thing the Mensheviks have "overlooked". The reinforcement of allotment property, *which is completely at variance* with the new capitalist relations, is a reactionary measure, and municipalisation *reinforces* allotment property as distinct from non-allotment property, which is "subject to municipalisation". Allotment land ownership divides the peasants with a thousand medieval barriers, and through the medieval fiscal "village commune", retards the development of productive forces. The "village commune" and this allotment ownership are *bound* to be destroyed by capitalism. Stolypin realises this, and destroys them the Black-Hundred way. The peasants feel it, and want to destroy them in the peasant, or revolutionary-democratic way. And the Mensheviks exclaim: "You mustn't touch the allotment lands."

Nationalisation abolishes the obsolete "village commune" and the medieval allotted property as completely as it is conceivably possible for these institutions to be abolished in capitalist society while observing the best interests of the peasant. In the booklet, *Material on the Peasant Question* (A Report of the Delegates' Congress of the All-Russian Peasant Union, November 6-10, 1905), published in St. Petersburg in 1905, we read: "The notorious question of the 'village commune' was not raised at all and was tacitly rejected: the land must be placed at the disposal of individuals and associations, state the resolutions passed at both the First and Second Congresses" (p. 12). To the question, whether the peasants themselves would suffer as a result of nationalisation of the allotment lands, the delegates replied: "They will get land in any case when it is distributed" (p. 20). The peasant proprietor (and his ideologist Mr.

Peshekhonov) understands perfectly well that "they will get land in any case when it is distributed" and that soon the feudal latifundia will be abolished. He needs "redistribution" on a vast scale, which means the nationalisation of all lands, in order to shake himself free from the toils of the Middle Ages, in order to "clear" the land, in order that its utilisation should be brought into line with the new economic conditions. This was well expressed in the Second Duma by Mr. Mushenko when, speaking on behalf of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, he said, with his native simplicity: "The population [farmers] will be properly distributed only when the land is unfenced, only when the fences imposed by the principle of private ownership of land are removed" (Minutes of the Second Duma, p. 1172). Compare this statement with the words of Marx quoted earlier, and you will realise that the philistine phrases about "socialisation" and "equalisation" conceal a very real content: the bourgeois revolutionary clearing of the old medieval system of landed property.

The municipalisation of lands in the bourgeois revolution is a *reactionary* measure, because it hinders the economically necessary and inevitable process of abolishing medieval landed property, the process of establishing *uniformity* of economic conditions on the land for all *proprietors*, whatever their condition, their past, their allotment in 1861, etc. The division of land into private property now would be *reactionary*, because it would preserve the present, out-of-date and obsolete allotment ownership; but eventually, after the land will have been completely cleared by means of nationalisation, division would be possible as the slogan of a *new* and free *farming class*.* The business of Marxists is to help the radical bourgeoisie (i.e., the peasantry) to carry out the fullest possible elimination of old junk and to ensure the rapid development of capitalism, and not at all to help the petty bourgeoisie in their striving to come to a comfortable arrangement and adapt themselves to the past.

* M. Shanin in his pamphlet, *Municipalisation or Division for Private Property* (Vilna, 1907), underlined that aspect of the question which bears on agriculture, but did not understand the two paths of development and the importance of abolishing the present landowning system.

Chapter III is devoted to "The Theoretical Basis of Nationalisation and of Municipalisation".

Naturally I shall not start repeating to the Polish comrades things that are commonly known to every Marxist, the fact that nationalisation of the land in capitalist society means abolishing absolute, and not differential rent, etc. But having in mind my Russian readers, I *was obliged* to write of this in detail, because Pyotr Maslov was asserting that Karl Marx's theory of absolute rent is a "contradiction" which "one can only account for [!!] by the fact that Volume III is a posthumous publication containing also the rough notes of the author" (*The Agrarian Question*).*

This pretension on the part of Pyotr Maslov, who desires to correct Karl Marx's rough notes, is not anything new for me. In the journal *Zarya*,[85] as early as 1901, I pointed out that Maslov in *Zhizn*[86] had distorted Marx's theory of rent.** Soon afterwards, however, Pyotr Maslov repeated this presumptuous and unquestionable nonsense in 1906 (the preface to the 3rd edition is dated April 26, 1906) *after the publication* of the *Theories of Surplus-Value*, where Marx explained the theory of absolute rent with complete clarity. Here Maslov surpassed himself! As I am unable to repeat here the detailed analysis of Pyotr Maslov's "corrections" to Marx given in my book, I will confine myself only to the observation that these corrections turn out to be the hackneyed arguments of bourgeois political economy. Pyotr Maslov goes as far as to contrast Marx's theory of absolute rent to "brickmaking" (p. 111); he warms up again "the law of diminishing returns", affirms that "without this law it is impossible to explain 'trans-Atlantic' competition" (p. 107) and finally talks himself into the assertion that *without refuting Marx it is impossible to refute the views of the Narodniks*: "If it were not for the 'fact' that the productivity of successive expenditures of labour on the same plot of land diminishes, the idyll which the ... Narodniks depict could, perhaps, be realised." (Maslov in the journal *Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 2, p. 123.) In a word, Pyotr Maslov's economic theory does *not* contain one single *new idea* on the question of

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* *The Agrarian Question*, 3rd ed., p. 108, footnote.

** See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 127.—*Ed.*

absolute rent, on the "fact" of diminishing returns, on the principal mistakes of "Narodism", on the difference between the improvement of cultivation and the improvement of technique. Having refuted the theory of absolute rent by purely bourgeois arguments worked to death by the official defenders of capitalism, Maslov was bound to land in the ranks of the distorters of Marxism. But while distorting Marxism, Pyotr Maslov was clever enough to *omit all* his corrections to Marx's rough notes from the German translation of his book on *The Agrarian Question*. Faced with Europeans, Maslov *hid his theory in his pocket*! As I wrote in Chapter III, I could not help recalling in this connection the story about a stranger who was present for the first time at a discussion between ancient philosophers but remained silent all the time. One of the philosophers said to the stranger: "If you are wise, you are behaving foolishly; if you are a fool, you are behaving wisely."

Naturally, to repudiate the theory of absolute rent is to deprive oneself of any chance of understanding the significance of the nationalisation of land in capitalist society, because nationalisation can lead to the abolition only of absolute, and not differential, rent. To repudiate absolute rent is to repudiate the economic significance of private landowning as an *obstacle* to the development of capitalism. Thanks to this, Maslov and Co. inevitably reduce the question of nationalisation or municipalisation to a political issue ("who should get the land?") and ignore the economic essence of the question. The combination of private ownership of allotment land (i.e., of inferior land owned by inferior proprietors) with public ownership of the remaining (superior) part of the land becomes an *absurdity* in any at all developed and free capitalist state. It is nothing more or less, than *agrarian bimetallism*.

As a result of this error of the Mensheviks, it transpires that the Social-Democrats have handed over criticism of private ownership of the land to the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Marx gave an admirable example of such criticism in *Capital*.* But with us it appears that the Social-Democrats

* See, for example, *Das Kapital*, III, 2. T., S. 346-47, on the price of land as a barrier to the development of capitalism; and Ibid., S. 344-45, 341, 342.[87]

do not conduct that criticism from the point of view of the development of capitalism, and all that reaches the masses is criticism by the Narodniks, i.e., a distorted philistine criticism of private property in land.

I will mention as a detail that the following argument has also been used against nationalisation in Russian literature: it would mean "money rent" for small peasant property. That is not so. "Money rent" (see *Capital*, Vol. III)[88] is a modern form of interest for the landlord. In *present-day* peasant leasehold, payment for land is undoubtedly *money rent* to a certain degree. The abolition of the feudal latifundia will hasten the differentiation of the peasantry and strengthen the peasant bourgeoisie, which is already carrying out capitalist renting of land (recall the data quoted earlier about renting of land among the higher groups of the peasantry).

Finally, it should be said that the view is fairly widespread among Marxists that nationalisation is practicable only at a very high stage of development of capitalism. That is incorrect. It would then be a question not of a bourgeois but of a socialist revolution. Nationalisation of the land is the most consistent bourgeois measure. Marx *repeatedly* affirmed this, from *The Poverty of Philosophy*[89] onwards. In his *Theories of Surplus-Value* Marx says (II. Band, I. Teil, S. 208): "In theory the radical bourgeois arrives at the repudiation of private landed property.... In practice, however, he lacks courage, since the attack on one form of property, private property in relation to the conditions of labour, would be very dangerous for the other form. Moreover, the bourgeois has territorialised himself." In Russia the bourgeois revolution is taking place in conditions when there exists a radical bourgeois (the peasant) who "has the courage" to put forward a programme of nationalisation on behalf of a mass of many millions, and who has not yet "territorialised himself", i.e., he derives more harm from (*medieval*) private property in land, than advantage and "profits" from (bourgeois) property in the same land. The Russian revolution *cannot* be victorious unless that "radical bourgeois", who wavers between the Cadet and the worker, supports the proletariat in its revolutionary struggle by mass action. The Russian revolution cannot be victorious except in the form

of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Chapter IV of the book deals with "political and tactical" considerations in questions of the agrarian programme. First among these is the "famous" argument of Plekhanov. "The key to my position," he exclaimed at Stockholm, "is that I draw attention to the possibility of restoration" (Minutes, p. 113). But the key is a completely rusty one—the Cadet key of a *deal* with reaction under the guise of a "guarantee against restoration". Plekhanov's argument is the most pitiful piece of sophistry, for while he asserts that there is no guarantee against restoration, he nevertheless *invents* such a guarantee. "It [municipalisation] will not surrender the land to the political representatives of the old order" (p. 45, Plekhanov's speech). What is restoration? The passing of power in the state into the hands of representatives of the old order. Can there be a guarantee against restoration? "No, there can be no guarantee" (Minutes, p. 44, Plekhanov's speech). Therefore ... he invents a guarantee—"municipalisation will not surrender the land".

Under municipalisation there will remain the *difference* between allotment and landlords' lands in the *economic sense*, i.e., it will facilitate a restoration, or the *recognition of this difference* de jure. In the *political* sense municipalisation is a *law* changing the ownership of landlords' estates. What is a law? The expression of the will of the ruling classes. If there is a restoration, the *same* classes once again become the *ruling* classes. Will they be bound by law, Comrade Plekhanov? If you gave this any thought, you would understand that no law can restrict the expression of the will of the ruling classes. Nationalisation makes restoration more difficult in the *economic* sense, because it *destroys all* the old barriers, *all* medieval property in land, and *adapts* it to the new uniform capitalist conditions of production.

Plekhanov's sophistry is an acceptance of the *Cadet* tactics of leading the proletariat not to complete victory but *to a deal* with the old authorities. In fact, the only absolute "guarantee against restoration" is a socialist revolution in the West, while a relative guarantee would be to carry the revolution through to its conclusion, to do away with the old in the *most radical fashion*, to provide the *greatest*

degree of democracy in politics (the republic) and to clear the ground for capitalism in the economy.

Another argument of Plekhanov's runs: "In the shape of local self-governing bodies which will possess the land, municipalisation will create a bulwark against reaction. And a very powerful bulwark it will be" (Minutes, p. 45). This is untrue. Never and nowhere has local self-government been a bulwark against reaction in the epoch of capitalism, nor could it be. Capitalism *inevitably* leads to centralisation of state power, and *every* local self-government will *unquestionably* be vanquished if the state authority is reactionary. Plekhanov is preaching *opportunism* when he concentrates attention not on "democracy in the centre", or *a republic*—the only bulwark against reaction conceivable in capitalist society—but on local self-government, which is always impotent in relation to great historical tasks, always small-scale, petty, subordinate and scattered. "A peasant agrarian revolution" *cannot* be victorious in Russia unless it defeats the central authority, but Plekhanov suggests to the Mensheviks views expressed at Stockholm by the Menshevik Novosedsky: "In the event of truly democratic local self-government being established, the programme now adopted may be carried into effect [listen to this!] even with a degree of democratisation of the central government which cannot be described as the highest degree of its democratisation. Even under democratisation of a comparative degree, so to speak, municipalisation will not be harmful, but useful" (Minutes, p. 138).

Nothing could be more clear. Let us teach the people to adapt itself to the monarchy: perhaps the latter won't "notice" our regional activity, and will "grant us our lives" like Shchedrin's gudgeon had his granted. The Third Duma is a good illustration of the possibility of municipalisation and *local* democracy, given a "relative", Menshevik democracy in the centre.

Then municipalisation makes for federalism and separatism in the regions. No wonder, in the Second Duma, the *Right-wing Cossack* Karaulov denounced nationalisation no less strongly than Plekhanov (Minutes, p. 1366) and *declared for municipalisation by regions*. The Cossack lands in Russia already *represent* an example of municipalisation. And it

was just this breaking-up of the state into separate regions that was one of the causes of the defeat of the revolution in the first three years' campaign!

Nationalisation—runs the next argument—strengthens the central authority of the bourgeois state! In the first place, this argument is put forward with the object of arousing distrust in the Social-Democratic parties of the *various nationalities*. "Perhaps, in some places, the peasants would agree to share their lands," wrote P. Maslov in *Obrazovaniye* (1907, No. 3, p. 104). "But the refusal of the peasants in a single large area (for example, Poland) to share their lands would be enough to make the proposal to nationalise all the land an absurdity." A fine argument, to be sure! Should we not give up the idea of a republic, since "the refusal of the peasants in a single large area is enough, etc."? It is not an argument but a piece of *demagogy*. Our political programme excludes any violence and injustice, demanding wide autonomy for the individual provinces (see Clause 3 of the Party programme). Thus, it is not a question of reinventing new "guarantees" which are unattainable in bourgeois society, but of the party of the proletariat using its propaganda and agitation to *call* for unity and not for dismemberment, to solve the lofty problems arising in centralised states, and not to sink into rusticity and national insularity. It is the centre of Russia that solves the agrarian problem: the borderlands *cannot* be influenced otherwise than by *example*.* This is obvious even to every democrat, let alone every Social-Democrat. And the question is only whether the proletariat should *raise* the peasantry to higher aims, or *sink* to the petty-bourgeois level of the peasantry itself.

Secondly, it is asserted that nationalisation will increase the possibility of arbitrary action at the centre, bureaucracy, etc. As regards bureaucracy, it should be observed that the *management* of the land even under nationalisation will remain in the hands of the local self-governing bodies. This means that the argument just quoted is false. The central authority will lay down the general conditions: i.e., for

* In a capitalist state private property in land and nationalisation *cannot* exist side by side. One of them must gain the upper hand. The business of the workers' party is to fight for the higher system.

example, it will prohibit any alienation of the land, etc. And does not our present, i.e., Menshevik, programme hand over to the "democratic state for disposal" not only the "colonisation lands", but also "forest and water areas of national importance"? But it is not wise to hide one's head under one's wing; here, too, *unlimited* arbitrary action is possible, since it is the central state authority itself which will determine *what* forests and waters are of national importance. The Mensheviks are looking for "guarantees" in the wrong place: *only* complete democracy at the centre, only a *republic*, can reduce the probability of disputes between the centre and the regions to a minimum.

"The bourgeois state will grow stronger," cry the Mensheviks, who in secret support the bourgeois monarchists (the Cadets), and in public beat their breasts at the very thought of supporting bourgeois republicans. The genuine historical question which objective historical and social development is putting to us is: a Prussian or an American type of agrarian evolution? A landlords' monarchy with the fig-leaf of a sham constitution, or a peasant (farmers') republic? To close our eyes to *such* an objective statement of the case by history means to deceive oneself and others, hiding in philistine fashion from the acute class struggle, from the acute, simple and decisive presentation of the question of a democratic revolution.

We cannot get rid of the "bourgeois state". Only petty-bourgeois philistines can dream of doing so. Our revolution is a bourgeois revolution precisely because the struggle going on in it is not between socialism and capitalism, but *between two forms of capitalism*, two paths of its development, two forms of bourgeois-democratic institutions. The monarchy of the Octobrists or the Cadets is a "*relative*" bourgeois "democracy", from the point of view of the Menshevik Novosedsky. The proletarian-peasant republic, too, is a bourgeois democracy. In our revolution we cannot make a *single step*—and we have not made a single step—which *did not support* in one way or another one section of the bourgeoisie or another against the old order.

If we are told that nationalisation means using public funds for the army, while municipalisation means using them for public health and education, it is sophistry worthy

of a philistine. Yet literally that is how Maslov argues: "Nationalisation, i.e., [*sic*!] the expenditure of ground-rent on the army and navy ...; municipalisation of the land, i.e., the expenditure of rent on the needs of the population" (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 103). This is petty-bourgeois socialism, or the destruction of flies by the use of a powder to be poured on the flies' tails when they have been caught! Our good Maslov has not realised that, if the Zemstvos in Russia and the municipalities in the West spend more on public health, etc., compared with the state, it is only because the bourgeois state has already carried out *its* most important expenditures (to assure the domination of the bourgeoisie as a class) out of funds coming from the biggest sources of revenue, and has *left* the local authorities with *secondary* sources for the so-called "needs of the population". Hundreds of thousands for the army, a few farthings for the needs of the *proletariat*—that is the true relationship of expenditures in the bourgeois state. And one has to be a Maslov to imagine that it is sufficient to *hand over* ground-rent for "disposal" by the municipalities, for the bourgeois state to be taken in by those subtle "politicians", the Mensheviks! And really, will the bourgeois state, thanks to this "most subtle policy", begin to give hundreds of thousands to the proletarians and farthings to the army and the navy?

In reality, the Mensheviks are pursuing a philistine policy—seeking refuge in the provincial backwoods of local self-government against having to solve the burning problem with which we are faced by history, namely, should our country have a centralised bourgeois republic of farmers, or a centralised bourgeois monarchy of Junkers? You won't dodge the issue, gentlemen! No provincialism, no playing at municipal socialism, will rescue you from *inevitable* participation in the solving of this *acute* problem. Your wriggling really means only one thing—secret support of the Cadet tendency, while failing to understand the importance of the republican tendency.

The Minutes of the Stockholm Congress are clear evidence of the fact that the Mensheviks, in defending municipalisation, are flirting with the Fabian "municipal socialism" existing in Europe. "Some comrades," Kostrov said there, "seem to be hearing about municipal ownership for the

first time. Let me remind them that in Western Europe there is a whole political trend [precisely! Kostrov, without wishing to do so, blurted out the truth!] called 'municipal socialism' [England]" (Minutes, p. 88). That this "*trend*" is the trend of *extreme opportunism* neither Kostrov nor Larin* took into consideration. It is quite consistent for the Socialist-Revolutionaries to drag in petty-bourgeois peddling of reforms as one of the tasks of the bourgeois revolution, but it is not for the Social-Democrats to do it, gentlemen! The bourgeois intellectuals in the West (the Fabians in England, the followers of Bernstein in Germany, the followers of Brousse in France) naturally shift the weight of emphasis from questions of state *structure* to questions of local *self-government*. But what we are faced with is precisely the question of the *structure* of the state, its agrarian basis—and to defend "municipal socialism" here is to *play* at agrarian socialism. Let the petty bourgeoisie hasten to "build themselves a nest" in the peaceful municipalities of future democratic Russia. The task of the proletariat is to organise the masses not for this purpose, but for the revolutionary struggle, for *complete* democratisation today and a socialist revolution tomorrow.

We Bolsheviks are often reproached for the utopianism and fantastic character of our revolutionary views. And these reproaches are heard most often in connection with nationalisation. But this is where they are least of all justified. Those who consider nationalisation to be "utopia" do not think about the necessary balance between political and agrarian changes. Nationalisation is no less "utopian"—from the point of view of an ordinary philistine—than a republic. And both are no less utopian than a "*peasant*" agrarian revolution, i.e., the victory of a peasant uprising in a capitalist country. All these changes are equally "difficult" as far as everyday peaceful development is concerned. And the outcry about nationalisation, of all things, being utopian, testifies first of all to *failure to understand* the essential and unbreakable connection between an economic

* *The Peasant Question and Social-Democracy*. A particularly vague commentary on the Menshevik programme. See p. 66. On p. 103 this wretched defender of municipalisation points to *nationalisation* as the *best* way out!

and a political upheaval. Confiscation of the landed estates (a demand in our programme recognised both by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks) is impossible without the abolition of the landlord autocracy (and with it the Octobrist, not purely landlord, autocracy). And the autocracy cannot be abolished without the revolutionary action of class-conscious millions, without a great surge of mass heroism, readiness and ability on their part to "storm heaven", as Marx put it when speaking of the Paris workers at the time of the Commune.[90] In its turn, this revolutionary surge is unthinkable without the radical abolition of *all* the relics of serfdom which for ages have oppressed the peasantry, including the *whole* of medieval property in land, all the shackles of the fiscal "village commune", the crumbs of accursed memory "granted" by the government, etc., etc., etc.

Owing to lack of space (I have already gone beyond the length laid down by the editors of *Przegląd*[91]) I omit a summary of the *fifth* chapter of my book ("Classes and Parties in the Debate on the Agrarian Question in the Second Duma").

The speeches of the *peasants* in the Duma are of tremendous political importance, because in them were expressed that passionate desire to get rid of the yoke of the landlords, that fiery hatred of medievalism and the bureaucracy, that spontaneous, ingenuous, often naïve and not quite definite, but at the same time stormy revolutionary spirit of the *ordinary* peasants, which prove better than any long arguments what potential destructive energy has accumulated within the mass of the peasantry against the nobility, the landlords and the Romanovs. The task of the class-conscious proletariat is mercilessly to show up, expose and eliminate all the numerous petty-bourgeois deceptions, allegedly socialist phrases, childishly naïve expectations which the peasants link with an agrarian revolution—but to eliminate them not in order to calm and pacify the peasants (as the betrayers of the people's freedom, the Cadet gentlemen, did in both Dumas) but in order to awaken among the masses a steel-like, unshakable and resolute revolutionary spirit. Without that *revolutionary spirit*, without a stubborn and merciless struggle of the *peasant* masses, all such things

as confiscation, the republic, and universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot are hopelessly "utopian". Therefore the Marxists must put the question clearly and definitely: two directions in the economic development of Russia, two paths of capitalism, have emerged with absolute clarity. Let all think well on this. During the first revolutionary campaign, during the three years 1905-07, both these directions became clear to us not as theoretical general conclusions, not as lessons to be drawn from such-and-such *features* of the evolution which has taken place since 1861. No, these directions have now become clear to us precisely as the directions *mapped out* by hostile classes. The landlords and the capitalists (the Octobrists) are quite clear that there is no other development except the capitalist one, and that *for them* it is impossible to travel that road without compulsory and speedy destruction of the "village commune", that kind of destruction which is identical with ... open robbery by the money-lender, with "destruction and plunder" by the police or "punitive" expeditions. It is the kind of "operation" in which it is extremely easy to break one's neck! As for the masses of the peasantry, they discovered for themselves no less clearly during those same three years that it was hopeless to expect anything from "Our Father the Tsar", or to count in any way on a peaceful road, and that revolutionary struggle was necessary to abolish all medievalism in general and all medieval property in land in particular.

All the propaganda and agitation of the Social-Democrats should be based on bringing these results home to the masses, on preparing the masses to make use of this experience for a resolute and unswerving attack, organised in the best possible way, during the *second* campaign of the revolution.

That is just why Plekhanov's speeches at Stockholm were so reactionary when he talked about the seizure of power by the proletariat and the peasantry meaning the rebirth of "the Narodnaya Volya spirit". Plekhanov himself reduced his argument to an absurdity: according to him, there would take place a "peasant agrarian revolution" without seizure of power by the proletariat, without seizure of power by the peasantry! On the other hand, Kautsky—who at the beginning of the break between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks

was patently inclined to favour the latter—has gone over ideologically to the side of the former, by recognising that only given "the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry" is a victory of the revolution possible.

Without complete abolition of all medieval property in the land, without the complete "clearing", i.e., without nationalisation of the land, such a revolution is unthinkable. The business of the party of the proletariat is to spread most widely this watchword of a most consistent and most radical bourgeois agrarian revolution. And when we have done *that*, we shall see what are the further prospects; we shall see whether such a revolution is *only* the basis for a development of productive forces under capitalism at an American speed, *or* whether it will become the prologue to a socialist revolution in the West.

July 18, 1908

P.S. I do not repeat here my draft of an agrarian programme, which was submitted to the Stockholm Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and which has often been printed in Social-Democratic literature. I will confine myself merely to some observations. When two directions for capitalist agrarian evolution exist, there must necessarily be included in the programme an "if" (the technical expression used at the Stockholm Congress), i.e., the programme must take both possibilities into account. In other words, so long as things are going as they are, we demand freedom of use of the land, tribunals for lowering rents, abolition of social-estates, etc. *At the same time we fight the present* direction and support the revolutionary demands of the peasantry in the interests of the speediest possible development of productive forces and of wide and free scope for the class struggle. While supporting the revolutionary struggle of the peasants against medievalism, the Social-Democratic Labour Party makes it clear that the best form of agrarian relations in capitalist society (and at the same time the best form in which survivals of serfdom can be eliminated) is the nationalisation of the land, that only in connection with a radical political revolution, the abolition of the autocracy

and the establishment of a democratic republic, is it possible to carry out a radical agrarian revolution, the confiscation of the landed estates and the nationalisation of the land.

Such is the *content* of my draft agrarian programme. The part which describes the bourgeois features of the *whole* of the present agrarian changes, and elucidates the purely proletarian point of view of Social-Democracy, was *adopted* at Stockholm and *became an integral part* of the present programme.

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INFLAMMABLE MATERIAL IN WORLD POLITICS

The revolutionary movement in various European and Asian countries has latterly made itself felt so weightily that we see before us the fairly clear outlines of a new and incomparably higher stage in the international proletarian struggle.

There has been a counter-revolution in Persia—a peculiar combination of the dissolution of Russia's First Duma, and of the Russian insurrection at the close of 1905. Shamefully defeated by the Japanese, the armies of the Russian tsar are taking their revenge by zealously serving the counter-revolution. The exploits of the Cossacks in mass shootings, punitive expeditions, manhandling and pillage in Russia are followed by their exploits in suppressing the revolution in Persia. That Nicholas Romanov, heading the Black-Hundred landlords and capitalists, scared by strikes and civil war, should be venting his fury on the Persian revolutionaries, is understandable. It is not the first time that Russia's Christian soldiers are cast in the role of international hangmen. That Britain is pharisaically washing her hands of the affair, and maintaining a demonstratively friendly neutrality towards the Persian reactionaries and supporters of absolutism, is a somewhat different matter. The British Liberal bourgeoisie, angered by the growth of the labour movement at home and frightened by the mounting revolutionary struggle in India, are more and more frequently, frankly and sharply demonstrating what *brutes* the highly "civilised" European "politicians", men who have passed through the high school of constitutionalism, can turn into when it comes to a rise in the mass struggle against capital and the capitalist colonial system, i.e., a system of enslavement, plunder and violence. The position of the Per-

sian revolutionaries is a difficult one; theirs is a country which the masters of India on the one hand, and the counter-revolutionary Russian Government on the other, were on the point of dividing up between themselves. But the dogged struggle in Tabriz and the repeated swing of the fortunes of war to the revolutionaries who, it seemed, had been utterly defeated, are evidence that the Shah's bashi-bazouks, even though aided by Russian Lyakhovs[92] and British diplomats, are encountering the most vigorous resistance from the people. A revolutionary movement that can offer armed resistance to attempts at restoration, that compels the attempters to call in foreign aid—such a movement cannot be destroyed. In these circumstances, even the fullest triumph of Persian reaction would merely be the prelude to fresh popular rebellion.

In Turkey, the revolutionary movement in the army, led by the Young Turks, has achieved victory. True, it is only half a victory, or even less, since Turkey's Nicholas II has so far managed to get away with a promise to restore the celebrated Turkish constitution. But in a revolution such half-victories, such forced and hasty concessions by the old regime, are the surest guarantee of new and much more decisive, more acute fluctuations of the civil war, involving broader masses of the people. And the school of civil war is never lost upon nations. It is a hard school, and its complete course *necessarily* includes victories for the counter-revolution, the unbridled licence of the infuriated reactionaries, the savage reprisals of the old government against the rebels, etc. But only incurable pedants and doddering mummies can moan over the fact that the nations have entered this very painful school. For it is one that teaches the oppressed classes how to wage civil war and how to carry the revolution to victory. It concentrates in the masses of contemporary slaves the hatred which downtrodden, benighted and ignorant slaves have always carried within them, and which leads to the supreme history-making feats of slaves who have realised the shame of their slavery.

In India lately, the native slaves of the "civilised" British capitalists have been a source of worry to their "masters". There is no end to the acts of violence and plunder which goes under the name of the British system of government in

India. Nowhere in the world—with the exception, of course, of Russia—will you find such abject mass poverty, such chronic starvation among the people. The most Liberal and Radical personalities of free Britain, men like John Morley—that authority for Russian and non-Russian Cadets, that luminary of "progressive" journalism (in reality, a lackey of capitalism)—become regular Genghis Khans when appointed to govern India, and are capable of sanctioning every means of "pacifying" the population in their charge, even to the extent of *flogging* political protestors! *Justice*, the little weekly of the British Social-Democrats, has been *banned* in India by these Liberal and "Radical" scoundrels like Morley. And when Keir Hardie, the British M. P. and leader of the Independent Labour Party, had the temerity to visit India and speak to the Indians about the most elementary democratic demands, the whole British bourgeois press raised a howl against this "rebel". And now the most influential British newspapers are in a fury about "agitators" who disturb the tranquillity of India, and are welcoming court sentences and administrative measures in the purely Russian, Plehve style to suppress democratic Indian publicists. But in India the street is beginning to stand up for *its* writers and political leaders. The infamous sentence pronounced by the British jackals on the Indian democrat Tilak—he was sentenced to a long term of exile, the question in the British House of Commons the other day revealing that the Indian jurors had declared for acquittal and that the verdict had been passed *by the vote of the British jurors*!—this revenge against a democrat by the lackeys of the money-bag evoked street demonstrations and a strike in Bombay. In India, too, the proletariat has already developed to conscious political mass struggle—and, that being the case, the Russian-style British regime in India is doomed! By their colonial plunder of Asian countries, the Europeans have succeeded in so steeling one of them, Japan, that she has gained great military victories, which have ensured her independent national development. There can be no doubt that the age-old plunder of India by the British, and the contemporary struggle of all these "advanced" Europeans against Persian and Indian democracy, will *steel* millions, tens of millions of proletarians in Asia to wage

a struggle against their oppressors which will be just as victorious as that of the Japanese. The class-conscious European worker now has comrades in Asia, and their number will grow by leaps and bounds.

In China, too, the revolutionary movement against the medieval order has made itself felt with particular force in recent months. True, nothing definite can yet be said about the present movement—there is such scanty information about it and such a spate of reports about revolts in various parts of the country. But there can be no doubt about the vigorous growth of the "new spirit" and the "European currents" that are stirring in China, especially since the Russo-Japanese war; and consequently, the old-style Chinese revolts will inevitably develop into a conscious democratic movement. That some of the participants in colonial plunder are this time greatly concerned is borne out by the way the French are acting in Indo-China: they *helped* the "historic authorities" in China to put down the revolutionaries! They feared equally for the safety of their "own" Asian possessions bordering an China.

The French bourgeoisie, however, are concerned not only over their Asian possessions. The barricades at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, near Paris, the shooting down of the strikers who built these barricades (on Thursday, July 30[17]) —these events are renewed evidence of the sharpening of the class struggle in Europe. Clemenceau, the Radical, who governs France on behalf of the capitalists, is working with uncommon zeal to shatter the last lingering remnants of republican-bourgeois illusions among the proletariat. The shooting down of the workers by troops acting on the orders of a "Radical" government has, under Clemenceau, become almost more frequent than before. The French socialists have already dubbed Clemenceau "The Red" for this; and now, when his agents, gendarmes and generals have again shed the blood of the workers, the socialists recall the catchphrase once uttered by this ultra-progressive bourgeois republican to a workers' delegation: "You and I are on different sides of the barricade." Yes, the French proletariat and the most extreme bourgeois republicans have finally taken their place on opposite sides of the barricade. The French working class shed much blood to win and defend the repub-

lic, and now, on the basis of the fully established republican order, the decisive struggle between the propertied class and the working people is rapidly coming to a head. "It was not simply brutality," *L'Humanité*[93] wrote of the July 30 events, "it was part of a battle." The generals and the police were bent on provoking the workers and turning a peaceful unarmed demonstration into a massacre. But the troops that surrounded and attacked the unarmed strikers and demonstrators met with resistance, their action leading to the immediate erection of barricades, and to events which are agitating the whole of France. These barricades, *L'Humanité* says, were built of boards and were ludicrously ineffectual. But that is not important. What is important is that the Third Republic had eliminated the old habit of barricades; whereas now "Clemenceau is reviving that habit"—and he is just as candid about the matter as were "the butchers of June 1848, and Galliffet in 1871", on the subject of civil war.

And the socialist press is not alone in recalling these great historic dates in connection with the events of July 30. The bourgeois press is furiously attacking the workers, accusing them of behaving as if they intended to start a socialist revolution. One paper cites a minor but characteristic incident indicative of the mood of both sides at the scene of action. When the workers were carrying a wounded comrade past General Virvaire, who directed the operations against the strikers, there were shouts from the demonstrators: "*Saluez*!" And the general of the bourgeois republic saluted his wounded enemy.

The sharpening of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is to be observed in all the advanced capitalist countries. The tendency is the same everywhere, though it manifests itself differently in accordance with the difference in historical conditions, political systems and forms of the labour movement. In America and Britain, where complete political liberty exists and where the proletariat has no revolutionary and socialist traditions that could be called living traditions, this sharpening of the struggle is expressed in the mounting movement against the trusts, in the extraordinary growth of socialism and the increasing attention it is getting from the propertied classes, and in workers' organisations, in some cases purely economic

ones, that are beginning to enter upon systematic and independent proletarian political struggle. In Austria and Germany, and partly also in the Scandinavian countries, this sharpening of the class struggle shows itself in election campaigns, in party relationships, in the closer alignment of the bourgeoisie of all sorts and shades against their common enemy, the proletariat, and in the hardening of judicial and police persecution. Slowly but surely, the two opposing camps are building up their strength, consolidating their organisations, drawing apart with increasing sharpness in every sphere of public life, as if preparing, silently and intently, for the impending revolutionary battles. In the Latin countries, Italy and particularly France, the sharpening of the class struggle is expressed in especially stormy, violent, and occasionally forthright revolutionary outbreaks, when the pent-up hatred of the proletariat for its oppressors bursts out with unexpected force, and the "peaceful" atmosphere of parliamentary struggle gives way to episodes of real civil war.

The international revolutionary movement of the proletariat does not and cannot develop evenly and in identical forms in different countries. The full and all-round utilisation of every opportunity in every field of activity comes only as the result of the class struggle of the workers in the various countries. Every country contributes its own valuable and specific features to the common stream; but in each particular country the movement suffers from its own one-sidedness, its own theoretical and practical shortcomings of the individual socialist parties. On the whole we clearly see a tremendous step forward of international socialism, the rallying of million-strong armies of the proletariat in the course of a series of practical clashes with the enemy, and the approach of a decisive struggle with the bourgeoisie—a struggle for which the working class is far better *prepared* than in the days of the Commune, that last great proletarian insurrection.

And this step forward of the whole of international socialism, along with the sharpening of the revolutionary-democratic struggle in Asia, places the Russian revolution in a special and especially difficult position. The Russian revolution has a great international ally both in Europe and

in Asia, but, at the same time, and *for that very reason*, it has not only a national, not only a Russian, but also an *international* enemy. Reaction against the mounting proletarian struggle is inevitable in all capitalist countries, and it is uniting the bourgeois governments of the whole world against every popular movement, against every revolution both in Asia and, particularly, in Europe. The opportunists in our Party, like the majority of the Russian liberal intelligentsia, are still dreaming of a bourgeois revolution in Russia that will "not alienate" or scare away the bourgeoisie, that will not engender "excessive" reaction, or lead to the seizure of power by the revolutionary classes. Vain hopes! A philistine utopia! The amount of inflammable material in all the advanced countries of the world is increasing so speedily, and the conflagration is so clearly spreading to most Asian countries which only yesterday were in a state of deep slumber, that the intensification of international bourgeois reaction and the aggravation of every single national revolution are absolutely inevitable.

The historical tasks of our revolution are not being performed by the forces of counter-revolution, and cannot be. The Russian bourgeoisie are necessarily gravitating more and more towards the international anti-proletarian and antidemocratic trend. It is not on liberal allies that the Russian proletariat should count. It must follow its own independent path to the complete victory of the revolution, basing itself on the need for a forcible solution of the agrarian question in Russia by the peasant masses themselves, helping them to overthrow the rule of the Black-Hundred landlords and the Black-Hundred autocracy, setting itself the task of establishing a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry in Russia, and remembering that its struggle and its victories are inseparable from the international revolutionary movement. Less illusions about the liberalism of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie (counter-revolutionary both in Russia and the world over). More attention to the growth of the international revolutionary proletariat!

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FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD[94]

The present sketch of Comrade Maslov's theoretical misadventures is borrowed from the book by N. Lenin which gives a systematic analysis of the tendencies in our agrarian development. Naturally, the exposure of the "original" agrarian theories of Maslov, which are saturated with a spirit of the most crude revisionism, inevitably involves the criticism of some propositions in the Party programme also. We think a discussion in the Party press on this question is quite timely.

As for Comrade Maslov's theoretical "discoveries", we have to address a few words to Comrade Plekhanov in particular about them, since he is the guardian angel of our agrarian revisionist.

In No. 6-7 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, when discussing momentous theoretical issues, you deigned incidentally to launch upon evasive and ambiguous remarks which are nothing short of *indecent*. You took upon yourself to declare in print that such-and-such members of our Party were *no comrades* of yours, while at the same time you lacked the courage to explain openly and plainly whether you had decided to withdraw from our organisation, or whether you sought the expulsion of such-and-such members from it. That was at once cowardly and rude.

So meditate a little, incorruptible warrior, over the revisionist feats of your Maslov. They fall, if anything does, under that little local authority where you, judging by published literature, have the reputation of a dread Dumbadze. Where then is your criticism of Comrade Maslov's revisionist fabrications? Where is your defence of the eco-

nomic theory of Karl Marx? And who, if not you, gave Maslov every support and encouragement?

Our Party Famusovs[95] are not unwilling to play the part of mercilessly determined fighters for Marxism—but in the service of factional favouritism they don't mind covering up very serious departures from Marxism!

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BELLICOSE MILITARISM AND THE ANTI-MILITARIST TACTICS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

I

The diplomats are in a flurry. There is a shower of "Notes", "Reports", "Statements"; ministers whisper behind the backs of the crowned puppets who, champagne-glasses in hand, are "working for peace". But their "subjects" know perfectly well that when crows flock together there must be a smell of carrion about. And the Conservative Earl Cromer informed the British Parliament that we were living in times when national (?) interests were involved, and passions were excited, and there was a risk, and more than a risk, that a collision would take place, however pacific (!) the intentions of rulers may be.

Plenty of inflammable material has accumulated in recent times, and it is steadily growing. The revolution in Persia threatens to upset all the barriers or "spheres of influence" set up there by the European powers. The constitutional movement in Turkey threatens to snatch that private estate from the claws of the preying wolves of European capitalism; and looming large and threatening are old "questions" which have now become acute—those of Macedonia, Central Asia, the Far East, etc.

But with the present network of open and secret treaties, agreements, etc., it is sufficient for some "power" to get the slightest of flicks for "the spark to burst into flame".

And the more menacingly the governments rattle their sabres one against the other, the more ruthlessly do they crush the anti-militarist movement at home. The persecutions

of anti-militarists are growing extensively and intensively. The "Radical-Socialist" Ministry of Clemenceau-Briand acts no less violently than the Junker-Conservative Ministry of Bulow. The dissolution of the "youth organisations" throughout Germany, following the introduction of the new law on unions and assemblies, which prohibits persons under the age of 20 from attending political meetings, has made anti-militarist agitation in Germany extremely difficult.

As a result, the dispute about the anti-militarist tactics of the socialists, which had died down since the Stuttgart Congress,[96] is being revived again in the Party press.

At first sight it is a strange thing. When the question is so obviously important, when militarism is so patently and starkly harmful for the proletariat, it would be difficult to find another question on which such hesitation and confusion reign among the Western socialists as in the arguments on anti-militarist tactics.

The fundamental premises for a correct solution of this problem have long ago been established quite firmly, and do not arouse any dispute. Modern militarism is the result of capitalism. In both its forms it is the "vital expression" of capitalism—as a military force used by the capitalist states in their external conflicts ("*Militarismus nach aussen*", as the Germans say) and as a weapon in the hands of the ruling classes for suppressing every kind of movement, economic and political, of the proletariat ("*Militarismus nach innen*"). A number of International Congresses (Paris 1889, Brussels 1891, Zurich 1893 and finally Stuttgart 1907) provided a perfect expression of this view in their resolutions. The Stuttgart resolution establishes this link between militarism and capitalism most circumstantially, although in keeping with the agenda ("International Conflicts") the Stuttgart Congress was more concerned with that aspect of militarism which the Germans call "external" ("*Militarismus nach aussen*"). Here is the relevant passage in this resolution: "Wars between capitalist states are usually the result of their competition on the world market, since each state strives not only to assure itself of a sphere of export, but also to conquer new regions, and the principal part in this is played by the enslavement of other peoples and countries. These wars then arise from the continuous armaments

produced by militarism, which is the principal implement of class domination of the bourgeoisie and of the political subjugation of the working class.

"A favourable soil for wars are nationalist prejudices, which are systematically cultivated in the civilised countries in the interests of the ruling classes, with the object of diverting the proletarian masses from their own class objectives and making them forget the duty of international class solidarity.

"Thus wars are rooted in the very essence of capitalism; they will end only when the capitalist system ceases to exist, or when the immensity of human and financial sacrifice caused by the development of military technique, and the indignation which armaments arouse in the people, lead to the elimination of the system.

"The working class, which is the principal supplier of soldiers, and which bears the brunt of the material sacrifices, is in particular the natural enemy of wars, because wars contradict the aim it pursues, namely, the creation of an economic system founded on socialist principles, which in practice will give effect to the solidarity of peoples...."

II

Thus the principle which connects militarism and capitalism is firmly established among socialists, and on this point there are no differences. But the recognition of this link does not of itself concretely determine the anti-militarist *tactics* of the socialists: it does not solve the practical problem of how to fight the burden of militarism and how to prevent wars. And it is in the answers to these questions that a considerable divergence of views is to be found among socialists. At the Stuttgart Congress these differences were very marked.

At one pole are German Social-Democrats like Vollmar. Since militarism is the offspring of capitalism, they argue, since wars are a necessary concomitant of capitalist development, there is no need for any special anti-militarist activity. That exactly is what Vollmar declared at the Essen Party Congress. On the question of how Social-Democrats should behave if war is declared, the majority of the German

Social-Democrats, headed by Bebel and Vollmar, hold rigidly to the view that the Social-Democrats must defend their country against aggression, and that they are bound to take part in a "defensive" war. This proposition led Vollmar to declare at Stuttgart that "all our love for humanity cannot prevent us being good Germans", while the Social-Democratic deputy Noske proclaimed in the Reichstag that, in the event of war against Germany, "the Social-Democrats will not lag behind bourgeois parties and will shoulder their rifles". From this Noske had to make only one more step to declare that "we want Germany to be armed as much as possible".

At the other pole is the small group of supporters of Hervé. The proletariat has no fatherland, they argue. Hence all wars are in the interests of the capitalists. Hence the proletariat must combat every war. The proletariat must meet every declaration of war with a military strike and an uprising. This must be the main purpose of anti-militarist propaganda. At Stuttgart Hervé therefore proposed the following draft resolution: "The Congress calls for *every declaration of war*, *whencesoever it may come*, being met with a military strike and an uprising."

Such are the two "extreme" positions on this question in the ranks of the Western socialists. "Like the sun in a drop of water", there are reflected in them the two diseases which still cause harm to the activity of the socialist proletariat in the West—opportunist tendencies on the one hand and anarchist phrase-mongering on the other.

First of all, a few remarks about patriotism. That "working men have no country" was really said in the *Communist Manifesto*. That the attitude of Vollmar, Noske and Co. strikes at this basic principle of *international* socialism is also true. But it does not follow from this that Hervé and his followers are right in asserting that it is of no concern to the proletariat in what country it lives—in monarchical Germany, republican France or despotic Turkey. The fatherland, i.e., the given political, cultural and social environment, is a most powerful factor in the class struggle of the proletariat; and if Vollmar is wrong when he lays down some kind of "truly German" attitude of the proletariat to "the fatherland", Hervé is just as wrong when he takes up

an unforgivably uncritical attitude on such an important factor in the struggle of the proletariat for emancipation. The proletariat cannot be indifferent to the political, social and cultural conditions of its struggle; consequently it cannot be indifferent to the destinies of its country. But the destinies of the country interest it only *to the extent* that they affect its class struggle, and not in virtue of some bourgeois "patriotism", quite indecent on the lips of a Social-Democrat.

More complicated is the other question, namely, the attitude to militarism and war. At the very first glance it is obvious that Hervé is unforgivably confusing these two questions, and forgetting the causal connection between war and capitalism. By adopting Hervé's tactics, the proletariat would condemn itself to fruitless activity: it would use up all its fighting preparedness (the reference is to insurrection) in the struggle against the effect (war) and allow the cause (capitalism) to remain.

The anarchist mode of thought is displayed in full measure here. Blind faith in the miracle-working power of all direct action*; the wrenching of this "direct action" out of its general social and political context, without the slightest analysis of the latter: in short the "arbitrarily mechanical interpretation of social phenomena" (as Karl Liebknecht put it) is obvious.

Hervé's plan is "very simple": on the day war is declared the socialist soldiers desert, while the reservists declare a strike and stay in their homes. But "the strike of the reservists is not passive resistance: the working class would soon go over to open resistance, to insurrection, and the latter would have all the greater chance of ending in triumph because the army on active service would be at the frontiers" (G. Hervé, *Leur Patrie*).

Such is this "effective, direct and practical plan"; and Hervé, confident of its success, proposes that a military strike and insurrection should be the reply to every declaration of war.

It will be clear from this that the question here is not whether the proletariat is able, when it finds such a course

* These words are in French in the original: *action directé.—Ed.*

desirable, to reply with a strike and insurrection to a declaration of war. The point at issue is whether the proletariat should be bound by an obligation to reply with an insurrection to *every* war. To decide the question in the latter sense means to take away from the proletariat the choice of the moment for a decisive battle, and to hand it over to its enemies. It is not the proletariat which chooses the moment of struggle in accordance with its own interests, when its general socialist consciousness stands at a high level, when its organisation is strong, when the occasion is appropriate, etc. No, the bourgeois governments would be able to provoke it to an insurrection even when the conditions for it were unfavourable, for example, by declaring a war specially calculated to arouse patriotic and chauvinist feelings among wide sections of the population and thus isolate the insurgent proletariat. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the bourgeoisie which, from monarchist Germany to republican France and democratic Switzerland, persecutes anti-militarist activity with such ruthlessness in peace-time, would descend with the utmost fury on any attempt at a military strike in the event of war, when war-time laws declarations of martial law, courts martial, etc., are in force.

Kautsky was right when he said of Hervé's idea: "The idea of a military strike sprang from 'good' motives, it is noble and full of heroism, but it is heroic folly."

The proletariat, if it finds it expedient and suitable, may reply with a military strike to a declaration of war. It may, among other means of achieving a social revolution, also have recourse to a military strike. But to commit itself to this "tactical recipe" is not in the interests of the proletariat.

And that precisely was the reply given to this debatable question by the Stuttgart International Congress.

III

But if the views of the Hervéists are "heroic folly" the attitude of Vollmar, Noske and those who think like them on the "Right wing" is opportunist cowardice. Since militarism is the offspring of capitalism, and will fall with it—they argued at Stuttgart and still more at Essen—no special

anti-militarist agitation is needed: it should not exist. But a radical solution of the labour question and the women's question, for example—was the reply given them at Stuttgart—is also impossible while the capitalist system exists; in spite of that, we fight for labour legislation, for extending the civil rights of women, etc. Special anti-militarist propaganda must be carried on all the more energetically because cases of interference in the struggle between labour and capital on the part of the military forces are becoming more frequent; and because the importance of militarism not only in the present struggle of the proletariat, but also in the future, at the time of the social revolution, is becoming more and more obvious.

Special anti-militarist propaganda has behind it not only the evidence of principle but also extensive historical experience. Belgium is ahead of other countries in this respect. The Belgian Labour Party, apart from its general propaganda of anti-militarist ideas, has organised groups of socialist youth under the title of Jeunes Gardes (Young Guards). Groups in one and the same area constitute an Area Federation, and all the Area Federations in turn form a National Federation, headed by a "Chief Council". The newspapers of the "Young Guards" (*La jeunesse—c'est l'avenir*, *De Caserne*, *De Loteling*,* etc.) circulate in tens of thousands of copies! The strongest is the Walloon Federation, which has 62 local groups with 10,000 members; in all there are at present 121 local groups of the "Young Guards".

In addition to agitation in print, there is intensive verbal agitation. In January and September (the months of the call-up) public meetings and processions are held in the main towns of Belgium. Outside the town halls, in the open air, socialist speakers explain to the recruits the meaning of militarism. The Chief Council of the "Young Guards" has a Complaints Committee, the duty of which is to gather information about all acts of injustice committed in the barracks. This information, under the heading "From the Army", is daily published in *Le Peuple*, the central organ of the party. Anti-militarist propaganda does not halt at the threshold of the barracks, and socialist soldiers form propaganda groups

* *Youth Is the Future*, *The Barracks*, *The Recruit.—Ed.*

within the army. At the present time there are about 15 such groups ("soldiers' unions").

Following the Belgian model, with varying intensity and forms of organisation, anti-militarist propaganda goes on in France,* Switzerland, Austria and other countries.

Thus specially-anti-militarist activity is not only specially necessary but practically expedient and fruitful. Therefore, since Vollmar opposed it, pointing out the impossible police conditions prevailing in Germany and the danger of it leading to party organisations being broken up, the question reduced itself to the factual analysis of conditions in this particular country. But this was a question of fact and not of principle. Though here, too, there was justice in Jaurès's remark that the German Social-Democrats, who in their youth, in the difficult years of the Anti-Socialist Laws, stood up against the iron hand of Prince Bismarck, could now, with their incomparably greater numbers and strength, not fear persecution at the hands of their present rulers. But Vollmar is all the more wrong when he tries to fall back on the argument that special anti-militarist propaganda is inexpedient in principle.

No less opportunistic is the conviction of Vollmar and those who think like him that the Social-Democrats are bound to take part in a defensive war. Kautsky's brilliant criticism made hay of these views. Kautsky pointed out that it was often quite impossible to make out—especially at times of patriotic excitement—whether a particular war has been brought about with defensive or aggressive aims (the example, Kautsky gave was: was Japan attacking or defending herself at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War?). Social-Democrats would be entangled in a net of diplomatic negotiations if they took into their heads to determine their attitude to a war by this criterion. Social-Democrats may find themselves even in a position to demand offensive wars. In 1848 (it would not hurt the Hervéists to remember this too) Marx

* An interesting feature among the French is the practice known as "The Soldier's Half-penny". Every week the worker pays one sou to the secretary of his union. The money collected in this way is sent to the soldiers "as a reminder that, even in soldier's clothes, they belong to the exploited class, and that in no circumstances should they forget this".

and Engels thought a war of Germany against Russia to be necessary. Later they strove to influence public opinion in Britain in favour of a war with Russia. Kautsky, by the way, puts forward the following hypothetical example: "Assuming," he says, "that the revolutionary movement in Russia is victorious, and the effects of this victory, in France, lead to power passing into the hands of the proletariat; let us assume, on the other hand, that a coalition of European monarchs is formed against the new Russia. Would international Social-Democracy begin protesting if the French Republic then came to the aid of Russia?" (K. Kautsky, *Our Views on Patriotism and War.*)

It is obvious that on this question (just as in discussing "patriotism") it is not the defensive or offensive character of the war, but the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat, or—to put it better—the interests of the international movement of the proletariat—that represent the sole criterion for considering and deciding the attitude of the Social-Democrats to any particular event in international relations.

The lengths to which opportunism can go in such questions too is shown by a recent statement of Jaurès. Expressing his views on the international situation in a German bourgeois-liberal newspaper, he defends the alliance of France and Britain with Russia against the charge of non-peaceful intentions, and treats that alliance as a "guarantee of peace"; he welcomes the fact that "we have now lived to see an alliance of Britain and Russia, two old-standing enemies".

Rosa Luxemburg has given a magnificent assessment of such a view, and a warm retort to Jaurès, in her "Open Letter" to him in the last issue of *Neue Zeit*.

Rosa Luxemburg begins by pointing out that to talk of an alliance between "Russia" and "Britain" means "talking in the language of bourgeois politicians", because the interests of the capitalist states and the interests of the proletariat in foreign policy are opposed to one another, and one cannot speak of a harmony of interests in the sphere of foreign relations. If militarism is the offspring of capitalism, then wars too cannot be abolished by the intrigues of rulers and diplomats; and the task of socialists is not to awaken

illusions on this score, but on the contrary constantly to expose the hypocrisy and impotence of diplomatic "peaceful démarches".

But the main point of the "Open Letter" is the assessment of Britain's and France's alliance with Russia which Jaurès so extols. The European bourgeoisie has given tsarism a chance to repel the revolutionary onset. "Now, in an attempt to turn its temporary victory over the revolution into a final one, absolutism is having recourse first and foremost to the tried method of all shaken despotisms—successes in foreign policy." All alliances with Russia now mean "a holy alliance between the bourgeoisie of Western Europe and Russian counter-revolution, the suppressors and executioners of Russian and Polish fighters for liberty. Such alliances mean the strengthening of the most bloody reaction, not only inside Russia, but in international relations as well.... Therefore the most elementary obligation of socialists and proletarians in all countries is to oppose with all their might an alliance with counter-revolutionary Russia".

Rosa Luxemburg asks Jaurès: "How are we to explain to ourselves that you will strive 'most energetically' to make the government of the bloody executioners of the Russian revolution and the insurrection in Persia an influential factor in European politics, and make the gallows in Russia pillars of international peace—you, who once uttered a brilliant speech in the French Parliament against the loan to Russia; you, who only a few weeks ago printed in your paper *L'Humanité* a fiery appeal to public opinion against the bloody work of the military tribunals in Russian Poland? How can one reconcile your plans for peace, which rely on the Franco-Russian and Anglo-Russian alliances, with the recent protest of the French Parliamentary Socialist Party and the Administrative Commission of the National Council of the Socialist Party against President Fallieres' visit to Russia—a protest which you signed, and which in passionate terms defends the interests of the Russian revolution? If the President of the French Republic cares to quote your conceptions of the international situation, he will reply to your protest that he who approves the end must approve the means; he who considers alliance with tsarist Russia as the harmony of international peace must accept

everything that strengthens that alliance and leads to friendship.

"What would you have said if once upon a time in Germany, in Russia or in Britain there had appeared socialists and revolutionaries who in the 'interests of peace' had recommended an alliance with the government of the Restoration, or the government of Thiers and Jules Favre, and had vested such an alliance with their moral authority?!"

This letter speaks for itself, and Russian Social-Democrats can only send their greetings to Comrade Rosa Luxemburg for this her protest and for her defence of the Russian revolution before the international proletariat.

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LEO TOLSTOY
AS THE MIRROR OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

To identify the great artist with the revolution which he has obviously failed to understand, and from which he obviously stands aloof, may at first sight seem strange and artificial. A mirror which does not reflect things correctly could hardly be called a mirror. Our revolution, however, is an extremely complicated thing. Among the mass of those who are directly making and participating in it there are many social elements which have also obviously not understood what is taking place and which also stand aloof from the real historical tasks with which the course of events has confronted them. And if we have before us a really great artist, he must have reflected in his work at least some of the essential aspects of the revolution.

The legal Russian press, though its pages teem with articles, letters and comments on Tolstoy's eightieth birthday, is least of all interested in analysing his works from the standpoint of the character of the Russian revolution and its motive forces. The whole of this press is steeped to nausea in hypocrisy, hypocrisy of a double kind: official and liberal. The former is the crude hypocrisy of the venal hack who was ordered yesterday to hound Leo Tolstoy, and today to show that Tolstoy is a patriot, and to try to observe the decencies before the eyes of Europe. That the hacks of this kind have been paid for their screeds is common knowledge and they cannot deceive anybody. Much more refined and, therefore, much more pernicious and dangerous is liberal hypocrisy. To listen to the Cadet Balalaikins[97] of *Rech*, one would think that their sympathy for Tolstoy is of the



Лев Толстой, как зеркало русской революции.

Противоречия, лежащие в мировоззрении художника и в революции, которой он явно не понимал, от которой он явно отворачивался, хочет показать на первый взгляд стремление к непосредственности. Не изучают ли нередко только то, что очевидно, не отражает явления правильно? Но наша революция — явление чрезвычайно сложное; среди массы ее непосредственных участников и свидетелей есть много совершенно явно темных, которые даже не понимают происходящего, даже отворачиваются от назревших исторических задач, подчиняются перед лицом каждой крупной

The first page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution", 1908.

Reduced

The first page of the manuscript of Lenin's "Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution", 1908.

Reduced

most complete and ardent kind. Actually, their calculated declamations and pompous phrases about the "great seeker after God" are false from beginning to end, for no Russian liberal believes in Tolstoy's God, or sympathises with Tolstoy's criticism of the existing social order. He associates himself with a popular name in order to increase his political capital, in order to pose as a leader of the nation-wide opposition; he seeks, with the din and thunder of claptrap, to *drown* the demand for a straight and clear answer to the question: what are the glaring contradictions of "Tolstoyism" due to, and what shortcomings and weaknesses of our revolution do they express?

The contradictions in Tolstoy's works, views, doctrines, in his school, are indeed glaring. On the one hand, we have the great artist, the genius who has not only drawn incomparable pictures of Russian life but has made first-class contributions to world literature. On the other hand we have the landlord obsessed with Christ. On the one hand, the remarkably powerful, forthright and sincere protest against social falsehood and hypocrisy; and on the other, the "Tolstoyan", i.e., the jaded, hysterical sniveller called the Russian intellectual, who publicly beats his breast and wails: "I am a bad wicked man, but I am practising moral self-perfection; I don't eat meat any more I now eat rice cutlets." On the one hand, merciless criticism of capitalist exploitation, exposure of government outrages, the farcical courts and the state administration, and unmasking of the profound contradictions between the growth of wealth and achievements of civilisation and the growth of poverty, degradation and misery among the working masses. On the other, the crackpot preaching of submission, "resist not evil" with violence. On the one hand, the most sober realism, the tearing away of all and sundry masks; on the other, the preaching of one of the most odious things on earth, namely, religion, the striving to replace officially appointed priests by priests who will serve from moral conviction, i.e., to cultivate the most refined and, therefore, particularly disgusting clericalism. Verily:

> *Thou art a pauper, yet thou art abundant,*
> *Thou art mighty, yet thou art impotent—*
> *—Mother Russia!*[98]

That Tolstoy, owing to these contradictions, could not possibly understand either the working-class movement and its role in the struggle for socialism, or the Russian revolution, goes without saying. But the contradictions in Tolstoy's views and doctrines are not accidental; they express the contradictory conditions of Russian life in the last third of the nineteenth century. The patriarchal countryside, only recently emancipated from serfdom, was literally given over to the capitalist and the tax-collector to be fleeced and plundered. The ancient foundations of peasant economy and peasant life, foundations that had really held for centuries, were broken up for scrap with extraordinary rapidity. And the contradictions in Tolstoy's views must be appraised not from the standpoint of the present-day working-class movement and present-day socialism (such an appraisal is, of course, needed, but it is not enough), but from the standpoint of protest against advancing capitalism, against the ruining of the masses, who are being dispossessed of their land—a protest which had to arise from the patriarchal Russian countryside. Tolstoy is absurd as a prophet who has discovered new nostrums for the salvation of mankind—and therefore the foreign and Russian "Tolstoyans" who have sought to convert the weakest side of his doctrine into a dogma, are not worth speaking of. Tolstoy is great as the spokesman of the ideas and sentiments that emerged among the millions of Russian peasants at the time the bourgeois revolution was approaching in Russia. Tolstoy is original, because the sum total of his views, taken as a whole, happens to express the specific features of our revolution as a *peasant* bourgeois revolution. From this point of view, the contradictions in Tolstoy's views are indeed a mirror of those contradictory conditions in which the peasantry had to play their historical part in our revolution. On the one hand, centuries of feudal oppression and decades of accelerated post-Reform pauperisation piled up mountains of hate, resentment, and desperate determination. The striving to sweep away completely the official church, the landlords and the landlord government, to destroy all the old forms and ways of landownership, to clear the land, to replace the police-class state by a community of free and equal small peasants—this striving the is the keynote of every historical step the peasantry has

taken in our revolution; and, undoubtedly, the message of Tolstoy's writings conforms to this peasant striving far more than it does to abstract "Christian Anarchism", as his "system" of views is sometimes appraised.

On the other hand the peasantry, striving towards new ways of life, had a very crude, patriarchal, semi-religious idea of what kind of life this should be, by what struggle could liberty be won, what leaders it could have in this struggle, what was the attitude of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intelligentsia towards the interests of peasant revolution, why the forcible overthrow of tsarist rule was needed in order to abolish landlordism. The whole past life of the peasantry had taught it to hate the landowner and the official, but it did not, and could not, teach it where to seek an answer to all these questions. In our revolution a minor part of the peasantry really did fight, did organise to some extent for this purpose: and a very small part indeed rose up in arms to exterminate its enemies, to destroy the tsar's servants and protectors of the landlords. Most of the peasantry wept and prayed, moralised and dreamed, wrote petitions and sent "pleaders"—quite in the vein of Leo Tolstoy! And, as always happens in such cases, the effect of this Tolstoyan abstention from politics, this Tolstoyan renunciation of politics, this lack of interest in and understanding of politics, was that only a minority followed the lead of the class-conscious revolutionary proletariat, while the majority became the prey of those unprincipled, servile, bourgeois intellectuals who under the name of Cadets hastened from a meeting of Trudoviks to Stolypin's anteroom, and begged, haggled, reconciled and promised to reconcile—until they were kicked out with a military jackboot. Tolstoy's ideas are a mirror of the weakness, the shortcomings of our peasant revolt, a reflection of the flabbiness of the patriarchal countryside and of the hidebound cowardice of the "enterprising muzhik".

Take the soldiers' insurrections in 1905-06. In social composition these men who fought in our revolution were partly peasants and partly proletarians. The proletarians were in the minority; therefore the movement in the armed forces does not even approximately show the same nation-wide solidarity, the same party consciousness, as were displayed

by the proletariat, which became Social-Democratic as if by the wave of a hand. Yet there is nothing more mistaken than the view that the insurrections in the armed forces failed because no officers had led them. On the contrary, the enormous progress the revolution had made since the time of the Narodnaya Volya[99] was shown precisely by the fact that the "grey herd" rose in arms against their superiors, and it was this self-dependency of theirs that so frightened the liberal landlords and the liberal officers. The common soldier fully sympathised with the peasants' cause; his eyes lit up at the very mention of land. There was more than one case when authority in the armed forces passed to the mass of the rank and file, but determined use of this authority was hardly made at all; the soldiers wavered; after a couple of days, in some cases a few hours, after killing some hated officer, they released the others who had been arrested, parleyed with the authorities and then faced the firing squad, or bared their backs for the birch, or put on the yoke again—quite in the vein of Leo Tolstoy!

Tolstoy reflected the pent-up hatred, the ripened striving for a better lot, the desire to get rid of the past—and also the immature dreaming, the political inexperience, the revolutionary flabbiness. Historical and economic conditions explain both the inevitable beginning of the revolutionary struggle of the masses and their unpreparedness for the struggle, their Tolstoyan non-resistance to evil, which was a most serious cause of the defeat of the first revolutionary campaign.

It is said that beaten armies learn well. Of course, revolutionary classes can be compared with armies only in a very limited sense. The development of capitalism is hourly changing and intensifying the conditions which roused the millions of peasants—united by their hatred for the feudalist landlords and their government—for the revolutionary-democratic struggle. Among the peasantry themselves the growth of exchange, of the rule of the market and the power of money is steadily ousting old-fashioned patriarchalism and the patriarchal Tolstoyan ideology. But there is one gain from the first years of the revolution and the first reverses in mass revolutionary struggle about which there can be no doubt. It is the mortal blow struck at the former softness

and flabbiness of the masses. The lines of demarcation have become more distinct. The cleavage of classes and parties has taken place. Under the hammer blows of the lessons taught by Stolypin, and with undeviating and consistent agitation by the revolutionary Social-Democrats not only the socialist proletariat but also the democratic masses of the peasantry will inevitably advance from their midst more and more steeled fighters who will be less capable of falling into our historical sin of Tolstoyism!

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BRITISH AND GERMAN WORKERS DEMONSTRATE FOR PEACE[100]

As is well known, in Britain and Germany a chauvinist campaign has long been conducted by the bourgeois press, especially the gutter press, in which these countries are incited against each other. Competition in the world market between British and German capitalists is becoming more and more bitter. Britain's former supremacy and her undivided ascendancy in the world market, have become a thing of the past. Germany is one of the capitalist countries that are developing particularly rapidly, and her manufactures are seeking markets abroad on an ever-growing scale. The struggle for colonies and the conflict of commercial interests have in capitalist society become one of the main causes of war. It is therefore not surprising that the capitalists of both countries consider war between Britain and Germany inevitable, and the military men on both sides deem it quite desirable. The British jingoes want to undermine the strength of a dangerous rival by smashing Germany's sea power while it is still immeasurably weaker than Britain's. The German Junkers and generals, headed by that Bourbon, Wilhelm II, are spoiling for a fight with Britain, hoping to be able to use their numerical superiority in land forces, and hoping that the clamour of military victories will stifle the growing discontent of the working masses and prevent the aggravation of the class struggle in Germany.

The British and German workers decided to come out publicly against the growing war danger. For a long time the labour press in both countries had been waging an unremitting struggle against chauvinism and militarism. But what was required now was some more imposing expression of the will of the working class than through the organs of the press. The British workers decided to send a delegation to Berlin to attend a grand demonstration that would declare

the joint determination of the proletariat of both countries to wage war on war.

The demonstration took place in Berlin on Sunday, September 20 (7, old style). This time the British workers' representatives were able to address the proletariat of Berlin without let or hindrance. Two years before, when J. Jaurès had wanted to speak to the German workers on behalf of the French working class at a Social-Democratic mass meeting in Berlin to protest against the bourgeois jingoes, the German Government banned him. This time it did not venture to eject the delegates of the British proletariat.

A mammoth rally of working men was held in one of Berlin's biggest halls. About 5,000 people immediately packed the place, and an overflow of many thousands occupied the surrounding grounds and the street. Stewards wearing red armbands kept order. Comrade Legien, the well-known leader of the German trade unions (called "free", i.e., actually Social-Democratic unions), greeted the British delegation on behalf of the entire politically and industrially organised working class of Germany. He said that fifty years ago French and British workers had demonstrated on behalf of peace. At that time those pioneer socialists were not backed by the organised masses. Today Britain and Germany together had an army of $4\frac{1}{3}$ million organised workers. It was on behalf of this army that the British delegates and the Berlin rally now spoke, declaring that the decision of war or peace lay in the hands of the working class.

In his speech in reply, the British workers' delegate Maddison condemned the jingo slander campaign conducted by the bourgeoisie, and handed over an Address from the Workers of Britain to the Workers of Germany, signed by 3,000 workmen. Among the signatories, he said, were representatives of both trends in the British labour movement (i.e., both Social-Democrats and adherents of the Independent Labour Party, who do not yet hold any consistent socialist point of view). The Address pointed out that wars serve the interests of the propertied classes. The masses of the workers bear all the burdens of war. The propertied classes derive benefit from national calamities. Let the workers unite to fight militarism, to ensure peace!

After other British delegates and a representative of the German Social-Democratic Party, Richard Fischer, had spoken, the meeting closed with the unanimous adoption of a resolution branding the "selfish and short-sighted policy of the ruling and exploiting classes" and expressing readiness to act in accordance with the resolution of the International Congress in Stuttgart, i.e., to fight war by all ways and means. The meeting broke up in an orderly manner amidst the singing of the workers' *Marseillaise*. There were no street demonstrations. The Berlin police and local military authorities were disappointed. It is characteristic of the regime in Germany that the most peaceful demonstration of the workers had to have a police and military demonstration to accompany it. The Berlin garrison was mobilised. Detachments of troops were stationed in different parts of the city in accordance with a strict plan, mostly in such a way that their hiding-places and numbers could not be easily detected. Police units patrolled the streets and squares in the vicinity of the meeting hall, particularly the road leading from there to the royal palace. The latter was ringed with police in plain clothes and troops concealed in house yards. An intricate system of police pickets was organised; groups of policemen loitered at street corners; police officers were detailed to all "important" spots; police cyclists acted as scouts and kept the military authorities informed on every step the "enemy" made; bridges and canal crossings were put under triple guard. "They stood watch over the threatened monarchy," sarcastically wrote *Vorwärts*,[101] commenting on all these measures taken by the government of Wilhelm II.

It was a rehearsal, we add for our part. Wilhelm II and the German bourgeoisie were rehearsing military combat with an insurgent proletariat. Such rehearsals are undoubtedly and in any case useful to both the masses of workers and to the soldiers. *Ça ira* (it will be a success!), as the French workers' song says. Repeated rehearsals are leading, maybe very slowly as yet, but very surely, to the great historical climax.

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THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

A students' strike has been called at St. Petersburg University. A number of other higher education establishments have joined in. The movement has already spread to Moscow and Kharkov. Judging from all the reports in the foreign and Russian newspapers and in private letters from Russia, we are faced with a fairly broad *academic* movement.

Back to the old days! Back to pre-revolutionary Russia! That is what these events signify above all. As before, official reaction is tightening the screw in the universities. The eternal struggle in autocratic Russia against the student organisations has taken the form of a crusade by the Black-Hundred Minister Schwartz—acting in full agreement with "Premier" Stolypin—against the autonomy which was promised the students in the autumn of 1905 (what did not the autocracy, faced with the onset of the revolutionary working class, "promise" Russian citizens at that time!); against an autonomy which the students enjoyed so long as the autocracy had "other things to think of than students", and which the autocracy, if it was to remain such, could not but begin to take away.

As before, the liberal press laments and groans, this time together with some Octobrists—the professors lament and snivel too, imploring the government not to take the road of reaction and to make use of an excellent opportunity "to ensure peace and order with the help of reforms" in "a country exhausted by convulsions"—imploring the students not to resort to unlawful courses which can only play into the hands of reaction, etc., etc., etc. How ancient and antiquated, how

hackneyed are all these tunes, and how vividly they resurrect before our eyes what took place twenty years ago or so, at the end of the eighties of last century! The similarity between that time and this is all the more striking when we take the present moment by itself, apart from the three years of revolution we have gone through. For the Duma (at first sight) with only the tiniest difference expresses that same pre-revolutionary relation of forces—the supremacy of the wild landlord, who prefers using Court connections and the influence of his friend the official to any kind of representation; the support of that same official by the merchants (the Octobrists) who do not dare to differ from their benevolent patrons; the "opposition" of the bourgeois intellectuals who are concerned most of all to prove their loyalty and who describe appeals to those in power as the political activity of liberalism. And the workers' deputies in the Duma recall feebly, far too feebly, the part which the proletariat was recently playing by its open mass struggle.

It may be asked, can we in such conditions attribute any importance to the old forms of primitive academic struggle of the students? If the liberals have sunk to the level of the "politics" of the eighties (one can of course only in irony speak of politics in this connection), will it not be a debasement of the aims of Social-Democracy if it decides that it is necessary to support the academic struggle in some way or other?

Here and there, apparently, Social-Democratic students are putting this question. At any rate, our editorial board has received a letter from a group of Social-Democratic students which says, among other things:

"On September 13, a meeting of the students of St. Petersburg University resolved to call upon students for an all-Russian student strike, the reason given for this appeal being the aggressive tactics pursued by Schwartz. The platform of the strike is an academic one, and the meeting even welcomes the 'first steps' of the Moscow and St. Petersburg Professorial Councils in the struggle for autonomy. We are puzzled by the academic platform put forward at the St. Petersburg meeting, and consider it objectionable in present conditions, because it cannot unite the students for an active struggle on a broad front. We envisage student action only as one co-ordinated with general political action, and in no case apart from it. The elements

capable of uniting the students are lacking. In view of this we are against academic action."

The mistake which the authors of the letter are making is of much greater political importance than may appear at first sight, because their argument, strictly speaking, touches upon a theme which is incomparably more broad and important than the question of taking part in this particular strike.

"We envisage student action only as one co-ordinated with general political action. In view of this we are against academic action."

Such an argument is radically wrong. The revolutionary slogan—to work towards co-ordinated political action of the students and the proletariat, etc.—here ceases to be a live guidance for many-sided militant agitation on a broadening basis and becomes a lifeless dogma, mechanically applied to different stages of different forms of the movement. It is not sufficient merely to proclaim political co-ordinated action, repeating the "last word" in lessons of the revolution. One must *be able* to agitate for political action, *making use* of all possibilities, all conditions and, first and foremost, all mass conflicts between advanced elements, whatever they are, and the autocracy. It is not of course a question of us dividing every student movement beforehand into compulsory "stages", and making sure that each stage is properly gone through, out of fear of switching over to "untimely" political actions, etc. Such a view would be the most harmful pedantry, and would lead only to an opportunist policy. But just as harmful is the opposite mistake, when people refuse to reckon with the actual situation that has arisen and the actual conditions of the particular mass movement, because of a slogan misinterpreted as unchangeable. Such an application of a slogan inevitably degenerates into revolutionary phrase-mongering.

Conditions are possible when an academic movement lowers the level of a political movement, or divides it, or distracts from it—and in that case Social-Democratic students' groups would of course be bound to concentrate their agitation against such a movement. But anyone can see that the objective political conditions at the present time are different. The academic movement is expressing the *beginning*

of a movement among the new "generation" of students, who have more or less become accustomed to a narrow measure of autonomy; and this movement is beginning when other forms of mass struggle are lacking at the present time, when a lull has set in, and the broad mass of the people, still silently, concentratedly and slowly are continuing to *digest* the experience of the three years of revolution.

In such conditions Social-Democrats would make a big mistake if they declared "against academic action". No, the groups of students belonging to our Party must use every effort to support, utilise and extend the movement. Like every other support of primitive forms of movement by Social-Democracy, the present support, too, should consist most of all in ideological and organisational influence on wider sections who have been roused by the conflict, and to whom this form of conflict, as a general rule, is their *first* experience of political conflicts. The student youth who have entered the universities during the last two years have lived a life almost completely detached from politics, and have been educated in a spirit of narrow academic autonomism, educated not only by the professors of the Establishment and the government press but also by the liberal professors and the whole Cadet Party. For this youth a strike on a large scale (if that youth is able to organise a large-scale strike: we must do everything to help it in this undertaking, but of course it is not for us socialists to guarantee the success of any bourgeois movement) is the beginning of a political conflict, whether those engaged in the fight realise it or not. Our job is to explain to the mass of "academic" protesters the objective meaning of the conflict, to try and make it *consciously* political, to multiply tenfold the agitation carried on by the Social-Democratic groups of students, and *to direct all* this activity in such a way that revolutionary conclusions will be drawn from the history of the last three years, that the inevitability of a new revolutionary struggle is understood, and that our old—and still quite timely—slogans calling for the overthrow of the autocracy and the convocation of a constituent assembly should once again become a subject of discussion and the touchstone of political concentration for fresh generations of democrats.

Social-Democratic students have no right to shirk such work under any conditions. And however difficult this work may be at the present time, whatever reverses particular agitators may experience in this or that university, students' association, meeting, etc., we shall say: knock, and it will be opened unto you! The work of political agitation is never wasted. Its success is measured not only by whether we have succeeded here and now in winning a majority, or obtaining consent for co-ordinated political action. It is possible that we shall not achieve this all at once. But that is why we are an organised proletarian party—not to lose heart over temporary failures, but stubbornly, unswervingly and consistently to carry on *our work*, even in the most difficult conditions.

The appeal we print below from the St. Petersburg Joint Student Council shows that even the most active elements of the students obstinately cling to pure academic aims, and still sing the Cadet-Octobrist tune. And this at a time when the Cadet-Octobrist press is behaving in the most disgusting fashion towards the strike, trying to prove at the very height of the struggle that it is harmful, criminal, etc. We cannot but welcome the rejoinder which the St. Petersburg Committee of our Party found it necessary to give the Joint Council (see "From the Party"[102]).

Evidently the whips of Schwartz are not enough as yet to change the present-day students from "academics" into "politicians"; they need the scorpions of more and more Black-Hundred sergeant-majors to give a full revolutionary training to new cadres. These cadres, trained by all Stolypin's policy, trained by every step of the counter-revolution, require the constant attention of ourselves, the Social-Democrats, who clearly see the objective inevitability of further bourgeois-democratic conflicts on a national scale with the autocracy, which has joined forces with the Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma.

Yes, on a national scale, for the Black-Hundred counter-revolution, which is turning Russia backward, is not only tempering new fighters in the ranks of the revolutionary proletariat, but will inevitably arouse a new movement of the non-proletarian, i.e., bourgeois democrats (thereby implying, of course, not that *all the opposition* will take part in

the struggle, but that there will be a wide participation of truly democratic elements of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, i.e., those capable of struggle). The beginning of a mass student struggle in the Russia of 1908 is a political symptom, a symptom of the whole present situation brought about by the counter-revolution. Thousands and millions of threads tie the student youth with the middle and lower bourgeoisie, the petty officials, certain groups of the peasantry, the clergy, etc. If in the spring of 1908 attempts were being made to resurrect the "*Osvobozhdeniye* League",* slightly to the left of the old Cadet semi-landlord union represented by Pyotr Struve; if in the autumn the mass of youth which is closest of all to the democratic bourgeoisie in Russia is beginning to be disturbed; if the hireling hacks, with malice tenfold, have started howling once more against revolution in the schools; if base liberal professors and Cadet leaders are groaning and wailing at the untimely, dangerous, disastrous strikes which displease those dear Octobrists, which are capable of "repelling" the Octobrists who hold power—that means new powder has begun to accumulate in the powder-flask, it means that *not only* among students is the reaction against reaction beginning!

And however weak and embryonic this beginning may be, the party of the working class must make use of it and will do so. We were able to work years and decades before the revolution, carrying our revolutionary slogans first into the study circles, then among the masses of the workers, then on to the streets, then on to the barricades. We must be capable, *now too*, of organising first and foremost that which constitutes the task of the hour, and without which all talk about co-ordinated political action will be empty words, namely, the task of building a strong proletarian organisation, everywhere carrying on *political agitation* among the masses for its revolutionary watchwords. It is this task of organisation in their own student midst, this agitation based on the concrete movement, that our university groups, too, should tackle.

The proletariat will not be behindhand. It often yields the palm to the bourgeois democrats in speeches at banquets,

* See pp. 63-67 of this volume.—*Ed.*

in legal unions, within the walls of universities, from the rostrum of representative institutions. It never yields the palm, and will not do so, in the serious and great revolutionary struggle of the masses. All the conditions for bringing this struggle to a head are not ripening as quickly and easily as some of us would hope—but those conditions are ripening and gathering head unswervingly. And the little beginning of little academic conflicts is a great beginning, for after it—if not today then tomorrow, if not tomorrow then the day after—will follow big continuations.

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EVENTS IN THE BALKANS AND IN PERSIA

The political press in Russia and throughout Europe is preoccupied lately with the events in the Balkans. For a time a European war seemed dangerously close, and that danger has by no means been eliminated, though it is much more probable that the whole thing will end up in shouting and clamour and war will be avoided.

Let us take a glance at the nature of the crisis and the tasks it imposes on the workers' party in Russia.

A powerful impetus to the political awakening of the Asian peoples was given by the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian revolution. But this awakening spread so slowly from one country to another that in Persia Russian counter-revolution played and continues to play what amounts to a decisive role, while in Turkey the revolution was at once confronted with a counter-revolutionary coalition of the powers, Russia at their head. True, the general tone of the European press and of the diplomatic statements would appear to contradict this. If we are to believe these statements and the semi-official press, there is universal "sympathy" with regenerated Turkey, a universal desire to see her constitutional regime strengthened and developed, general praise for the "moderation" of the bourgeois Young Turks.

All these fine words, however, are typical of the base bourgeois hypocrisy of Europe's present-day reactionary governments and present-day reactionary bourgeoisie. For the fact is that not a single European country calling itself a democracy, and not a single European bourgeois party professing to be democratic, progressive, Liberal, Radical, etc., has in any way demonstrated a genuine desire to promote

the victory and consolidation of the Turkish revolution. On the contrary, they all *fear* its success, for the inevitable result of it would be, on the one hand, to foster the desire for autonomy and genuine democracy in all the Balkan nations and, on the other, ensure the victory of the Persian revolution, give fresh impetus to the democratic movement in Asia, intensify the struggle for independence in India, create free institutions along an immense stretch of Russia's frontier—and, consequently, new conditions that would hamper the policy of Black-Hundred tsarism and facilitate the rise of the revolution in Russia, etc.

Essentially, what we see now going on in the Balkans, Turkey and Persia is a counter-revolutionary coalition of the European powers *against* the mounting tide of democracy in Asia. All the efforts of our governments, all the preaching of the "big" European papers, are aimed at glossing over this fact, misleading public opinion, covering up with hypocritical speeches and diplomatic hocus-pocus the *counter-revolutionary coalition* of the so-called civilised nations of Europe against the nations of Asia, least civilised but most energetic in their striving for democracy. And the very essence of proletarian policy at this stage should be to tear the mask from these bourgeois hypocrites and to reveal to the broadest masses of the people the reactionary character of the European governments who, out of fear of the proletarian struggle at home, are playing, and helping others play, the part of gendarme in relation to the revolution in Asia.

Europe has woven a dense web of intrigue around all the Turkish and Balkan events, and the man in the street is being hoodwinked by the diplomats, who try to divert public attention to trifles, secondary issues, individual aspects of present developments, in an effort to obscure the meaning of the process as a whole. In contrast to this, our task, the task of international Social-Democracy, should be to show the people how these developments are interconnected, to bring out their fundamental trend and underlying motives.

Rivalry among the capitalist powers, anxious to "bite off" as big a piece as they can and extend their possessions and colonies, coupled with fear of an independent democratic movement among the nations dependent on or "protected"

by Europe—these are two mainsprings of all European policy. The Young Turks are praised for their moderation and restraint, i.e., the Turkish revolution is being praised because it is weak, because it is not rousing the popular masses to really independent action, because it is hostile to the proletarian struggle beginning in the Ottoman Empire—and at the same time the plunder of Turkey continues. The Young Turks are praised for making it possible to go on plundering Turkish possessions. They praise the Young Turks and continue a policy, the obvious purpose of which is *to partition Turkey*. In this connection the Social-Democratic *Leipziger Volkszeitung* made this very true and apt comment:

"In May 1791, far-sighted statesmen who were really concerned for the well-being of their country carried out a political reform in Poland. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria praised the Constitution of May 3, saying it would 'bring prosperity to a neighbouring country'. The whole world extolled the Polish reformers for practising 'moderation', unlike the terrible Jacobins of Paris.... On January 23, 1793, Prussia, Austria and Russia signed a treaty partitioning Poland!

"In August 1908, the Young Turks carried out their political reform with uncommon smoothness. The whole world praised them for practising such respectable 'moderation', unlike the terrible socialists of Russia.... Now, in October 1908, we are witnessing a series of developments that presage the partition of Turkey."

Indeed, it would be childish to believe the *words* of the diplomats and disregard their *deeds*, the collective action of the powers against revolutionary Turkey. The very *fact* that the present developments were preceded by meetings and conversations of the Foreign Ministers and Heads of State of several countries, is enough to dispel this naïve faith in diplomatic statements. In August and September, immediately after the Young Turk revolution and just before the Austrian and Bulgarian declarations, Mr. Izvolsky met King Edward and Premier Clemenceau of the French Republic in Karlsbad and Marienbad; the Austrian and Italian Foreign Ministers, von Aehrenthal and Tittoni, met in Salzburg; then came the meetings between Izvolsky and Aehrenthal in Buchloe on September 15; between Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria and Emperor Franz-Joseph in Budapest; Izvolsky's meeting with von Schoen, the German

Foreign Minister, and later, with Tittoni and the King of Italy.

These facts speak for themselves. *All the important* points had been agreed upon *before* the Austrian and Bulgarian action secretly and directly, at personal meetings of kings and ministers, *between* the *six* powers: Russia, Austria, Germany, Italy, France and Britain. The *subsequent* controversy in the press as to whether Aehrenthal was speaking the truth when he stated that Italy, Germany and Russia had agreed to Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was *a farce from beginning to end*, *a sheer deception*, that can fool only liberal philistines. The foreign policy directors of the European powers—the Izvolskys, Aehrenthals and the whole gang of crowned robbers and their ministers—purposely threw this bone to the press: go on bickering, gentlemen, over who cheated whom and who affronted whom, whether Austria cheated Russia, or Bulgaria cheated Austria, etc., over who was the "first" to begin tearing up the Berlin Treaty,[103] over the different attitudes to the proposed conference of the powers, and so on and so forth. Please keep public attention preoccupied with these interesting and important—oh, very important!—questions. That is exactly what we need in order to conceal *what really matters*, namely, that we have already come to a preliminary agreement on the main thing, i.e., action against the Young Turk revolution, further steps to partition Turkey, revision of the Dardanelles arrangement on one pretext or another, permission for Russia's Black-Hundred tsar to strangle the Persian revolution. That is the crux of the matter; that is what we, the leaders of the reactionary bourgeoisie of all Europe, really need, and that is what we are doing. As for the liberal simpletons in the press and in parliament, they can spend their time debating how it all began, who said what, and in what guise the policy of colonial plunder and suppression of democratic movements is to be finally signed, sealed and presented to the world.

In each of the European Great Powers—with the exception of Austria, which for the time being is "satiated"—the liberal press is accusing *its* government of inadequate defence of *its* national interests. Everywhere the liberals present their country and their government as the most mal-

adroit in "utilising" the situation, as having been fooled, etc. And that precisely is the policy of our Cadets too. They have long been saying that Austria's successes make them "envious" (Mr. Milyukov's own words). This policy of the liberal bourgeoisie in general, and that of our Cadets in particular, is the most revolting hypocrisy, the vilest betrayal of the genuine interests of progress and freedom. For it is a policy which, first, befuddles the democratic consciousness of the masses by hushing up the conspiracy of the reactionary governments. Secondly, it impels every country to follow a so-called active foreign policy, i.e., it sanctions the system of colonial robbery and interference by the powers in Balkan affairs, interference which is always reactionary. Thirdly, it plays directly into the hands of reaction, interesting the people in how much "we" will receive, how much "we" will get out of the booty, how much "we" can bargain for "ourselves". What the reactionary governments need most, at this juncture, is precisely the opportunity to plead that "public opinion" supports their territorial seizures, demands for "compensation", etc. Look, they say, the press of my country accuses me of excessive generosity, of inadequate defence of the national interests, of being too pliable, and it threatens war. Consequently, my demands are most "modest and fair", and must therefore be met in full!

The policy of the Russian Cadets, like that of the European liberal bourgeoisie, is one of subservience to the reactionary governments, defence of colonial aggrandisement and plunder, and interference in the affairs of other countries. The Cadet policy is especially harmful because it is being conducted under the "opposition" flag, and therefore misleads very many, wins the confidence of those who have no faith in the Russian Government and corrupts the masses. Therefore, our Duma deputies and all our Party organisations must bear in mind that we cannot make a single serious step forward in Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation about the Balkan events without revealing—*from the Duma rostrum*, in leaflets and at meetings—the *connection* between the reactionary policy of the autocracy and the hypocritical opposition of the Cadets. We shall never be able to explain to the people how harmful and reactionary the policy of the

tsarist government is, unless we explain that Cadet foreign policy is *essentially the same*. We cannot combat chauvinism and the Black-Hundred spirit in foreign policy, unless we combat the-phrase-mongering, the posing, the mental reservations and dodges of the Cadets.

Where concessions to the liberal-bourgeois point of view lead socialists will be seen from the following example. In the well-known opportunist journal *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (*Socialist—???—Monthly*), Max Schippel has this to say on the Balkan crisis: "Nearly all thinking party members would consider it a mistake if the view which was recently expressed once more in our Berlin Central Organ [*Vorwärts*] prevailed, the view that Germany has nothing to look for in either the present or future revolutions in the Balkans. Certainly, we should not strive for territorial acquisitions.... But there can be no doubt that the major realignments of the powers in this area, which is an important connecting link between Europe, the whole of Asia and part of Africa, have a direct bearing on our international position.... For the time being the reactionary Russian colossus is of no decisive importance.... We have no reason to see in Russia an enemy always and everywhere, as she was regarded by the democrats of the fifties" (S. 1319).

This silly liberal, parading as a socialist, has failed to notice Russia's reactionary intrigues behind her "solicitude" for the "Slav brothers"! By using the words "we" (meaning the German bourgeoisie), "our" position, etc., he has failed to notice either the blow dealt the Young Turk revolution, or Russia's action against the Persian revolution!

Schippel's statement appeared in the October 22 issue of the journal. On October 18 (5), *Novoye Vremya*[104] published a vitriolic article alleging that the "anarchy in Tabriz has reached incredible dimensions" and the city has been "half destroyed and sacked by semi-savage revolutionaries". In other words, the victory of the revolution over the Shah's troops in Tabriz has immediately aroused the fury of the semi-official Russian journal. It describes Sattar Khan, leader of the Persian revolutionary forces, as the "Pugachov[105] of Aderbaijan" (Aderbaijan, or Azerbaijan, is the northern province of Persia and, according to Reclus, accounts for nearly one-fifth of the total population; Tabriz is

the capital of the province). "One is entitled to ask," *Novoye Vremya* wrote, "whether Russia can endlessly tolerate these outrages, which are ruining our lucrative trade on the Persian frontier.... It should be borne in mind that all Eastern Transcaucasia and Aderbaijan are an ethnological whole.... Tatar semi-intellectuals in Transcaucasia forgetting that they are Russian subjects, have displayed warm sympathy for the disturbances in Tabriz and are sending volunteers to that city... What is much more important for us is that Aderbaijan, which borders on Russia, should be pacified. Deplorable though it may be, circumstances might compel Russia, despite her strong desire not to interfere, to take this task upon herself."

On October 20, the German *Frankfurter Zeitung* carried a dispatch from St. Petersburg that Russian occupation of Aderbaijan is contemplated by way of "compensation". On October 24 (11), the same paper published a telegram from Tabriz: "*Two days ago six battalions of Russian infantry, supported by cavalry and artillery, crossed the Persian frontier and are today expected in Tabriz.*"

The Russian troops were crossing the Persian frontier on the very day when Max Schippel, slavishly repeating the assurances and the *outcries* of the liberal and police press, was telling the German workers that Russia's importance as a reactionary colossus was now a thing of the past, and that to regard Russia as an enemy under all circumstances would be a mistake!

There is to be a new massacre of Persian revolutionaries by the troops of Nicholas the Bloody. The unofficial Lyakhov is being followed by the official occupation of Aderbaijan, and the repetition in Asia of what Russia did in Europe in 1849, when Nicholas I sent his troops against the Hungarian revolution. At that time there were genuine democrats among the bourgeois parties of Europe, who were capable of fighting for freedom, and not only hypocritically talking about freedom, as all the bourgeois democrats do in our day. Russia had then to play the part of European gendarme against at any rate a few European countries. Today *all* the biggest European powers, not excluding the "democratic" republic of the "red" Clemenceau, mortally afraid as they are of any extension of democracy at home because it would

benefit the proletariat, are *helping* Russia play the gendarme in Asia.

There cannot be the slightest doubt that "freedom of action" for Russia against the Persian revolution was *part of the September reactionary conspiracy* of Russia, Austria, Germany, Italy, France and Britain. Whether this was explicitly stated in some secret document (which may be published many years hence in a collection of historical materials) or whether it was only intimated by Izvolsky to his most obliging fellow-negotiators, or whether the latter "hinted" that they intended to pass from "occupation" to "annexation", and that the Russians would perhaps like to pass from the Lyakhov policy to "occupation", or whether some other arrangement was made—all that is not of the least importance. What is important is that, however informal, the September counter-revolutionary conspiracy of the powers *is a fact*, the significance of which becomes increasingly clear with every passing day. It is a conspiracy against the proletariat and democracy. It is a conspiracy for directly suppressing the revolution in Asia, or at least for dealing it indirect blows It is a conspiracy for the continuation of colonial plunder and territorial conquest in the Balkans today, in Persia tomorrow, maybe in Asia Minor and Egypt the day after, etc., etc.

Only the world proletarian revolution can overthrow this combined power of the crowned bandits and international capital. The urgent task of all socialist parties is to intensify agitation among the masses, unmask the diplomats of all countries at their tricks and bring out all the facts for the people to see—the facts revealing the infamous role of *all the allied powers* without exception—both as direct performers of the functions of the gendarme, and as his abettors, friends and financiers.

An extremely onerous, but at the same time extremely noble and momentous task falls now to the Russian Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma, where a statement by Izvolsky and a question by the Cadets and Octobrists are expected. The Social-Democratic deputies are members of a body that is a screen for the policy of the chief reactionary power, the chief plotter of counter-revolution, and they must find in themselves the courage and ability *to tell the*

whole truth. At a time like this, the Social-Democratic deputies in the Black-Hundred Duma are people to whom much is given and of whom much is required. For apart from them there is *no one* in the Duma to voice the protest against tsarism from positions *other* than those of the *Cadets* and Octobrists. And a Cadet "protest", at such times and in the present circumstances, is worse than no protest at all since it can be made only *from amidst the selfsame* capitalist wolf-pack, and on behalf of the selfsame wolfish policy.

Our Duma group and all our other Party organisations should therefore set to work at once. Agitation among the masses is now a hundredfold more important than in ordinary times. Three propositions should take first place in all our Party agitation. First, in contrast to the whole of the reactionary and liberal press—from the Black Hundreds to the Cadets—Social-Democrats should expose the diplomatic game of conferences, agreement of the powers, alliances with Britain against Austria, or with Austria against Germany, or any other. Our job is to reveal the *fact* that there exists a reactionary conspiracy of the powers, a conspiracy which the governments are doing everything they possibly can to conceal behind the farce of public negotiations. Our policy should be to denounce this diplomatic farce, bring the truth to the people, expose international anti-proletarian reaction! Secondly, we should reveal the real, as distinct from the asserted, results of this conspiracy, namely, the blow to the Turkish revolution, Russia's assistance in strangling the Persian revolution, interference in the affairs of other nations, and violation of that fundamental democratic principle, the right of nations to self-determination. That right is championed by our programme and the programmes of all the Social-Democratic parties of the world. And there can be nothing more reactionary than the solicitude of the Austrians on the one hand, and the Russian Black Hundreds on the other, for their "Slav brothers". This "solicitude" is being used to screen the vile intrigues that have long won Russia notoriety in the Balkans. This "solicitude" always boils down to encroachments on *genuine* democracy in one Balkan country or another. There is only one sincere way for the powers to show "solicitude" for the Balkan nations, and that is to leave them alone, stop harassing

them by foreign interference, stop putting spokes in the wheel of the Turkish revolution. But, of course, the working class cannot expect that kind of policy from the bourgeoisie.

All the bourgeois parties, including the most liberal and "democratic" in name, our Cadets included, support capitalist foreign policy. That is the third thing which the Social-Democrats must with special vigour bring to the knowledge of the people. For, to all intents and purposes, the liberals and Cadets stand for the present rivalry between the capitalist nations, differing with the Black Hundreds only as to the forms this should take, and insisting only on international agreements different from those upon which the government now relies. And this liberal struggle against one variety of bourgeois foreign policy in favour of another variety of that same policy, these liberal reproaches levelled at the government for lagging behind other countries (in rapine and intervention!) have the most corrupting effect on the masses. Down with all colonial policy, down with the whole policy of intervention and capitalist struggle for the conquest of foreign lands and foreign populations, for new privileges, new markets, control of the Straits, etc.! Social-Democrats do not subscribe to the stupid philistine utopia of "peaceful and just" capitalist progress. Their struggle is against the whole of capitalist society as such, in the knowledge that there is no other champion of peace and liberty in the world than the international revolutionary proletariat.

P. S. After this article had been sent to the press, the papers published a dispatch of the *St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency* denying the report about Russian troops having crossed the Persian border. The dispatch was published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of October 24, in the second morning edition The *third* edition carried a report from Constantinople dated October 24, 10.50 *p.m.*, stating that on the evening of the 24th news of the Russian troops crossing the Persian border had reached Constantinople. The foreign press, *with the exception of the socialist papers*, is so far silent on the Russian invasion of Persia.

To sum up: we are not yet in a position to learn the whole truth At any rate, the "denials" emanating from the tsarist

government and the *St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency* are not, of course, to be trusted. That Russia, with the knowledge of the powers, is fighting the Persian revolution with every means at her command, from intrigue to the sending of troops, is a fact. That her policy is to occupy Azerbaijan, is likewise beyond doubt. And if the troops have not yet crossed the border, then very probably all the preparations for them to do so have already been made. There is no smoke without fire.

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MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU[106]

On Sunday October 11 (N.S.) there took place in Brussels the first meeting of the International Socialist Bureau since the Stuttgart Congress. The gathering of representatives of various socialist parties was chosen also as a convenient occasion for a conference of socialist journalists and parliamentarians. The first conference took place on the eve of the meeting of the Bureau, the second the day after. The composition of both conferences, it should be mentioned, was scarcely different from that of the Bureau: the majority of the members of the Bureau were both journalists and M.P.s. Only a few Belgian socialist deputies were additional members of the conference on Monday October 12.

The conference of journalists opened at 3 p.m. on Saturday. The question under discussion was that of regulating and developing the relations between the periodical press of the various socialist parties. The Belgians drew up a list of correspondents, members of their party, who were ready to give information to the newspapers of other parties on various particular questions. The wish was expressed that similar lists should be drawn up by other parties, and it was suggested that there should be a note of what languages the correspondent knew. The foreign bulletins of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (*La Tribune Russe*, in French) and of the Social-Democrats (in German)[107] were mentioned as particularly useful publications for our foreign comrades. It was also remarked that in the case of countries where there were different socialist parties, or various tendencies within a single party, a note should be made in the lists stating

which party, etc., the correspondents belonged to Russian Social-Democrats living abroad ought to make use of this international conference to ensure better arrangements for their reports in foreign socialist newspapers.

The conference decided that the International Socialist Bureau was to get in touch with those nations which had no daily socialist papers on the question of publishing regular bulletins (in one of the three official languages of the International, or in all three—French, German and English). Following this, the Bureau was to enquire of the editors of the socialist daily newspapers of the different countries, what sum they would agree to pay in order to receive such bulletins regularly.

The Bureau Abroad of the Central Committee of our Party[108] should take special notice of this decision. The business of informing our foreign comrades about the affairs of Russian Social-Democracy is organised far from satisfactorily, and there should be an immediate and serious discussion on how to put this matter in order, and on publishing a *Party* bulletin abroad in three languages. Everything possible should be done to put such a plan into practice.

The next point discussed was the proposal of Camille Huysmans, the Secretary of the Bureau, that the German Social-Democrats, who have 70 daily newspapers, should take the initiative of setting up an international bureau of telegraph and telephone Communications between the editorial offices of the socialist newspapers in Berlin, Vienna, Paris, Brussels, etc. The German delegates said that it was impossible to carry out this plan immediately; but they stated that a central information bureau of the German Social-Democratic Labour Party had recently been set up in Germany, and that when this was working satisfactorily it would be possible to consider transforming this bureau into an international organisation. The conference expressed its satisfaction at this promise, and the meeting ended after deciding that conferences of the socialist journalists of various countries should be timed as before to coincide with meetings of the International Socialist Bureau.

In the evening there was an international mass meeting at the Maison du Peuple at which Austrian, German, British, Turkish and Bulgarian delegates spoke—mainly on the

subject of the international conflicts, and of the struggle of the socialist proletariat of all countries for the preservation of peace. The meeting ended with the unanimous adoption of a resolution as follows: "The international meeting held on October 10 (N.S.) at the Maison du Peuple reaffirms the energetic resolution of the world proletariat to defend peace among the nations and to struggle with all its strength against capitalist militarism, which ruins and oppresses all peoples. The meeting expresses its confidence that the various national sections of the Workers' International will apply in full the decision adopted on this question by the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart." The meeting concluded with the singing of *The Internationale*.

The whole of the next day was taken up with the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau. The first item on the agenda, namely, the affiliation of the British Labour Party, occupied the whole of the morning session. According to the Rules of the International, organisations eligible for membership are, first, socialist parties which recognise the class struggle, and secondly, working-class organisations whose standpoint is that of the class struggle (i.e., trade unions). The Labour Party recently formed in the British House of Commons does not openly call itself socialist, and does not expressly and definitely recognise the principle of the class struggle (which, be it said in parenthesis, the British Social-Democrats call upon it to do). Needless to say this Labour Party was admitted to the International in general and to the Stuttgart Socialist Congress in particular, because, as a matter of fact, this Party is an organisation of a mixed type, standing between the two types defined in Clauses 1 and 2 of the Rules of the International, and embodying the political representation of the British trade unions. Nevertheless, the question of the affiliation of this Party was raised, and raised by the Party itself, in the person of the so-called Independent Labour Party (the I.L.P., as the British call it), which is one of the two subsections of the British section of the International. The other subsection is the Social Democratic Federation.

The Independent Labour Party demanded the *direct* recognition of the Labour Party as an affiliated organisation of the International. Its delegate Bruce Glasier urged the

enormous significance of this representation in Parliament of hundreds of thousands of organised workers who were steadily and surely moving towards socialism. He was very contemptuous of principles, formulas and catechisms. Kautsky, in reply to him, dissociated himself from this attitude of contempt towards the principles and ultimate aim of socialism, but wholly supported the affiliation of the Labour Party as a party waging the class struggle in practice. Kautsky moved the following resolution:

"Whereas by previous resolutions of the International Congresses, all organisations adopting the standpoint of the proletarian class struggle and recognising the necessity for political action have been accepted for membership, the International Bureau declares that the British Labour Party is admitted to International Socialist Congresses, because, while not expressly [*ausdrücklich*] accepting the proletarian class struggle, in practice the Labour Party conducts this struggle, and adopts its standpoint, inasmuch as the Party is organised independently of the bourgeois parties." Kautsky was supported by the Austrians, by Vaillant of the French group, and, as the voting showed, by the majority of the small nations. The opposition came first of all from Hyndman, the representative of the British Social Democratic Federation, who demanded that the *status quo* be maintained until the Labour Party expressly recognised the principle of the class struggle and of socialism; then from Roussel (the second French delegate and a follower of Guesde), Rubanovich of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, and Avramov, the delegate of the revolutionary wing of the Bulgarian socialists.

I took the floor in order to associate myself with the first part of Kautsky's resolution. It was impossible, I argued, to refuse to admit the Labour Party, i.e., the parliamentary representation of the trade unions, since Congresses had previously admitted all trade unions whatever, even those which had allowed themselves to be represented by bourgeois parliamentarians. But, I said, the second part of Kautsky's resolution is wrong, because *in practice* the Labour Party is not a party really independent of the-Liberals, and does not pursue a fully independent class policy. I therefore proposed an amendment that the end of the

resolution, beginning with the word "because", should read as follows:

"because it [the Labour Party] represents the first step on the part of the really proletarian organisations of Britain towards a conscious class policy and towards a *socialist* workers' party". I submitted this amendment to the Bureau, but Kautsky would not accept it, stating in his next speech that the International Bureau could not adopt decisions based on "expectations". But the main struggle was between the supporters and the opponents of Kautsky's resolution as a whole. When it was about to be voted on, Adler proposed that it be divided into two parts. This was done, and both parts were carried by the International Bureau: the first with three against and one abstention, and the second with four against and one abstention. Thus Kautsky's motion became the decision of the Bureau. Rubanovich abstained on both votes. Let me add that Adler, who spoke after me and before Kautsky's second speech, replied to me in the following manner—I am quoting from the Belgian socialist organ *Le Peuple*, which gave the most detailed and exact reports of the sessions: "Lenin's proposal is tempting [*séduisante*, Adler said: *verlockend*, enticing], but it cannot make us forget that the Labour Party is now outside the bourgeois parties. It is not for us to judge how it did this. We recognise the fact of progress."

Such was the nature of the debate at the International Bureau on the question under discussion. I shall now take the liberty to deal in greater detail with this debate, in order to explain the position that I took up to the readers of *Proletary*. The arguments advanced by V. Adler and K. Kautsky failed to convince me, and I still think they are wrong. By stating in his resolution that the Labour Party "does not expressly accept the proletarian class struggle", Kautsky undoubtedly voiced a certain "expectation", a certain "judgement" as to what the policy of the Labour Party is now and what that policy should be. But Kautsky expressed this *indirectly*, and in such a way that it amounted to an assertion which, first, is incorrect in substance, and secondly, provides a basis for misrepresenting his *idea*. That by separating in *Parliament* (not during the elections! not in its whole policy! not in its propaganda and agitation!)

from the bourgeois parties, the Labour Party in Britain is taking the first step towards socialism and towards a class policy of the proletarian mass organisations is indisputable. This is not an "expectation" but a fact, the very fact which compels us to admit the Labour Party into the International, since we have already accepted the trade unions. Finally, it is precisely such a formulation that would make hundreds of thousands of British workers, who undoubtedly respect the decisions of the International but have not yet become full socialists, ponder once again over the question why they are regarded as having taken only the *first* step, and what the *next* steps along this road should be. My formulation does not contain even the shadow of a claim that the International should undertake to solve the concrete and detailed problems of a national labour movement, should undertake to determine when the next steps should be taken, and what they should be. But that further steps are necessary in general must be admitted, in relation to a party which does not expressly and clearly accept the principle of the class struggle. Kautsky in his resolution acknowledged this indirectly, instead of doing so directly. It looked as if the International was certifying that the Labour Party was *in practice* waging a consistent class struggle, as if it was sufficient for a workers' organisation to form a separate labour group in Parliament in order *in its entire conduct* to become independent of the bourgeoisie!

On this question Hyndman, Roussel, Rubanovich and Avramov undoubtedly occupied a still more incorrect position (which Rubanovich did not rectify but confused by his abstention on both parts of the resolution). When Avramov declared that to admit the Labour Party would be to encourage opportunism, he expressed a glaringly wrong view. One need only recall Engels's letters to Sorge. For a number of years Engels strongly insisted that the British Social-Democrats, led by Hyndman, were committing an error by acting like sectarians, failing to link themselves with the unconscious but powerful class instinct of the trade unions, and by turning Marxism into a "dogma", whereas it should be a "guide to action".[109] When there exist objective conditions which retard the growth of the political consciousness and class independence of the proletarian masses, one must be

able patiently and steadfastly to work hand in hand with them, making no concessions in principles but not refraining from activity *right in the midst* of the proletarian masses. These lessons of Engels's have been corroborated by the subsequent development of events, when the British trade unions, insular, aristocratic, philistinely selfish, and hostile to socialism, which have produced a number of outright traitors to the working class who have sold themselves to the bourgeoisie for ministerial posts (like the scoundrel John Burns), have nevertheless begun *moving towards* socialism, awkwardly, inconsistently, in zigzag fashion, but still moving towards socialism. Only the blind can fail to see that socialism is now growing apace among the working class in Britain, that socialism is *once again* becoming a mass movement in that country, that the social revolution is approaching in Great Britain.

The International would undoubtedly have acted wrongly had it not directly and resolutely expressed its complete sympathy with this vast step forward by the mass labour movement in Britain, and voiced its encouragement of the great turn that had begun in the cradle of capitalism. But it does not in the least follow from this that the Labour Party can already be recognised as a party in practice independent of the bourgeoisie, as a party waging the class struggle, as a socialist party, etc. It was necessary to rectify one undoubted error committed by the British Social Democratic Federation, but there was no need to give even a shadow of encouragement to *other*, *undoubted and not less important* errors of the British opportunists who lead the so-called Independent Labour Party. That these leaders are opportunists is indisputable. Ramsay MacDonald, the leader of the I.L.P., even proposed at Stuttgart that Clause 2 of the Rules of the International be so amended as to require, in place of the recognition of the class struggle, only the good faith (*bona fides*) of labour associations, for affiliation to the International. Kautsky himself immediately detected the opportunist note in the words of Bruce Glasier and dissociated himself from them—*in his speech at the Bureau*, but unfortunately not in his resolution. The speech at the Bureau was delivered before a dozen persons, but the resolution was written for millions.

I have before me the newspapers published by both trends of British socialism containing comments on the meeting of the International Bureau. The organ of the Independent (ahem! ahem!) Labour Party, the *Labour Leader*, rejoices, and *openly declares* to tens of thousands of British workers that the International Socialist Bureau not only recognised the Labour Party (that is true, and it had to be done) but also "*vindicated the policy of the I.L.P.*" (*Labour Leader*, October 16, 1908, p. 665). This is not true. The Bureau did *not* vindicate it. This is an illegitimate, opportunist interpretation of a slight awkwardness in Kautsky's resolution. This slight awkwardness is beginning to bear rather abundant fruit; on top of this comes a poor translation: no wonder the Italians say that translators are traducers (*traduttori—traditttori*). The official translations of the Bureau resolutions into the three official languages have not been published yet, and it is not known when they will appear. Kautsky's resolution states that the Labour Party "adopts the standpoint of the class struggle" (end of the resolution; in the original: *sich ... auf seinen, d. h. des Klassenkampfs, Boden stellt*), which, in the translation of the British *Social-Democrats* reads: "places itself in consequence on the ground of international socialism." In the translation of the British *opportunists* (I.L.P.) it reads: "*adopts the position of international socialism*". (Ibid.) Now try and rectify such mistakes when you carry on agitation among the British workers!

Far be it from me to accuse Bruce Glasier of distorting the resolution. I am sure he could not have had that in mind. And this is not so important. What is important is that the *spirit* of Kautsky's resolution, precisely the *second* part of it, be applied in practical mass work. On the same page of the *Labour Leader*, another member of the I.L.P., describing his impressions of the Bureau meeting and of the mass meeting in Brussels, complains that at the meeting "the emphasis on the ideal and ethical aspect of socialism ... was almost entirely absent", an aspect which, he averred, was always emphasised at I.L.P. meetings. "*In its stead we had ... the barren and uninspiring dogma of the class war.*"

When Kautsky was writing his resolution about the British, he had in mind, not a British "Independent", but a German Social-Democrat....

Justice, the organ of the British Social-Democrats, publishes bitter words from Hyndman against the majority of the Bureau as "whittlers-away of principle to suit the convenience of trimmers". "I have not the slightest doubt," writes Hyndman, "that if the British Labour Party had been told plainly that they either had to accept socialist principles ... or keep away altogether, they would very quickly have decided to bring themselves into line with the International Socialist Party." And in another article in the same issue, *facts* are quoted to prove that *in practice* the Independent Labour Party got some of its members elected under a *jumbled* flag of both Liberalism and the Independent Labour Party (Liberal-Labour Alliance), and that some of the "Independents" *had the backing of the Liberal Minister, John Burns* (*Justice*, October 17, 1908, pp. 4 and 7).

If Hyndman carries out the plan he speaks of, namely, that of raising this question again at the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen (1910), then the R.S.D.L.P. must try to get Kautsky's resolution amended.

The second item on the agenda was the question of joint action by the proletariat and the socialists of various countries against the international and colonial conflicts with which the policy of the bourgeois governments is fraught. Vaillant moved a resolution which was adopted with slight amendments. During the discussion the Austrian delegates referred to the fact that their party in its delegations officially opposes the policy of Franz-Joseph, and reaffirms the recognition by socialists of the right of all nationalities to self-determination. But in opposing the policy of Franz-Joseph—said the Austrians—we are also against the policy of Abdul Hamid or Edward VII. Our business is to make the government responsible for the consequences of its actions. The British expressed the desire for more explicit declarations by the Austrian Social-Democrats against their government, but the Austrians did not go further than what has been stated. Avramov, a delegate from the Bulgarian socialists (the "Narrows", i.e., the revolutionary Social-Democrats; in Bulgaria there are also the "Broads", i.e., opportunist Social-Democrats), insisted on the imperialist

bourgeoisie of the Balkan states themselves being mentioned, but the amendment to this effect was rejected. On the subject of the proclamation of Bulgarian independence, stated Avramov, the Bulgarian socialists strongly opposed the bourgeois parties, considering this proclamation to be a harmful piece of adventurism from the point of view of the working class. Bruce Glasier moved that the resolution should include a statement on the necessity of organising international demonstrations; but it was decided that a recommendation to this effect should be sent through the Bureau to the various national parties. Van Kol (a delegate from the Dutch Social-Democrats) suggested that there should be included a protest against the infringements of the Berlin Treaty by the powers. But before the voting he withdrew this proposition, as it had been pointed out that it was not for socialists to make a point of defending treaties concluded by bourgeois states. The text of the resolution adopted by the International Bureau is as follows:

"Whereas, in the first place, the British and German socialists by their demonstrations for peace, the French socialists by their campaign against the Moroccan expedition, the Danish socialists by their proposal for disarmament, were acting in keeping with the decisions of the International,

"Whereas, further, the danger of war persists; capitalist imperialism continues to intrigue in Britain and in Germany, the Moroccan expedition and adventure continues; tsarism, seeking new loans above all, is trying to add an element of confusion to the situation in order to strengthen its position in its struggle against the Russian revolution; in the Balkan Peninsula the intervention of foreign powers and their self-seeking ambitions are inflaming national and religious passions more than ever; the proclamation, quite recently, of the independence of Bulgaria and particularly the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina have increased the peril of war and brought this peril nearer; and whereas, finally, the conspiracies of the governments, their intensified armaments militarism and capitalist competition and plundering of the colonies everywhere constitute a threat to peace,

"The International Socialist Bureau confirms once more that the socialist party and the organised proletariat are the only force capable of preserving international peace, and that they consider it their duty to safeguard it.

"The Bureau calls upon the socialist parties of all countries, in accordance with the resolution of the Stuttgart International Congress, to strengthen their vigilance and their activity, bending every, effort in the direction indicated, and requests the Central Committees

and Executives of the parties, their parliamentary groups and their delegates to the bureau to seek out, together with the Secretariat of the International Socialist bureaus the means and practical measures, both national and international, which according to particular concrete circumstances could most serve to avert war and maintain peace."

The third item on the agenda was a proposal by the British section to hold regular meetings of the International Socialist Bureau twice yearly. No binding resolution was adopted on this question; only a desire was expressed in this sense. Evidently the vast majority do not consider it necessary to convene a meeting more frequently than once a year, as has been the case hitherto—except, of course, in emergencies.

The fourth item on the agenda was the proposal of the Bureau to alter the contributions made by each party for maintenance of the Bureau. Up till now the nominal income of the Bureau was 14,950 francs a year (about 6,000 rubles); it was proposed that this sum should be raised to 26,800 francs or, allowing for the usual arrears, 20,000 francs (8,000 rubles) in round figures. For this purpose each party would have to contribute 100 francs per annum for each vote it possesses at International Socialist Congresses. Russia has 20 votes, and consequently would have to pay 2,000 francs, made up of 700 francs by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 1,000 by the Social-Democrats and 300 francs by the trade unions. Hitherto Russia has been paying 1,500 francs a year, of which we (by arrangement with the Socialist-Revolutionary Party) paid 900 francs. On this question, too, no binding resolution was adopted. The Bureau was instructed to contact the national parties, and a wish was expressed that contributions should amount to 100 francs yearly per vote.

The fifth item was the alteration in the number of votes for Sweden—they were raised to 12—and for Hungary—where a general increase was postponed, but 2 votes were added for Croatia. An Armenian subsection of the Turkish section was also admitted, before the Turkish section itself had yet come into existence. The Armenian socialists in Turkey refused to "wait for" the Turks, and this subsec-

tion was given 4 votes. It would be desirable that our comrades, the Armenian Social-Democrats, who know the position of Armenian socialism in Turkey, should express their opinion on this question.

The sixth item on the agenda was on the admission of the Social-Democratic Party of Chile. This party was formed after a split in the Democratic Party of Chile. The Chilean Social-Democrats were admitted without any discussion.

The seventh item on the agenda was the question of the Zionist socialists in Russia.[110] As is known, they approached the Central Committee of our Party before the Stuttgart Congress, asking to be admitted to the Social-Democratic subsection of the Russian section of the International. Our Central Committee refused, and adopted a resolution stating the reasons why *Zionists*, even though they called themselves "Zionist socialists", should not be included among Social-Democrats. A representative of the Z.S. came to Stuttgart, and in Stuttgart too our subsection refused to admit him, while the Socialist-Revolutionaries abstained. As the Rules allow new members of the International to be admitted only with the consent of the national sections (and if two national subsections are in disagreement a final decision is taken by the International Bureau), the Z.S. could not get into the Congress in the normal way. They appealed to the Bureau, which then adopted a compromise decision—to admit the representative of the Z.S. to the Congress with a *consultative* voice. Now we had to clear up the muddle which had been created. Were the Zionist socialists members of the International or not? Victor Adler declared, as at Stuttgart, strongly against the Z.S. and for a refusal to postpone discussion as they had requested (they had sent a telegram saying they could not attend). Non-appearance, said Adler, was sometimes the best method of defence. I took the floor to recall once again the decision of our Central Committee, and to point out that to admit the Z.S. against the will of both Russian subsections would be an impossible infringement of the Rules of the International. Rubanovich and Zhitlovsky, the representative of the S.J.L.P. (the Socialist Jewish Labour Party,[111] which the S.R.s at Stuttgart had admitted into their subsection) warmly spoke against the non-admission of the Z.S. Rubanovich *could not however*

report any other resolution of the S.R. Party, beyond its *abstention* on this question, while Zhitlovsky (in face of the inevitable exclusion of the Z.S.) was obviously *defending himself*, asserting with comic vehemence that, if the Zionist Socialists were territorialists, then they too—the S.J.L.P.—were territorialists. Naturally, it followed from this, not that the Z.S. ought to be admitted, but only that there was hardly anyone else in the International except the S.R.s who would agree to admit the S.J.L.P. either. Speaking a second time, I emphatically protested against Rubanovich's manoeuvre in trying to force the Zionists on *someone else's* subsection while at the same time not quoting any resolution of his own subsection in favour of the Zionists. In the upshot, the Bureau (with two abstentions, Rubanovich and Vaillant) unanimously adopted Adler's motion, which runs:

"The Bureau states that the admission of the Zionists (with a consultative voice) took place as an exception in relation to the sessions of the Stuttgart Congress, that the Zionists at present are not affiliated to the International Bureau, and proceeds to the next business."

The eighth and last item on the agenda was the confirmation, almost without discussion, of the special composition of the delegation of the French Socialists to the International Bureau. Guesde was appointed one of the delegates from France, while the second French vote in the Bureau was given to two delegates jointly, Vaillant and Jaurès.

The meeting ended with the unanimous adoption of a resolution of sympathy with the Turkish revolution, moved by the Belgian delegate de Brouckère:

"The International Socialist Bureau greets with joy the fall of the infamous regime which Abdul Hamid so long maintained in Turkey with the help of the powers, and welcomes the possibility now presented to the peoples of the Turkish Empire to work out their own destinies, and the introduction of a regime of political liberty which will allow the nascent proletariat to carry on its class struggle in close unity with the proletariat of the whole world."

On Monday October 12 a session of the inter-parliamentary conference was held. There were three items on the agenda: (1) The last parliamentary session, (2) Colonial reforms (re-

port by van Kol), and (3) Socialist action for peace within the Inter-parliamentary Union (report by the Belgian deputy Lafontaine) followed by four questions: (a) Terms of payment for building workers (in the event of the bankruptcy of their employers), (b) Postal voting, (c) New lists of members of the parliamentary groups and their secretaries, (d) Dispatch of documents.

On the first item, the conference confined itself to confirming, on the proposal of Pernerstorfer, the decision of the Stuttgart Congress: secretaries of the parliamentary groups are invited to send *written reports* of the groups to the International Socialist Bureau. A brief exchange of opinion on the two last "questions" led to a similar reminder. On the first two "questions" materials and proposals put forward by some socialist M.P.s were briefly mentioned. Lafontaine's report was on his suggestion postponed. In this connection the Austrians and Germans said that they were against the participation of socialists in bourgeois parliamentary conferences for peace. The Swedish delegate Branting referred to the special conditions which, allegedly, explained the participation of the Swedish Social-Democrats in these conferences. On his motion, it was decided to put down the question of state insurance for the workers on the agenda of the next inter-parliamentary conference to be held at the same time as the next meeting of the Bureau.

The only subject on the agenda on which a short report was read, and on which there was a discussion of not inconsiderable interest, proved to be the question of colonial reforms. The Dutch delegate van Kol, who made himself famous by his opportunist resolution on the colonial question at Stuttgart, tried in his report by a somewhat different approach to drag in his favourite idea of a "positive" colonial programme for Social-Democracy. Setting aside completely the struggle of Social-Democrats against colonial policy, their agitation among the masses against colonial robbery, the awakening of a spirit of resistance and opposition among the oppressed masses in the colonies, van Kol concentrated all his attention on a list of possible "reforms" of life in the colonies within the present system. Like a benevolent official, he listed a variety of questions, beginning with property in land and ending with schools, encourage-

ment of industry, prisons, etc., all the time underlining the necessity of being as practical as possible—for example, reckoning with the fact that universal suffrage is not always applicable to savages, that sometimes one cannot but agree with the necessity of introducing compulsory labour in the colonies instead of prisons, etc., etc. The whole report was saturated with a spirit, not of proletarian class struggle, but of the most petty-bourgeois—and even worse, bureaucratic—peddling of "reforms". In conclusion he suggested that a committee be appointed from the five main countries possessing colonies to draw up a colonial programme for Social-Democracy.

Molkenbuhr on behalf of the Germans, and some Belgians, tentatively sought to follow van Kol, differing from him only on details—whether a single common programme was necessary, wouldn't this be stereotyping, and so forth. This approach to the question served van Kol's purpose, because the very thing he wanted was to reduce everything to "practical details", and to show that "in practice" the differences were smaller than it seemed at Stuttgart. But Kautsky and Ledebour discussed the question in principle, and attacked the fundamental hypocrisy of van Kol's whole position. Van Kol declares, said Kautsky, that in particular cases universal suffrage is inapplicable; therefore, in one form or another he accepts despotism in the colonies, because he does not propose any other electoral system, nor can he do so. Van Kol conceives the possibility of compulsory labour, said Ledebour; therefore, he opens the door to bourgeois policy which uses thousands of different pretexts for preserving slavery in the colonies. Van Kol defended himself extremely stubbornly and extremely badly, asserting for example that sometimes you can't do without taxes in kind, that "he saw this himself in Java", that the Papuans don't know what voting means, that at the elections things are sometimes decided by pure superstition or by getting the voters drunk on rum, etc. Kautsky and Ledebour ridiculed these arguments, asserting that our common democratic programme is unquestionably applicable to the colonies as well, and that it is essential to bring to the fore the struggle against capitalism in the colonies too. Is the superstition of our "educated" Catholics any better than the superstitions

of the savages, asked Ledebour. Even if parliamentary and representative institutions are not always applicable, said Kautsky, democracy is always applicable, and the struggle against every departure from democracy is always obligatory. The respective policies of revolutionary and opportunist Social-Democracy were brought out with complete clarity as a result of this discussion, and van Kol, seeing that his motion would undoubtedly receive "a first class funeral", himself withdrew it.

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P. MASLOV IN HYSTERICS

P. Maslov has published a "Letter to the Editor" in No. 8-9 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* which can only be called hysterical. Indeed, is it not hysterics when he not only tries to shame me by comparing my style with that of the Priest Iliodor, but trots out some *conversation* or other which took place *14 years ago*? The reader may think this a joke, but it is a fact. "When, before the appearance of Volume III of *Capital*, Lenin read my manuscript, in which there was the same answer to the question of the distribution of profit as in Volume III," writes Maslov, "Lenin stated that he considered the ridiculous solution of the problem by Prof. Skvortsov[112] to be correct." Fancy that—*before* the appearance of Volume III, i.e., *before 1894*! One must have the naïveté of a child—which cannot be said of my most reverend opponent—or to be in a state of hysterics, to pretend to remember exactly some conversation which was supposed to have taken place *fourteen years ago*, and one's own unprinted manuscripts. Would it not be better to print that manuscript, eh, Comrade Maslov? What an advantage it would be to prove that Maslov, and Maslov alone, *before* Volume III, solved the problem that Engels put to the world! True, it would seem a bit late perhaps—but better late than never. One cannot really imagine, after all, that Maslov simply wanted to praise himself by referring to his own recollections.

It would appear that the editors of the paper in which Maslov is writing have not yet praised Maslov's amendment to Marx, and so Maslov has decided to praise himself for what he did (under his breath) fourteen years ago.... It would also appear that (if one is to believe the titanic strength of Com-

rade Maslov's memory) I made mistakes fourteen years ago, before the appearance of Volume III of *Capital*, and have not printed these mistakes; whereas Maslov began to make mistakes 7 years and 14 years after the appearance of Volume III, and prints these mistakes. However, it is possible that Maslov's hysterics are not quite unpremeditated. Exactly five years ago Martov threw a fit of hysterics in front of Plekhanov, and thereby impelled him to go over from the Bolsheviks to the Mensheviks. Can P. Maslov be hoping that Plekhanov, after reading his outcries in the newspaper edited by Plekhanov and Co., will go over from the ranks of the supporters of Marx's theory of rent to the supporters of Maslov's theory of rent? That would be very interesting; but so long as it has not happened, let us see how matters stand with Maslov's accusation that my article "consists of a mass of distortion and obvious untruths".

Really, "a mass", Comrade Maslov?

Well, let's look at all your arguments.

"Lenin writes: 'It is not true to say that according to Marx absolute rent results from the low composition of agricultural capital. Absolute rent arises from the private ownership of land. This private ownership creates a special monopoly.'"*

Here Maslov *breaks off my sentence*, which does not end at the word "monopoly" and goes on to refer to a *definite page in Volume IV* (*Theories of Surplus-Value*). This is not distortion on Maslov's part, oh no! It is only a "correction" of somebody else's exposition....

"This is what Lenin writes," continues P. Maslov. "And this is what Marx writes: 'If the average composition of agricultural capital were equal to, or higher than, that of the average social capital, then absolute rent—again in the sense just described—would disappear; i.e., rent which differs equally from differential rent as well as that based upon an actual monopoly price' (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 631, Russian translation[113]). I will leave it to the reader to judge who gives a better version of Marx" (then follows a footnote about the mistake regarding the law of profit which I made fourteen years ago, as P. Maslov so well remembers, in a private conversation with him).

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, p. 301.—*Ed.*

I also leave it to the reader to judge on whose side there are "distortions and obvious untruths". The most worthy Maslov *broke off my sentence before my reference to Marx*, and gives me another reference! What sort of an argument is this? Has not Maslov again and again exposed the self-contradiction of Marx's "rough notes" (I would remind the reader that Maslov in 1906, i.e., even after the *Theories of Surplus-Value* had been published, made so bold as to account for the mistakes he had found in Marx by the fact that Volume III consisted of "rough notes")? Does not this prove that Marx's arguments were faulty, because he derived absolute rent *now* from private property in land, *now* from the low composition of capital in agriculture?

No, it only proves that Maslov is once again in an unholy muddle. You can find in Marx dozens of phrases where absolute rent is derived from private property in land, and dozens of phrases where it is derived from the low composition of agricultural capital. And this for the simple reason that Marx puts forward *both these conditions* in the appropriate passages of his exposition—just as *I put forward both* when I was setting out Marx's ideas. In that very same passage of my article from which Maslov has taken his quotation I also speak of the *low composition* of agricultural capital! (*Proletary*, No. 33, p. 3, cols. 2-3.*) Maslov quotes against me Chapter 45 of Volume III, the chapter on absolute rent. Maslov takes his quotation from page 298 of the original. Yet *earlier* on page 287, Marx says that differential rent is not "created" by private property in land (differential rent is inevitable under capitalism *even without* property in land), whereas property in land creates absolute rent. "Landed property itself," writes Marx in italics, "has created rent" (Vol. III, section 2, S. 287**).

And now the question is, does the quotation from page 287 contradict the quotation from page 298? Not at all. Having ascertained that private property in land *creates* rent (i.e., absolute rent), Marx goes on to ascertain that that rent will be either simply a monopoly, only a monopoly, purely a monopoly, or the *result* of the fact that monopoly prevents the *levelling of profits* on capital low in its compo-

* See present edition, Vol. 13, p. 301-02.—*Ed.*

** See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 737.—*Ed.*

sition (agriculture) with that which is higher in composition (industry).

Maslov consequently repeats in the newspaper edited by Plekhanov and Co. his flagrant distortion of Marxism. Maslov consequently insists, here too—without however saying it straight out—that there cannot be any absolute rent, that Marx's theory is an error, while the theory of bourgeois political economy which denies the existence of absolute rent is true.

Why then not say straight out what he has already said in *The Agrarian Question* and what I gave in my quotation? Isn't that a "distortion and obvious untruth"? If not, what is it? In *The Agrarian Question* he says that Marx was wrong and that there can be no absolute rent, whereas in the newspaper edited by Plekhanov and Co. he *keeps silent about this* and talks only about who sets out the views of Marx *more correctly*! So it transpires that all we were arguing about with Maslov was "who sets out Marx's theory more correctly", and that I was not telling the truth when I said that Maslov had "amended" Marx's "rough notes" by throwing out absolute rent! For shame, Comrade Maslov!

"Further. 'Pyotr Maslov,' writes Lenin, 'has failed to understand ... Marx's differential rent as well.... When a fresh investment of capital in his land yields the tenant additional profit and *additional rent* (Lenin's italics), it is the tenant, not the landowner, who appropriates that rent.'* In this connection Lenin, of course, reads the 'ignorant' Maslov the appropriate lecture. We take Volume I of *The Agrarian Question*, and on page 112 we find: 'If the intensification of agriculture, by the fresh investment of 500 rubles, results in the same quantity of product, the tenant will receive a profit not of 25 per cent but of 100 per cent, as on the first investment of capital he pays 333 rubles of rent.... If in the investment of the first capital he contented himself with average profit..., it is of more advantage to him to reduce the rented area and to expend new capital on the same land, because it will result in a surplus over the profit, it will provide rent for the tenant also.' But Lenin needed an untruth in order to abuse me."

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 303.—*Ed.*

Let us see who has told an untruth. To get to the bottom of this, it is important to notice the *dots* in the quotation I made, as reproduced by Maslov. For I quoted all that Maslov had said on this subject in full. Dots stand for *omissions*. And what Maslov has done is to *omit* in his quotation from page 112 of his first volume *the very passage* in which he *attacks Marx*, and which he prints *in italics* on page 112! This may seem incredible, but it is a fact. In my article in *Proletary*, as Maslov's second argument against Marx, I quote the following phrase from page 112 of his first volume: "Rent from the 'last' investment of capital, Rodbertus's rent and Marx's absolute rent, will disappear *because the tenant can always make the 'last' investment the last but one, if it produces anything besides the ordinary profit*" (Maslov's italics).*

This is Maslov's argument against Marx. It was *this* argument which I attacked, and which, I continue to assert, is a mass of falsehood and muddle. And Maslov replies to me by quoting *this same* page 112, but *leaving out* his attack on Marx! In place of this attack he puts *dots*: before the dots he quotes the *beginning* of the page, after them the *end*, but the attack on Marx has disappeared. What is this if not a distortion and an obvious untruth?

I never asserted and do not assert now, that in the four hundred pages of *The Agrarian Question* one cannot find sound passages. I only asserted that *Maslov's arguments against Marx* are unheard-of nonsense and incredible muddle. If Maslov, in the fourth edition he promises, cuts out these arguments, if for example, on page 112 he leaves what he has quoted in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, I will say, and anyone will say, that as from the fourth edition Maslov has ceased to correct Marx. But until this is done, anyone reading Volume I will see on page 112 Maslov's argument against Marx, the argument he *left out* in *Golos*. And everyone will see that I was right in criticising *this* argument, i.e., that this argument against *absolute* rent is ridiculous, since the tenant appropriates during the period of his lease the additional rent from his fresh investment of capital *in full*, i.e., both absolute and differential.

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 302.—*Ed.*

I will not dwell on Maslov's next "example", because it refers to *the very argument* which Maslov omitted in *Golos*. Obviously my criticism of the argument falls if Maslov *withdraws* the argument. But if he does not do this, and only shortens his quotations, I ask the reader, who is responsible for "a mass of distortion and obvious untruths"?

Maslov's last quotation from my article is as follows: "'What is intensification?' asks Lenin, and replies: 'It is the further expenditure of labour and capital. A reaping-machine, according to the discovery of our great Maslov, is *not* (Lenin's italics) expenditure of capital. A seed drill is not an expenditure of capital.'* Owing to his ignorance of the most elementary terms in the agrarian question, Lenin has given a wrong definition of intensification, and has not only written obvious nonsense but also asserts an obvious untruth. In *The Agrarian Question* (p. 62) I wrote: 'A threshing-machine diminishes the expenditure of labour per unit of land area, both in an extensive and in an intensive economy.' (It is by *such* expenditure, and not expenditure in general, irrespective of the land area involved, that the degree of intensiveness is determined. *P. M.*) A harvester has the same significance."

Look here, my worthy friend, I will say to Maslov in reply: one must draw the line somewhere! Was the argument really about whether the intensiveness of the expenditure of capital is determined per unit of area, or irrespective of the area? That is indeed a distortion and an obvious untruth! The argument was not about that at all. In the *second* part of my article, now quoted by Maslov, I was *not* arguing against *The Agrarian Question* but *against Maslov's article in "Obrazovaniye", 1907, No. 2.*

Just try arguing with an individual who now removes from his works the very arguments against Marx which the critic was challenging, now *throws out entire articles he has written*, and slips under the nose of the reader something quite *irrelevant* to the matter!

The second part of my article is headed: "Is It Necessary to Refute Marx in Order to Refute Narodism?" In this part I criticise *only* Maslov's article in *Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 2.

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* See present edition, Vol. 13, p. 309.—*Ed.*

Maslov says nothing in *Golos* about that article, and quotes from his *Agrarian Question*! But that is a silly game of hide-and-seek! I never said that Maslov, in *The Agrarian Question*, went to the length of asserting that to refute Narodism it was necessary to refute Marx.

But in *Obrazovaniye* Maslov *did say this*. And it was to this that I was objecting, and not at all to what expenditure of capital determines intensification. Does or does not Maslov maintain his assertion that "if it were not for the fact that the productivity of successive expenditures of labour on the same plot of land diminishes, the idyll which the Socialist-Revolutionaries ... depict could, perhaps, be realised"?

You go into hiding, worthy opponent? But that means acknowledging defeat.

Do you maintain your assertion that you "happened to be the first to lay special emphasis on the difference between the significance of the cultivation of the soil and of technical progress for the development of farming, and, in particular, for the struggle between large-scale and small production"? That is what you said in *Obrazovaniye*. And that is what I quoted in *Proletary*. It is to that, and only to that question, that your argument about the reaping-machine refers—an argument in *Obrazovaniye*, and not in *The Agrarian Question*. By not defending what he has said in *Obrazovaniye*, Maslov admits he is wrong.

Thus on the substance of the question all Maslov does in *Golos* is to wriggle. He repeats his muddle about Marx not deducing absolute rent from private property in land, but does not directly defend his amendments to Marx; his arguments against Marx he omits from his quotations; what he has said in *Obrazovaniye* he evades altogether. And we repeat: Maslov's abolition of Marx's absolute rent in *The Agrarian Question*, and Maslov's arguments in *Obrazovaniye*, remain unsurpassed pearls of confusion, the importation of a bourgeois point of view into theory.

As regards the German edition of Maslov's book, I poked fun at the fact that in it all the corrections to Marx are hidden away. Maslov defends himself by saying that the publisher did not bring out the whole of the first part of his book. What does this correction by Maslov amount to? I said Maslov had thrown out these corrections. Maslov says it

was the publisher who did it—and the publisher is the German Social-Democrat Dietz.

If it was Dietz who threw out Maslov's "theory", Maslov's "corrections" to Marx, *with* Maslov's consent, then my argument is not affected in any way. If Dietz did it *without* Maslov's consent, then my argument changes only in its form: Dietz, by throwing out the stupidities from Maslov's book, acted wisely.

Was that the correction which the worthy Maslov was seeking?

Maslov says that I "begin to seek heresies in my opponents" because I "wish to cover up" the heresy of my friends. That is not true. Against what I consider heresy in my friends I speak as strongly as I do against you. That can be seen from my footnote in the symposium, *In Memory of Marx*,* which has just appeared. As for Maslov's heresies I "began to seek" them in "*Zarya*" *in 1901*,** i.e., *two years* before the split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, *two years* before Maslov's first municipalisation programme. In 1901 Maslov was my "opponent" in the Party *only* on the question of his corrections to Marx's theory.

P.S. The present article had already been written when I received a special leaflet from the management of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, which says:

"Owing to a printer's error in No. 8-9 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the *comment* of the editorial board to Comrade Maslov's letter was *omitted*. This mistake will be immediately corrected, and the comment made available to subscribers and purchasers."

We have not yet received this correction. I think it my duty to inform our readers about this printer's error. But is there not yet *another* printer's error in the special leaflet I reprint here? Should it not, instead of *Comrade* Maslov, read *Mr.* Maslov? Was it not Plekhanov who declared in print that people who depart from Marx are for him not comrades but gentlemen! Or does not that hold good for *Mensheviks* who preach departure from Marxism?

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* See p. 34 of this volume.—*Ed.*
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SOME REMARKS ON THE "REPLY" BY P. MASLOV[114]

My opponent accuses me of using methods of polemics which distort the issue. To ascertain whether this is true, I will examine P. Maslov's "Reply" step by step.

Maslov's first example. Lenin says that a new upsurge of the revolution is unthinkable without the radical abolition of all the survivals of serfdom, "as though Social-Democracy, in adopting the programme of municipalisation of the land, intends to preserve the survivals of serfdom, to leave the estates in the hands of the landlords".

Every reader will see that Maslov is begging the question; because what I have been pointing out all the time is that the term, a survival of serfdom, applies not only to landlord property but also to the allotment property still in existence. That was what the argument was about. By avoiding this question *all through* his reply, by not saying a word about whether there is a medieval element in allotment property in land, whether to clear away this medievalism is advantageous for capitalism or not, Maslov distracts the attention of the reader. Not to reply to an argument of one's opponent on a question of principle, and to ascribe only "pathos" to him, means not to argue but to turn to abuse.

The second example. My remark about an agrarian and a political revolution being indissolubly connected Maslov calls lack of respect for the reader. Municipalisation does not break this connection either. Is that a reply? Is not Maslov passing over in silence here—(1) my *explicit* reference to the Menshevik Novosedsky, who *definitely* connected municipalisation with an incomplete political revolution; and (2) my argument that municipalisation does

not affect either the medieval village commune or medieval landowning, i.e., unquestionably and firmly condemns the agrarian revolution itself, and only the agrarian revolution, to remain half-finished?

Maslov's third argument: "The peasants' hatred of the landlords and the officials serves Lenin as an argument in favour of his programme and against the programme adopted." Untrue. Every reader will notice that Maslov has substituted "hatred of the *landlords*" for "*hatred of medievalism*" (Maslov himself admits a few lines earlier that that was what I spoke of). He needed this substitution in order to pass over in silence my argument as to the medieval character of *allotment* property.

It is not true that I called my programme a Bolshevik one. Nor is it true that the question of nationalisation was voted on at Stockholm. You should not distort facts, Comrade Maslov!

"No theory of rent affords the least advantage to the programme of nationalisation or municipalisation, because the income from confiscated lands in any case goes to the state or the municipal authority."

Here we have at last an argument in substance. An excellent argument, too, because it best shows how monstrously Maslov is distorting Marxism. Only by rejecting Marx's *absolute rent*, which Maslov has "refuted", can one reduce the question purely to "income", forgetting about the lowering of prices for grain and ensuring access for capital to agriculture! Maslov has confirmed by his argument that the *economic* essence of the question is alien and incomprehensible to him. It is not a question of income, my dear sir, but of the relations of production in agriculture, which change for the better when *absolute* rent is abolished. By rejecting absolute rent in Marx's theory, Maslov has deprived himself of any possibility of understanding the economic significance of nationalisation. Why millions of small proprietors in the Russian bourgeois revolution could and were bound to demand it—that *economic* problem does not exist for Maslov. That's just the trouble with him!

It is true that my articles in the years 1905-08 were directed against the programme of the cut-off lands. But

"to leap and dance" on this question as Maslov does means to throw dust in the eyes of the reader, and not to clear up disputed questions. After all, Maslov himself has not stood by all his programme of 1903! Why then does he hide this from the reader, and put forward only one side of the past? Why does he quote the words, which I do not deny now either, that nationalisation of the land is harmful in a "police state"? Is that argument, or abuse?

For Polish readers who don't know the details of the discussion on the agrarian question among Russian Social-Democrats, I will explain that in 1903, before the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., Maslov put forward in the press a different programme from the one he recommended in 1906. I should have thought it impermissible to dig up previous differences, and in my previous article I did not touch on them. But now Maslov himself has brought up the old dispute. It came into his head that it would be a brilliant piece of wit to refute the programme of 1903 which I have given up—or was he perhaps attracted by the thought that to argue about the past would draw attention away from the weak points in his new views? The fact remains that, in touching on earlier disputes, Maslov did not tell the Polish Social-Democrats that he himself had changed his programme of 1903. While blaming his opponent for the open and long since completed alteration in the previous programme, he conceals the fact that he himself has changed his programme. He also conceals the fact that in 1903 Pyotr Maslov not only did not insist on the necessity of leaving the allotment lands at all costs in the hands of their owners, but on the contrary, simply included in his programme the *socialisation* if possible of the *allotment lands* as well.

Splendid, is it not? For whom are recollections of the past unpleasant? For him who has openly recognised the source of mistakes in his previous view, or for him who hides the fact that his views have changed? Why was it that in 1903 P. Maslov thought the socialisation of allotment lands possible as well, while in 1906-08 he flies into a rage at the mere thought of such views being entertained?

Let the reader judge for himself of such "polemical" methods or rather such covering-up of traces. Maslov follows

the recipe of the sly old fellow depicted by Turgenev: denounce as loudly as possible what you want to hide in your own actions! Others have changed their views, and pointed it out themselves. Shout as loudly as possible against these changes, in order to hide the change in your own views! In the absence of arguments, one needs must fall back on swindling.

My table showing the distribution of landed property in European Russia displeases Maslov. He is indignant that I compare "Kalmyk" property with the "intensive economy" of south-western Russia. The reader who is familiar with the literature on the agrarian question knows, of course, that *Maslov himself* as well as other authors compare—though it be for particular districts—the ruined horseless peasant having four dessiatines of land in some remote backwoods, with the rich farmer carrying on intensive market-gardening on the same quantity of land near a large city. Out of place, quite out of place, is Comrade Maslov's boasting of his "detailed analysis"! It is *boasting*, and not scientific argument: because it is impossible to ascertain the *results* of the struggle in any other way than the one I adopted, and Maslov himself understands the impossibility of making "detailed analyses" in *Przegląd*.

In dealing with my argument that when the Trudovik group declared for nationalisation they proved to the Mensheviks that I was right, Maslov does not simply examine this argument, but tries indirectly to weaken it by saying that (1) the nationalisation was "whittled down" and (2) many joined the autonomists in the First Duma "just because their electorate did not want nationalisation of the land".

Is not this evasion of the question? What has nationalisation in common with this "whittling down"? And what have the autonomists in common with what Maslov in 1905 and all the Mensheviks at Stockholm categorically stated about the Russian peasants—that they would not in any case agree to nationalisation, and would reply to it with a Vendée? Maslov passes over in silence the fact—for him an unpleasant one—that the adoption of a programme of nationalisation by the Trudovik group *after* the Stockholm Congress *refuted* the arguments of the Mensheviks. Such

a "reply", in which the real issue is systematically avoided, is not difficult, but it is not of great value. It is a fact that both the First and Second Dumas often put the workers' deputies in an embarrassing position, because the Social-Democrats were "whittling down" nationalisation *more* than the peasants themselves. The Social-Democrats found themselves in the position of timorous philistine intellectuals *advising* the peasant to deal *more carefully* with the old, medieval allotment property, to reinforce it as much as he could, to adapt the new free property in land to capitalism as slowly as possible! The point is, Comrade Maslov, not that the Trudoviks were whittling down nationalisation but that the Social-Democrats, the Marxists, were whittling it down still more—because municipalisation is nationalisation whittled down to the point of distortion. The trouble is not that the autonomists sometimes rejected* nationalisation; the trouble is that the Russian Social-Democrats failed to understand the nature of the struggle of the Russian peasants. Maslov's demagogy is not that he records the disagreement of some of the autonomists with nationalisation, but that he is silent about the fact that many autonomists disagree with municipalisation, and that he uses petty-bourgeois separatist arguments to incite them against nationalisation!

The autonomists are against nationalisation. Let the reader consider in whose favour such an argument works. For my part, I would mention that as early as 1903, when criticising Maslov's programme *of that day*, I called municipalisation whittled nationalisation. I would mention that, when arguing with Maslov in 1906 before the Stockholm Congress, I pointed out that it was wrong to confuse the question of national autonomy with that of nationalisation of the land.** The very foundations of our programme guarantee autonomy. Consequently they also guarantee the autonomous disposal of the nationalised land! Maslov cannot understand this elementary fact! Nationalisation means the abolition of absolute rent, the passing of the land

* Not at all, not all! The fact that nationalisation was defended by the Ukrainian autonomist, Chizhevsky, should have given Maslov food for thought.

** See present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 181-84.—*Ed.*

into the property of the state, the prohibition of all transfers of land, i.e., the elimination of all mediators between those who work the land and the owner of the land—the state. Within the limits of this prohibition, the autonomy of countries and peoples in relation to the disposal of the land, the establishment of conditions for settlement, and regulations for distribution, etc., etc., is quite permissible, does not in any way contradict nationalisation and is included in the demands of our political programme. It follows clearly from this that only petty bourgeois—and that is what all the "autonomists" were—could cover up their cowardice, their unwillingness to fight actively to the end for a single, centralised agrarian revolution, by expressing a fear that they would lose their autonomy. For Social-Democracy the question is posed the other way round: it is the business of the proletariat to carry the revolution through to its very end, both in the political sphere and in the agrarian. *For this purpose* it is necessary to nationalise the land—a thing that is demanded by the Trudoviks, i.e., the politically-minded Russian peasants. The important thing for a Marxist is the economic criterion of such a step; and this economic criterion proclaims that, in keeping with Marx's teaching, bourgeois nationalisation of the land ensures the maximum development of productive forces in agriculture. Thus a resolute bourgeois-revolutionary step in the agrarian sphere is indissolubly bound up with a resolute bourgeois-democratic revolution in the political sphere, i.e., with the establishment of a republic, which alone guarantees *true autonomy*. Such is the real relationship between autonomy and an agrarian revolution, which Maslov has completely failed to understand!

Maslov calls my reference to Marx's *Theories of Surplus-Value* an "evasion", because Marx never said "that the peasants want to expropriate themselves". Come, come, Comrade Maslov! Can it really be that you have not understood Marx's clear words? Does Marx say that for capitalism the complete abolition of medieval property in land is an advantage—does he or does he not? Is the nationalisation of the land advocated by the Trudoviks and demanded by the Russian peasants in 1905-07, abolition of medieval property—is

it or is it not? For it was about this that we were talking, my dear sir, and the laughable renaming of bourgeois-peasant nationalisation of the land "expropriation" of the peasants does not in the least refute the correctness of the question as I put it.... "In industry as well," Maslov continues, "capitalism ruins small proprietorship, but does it follow from this that the Social-Democrats have got to assume the task of expropriating the handicraftsmen?"

This is a perfect gem! To call the struggle of the peasants against medieval barriers in landownership, the struggle for nationalisation of the land, which (Marx showed) most favours the development of capitalism, "expropriation" of the peasants, and to put it on the same footing as expropriation of the handicraftsman by the capitalist. For God's sake, Comrade Maslov! Just think, in the name of all that is holy, why we *support* the peasant against the landlord, and leave it to the anti-Semites to support the handicraftsman against the factory!

Maslov does not understand that to support the handicraftsman, i.e., petty proprietorship in industry, can never be the job of Social-Democrats, since this activity is decidedly and invariably reactionary. But support of petty proprietorship in agriculture *may* be the duty of Marxists, and *must* be their duty wherever petty-bourgeois economy is economically *progressive* compared with large-scale feudal economy. Marx never supported small-scale industry against large-scale, but Marx supported small-scale farming in the forties in respect to America, and peasant agriculture against the feudal latifundia in 1848 in relation to Germany. In 1848 Marx proposed the breaking-up of the German feudal estates. He supported the movement of the small farmers against the large-scale slave-owning estates in America, for freedom of the soil and for the abolition of private property in land in America.[115]

Was Marx's trend of thought in agrarian policy correct? It was correct, esteemed Comrade Maslov—who has "revised" the theory of absolute rent in the spirit of bourgeois economics, but has not had time to "revise" the rest of Marx. A bourgeois revolution in the agrarian sphere can be consistent and really victorious only when it forcibly and drastically abolishes all feudal property, when it wipes

out all previous property in land, and instead creates a basis for the new free bourgeois property in land, adapted to the requirements of capital and not of the landlords. Nationalisation of the land is fully in keeping with the trend of such a revolution. Moreover nationalisation of the land is the only measure which ensures that such a revolution takes place with the greatest consistency thinkable in capitalist society. There is no other means so resolutely and painlessly to liberate the peasants from the "ghetto" of allotment property. There is no other means to destroy the old rotten village commune without police, bureaucracy and money-lender.

Viewed objectively, the question presents itself in the Russian bourgeois revolution in the following way, and only in the following way: will Stolypin (i.e., the landlords and the autocracy) adapt the old form of landed property to the requirements of capitalism, or will the peasant masses themselves do it by overthrowing the power of the landlords and the tsar? In the first case, adaptation is only possible by means of reforms, i.e., by a half-hearted, long-dragged-out process, involving a much slower growth of the productive forces, the least possible development of democracy condemning Russia to the prolonged supremacy of the Junker. In the second case, only a revolutionary adaptation is possible, i.e., one which forcibly sweeps away the landlords' estates and ensures the most rapid possible development of the productive forces. Is that revolutionary abolition of landlord property thinkable if the old allotment property of the peasants remains? No, it is unthinkable—and the peasant deputies in both Dumas demonstrated that it was impossible. They demonstrated this by creating a political type of peasantry representative of all Russia in the period of the bourgeois revolution: the *Trudovik* type, who demands *nationalisation* of the land.

In shouting about the S.R. character of nationalisation, Maslov is repeating the old tactic of the Mensheviks: while themselves flirting with the Cadets, to accuse the revolutionary Social-Democrats of coming closer to the Socialist-Revolutionaries. People coquette with the liberal-monarchist landlords and merchants, but are indignant that the revolutionary Social-Democrats in a bourgeois

revolution want to march together with the revolutionary peasant bourgeois. Nor is that all. Thundering against the S.R. character of nationalisation, Maslov demonstrates his complete incomprehension of the Marxist analysis of the Narodnik views and aspirations of the Russian peasantry. Maslov does not understand that the Social-Democrats in Russia were long ago pointing out the reactionary nature of the socialist, or rather quasi-socialist, theories or dreams of a reallotment of the land (the general redistribution), etc., and the *bourgeois progressiveness* of this ideal in present-day semi-feudal Russia. Beyond the S.R.s' petty-bourgeois *phrase* about socialism, Maslov is incapable of discovering the bourgeois reality—namely, revolutionary struggle against all the old medieval rubbish. When a Socialist-Revolutionary talks about equalised land tenure, socialisation of lands, etc., the Socialist-Revolutionary is talking balderdash from the economic point of view, he is revealing his illiteracy in the sphere of economic science and the theory of the development of capitalism. But behind these phrases, behind these dreams, is hidden a live and highly realistic content—not at all a socialist one, however, but a purely bourgeois content, namely, clearing the ground for capitalism, abolishing all medieval and social-estate barriers existing on the land, and the creation of a free arena for capitalism. That is what our poor Maslov can't get himself to understand—and this is directly connected with the fact that Maslov cannot understand Marx's doctrine of absolute rent, which, unlike differential rent, can be abolished in capitalist society, the development of which will be advanced by its abolition.

Incapable of fighting the S.R.s, Maslov vulgarises Marxism, condemning himself only to contemplation of the "rear aspect" of the peasant, who is shackled to his plot of land, and is quite unable to understand the democracy and the revolutionary bourgeois spirit of the peasant who wants to sweep away both landlord property and allotment property in the soil.

Incapable of fighting the S.R.s, Maslov surrenders to them, to the petty-bourgeois socialists the criticism of private property in land. That criticism from the point of view of the development of capitalism, was given by Marx

and should be given by Marxists. But in cutting himself off from that road by his denial of absolute rent, Maslov capitulates to the S.R.s, admitting in theory that they are right—when it is Marx who is right! He capitulates to the S.R.s, who criticise private ownership of the land in a petty-bourgeois way, not from the point of view of the development of capitalism, but only from the point of view of delaying its development. Maslov has not understood that the mistake of the S.R.s in their agrarian programme begins *after nationalisation*, i.e., when they go on to "socialisation" and "equalisation" and reach the point of denying a class struggle amongst the small peasantry. The S.R.s do not understand the *bourgeois* character of nationalisation: that is their principal error. And let any Marxist who has studied *Capital* tell me, is it possible to understand the bourgeois character of nationalisation when one denies the existence of absolute rent?

Furthermore, Maslov says that I am turning all petty-peasant property throughout Europe into medieval property. Quite untrue. In Europe there is no "allotment" property in land, nor are there barriers deriving from the medieval ranks of society: there exists free and capitalist, not feudal, property in land. In Europe there is no peasant movement against the landlords supported by the Social-Democrats. P. Maslov has forgotten all this!

Let us go on to the political arguments. My argument that the municipalisation advocated by the Mensheviks is bound up with the idea of compromise with the monarchy is described by Maslov as an "insinuation" and a "deliberate lie"—but then how about my textual quotation from the speech of the Menshevik Novosedsky, Comrade Maslov? On whose side is there a lie? Isn't the real trouble that you want to use terrible words to wipe away the unpleasant fact of Novosedsky's admission?

Handing over the land to the municipalities increases their chances in the fight against a restoration, asserts Maslov; but I permit myself to think that only the strengthening of a central republican authority can seriously impede reaction, whereas the dispersal of its forces and resources among various regions facilitates the work of reaction. We must strive to unite the revolutionary classes,

and first of all the proletariat, of the various parts of the state into a single army, and not dream of a hopeless, economically impossible and senseless federalist attempt to hand over revenues from confiscated lands to the various regions. "Choose, Polish comrades," says Maslov: "Should a Polish Sejm receive the revenues from confiscated lands, or should these revenues be handed over to the Russians in St. Petersburg?"

A magnificent argument! And, of course, not a hint of demagogy in it! No confusion of the agrarian question with the question of Polish autonomy!

But I will say: the freedom of Poland is impossible without the freedom of Russia. And that freedom will not be achieved if the Polish and Russian workmen do not do their duty of supporting the Russian peasants in their struggle for nationalisation of the land, and in carrying that struggle to complete victory in both the political sphere and the agrarian. Municipalisation and nationalisation should be evaluated from the point of view of the economic development of the centre of Russia and of the political destinies of the country as a whole, and not from the point of view of the specific features of any particular autonomous national territory. Without the victory of the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry in Russia, it is absurd to talk about genuine autonomy for Poland, the rights of municipalities and so forth. They become empty phrases. The peasantry in Russia, on the other hand, inasmuch as it is revolutionary, inasmuch as it rejects the idea of compromise with the bourgeoisie and the Octobrists, but fights together with the workers and all democrats, has already irrefutably proved its sympathy for nationalisation of the land. If the peasantry ceases to be revolutionary, i.e., renounces this sympathy and turns away from a bourgeois-democratic revolution, then the peasants will be pleased with Maslov's anxiety to preserve the old form of property in land—but then Maslov's municipalisation will be altogether ridiculous. But so long as the revolutionary-democratic struggle of the peasantry continues, so long as there is sense in an "agrarian programme" of Marxists in a bourgeois revolution, it is our duty to support the revolutionary demands of the peasantry, including

the demand for nationalisation of the land. Maslov will not strike that demand of the Russian peasants out of the history of the Russian revolution; and it can safely be said that the rise of the tide, the revival of the struggle of the peasants for the land, when it takes place once again, will clearly reveal all the reactionary nature of "municipalisation".

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THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

The agenda of the forthcoming All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. includes the question: "The present situation and the tasks of the Party". The organisations of our Party have already begun (Moscow and St. Petersburg ahead of all other centres in this respect) systematically to discuss this question, which is undoubtedly of extreme importance.

The present period of lull in the movement for liberation, of rampant reaction, of betrayals and despondency in the camp of the democrats, of crisis and partial break-down in the Social-Democratic organisations, makes it particularly vital to take into account first of all the main lessons of the first campaign of our revolution. We have in mind not tactical lessons in the narrow sense of the word, but in the first place the general lessons of the revolution. And, in keeping with this, our first question will be, what are the objective changes which have taken place in the grouping of classes and the political balance of forces in Russia between 1904 and 1908? The main changes can be reduced, in our view, to the following five: (1) There has been a fundamental shift in the agrarian policy of the autocracy on the peasant question; support and reinforcement of the old village commune have been superseded by a policy of speeded-up police destruction and plundering of that commune. (2) The representative arrangements of the Black-Hundred nobility and big bourgeoisie have made a tremendous step forward: instead of the former local elected committees of the nobles and merchants, instead of sporadic attempts at representing them on an all-Russian scale, there is a single representative body, the State Duma,

in which these classes are guaranteed complete preponderance. Representation of the liberal professions—to say nothing of the peasantry and the proletariat—is reduced to the role of an appendage and a makeweight in this so-called "constitutional" institution, the purpose of which is to strengthen the autocracy. (3) For the first time the classes have achieved a definite cleavage and taken shape in open political struggle during this period: the political parties which now exist openly and secretly (half-secretly, to be more exact, for there are no completely "secret" parties in Russia since the revolution), express with previously unheard-of exactness the interests and viewpoint of classes; which during the three years have matured a hundred times more than during the preceding half-century. The Black-Hundred nobility, the national-"liberal" bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois democrats (the Trudoviks with their small Left wing of S.R.s) and proletarian Social-Democracy have all during this period completed the "foetal" stage of their development, and for years ahead have defined their nature, not in words but by facts and mass actions. (4) What before the revolution was known as liberal and liberal-Narodnik "society", or the spokesman and "enlightened" part of the "nation" at large—the broad mass of well-to-do, noblemen's and intellectuals' "opposition", which seemed to be something integral, and homogeneous, permeating the Zemstvos, the universities, all the "decent" press, etc., etc.—has displayed itself in the revolution as the ideologues and supporters of the bourgeoisie, and has taken up what all can recognise now as a *counter-revolutionary* position in respect of the *mass* struggle of the socialist proletariat and the democratic peasantry. The counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie has come into existence and is growing—and this fact does not cease to be a fact because it is denied by the "progressive" legal press, or because our opportunists, the Mensheviks, keep silent about it and do not understand it. (5) Millions among the population have gained practical *experience*, in the most varied forms, of a genuinely mass and directly revolutionary struggle, including a "general strike", the expulsion of landowners, the burning of their country-houses, and open armed uprising. He who was already a revolutionary or a class-conscious worker

before the revolution cannot fully realise the tremendous significance of this fact, which has radically changed a number of previous conceptions of the course of development of a political crisis, the tempo of this development, the dialectics of history created in practice by the masses. The assessment of this experience *by the masses* is an invisible, painful and slow process, playing a far more important part than many an event on the surface of the country's political life which fascinate infants who are not only of an infantile age in politics buts sometimes a good deal older. The leading role of the proletarian masses all through the revolution and in all the fields of struggle, from demonstrations, through insurrection, to (in chronological order) "parliamentary" activity, has become apparent for all to see during this period, if we look over it as a whole.

Such are the objective changes which have created a gulf between pre-October and present-day Russia. Such are the *results* of three years of the most eventful period in our history, results given, of course, in a summarised form, so to speak, insofar as one is able in a few words to outline what is most important and essential. Now let us examine the conclusions in the sphere of tactics which these results dictate.

The change in the agrarian policy of the autocracy is of exceptionally great importance for a "peasant" country like Russia. This change is not an accident, it is not the fluctuations in ministerial lines of action, not an invention of the bureaucracy. No, it is a profound "shift" towards *agrarian Bonapartism*, towards a liberal (economically understood, i.e., bourgeois) policy in the sphere of peasant land relations. Bonapartism is the manoeuvring on the part of a monarchy which has lost its old patriarchal or feudal, simple and solid, foundation—a monarchy which is obliged to walk the tightrope in order not to fall, make advances in order to govern, bribe in order to gain affections, fraternise with the dregs of society, with plain thieves and swindlers, in order not to rely only on bayonets. Bonapartism is the objectively necessary evolution of the monarchy in any bourgeois country, traced by Marx and Engels through a number of facts in the modern history of Europe. And the agrarian Bonapartism of Stolypin, on

this point quite consciously and steadfastly supported both by the Black-Hundred landlords and the Octobrist bourgeoisie, could not even have seen the light, much less have lasted two years now, if the village commune itself in Russia were not developing in a capitalist direction, if within the commune elements were not steadily shaping which the autocracy could begin its flirtation with, to which it could say: "Enrich yourselves!", "Plunder the commune but support me!" Therefore, any assessment of Stolypin's agrarian policy that did not reckon with the Bonapartist methods of the latter, on the one hand, and its bourgeois (that is, liberal) essence on the other would be decidedly erroneous.

For example, our liberals express their dimly realised understanding that Stolypin's agrarian policy is Bonapartism by their attacks on its police character, on the idiotic interference of officials in peasant affairs, etc., etc. But when the Cadets lament the violent break-up of the "age-old" foundations of our country life, they become *reactionary* moaners. Without a violent, revolutionary break-up of the foundations of the old Russian countryside there can be no development of Russia. The struggle is going on—though very many indeed of its participants do not realise it—*only* about whether it will be the violence of a landlords' monarchy against the peasants, or of a peasant republic against the landlords. In both cases a bourgeois, and no other kind of agrarian revolution in Russia is *inevitable*, but in the first case it will be a slow and agonising one, in the second a swift, broad and free-moving one. The struggle of the workers' party for this second road is expressed and recognised in our agrarian programme—not in the part where the senseless idea of "municipalisation" is put forward, but in the part which speaks about *confiscating all the landed* estates. After the experience of three years it is only, perhaps, among the Mensheviks that people can be still found who do not see the link between the struggle for that confiscation and the struggle for a republic. Stolypin's agrarian policy, if maintained for a very long time, if it reconstructed all landed relations in the countryside for good and all on purely bourgeois lines, might force us to give up the idea of any agrarian programme in bourgeois

society (up to this day *even* the Mensheviks, and even the Cherevanins among the Mensheviks, have not reached the point of renouncing our agrarian programme). But Stolypin's policy can by no means induce us to change our tactics today. Since the "confiscation of all landed estates" stands in the programme, only infants can fail to see the revolutionary tactics (in the direct and narrow sense of the word "revolutionary") which follow from this. And it would be wrong to put the question in this way, that if Stolypin's policy is suffering "bankruptcy", that means that a revival is near—and vice versa. The failure of Bonapartist methods does not imply the failure of the policy of the kulak plundering of the village commune. And, vice versa, Stolypin's "success" in the countryside now and in the next years to come will *necessarily* inflame the struggle within the peasantry rather than quench it, for only by a long, a very long road, can the "goal", i.e., the final and complete consolidation of a *purely* bourgeois peasant economy, be achieved. Stolypin's "success" in the years immediately ahead might lead at best to the emergence of a stratum of consciously counter-revolutionary Octobrist peasants, but it is just such a transformation of the well-to-do minority into a politically conscious and united force that would inevitably give a tremendous impetus to the development of political consciousness and unity of the democratic mass against such a minority. We Social-Democrats could wish for nothing better than the transformation of the spontaneous, sporadic, blind struggle between the "sharks" and the "community" into a conscious and open struggle between Octobrists and Trudoviks.

Let us go on to the question of the Duma. Undoubtedly this Black-Hundred "constitutional" body is just another development of the absolute monarchy towards Bonapartism. All those features of Bonapartism which we noted above are revealed with perfect clarity in the present electoral law, in the faked majority of Black-Hundred representatives plus the Octobrists, in the sham imitation of Europe, in the rush for loans, the expenditure of which is allegedly controlled by "the representatives of the nation", and the complete ignoring of all the debates and decisions of the Duma by the autocracy in its practical policy.

The contradiction between the Black-Hundred autocracy, which virtually reigns supreme, and the window-dressing of a bourgeois "constitution" is revealing itself more and more obviously, as bringing with it the elements of a new revolutionary crisis. The autocracy was to have been covered up, dressed up, decked out with the help of the Duma; in effect, the Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma with every day of its existence reveals, exposes, lays bare the true character of our state power, its clear class foundations and its Bonapartism. One cannot but recall in this connection the remarkably profound observation of Engels (in his letter to Bernstein on August 27, 1883[116]) on the meaning of the *transition* from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. While the liberals in general and the Russian Cadets in particular see in such a transition the workings of their notorious "peaceful" progress and its guarantee, Engels pointed out the historic role of the constitutional monarchy as a form of state which facilitates a *decisive* struggle between the feudalists and the bourgeoisie. Engels wrote: "But just as this struggle [between feudalism and the bourgeoisie] could not be fought out to a decisive conclusion under the old absolute monarchy but only in a constitutional one (England, France 1789-92 and 1815 30), so the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat can only be fought out in a republic." Engels here gives the title of constitutional monarchy, among others, to the France of 1816, when the famous Chambre Introuvable, a reactionary counter-revolutionary chamber, ran amuck in support of the White Terror against the revolution probably no less violently than our Third Duma. What does this mean? Does Engels recognise the reactionary assemblies of representatives of the landlords and capitalists, who support absolutism in its struggle with revolution, as being genuinely constitutional institutions? No. It means that there may arise historical conditions when institutions which falsify a constitution inflame the struggle for a real constitution, and become a stage in the development of new *revolutionary* crises. In the first campaign of our revolution the majority of the people still believed in the possibility of reconciling a genuine constitution with the autocracy; and the Cadets built their whole policy on system-

atically sustaining this belief among the people, while the Trudoviks followed the lead of the Cadets at least half-way in this respect. Now the autocracy by its Third Duma is showing the people in practice with what "constitution" it can "reconcile itself"—and thereby brings nearer a wider and more resolute struggle *against the autocracy*.

It follows from this, incidentally, that it would be quite wrong to replace our old slogan of "down with the autocracy" with the slogan "down with the Third Duma". Under what conditions could a slogan like "down with the Duma" acquire meaning? Let us assume that we are faced with a liberal, reform-seeking, compromising Duma in a period of the sharpest revolutionary crisis, which had developed to the point of direct civil war. It is quite possible that at such a moment our slogan might be "down with the Duma", i.e., down with peaceable negotiations with the tsar, down with the deceptive institution of "peace", let's call for a direct attack. Now let us assume, on the contrary, that we are faced with an arch-reactionary Duma, elected under an obsolete electoral law, and the absence of any acutely revolutionary crisis in the country. In that case the slogan "down with the Duma" might become the slogan of a struggle for electoral reform. We see neither of these contingencies at the present time. The Third Duma is not a compromising but a downright counter-revolutionary body, which does not cover up the autocracy, but exposes it, and which plays no independent part in any respect; no one anywhere expects it to produce progressive reforms; no one imagines that the source of tsarism's real power and strength lies in this assembly of diehards. All are agreed that tsarism does not repose on it, but makes use of it; that tsarism can pursue its entire present policy, both if the calling of such a Duma be postponed (as the calling of a parliament was "postponed" by Turkey in 1878) and if it be replaced by a "Zemsky Sobor"* or something similar. The slogan "down with the Duma" would mean concentrating the main attack on an institution which is neither independent nor decisive, and which does not play the principal part. Such a slogan would be wrong. We must keep the old slogan of "down

* A central representative assembly.—*Ed.*

with the autocracy" and "long live the Constituent Assembly", because it is precisely the autocracy which continues to remain the real authority, the real support and bulwark of reaction. The fall of the autocracy inevitably means the removal (and the revolutionary removal at that) of the Third Duma as an institution of tsarism; but the fall of the Third Duma by itself would mean either a new adventure by that same autocracy or an attempt at reform—a deceptive and only apparent reform—undertaken by the same autocracy.*

To proceed. We have seen that the class nature of the political parties during the three years of the first revolutionary campaign has become defined with remarkable force and salience. Hence it follows that in all discussions af the present balance of political forces, of the tendencies to change in this balance, etc., it is essential to reckon with these concrete data of historical experience, and not with abstract "general arguments". The entire history of the European states bears witness that precisely in the periods of direct revolutionary struggle deep and lasting foundations of class groupings are laid, and divisions into large political parties take place, which thereafter persist even in very long periods of stagnation. Some parties may go underground, give no sign of life, disappear from the front of the political stage: but at the slightest revival the main political forces inevitably will give signs of themselves again, perhaps in an altered form but with the same character and direction of their activity, so long as the objective tasks of the revolution, which has suffered defeat to this or that extent, are not fulfilled. Hence, it would be the greatest short-sightedness, for example, to presume that because there are no Trudovik organisations in the local areas, and the Trudovik group in the Third Duma is distinguished by its particular confusion and impotence, the masses of the democratic peasantry have therefore completely fallen apart, and play no essential role in the process of the rise of a new revolutionary crisis. Such a

* In the next issue we shall examine the other aspect of the question of "Duma" tactics, and discuss the "letter" from an otzovist comrade in *Rabocheye Znamya*, No. 5. (See pp. 286-302 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

view is worthy only of the Mensheviks, who more and more are falling into the most humdrum "parliamentary cretinism" (take, for example, their truly disgraceful renegade attacks against the illegal Party organisation). Marxists should know that the conditions of representation, not only in our Black-Hundred Duma but even in the most ideal bourgeois parliament, will always create an artificial disparity between the real strength of the various classes and its reflection in the representative institution. For example, the liberal-bourgeois intelligentsia always and everywhere seems in parliaments to be a hundred times stronger than it is in reality (in our revolution, too, opportunist Social-Democrats took the Cadets for what they seemed to be), and on the contrary very broad democratic strata of the petty bourgeoisie (in the towns during the bourgeois revolutions of 1848, in the countryside in Russia) often prove to be an extremely important factor in the open struggle of the masses, while being quite insignificant from the point of view of their representation in parliaments.

Our peasantry entered upon the revolution immeasurably less politically conscious than the liberal bourgeois on the one hand and the socialist proletariat on the other. For this reason it drew from the revolution more painful but valuable disillusionments, more bitter but salutory lessons, than any other class. Quite naturally, it is digesting these lessons with particular difficulty and particularly slowly. Quite naturally many "radicals" from among the intelligentsia will lose patience, and give it all up as a bad job—and so will some Social-Democratic philistines, on whose faces a contemptuous grimace appears whenever someone talks about some peasant democracy or other, but whose mouths water at the mere sight of the "enlightened" liberals. But the class-conscious proletariat will not so easily strike out of its memory what it saw and what it took part in during the autumn and winter of 1905. And taking into account the balance of forces in our revolution, we must know that the certain sign of a genuinely widespread rise in the social tide, of a genuinely approaching revolutionary crisis, will inevitably be, in the Russia of today, a movement among the peasantry.

The liberal bourgeoisie in our country has entered upon the path of counter-revolution. Only the brave Cherevanins can deny this—they and the cowardly editors of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, who deny their own comrade-in-idea and -arms. But if this counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeois liberals-were to lead anyone to infer that their opposition and discontent, their conflicts with the Black-Hundred landlords, or any rivalry and struggle of the different sections of the bourgeoisie among themselves, can be of no importance in the process of a new upsurge, this would be a tremendous mistake, and real Menshevism inside out. The experience of the Russian revolution, like the experience of other countries, proves beyond doubt that where the objective conditions of a profound political crisis exist, the tiniest conflicts seemingly remote from the real breeding ground of revolution, can be of the most serious importance as the reason, as the last straw, as a turning-point in public feeling, etc. Let us recall that the Zemstvo campaign and the liberals' petitions of 1904 were the forerunner of such an original and purely proletarian "petition" as that of January the Ninth. When the Bolsheviks were arguing about the Zemstvo campaign, it was not against its use for proletarian demonstrations, but against our Mensheviks wanting to confine these demonstrations to the Zemstvo assembly halls, against the demonstrations before the Zemstvo people being declared the highest form of demonstration, and against plans for the demonstrations being drawn up with a view to preventing the liberals from being frightened off. Another example is the student movements. In a country which is going through an era of bourgeois-democratic revolution involving a progressive accumulation of inflammable material, these movements may easily spark off events infinitely more far-reaching than a petty and local conflict over the management of affairs in a single branch of the state administration. Naturally, the Social-Democrats, who carry on the independent class policy of the proletariat, will never adapt themselves either to the student struggle or to new Zemstvo congresses, or to the conceptions of sections of the bourgeoisie which have fallen out among themselves; they will never ascribe independent importance to this

family quarrel, and so on. But it is precisely the Social-Democratic Party which is the party of the class leading the whole struggle for emancipation; it is unquestionably bound to make use of each and every conflict, to inflame it, to extend its importance, to link with it its own agitation for revolutionary slogans, to bring the news of these conflicts to the broad masses, to induce them to take independent and open action with their own demands, etc. In France after 1793, a counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie came into being and steadily grew; nevertheless the conflicts and the struggle between its different sections continued for another hundred years to serve in one way or another as grounds for new revolutions in which the proletariat invariably played the part of the principal motive force, and which it *carried through* to the point of winning a republic.

Let us now consider the conditions for an offensive by this leading and advanced class in our bourgeois-democratic revolution, the proletariat. When the Moscow comrades were discussing this question, they quite rightly underlined the root importance of the industrial crisis. They collected extremely interesting material about this crisis, took into account the significance of the struggle between Moscow and Lodz, and amended in several respects certain conceptions which had hitherto prevailed. It remains only to be wished that this material should not wither away in the subcommittees of the Moscow Committee or the Moscow Area Committee, but should be worked over and published in the press for the whole Party to discuss. For our part we shall confine ourselves to a few remarks on the *presentation* of the question. The direction in which the crisis is moving is, by the way, a moot question (it is generally admitted that a very severe depression, bordering on a crisis, once more reigns in our industry after a very brief and slight boom). Some say that offensive economic struggles by the workers are as impossible as before, and consequently a revolutionary upswing is impossible in the near future. Others say that the impossibility of economic struggle impels a turn to a political struggle, and therefore a revolutionary upswing is inevitable in the near future.

We think that both arguments have at their foundation the same error, which consists in simplifying a complex issue. Undoubtedly the detailed study of the industrial crisis is of the greatest importance. But it is also beyond doubt that no data about the crisis, even if they were ideally accurate, can in reality decide the question of whether a rise of the revolutionary tide is at hand or not: because such a rise depends on a thousand additional factors which it is impossible to measure beforehand. It is indubitable that without the general groundwork of an agrarian crisis in the country, and depression in industry, profound political crises are impossible. But if the general groundwork exists, that does not permit us to conclude whether the depression will for a time retard the mass struggle of the workers in general, or whether *at a certain stage* of events *the same* depression will not push new masses and fresh forces into the political struggle. To answer such a question there is only one way: to keep a careful finger on the pulse of the country's whole political life, and especially the state of the movement and of the mood of the mass of the proletariat. Recently, for example, a number of reports from Party workers in different parts of Russia, in both industrial and agricultural areas, point to an undoubted revival of interest, an influx of fresh forces, a growing interest in agitation, etc. Comparing with this the beginning of mass unrest among the students, on the one hand, and the attempts to revive the Zemstvo congresses, on the other, we can record a certain turn in events, something that is breaking up the complete stagnation of the last eighteen months. How strong that turn is, whether it means the opening stage for a new epoch of open struggle, etc., facts will show. All that we can do now, and all that we must do in any case, is to intensify our efforts to strengthen the illegal Party organisation and multiply tenfold our agitation among the mass of the proletariat. Only agitation can reveal on a broad scale the real state of mind of the masses, only agitation can make for close co-operation between the Party and the whole working class, only making use for the purposes of political agitation of every strike, of every important event or issue in working-class life, of all conflicts within the ruling classes or between one section

of those classes or another and the autocracy, of every speech by a Social-Democrat in the Duma, of every new expression of the counter-revolutionary policy of the government, etc.—only work like this can once again close the ranks of the revolutionary proletariat, and provide accurate material for judging the speed with which conditions for new and more decisive battles are coming to a head.

To sum up. A survey of the results of the revolution and the present situation show clearly that the objective tasks of the revolution have not been performed. The shift towards Bonapartism in the autocracy's agrarian policy and in its general policy both in the Duma and through the medium of the Duma, only sharpens and widens the contradiction between the Black-Hundred autocracy and the supremacy of the "wild landlord", on the one hand, and the requirements of the economic and social development of the whole country, on the other. The police and kulak drive against the masses in the countryside is making the struggle there more acute and politically conscious, bringing—so to speak—the struggle against the autocracy closer to the everyday and vital problems of every village. The defence of revolutionary-democratic demands in the agrarian question (confiscation of all landed estates) is exceptionally binding a duty for the Social-Democrats at such a moment. The Black-Hundred-Octobrist Duma, which shows clearly in practice with what "constitution" the autocracy can "be reconciled" and which does not resolve a single question even within the narrowest limits of meeting the needs of the country's economic development, is turning the struggle "for a constitution" into a revolutionary struggle *against the autocracy*. The local conflicts of individual sections of the bourgeoisie among themselves and with the government, in these conditions, bring just such a struggle nearer. The impoverishment of the countryside, depression in industry, a general feeling that there is no way out in the present political situation and that the notorious "peaceful constitutional" way is hopeless, all give rise more and more to new elements of a revolutionary crisis. Our business now is not artificially to invent any new slogans (like that of "Down with the Duma" instead of "Down with the autoc-

racy"), but to strengthen the illegal Party organisation (in spite of the reactionary outcry of the Mensheviks who are trying to bury it) and to develop wide revolutionary Social-Democratic agitation, which will bind the Party firmly together with the masses of the proletariat and mobilise those masses.

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HOW PLEKHANOV AND CO. DEFEND REVISIONISM

The editorial comment in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, i.e., by Plekhanov and Co., on our analysis of Comrade Maslov's letter* in *Proletary*, No. 37, has now appeared as a separate supplement to No. 8-9 of *Golos*.

This "Comment", in length about half a column of *Proletary*, merits the attention of Russian Social-Democrats, for it shows how petty factional interests have led Plekhanov and Co. to *defend* theoretical revisionism with the aid of the most unseemly sophistry. Here are the facts.

"We are the most determined and absolutely irreconcilable opponents of that *re-examination* (revision) of Marxism which is being performed under the reactionary influence of the ideologists of the West-European bourgeoisie and whose object is to strike at the roots of the philosophical, sociological, and economic doctrines of Marx and Engels." That is the first sentence of the comment. "Most determined and absolutely irreconcilable opponents"—could it be put more sharply? It would be hard to produce a more grandiloquent formula for the *promises* of Plekhanov and Co.

But ... the trouble is that our "irreconcilable" enemies of revisionism resort to a very meaningful "but" *in relation to Maslov* (and Plekhanov and Co. wrote this Comment precisely in connection with Maslov's article, precisely on the question of Maslov's revisionism).

"But we have never been Marxist sectarians," Plekhanov and Co. declare, "and we realise only too well that one can differ from Marx and Engels on one question or another,

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* See pp. 247-54 of this volume.—*Ed.*

and far from perverting their point of view or repudiating their method, remain true to both." And this example is cited: Cunow, a Social-Democrat, had "partial differences with Engels" on the question of "the origin of the matriarch te", but "only a morbid mind could accuse him of revisionism on these grounds".

"The foregoing holds good also for our attitude to Comrade Maslov's views on Marx's theory of rent. We do not share this view" (*Golos* adds editorially: "Comrade Martynov made the specific reservation in No. 1 of *Golos* that he did not agree with Comrade Maslov's amendment to the theory of absolute rent"), "but we do not regard it as revisionism...."

The reader can now follow the Plekhanov and Co. trend of reasoning. We are "absolutely irreconcilable opponents of revisionism", *but*—"we do not regard it [Maslov's view on the theory of absolute rent] as revisionism". Revisionism strikes at the roots of Marx's doctrine, whereas Maslov differs with Marx on a partial issue—such is the line of defence taken by Plekhanov and Co., and fully amplified by the reference to Cunow.

We ask the unbiased and thinking reader: is this not sophistry? Marx's theory of absolute rent is declared a "partial issue"! Differences on his theory of rent are *equated* with the fact that Cunow had "partial differences" with Engels on the origin of the matriarchate! Plekhanov and Co. apparently consider their Mensheviks little children to be fed on such explanations. One has to have no respect for oneself or for one's reader to play the clown like this in discussing cardinal questions of principle. Plekhanov and Co. themselves begin their explanation with a solemn phrase in which revisionism is described as striking at the *roots* of Marx's and Engels's doctrine. Very well. But do Plekhanov and Co. renounce *that* attitude in the case of Maslov? Yes or no? Or have Plekhanov and Co. penned their comment only to *conceal* their thoughts?

Maslov has declared, in a number of articles and in several editions of his *Agrarian Question*, that (1) Marx's theory of absolute rent is wrong; (2) the appearance of such a theory is due to the "rough" nature of Volume III; (3) "diminishing returns" are a *fact*; (4) if the theory of

absolute rent were correct and the "law of diminishing returns" wrong, the Narodniks in Russia and the revisionists the world over might prove to be right.

These were the four points which were held against Maslov in the *Proletary* article from which the whole polemic began. But just see how Plekhanov and Co. react. First, they very modestly confine themselves to the question of rent, i.e., they maintain complete silence on all the other questions. Is this not defence of revisionism? Are Plekhanov and Co. going to deny that the revision of Marx's theory about the absurdity of both the law and "fact" of diminishing returns "is being performed under the reactionary influence of the ideologists of the West-European bourgeoisie"? Secondly, the theory of absolute rent is equated with a partial question, with differences ("partial") over the origin of the matriarchate!

This, gentlemen, is mental acrobatics! And you are using them to conceal your public defence of revisionism. For *you do not venture* to state openly that recognition of absolute rent and negation of the law (or "fact") of diminishing returns are *not* the "*roots*" of Marx's economic doctrine on the agrarian question. You defend your "own chap" by adjusting Marx to fit Maslov, by declaring that, in *Maslov's case*, the very *roots* of Marx's *theory* are no more than a matter of "partial differences". You thereby confirm what *Proletary* (No. 33*) said about the Menshevik theoretical Famusovs,** who reward their household by agreeing to regard Marx's economic *theory* as a "partial" question and by putting it on a par with the question of the origin of the matriarchate.

Plekhanov and Co. are "irreconcilable enemies of revisionism"—but if you are a Menshevik, don't be afraid of these dread words! You can go to the *Golos* editors, knowing that for Mensheviks irreconcilability is very reconcilable—so much so that they are prepared to equate "uprooting of theory" with "differences over the origin of the matriarchate". Indulgences are being offered cheap, ladies and gentlemen, the sale is on!

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* See pp. 189-90 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See Note 95.—*Ed.*

But to continue. We do not share Maslov's views on rent, say Plekhanov and Co. Martynov has already made a reservation to that effect, they add. The "individual" whom the editors of *Proletary* described as "Maslov's guardian angel" (i.e., Plekhanov), has "often [listen to this!] *polemised in the press* [*Golos* italics] with Comrade Maslov on subjects closely related to our agrarian programme".

That, literally, is what Plekhanov and Co. say in their "Comment"!

Learn from your editors how to write disclaimers, Menshevik comrades. Here you have a classical example. The point at issue is revisionism, and the controversy began about whether it was theoretical irreconcilability or *only* petty factional spite that made Plekhanov refer to several of his opponents, in the Party organ, as "Messrs." But the "disclaimer" says: Plekhanov "often polemised in the press" with Maslov, but *not about the rent theory and not* about Maslov's deviations from Marxian theory.

Is there a suitable parliamentary expression to describe such methods? Plekhanov, who is a lover of theoretical controversies, and is able, on occasion, to turn them into campaigns, has *never*, *not once*, *polemised* with Maslov about what constitutes his revisionism, i.e., his negation of the absolute rent theory, his describing it as a "rough note", his defence of the "fact" of diminishing returns, or about whether or not the Narodniks and revisionists might have proved to be right if Maslov had not refuted Marx. Not once did Plekhanov argue on *these points*: he polemised about something quite different, namely, side issues, which the Menshevik Tartuffes* have now concealed behind a subtly hazy, deliberately misleading and diplomatically confused phrase: "subjects closely related to our agrarian programme"!

Brilliant, what? One cannot help congratulating Plekhanov and Co. on this opening defence of revisionism! One cannot help recalling politicians of the Clemenceau stamp. Clemenceau, "irreconcilable" enemy of reaction, "often polemised" with it, but now, with reaction in the

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* Hypocrites: the character typifying this vice in Molière's comedy of the same name.—*Ed.*

saddle, Clemenceau makes reservations and ... serves it. Plekhanov is an "irreconcilable" enemy of revisionism. Plekhanov has "often polemised" with Maslov (on every imaginable subject *except* Maslov's revisionism). And now Maslov has come out against Marx, repeating his old arguments against the Marxian theory in the pages of *Golos*, but Plekhanov and Co. only make *reservations*!

Buy your indulgences, literary gentlemen, sign up with the Mensheviks! Tomorrow you will be given the opportunity to refute Marx's theory of value as well in the pages of *Golos*—with the reservation in a comment by the editors that they "are not in agreement"....

"Will not *Proletary* endeavour," Plekhanov and Co. ask in the same Comment, "'to substantiate its remark' about the connection between Maslov's reflections on absolute rent and the programme which repudiates nationalisation?" With the greatest of pleasure, dear "irreconcilables". Here is a brief first *substantiation* to start with:

"Is it possible, while failing to understand Marx's theory of absolute rent, to appreciate the role of private property in land as an obstacle to the development of the productive forces of capitalist society?"

Consult Maslov, "irreconcilable" Plekhanov and Co., and answer *that* question, which gives you the substantiation you want!

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TWO LETTERS

We print in the present issue of *Proletary* a letter from an otzovist worker[117] published in No. 5 of *Rabocheye Znamya* with a note from the editors saying that they do not share his views, and regard the letter as an article for discussion; and secondly a letter from Mikhail Tomsky, a St. Petersburg worker, which our paper has just received. We print both letters in full. We are well aware that there may be malicious critics capable of wrenching separate passages or phrases from their context, in one or other of these letters, and of grossly misinterpreting them, drawing conclusions from them remote from the intentions of both authors, who were writing hurriedly, in the most unfavourable conditions of secrecy. But it is not worth taking notice of such critics. Any person who is seriously interested in the state of the working-class movement and the condition of Social-Democracy in Russia at the present time will most probably agree with us that both letters are remarkably characteristic of *two tendencies* among our class-conscious workers. These two tendencies are revealing themselves at every turn in the life of all the Social-Democratic organisations of St. Petersburg and Moscow. And as the third tendency, the tendency of Menshevism, which is frankly, and openly—or secretly and shamefacedly—burying the Party, is scarcely represented at all within the local organisations, we can say that the clash between these two tendencies is the *topic of the day* in our Party. That is why it is necessary to dwell in full detail on the two letters.

Both writers recognise that our Party is going through a crisis, not only of organisation but also of ideology and

policy. This is a fact which it would be stupid to hide. We must clearly realise its reasons and understand the way to combat it.

Let us begin with the St. Petersburg worker. It is clear from his whole letter that there are two reasons for the crisis, in his opinion. On the one hand, the lack of Social-Democratic leaders from among the workers has had this result, that the almost mass desertion of the Party by the intellectuals has meant in many places a break-down of the organisation, incapacity to rally and close its ranks, grown thin through heavy repression and the apathy and fatigue of the masses. On the other hand, in the author's opinion, our propaganda and our agitation greatly exaggerated "the present situation", i.e., they concentrated on questions of revolutionary tactics of the moment and not on the preaching of socialism, not on developing the Social-Democratic consciousness of the proletariat. "Workers became revolutionaries, democrats, anything but socialists"; and when the wave of the general democratic, i.e., bourgeois-democratic movement subsided, they left the ranks of the Social-Democratic Party in very large numbers. The St. Petersburg worker links this view with a sharp criticism of "groundless" "invention" of slogans, and with a demand for more serious propaganda work.

We consider that, in arguing against one extreme, the writer sometimes falls into the other; but by and large his point of view is unquestionably and completely correct. It cannot be said that it was a "mistake" to make "whole campaigns" out of topics of the day. This is exaggerated. This means forgetting *yesterday's* conditions from the point of view of *present-day* conditions, and in fact the writer corrects himself by admitting that "the moment of direct actions by the proletariat is, of course, an exceptional question". Let us take two such actions, as far as possible differing in character and separated in time: the boycott of the Bulygin Duma in the autumn of 1905 and the elections to the Second Duma at the beginning of 1907. Could a proletarian party, at all alive and vital, *not* concentrate its principal attention and main agitation at such a time on the slogans of the day? Could a Social-Democratic Party which was leading the masses of the proletariat at both

these moments *not* concentrate its internal struggle on slogans which would determine the immediate action of the masses? To enter the Bulygin Duma or to thwart it? To go into the elections for the Second Duma in a bloc with the Cadets, or against the Cadets? It is sufficient to put these questions clearly, and to recall the conditions of this not distant past, to shed all doubt about the reply. The fierce struggle for this or that slogan came about, not because of a "mistake" by the Party—no, it was aroused by the objective necessity for a swift and solid decision, in conditions when there was no unity in the Party, and when there were two lines of tactics, two ideological currents in the Party, a petty-bourgeois opportunist one and a proletarian revolutionary one.

Neither should things be represented as though not enough was being done at the time for the propaganda of socialism and for spreading knowledge of Marxism among the masses. That would be untrue. It is precisely at that period, from 1905 to 1907, that a mass of serious theoretical Social-Democratic literature—mainly translated—was disseminated in Russia on a scale which will yet *bear fruit*. We must not be sceptics, we must not impose our own impatience on the masses. *Such* quantities of theoretical literature cast in so short a time among the virgin masses who had been as yet scarcely touched by a socialist pamphlet, are not digested all at once. The Social-Democratic booklet is not lost. *It has been sown*. It is growing. And it will bear its fruits—perhaps not tomorrow or the day after, but a little later; we cannot alter the objective conditions in which a new crisis is growing—but it will bear fruit.

Nevertheless there is a profound truth in the main idea of the writer. The truth consists in this, that in a bourgeois-democratic revolution there is *inevitably* a certain interweaving of proletarian-socialist and petty-bourgeois-democratic (both opportunist-democratic and revolutionary-democratic) elements and tendencies. There *could be no* first campaign of a bourgeois revolution in a capitalistically developing "peasant" country without the objective fusion of certain proletarian sections and certain petty-bourgeois sections making itself felt. And we are now going through a process of necessary sorting-out, demarcation.

new crystallisation of the genuinely proletarian-socialist elements, their *cleansing* from those who had "*attached themselves to the movement*" (what the Germans call *Mitläufer*) only because of an "arresting" slogan on the one hand, or for the sake of a joint struggle with the Cadets for a "Duma with full powers", on the other.

This sorting-out is taking place, in varying degrees, in both wings of the Social-Democrats. One cannot get away from the fact that the ranks have been thinned both among the Mensheviks and among the Bolsheviks! We must not be afraid to admit it. There cannot be the least doubt, of course, that the disintegration and demoralisation which can be seen in the ranks of the Right wing of the Party has been avoided by the Left wing. And this is not an accident. Lack of stability in principles could not but facilitate collapse. Events will ultimately show *in practice* where and how the greatest unity of organisation, proletarian loyalty, Marxist consistency have been preserved. Experience resolves such arguments—not words or promises or pledges. The fact remains that disunity and wavering exist, and this fact calls for an explanation. And there can be no other explanation than the necessity of a *new sorting-out*.

Let us illustrate this thought with small examples—the composition of the "prison population" (as the lawyers call it), i.e., the make-up of the people who are in prison, in exile, on hard labour or in emigration for political reasons. That composition does correctly reflect the reality of yesterday, And can there be any doubt that the composition of the "politicals" in places remote and not so remote, is distinguished at present by a tremendous variety of political views and moods, a hotchpotch and utter confusion? The revolution raised up to political life such deeplying sections of the people, it often brought out on to the surface so many casuals, so many "knights for a day", so many newcomers, that it was quite inevitable that very many of them should lack any kind of integrated outlook on the world. Such an outlook cannot be shaped in the course of a few months of feverish activity—and the average "life expectancy" of most of the revolutionaries during the first period of our revolution probably does not exceed a

few months. Therefore a new sorting-out among the new social layers, the new groups, the new revolutionaries awakened by the revolution is quite inevitable. And this sorting-out is going on. For example, the burial of the Social-Democratic Party, which a number of Mensheviks are attempting, really means that these worthy gentry *are burying themselves* as Social-Democrats. We certainly need not fear this sorting-out. We should welcome it, we should help it. Let there be snivelling from the flabby-minded, who here and there will begin shouting: Again struggle! Again internal friction! Again polemics! Our reply is that without unremitting struggle no genuinely proletarian, revolutionary Social-Democracy has ever built up anywhere. With us in Russia it is building up even in the present difficult circumstances, and *that process will be successful*. The guarantee for this is the whole capitalist development of Russia, the impact of international socialism on us, the revolutionary tendency of the first campaign of 1905-07.

In the interests of this new sorting-out a strengthening of theoretical work is essential. The "present moment" in Russia is precisely one in which the theoretical work of Marxism, its deepening and expansion, are dictated not by the state of mind of this or that individual, not by the enthusiasm of one or another group, and not even by the external police conditions which have condemned many to elimination from "practical work"—but by the whole objective state of affairs in the country. When the masses are digesting a new and exceptionally rich experience of direct revolutionary struggle, the theoretical struggle for a revolutionary outlook, i.e., for revolutionary Marxism, becomes the watchword of the day. Therefore the St. Petersburger is a thousand times right when he emphasises the necessity of deepening socialist propaganda, of working out new questions, of encouraging and developing in every possible way the study groups which are turning out real Social-Democrats, Social-Democratic leaders of the masses, from amongst the workers themselves. Here the role of the local Party *cells*—the very mention of which throws Dan and Co. into epileptic convulsions—is exceptionally great, and the "professional revolutionaries" so hateful to the

opportunist intellectuals are called upon to play a new and gratifying part.

But even here, while defending an absolutely correct idea, Mikhail Tomsky partly falls into the other extreme. Thus, he is wrong when he strikes out of the list of "serious questions" a study of the experience of the revolution during these three years, a study of the practical lessons of the direct struggle of the masses, a summing up of the results of revolutionary-political agitation, etc. Here, most probably, there is simply a gap in the writer's statement of his case, or minor mistakes due to the conditions in which his letter was hastily written. This study, this summing up before the widest possible working-class audience, are much more important than the question of "local courts", "local self-government" and suchlike "reforms" in Stolypin's Russia about which bureaucrats and liberals love to chatter. Such "reforms" under a Black-Hundred Duma and a Black-Hundred autocracy are bound to be a farce.

But Mikhail Tomsky is absolutely right when he strongly objects to the "invention of slogans" in general, and such slogans as "down with the Duma" or "down with the Duma group" in particular. He is a thousand times right when he contrasts this "floundering" with sustained Social-Democratic work of organisation, propaganda and agitation to strengthen the Social-Democratic Party, to reinforce its traditions so hateful to the opportunists, to maintain continuity in its work, to extend and stabilise the influence of *this* Party, the *old* Party (rage, editors of the opportunists' *Golos*!) over the masses of the proletariat.

This brings us to the letter of the Moscow comrade and to criticism of its main point, namely, the far-famed "otzovism". We have repeatedly come out in *Proletary* against otzovism, ever since the time when a minority of the Bolsheviks at the Moscow conference moved their well-known resolution on this question (see *Proletary*, No. 31). We now have before us, also in the name of a minority of the Moscow Bolsheviks, a first systematic attempt to make out a case for otzovism. Let us look at it more closely.

The otzovist comrade starts from the correct premise that the objective tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia have not been achieved, and that "the rev-

olution has not been liquidated". But from this correct premise he draws wrong conclusions. "To what should our Party adapt itself?" he asks. "To years of stagnation, or to a new social upsurge?" And this is where he goes wrong. From the fact that the revolution has not been liquidated there follows the inevitability of a new bourgeois-democratic upsurge—and only that. But it does not follow from this either that this upsurge will *wholly* follow the pattern of the old grouping of elements among bourgeois democracy (a re-grouping might take much longer than we and our opponent might like), or that a "social upsurge" (it were better to say: revolutionary upsurge) is impossible after, say, a *year* of stagnation. We have gone through not less than a year of stagnation, and we are still experiencing it. The otzovist comrade himself admits that "it is difficult and even impossible to say what *will be* that external cause which will *set in motion* ... the masses". Moreover, in inviting the Party "to adapt our tactics and organisation to it [to the revolution, i.e., to a revolutionary upsurge], and not to the political moment of stagnation we are going through", the writer is himself proposing that the organisation should be reconstructed in keeping with the moment of stagnation, with the frantic police repressions, with the impossibility of direct and immediate contacts between our committees and the masses of workers. There is no doubt that in conditions of an upsurge the author would not put forward such a plan of organisation or make it a key issue. Consequently, he is *in fact* refuting his own statement of the question, he is, by his *practice*, making an amendment to his *theory*. This happened because he stated his theoretical premise wrongly. From the inevitability of a new upsurge there follows the necessity of maintaining both our old programme and the old revolutionary watchwords of all our mass work, the necessity of systematically preparing the Party and the masses for new revolutionary battles. But it does not follow from this whether the upsurge has or has not already begun, and whether we have to "adapt ourselves" to its opening stage, or to its highest point. In 1897, in 1901, and at the beginning of 1905, it was absolutely true that a new revolutionary upsurge was inevitable (after the weak upsurges in the early sixties and

late seventies); but at these three moments the revolutionary Social-Democrats knew how to adapt their tactics to the varying conditions of mounting crisis. In 1897 we rejected the "plan" of a general strike, as a phrase—and we were right. In 1901 we did not make the slogan of insurrection the order of the day. After January 9, 1905, both this slogan and a mass strike were correctly made the order of the day by the revolutionary Social-Democrats. We do not wish to imply by any means that a new upsurge is bound (or even "likely") to be as slow. On the contrary, all the facts and all the experience of revolutions in Europe oblige us to expect a tempo incomparably more rapid than in the years 1897-1905. The fact remains that at different *moments* of the upsurge the revolutionary Social-Democrats *always* put forward different slogans. The mistake of the otzovist comrade is that he forgets this experience of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

Proceeding to our Duma group, the otzovist comrade starts out with the premise: "The natural fulfilment of the Party, its diplomatic representative, so to speak, is the Duma group." This is wrong. The author exaggerates the significance and the role of the parliamentary group. The author is extolling that role beyond measure, in Menshevik fashion: there must be something in what people say about extremes meeting! From the view that the parliamentary group is the "fulfilment" of the Party the Mensheviks arrive at the conclusion that it is necessary to adapt the Party to the group. The otzovists arrive at the conclusion that such a poor "fulfilment" of the Party is disastrous to the Party. In both cases the premise is false. Nowhere under any conditions, even in the most "ideal" bourgeois-democratic republic, would revolutionary Social-Democracy agree to recognise its parliamentary group either as the "natural fulfilment" of the Party or as *its* "diplomatic representative". Such a view is deeply fallacious. We send deputies into bourgeois and bourgeois-Black-Hundred representative institutions not for diplomacy, but for a special type of subsidiary Party work, for agitation and propaganda from a particular rostrum. Even when there is an "ideal" democratic franchise, the parliamentary group of a workers' party will always bear certain traces of the influ-

ence of the general bourgeois circumstances in which the elections take place: for example, it will always be more "intellectual" than the Party as a whole, and therefore we shall never recognise the group to be the "fulfilment" of the Party. The parliamentary group is not a general staff (if I may be allowed to use a "military" simile side by side with the "diplomatic" one used by the writer), but rather a unit of trumpetors in one case, or a reconnaissance unit in another, or an organisation of some other auxiliary "arm".

The otzovist comrade has transformed the parliamentary group from a *subsidiary Party organisation* into the "fulfilment" of the Party in order, by *exaggerating* the significance of the group, to attribute an entirely wrong character to the activity of the contingent which we have sent into the bourgeois-Black-Hundred Duma.

But possibly the writer would not insist on this "fulfilment". Elsewhere in his article he says quite rightly: "One of the chief motives which induced the Party to take part in the elections was its hope of using the Duma rostrum for propaganda and agitation." That is true, and the writer's objection to this true proposition displays his error most forcibly. He writes: "Events, however, showed that agitation in the Third Duma was of no value at all, first because of the make-up of the group itself, and secondly because the masses are completely indifferent to all that goes on within the walls of the Taurida Palace."

We shall begin our examination of this proposition, which is so full of errors, from the end. Agitation is of no value at all *because* the masses are completely indifferent to all that goes on in the Duma. What is this? What does it mean? It would appear, from this monstrous logic, that we should have to "recall" not the parliamentary group but the "masses" for their "indifference"! For, as we all know, what is carried on in the Duma is the policy of the autocracy, the policy of support for tsarism by the Black-Hundred landlord and the Octobrist big capitalist, the policy of servility to tsarism on the part of the liberal Cadet gasbag. To be indifferent "to all that goes on within the walls of the Taurida Palace" means to be indifferent to the autocracy, to the whole internal and external policy of the autocracy! The writer has once again produced an argument

in the spirit of Menshevism inside out. "If the masses are indifferent, then the Social-Democrats should be indifferent too." But we are a party *leading* the masses to *socialism*, and not at all one which follows every change in mood or depression in the spirits of the masses. All Social-Democratic parties have had to cope at times with the apathy of the masses, or their infatuation with some error, some fashion (chauvinism, anti-Semitism, anarchism, Boulangism,[118] etc.), but never do consistently revolutionary Social-Democrats yield to every changing mood of the masses. One can and must criticise the bad policy of Social-Democrats in the Third Duma, when they carry on a bad policy there; but to say that the agitation is of no value *because* of the complete indifference of the masses, means to talk in a non-Social-Democratic way.

Or maybe "the complete indifference of the masses" does not mean indifference to the policy of tsarism in general? In other words, the masses are indifferent to all that is going on within the walls of the Duma, but are *not indifferent*, shall we say, to discussion of the question of street demonstrations, new strikes, insurrection, the inner life of revolutionary parties in general and the Social-Democratic Party in particular? And that is just the trouble with the writer: this, evidently, is just what he thinks, but is *obliged* not to put this obvious nonsense in so many words! If he really could say and prove that the masses at the present moment are not in the least indifferent to politics in general, but on the contrary have a much more lively interest in more active forms of politics, the question naturally would present itself otherwise. If instead of a year of political lull, of decline and disintegration in all Social-Democratic and all workers' organisations, we had had a year of obvious interest of the masses in directly revolutionary forms of struggle, we should be the first to admit that we were wrong. Only the "parliamentary cretins" of Menshevism, who hypocritically close their eyes to the experience of the work of Marx, Lassalle, and Liebknecht in periods of revolution, can stand always and everywhere for participation in any representative institution, without taking into account the conditions of the revolutionary moment. The question of taking part in the Third Duma

or boycotting it, like every other political question, must be considered by Marxists *concretely* and not abstractly, taking into account the *entire* revolutionary situation as a whole, and not the pitiably barren argument that, "if representation exists then one must be represented". A lively interest of the masses in politics would mean that objective conditions existed for a growing crisis, that is, it would mean that a certain upsurge was already visible and when that upsurge gained strength the feeling among the masses would inevitably find expression in *mass action*.

On the latter question the otzovist comrade makes the following admission: "every change in its [the parliamentary group's] activity is closely linked with a change in the regime, which we are not at present strong enough to influence".... Why does the otzovist comrade consider that we are not only powerless at present to change the regime but even to *influence* it? Evidently because, as a Social-Democrat, he has in mind solely action by the masses of the proletariat, and considers such action *at present* impossible and any talk about it useless. But look how, in doing so, he tries to shift the blame, i.e., turns an argument which speaks against otzovism against us:

"*Break through* the police barriers which separate the deputies from the masses," writes the otzovist comrade, "make the parliamentary group come out more sharply and strikingly, in a word, organically fuse its work with the life of the proletariat, and then the workers perhaps will see some positive value in it. But as every change in its activity is closely linked with a change in the regime, which we are not at present strong enough to influence, all dreams of expanding and deepening the work of the group must be abandoned!"

If the expansion and deepening of the work of the Duma group depends on "breaking through the police barriers", why does the conclusion run that "dreams of improving the group must be abandoned", and not that dreams of breaking through police barriers must be abandoned? The writer is obviously illogical, and his argument should be amended in the following way: there must be unremitting work to improve all Party activity and all links of the Party with the masses, and the result of this will inevitably be both

that police barriers in general will be broken through, and in particular Party co-operation with the Duma group, Party influence on the group will become stronger. It is as though the writer were demanding that *we* anti-otzovists should "break through police barriers", and then perhaps he would agree to give up his otzovism. But is it not clear that thereby he is turning the real interconnection and interdependence of political phenomena upside down? Perhaps (we would reply) you might be right, Comrade Otzovist, if the mass could "at present" not only "influence the regime" (every successful political demonstration will influence the regime) but also break through the barriers, i.e., if the mass could *now* break through the "barriers" of the Third Duma, it might be useless, perhaps, for the revolutionary Social-Democrats to send their group into this Duma. Perhaps. But you yourself say that this is not the case: you yourself agree that, in present circumstances, hard and serious preparatory work is still needed to turn that possibility into reality.

"The composition of the group," you say. If recall were proposed with a view to *changing* the composition of the group, this argument might be worth while considering in the light of whether the composition would be improved by new elections upon the resignation of the present group. But the writer has nothing like this in mind. He wants not only to recall the Duma group, but to abolish any representation of Social-Democracy in the Third Duma, declaring participation in the latter to be a mistake. From this point of view to advance "the composition of the group" as a justification for otzovism is the most unforgivable timidity and lack of faith for a Social-Democrat. Our Party succeeded in making the Black Hundreds choose our Party candidates, the Social-Democrats, from among the worker-electors.[119] Are we then to declare that it is hopeless for these Party workmen to be able to expound their socialism, simply and plainly, from the Duma rostrum? Are we to haul down the flag after a few months of struggle against bourgeois "well-informed persons"[120] (see the excellent description of the harm they do, in the letter about the Duma group published in this issue)? Must we declare that our Party is incapable, in a period of temporary

lull and stagnation, of putting forward worker-Social-Democrats who are able to publicly expound their socialism? That is not politics but nervousness. Of course our Duma group itself is mostly to blame for this, because it is precisely by its serious mistakes, and by those mistakes alone, that it drives those who are resentful of it into otzovism. But we will not allow this justified resentment to lead us into a wrong policy. No. We must and shall work hard and persistently to bring the Party and the Duma group closer together, to improve the group itself. We shall not forget that in the experience of international Social-Democracy there were examples of much more prolonged and much more acute struggle between the group and the Party than we have had during the Third Duma. Remember the Germans. Under the Anti-Socialist Law matters went so far that the parliamentary group made a number of the most deplorable anti-Party opportunist mistakes (voting for the subsidy to the shipping company, etc.). The Party had its weekly central organ abroad, and regularly imported it into Germany. The organisation of the German Social-Democrats at that time, in spite of furious police persecution, in spite of the fact that the situation was less revolutionary, for a number of objective reasons, than in present-day Russia, was incomparably broader and stronger than the present organisation of our Party. And the German Social-Democratic Party fought a long war against its parliamentary group, and won it. The ridiculous supporters of the "youth", who spent their time on hysterics instead of on improving the parliamentary group, came, as we all know, to a very bad end. And the victory of the Party expressed itself in the subordination of the parliamentary group.

With us in Russia the Party's struggle with the Duma group to correct the latter's errors is only just beginning. We have not yet had a single Party conference telling the group firmly and clearly that it must correct its tactics in such-and-such definitely specified respects. We have not as yet a central organ appearing regularly, following every step of the group on behalf of the whole Party and giving it direction. Our local organisations have done still very, very little in that field of work—agitation among

the masses on the subject of every speech of a Social-Democrat in the Duma, explaining every mistake in this or that speech. Yet we are being asked to give it all up, to declare the struggle hopeless, to renounce use of the Duma rostrum at times like the present of 1908. Once again, that is not politics but bad nerves.

No striking acts, you say. About these "striking acts" one must distinguish two things: first, the poor state of information in the Party and, secondly, a most serious mistake of principle in the way the very question of striking acts is put.

On the first question it should be said that so far all who wanted to criticise the group in a business-like way have pointed out a number of unquestionably serious mistakes (the declaration; the voting of millions to Schwartz; the consultation with the Popular Democrats; the recognition of religion as a private matter for the *Party*; the lack of any statement on the interpellation of the government on October 15, 1908; the lack of any clear criticism of the Cadets, etc.). To hush up these mistakes as the Mensheviks do—they find everything for the best, with the sole exception of Chilikin's speech—is simply disgusting. We should not hush up these mistakes but thrash them out publicly, in our local and non-local press, at every meeting, in agitational leaflets spread among the masses after every speech. We have done very little as yet in the way of practical criticism of the group, and acquainting the proletarian masses with such criticism. We must, all of us everywhere, set to work in this respect. And when we do, we shall see that there are a number of speeches by the group, and particularly formulas for calling next business, drawn up on the suggestions of representatives of the Central Committee and in agreement with these representatives, which contain a *correct* exposition of the programme of the R.S.D.L.P., which are printed in the Reports of the Duma proceedings and in the supplement to *Rossiya*[121]—and of which not one-hundredth has been used as yet by us in our mass agitation. Needless to say, one should criticise the group, it is dishonest to hush up its mistakes. But all of us have also to strengthen our organisations in the local areas, and develop the agitation to make use of every act by the

Duma group. Only the combination of the two forms of work is activity really worthy of consistent revolutionary Social-Democrats, and only this combination will help us to overcome "the moment of stagnation" and hasten the arrival of a new upsurge.

To proceed. In emphasising "the absence of striking acts", the writer says that "the impression has been created on whom? on some *Mitläufers* who don't understand the ABC of Marxism?] that the Social-Democrats have accepted the existing situation, and are thinking of peaceable cultural work. The existence of the group has become a demonstration, as it were, that the revolution has been buried—if not in words then ... in practice. Wrong though that opinion may be, we can refute it not by arguments but by facts." And the only "fact" which the writer proposed as a means of "reconstructing" all the tactics of "emphasising" the Social-Democratic attitude to the Duma in the eyes of the masses, is recall of the group! It would appear that to recall the group from the Duma is regarded as a "fact" which refutes the "burial of the revolution", and as a "striking act" *which emphasises* the new tactics!

Our reply is that the writer misunderstands the general significance of "striking acts" and "striking" slogans. When we Bolsheviks were carrying on a boycott of the Bulygin Duma in 1905, the slogan was right not because it was "striking" but because it *accurately* expressed the *objective* situation: the existence of an upsurge, which tsarism was trying to divert by promising a consultative Duma. When in the summer of 1906 we released the slogan of "an executive committee of the Left to support insurrection and no support to the demand of a Cadet Ministry", this slogan was right not because it was "striking", but because it *accurately* expressed the *objective* situation; events proved that the Cadets were hindering the struggle, that their secret negotiations with Trepov in June 1906 expressed the manoeuvres of the government, that the *real* fight took place, and was bound to take place, on a different field, after the Duma had been dissolved, namely, on the field of armed struggle (Sveaborg and Kronstadt, as the culmination of the soldiers' and peasants' mutinies). When in 1907 we were fighting for the slogan of no bloc with the Cadets, but a bloc against

the Cadets, this slogan was correct not because it was "striking", but because it accurately expressed the *objective* conditions of the moment. The elections in St. Petersburg, and the sum total of voting and debate) in the Second Duma, proved that the "Black-Hundred menace" was a fiction, and that *in reality* the struggle was against the Cadets and the reactionaries together, not together with the Cadets against the reactionaries.

Undoubtedly some people joined us during the revolution not because they understood the *Marxist* criterion of the correctness of Social-Democratic slogans and tactics, but only because they were "striking". That today, when the wave has ebbed, there remain and will remain only real Marxists, does not frighten us but rejoices us. And we invite the otzovist comrade to think carefully over his argument that the burial of the revolution must be disproved not by words but by facts—and *therefore* let us recall the Duma group! His argument is absolutely wrong. To recall the group by way of *emphasising* the fact that the revolution has not been buried, means the *burial* of those "revolutionaries" who are capable of applying such a policy. For that kind of "revolutionariness" expresses confusion and impotence in that painful, difficult and slow work which is dictated "at present" by objective conditions, and which cannot be simply dismissed or passed over in silence.

In conclusion we would point out that the otzovist comrade himself, at the end of his letter, proposes a *five-point* plan of immediate work which correctly expresses the tasks of the moment and *refutes* his own wrong tactics. We say again: the *practice* of the otzovist comrade is better than his theory. He is unquestionably right when he says that a strong illegal organisation is necessary. He will not insist, probably, on the utterly impracticable "appointment" of local Committee-men by the Central Committee. We should not forget that the professional revolutionary from among the Social-Democratic workers is coming to take the place or rather coming to the aid of the professional revolutionary from among the intellectuals (furious though this makes the Mensheviks, it is a fact); consequently the new illegal organisation will not entirely resemble, and must not *entirely* resemble, the old one. We think likewise

that the expression "to break the Party cells away from each other" in the last sentence of the first point is an awkward phrase which has slipped in by accident, and which it would be quite wrong to find fault with. After all, a Social-Democratic illegal organisation will not break away but bring together the local Party cells which at present are separated from each other. The otzovist comrade is quite right when he emphasises the special importance of socialist propaganda and the opinion poll method of agitation. "Everyday links between the masses and the Party", "drawing the masses into discussion of our agitation slogans"—these are the real *topics of the day*. Recognition of *such* topical questions shows better than any argument, and in spite of all "invented" slogans (as M. Tomsky aptly puts it) that the course of events confronts all of us, both anti-otzovists and otzovists, with *one* essential practical task, one "slogan" of revolutionary Social-Democracy. This is the ideological strengthening of socialism, the organisational strengthening of the illegal workers' party with leaders from among the workers themselves, the development of many-sided Social-Democratic agitation among the masses. *This* work, when tackled more and more energetically, will unite us all. It will pull together, discipline, correct our Duma group better than dozens of mere ultimatums. It will vitalise our work. It will resurrect the atmosphere of vigorous revolutionary activity. It will teach us to gauge exactly the rise of the tide and to determine its symptoms. It will scatter like the dust all the dead, thought-up, "invented" slogans of otzovism!

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THE AGRARIAN DEBATES IN THE THIRD DUMA

Nearly a month of agrarian debates in the Third Duma has provided exceptionally valuable material for the study of the present state of the agrarian question, the lessons of the revolution and the tasks of the proletariat. We shall try and draw the main conclusions from this material. The speakers fall of themselves into four groups—the Rights, the Cadets, the peasants and the Social-Democrats. The differences between the "Right" in the narrow sense of the word and the Octobrists completely fade out. The peasants unquestionably act as a single political tendency on the agrarian question, the difference between the Right-wing peasants and the Trudoviks being only a distinction of shadings within a single tendency. Let us analyse the position which each of these groups took up. (The figures in brackets refer to the pages of the verbatim reports in the supplement to *Rossiya*.)

As could have been expected of Black-Hundred "parliamentarians", the Rights and the Octobrists tried to cover up the substance of their agrarian policy with the litter of juridical casuistry and archive rubbish, holding forth on the relations between the law of November 9, 1906, and Article 12 of the General Statute on the Peasantry (granting the peasants, after redemption, the right to demand a separate piece of land as their private property), then on Article 165 of the Statute of Land Purchase, etc. Posing as a "liberal", Shidlovsky tried to prove that the legislation of Count D. Tolstoy on inalienability of allotments, etc., contradicted the "spirit" of 1861, whereas the law of November 9, 1906, corresponded to that spirit. All this

was sheer humbug, calculated to throw dust into the eyes of the peasantry and obscure the real issue. To a considerable extent the Cadets, as we shall see later, rose to the bait of the Black Hundreds; but for us socialists it is sufficient to point out in a few words what a thick layer of bureaucratic dust must be brushed off the speeches of the Shidlovskys, the Lykoshins and other lackeys of the Black-Hundred tsarist gang to see the real content of their agrarian policy. Mr. Lvov the First, who, we believe, calls himself a Peaceful Renovator, but who in fact is a real Black Hundreder with the manners and graces of a Mr. Struve, expressed this content more clearly than others. "Among the peasantry," said this servant of the landlords, "two elements have emerged: the helpless individual and the lawless mob (*applause from the Right and the Centre*).... Such a condition of the masses is a menace to the lawful [meaning, landlords'] state (*applause from the Right and the Centre*).... The land must belong to all who toil, the land like the air and water; we have come here to get land and freedom." This was the dominating voice. And this voice, snatched directly from those superstitions and prejudices which are rooted in the peasant mass, this voice pointed out to us that superstitious conception of authority which can take from some and give to others.... "Let us recall what was said in this building [continued Mr. Lvov remembering previous Dumas]. It is painful for me to recall this, but I will say, I cannot but say, what was discussed in the agrarian commission. Yes, when even the question of leaving at least vegetable allotments or orchards inviolate met with the strongest opposition, met the most violent resistance, and was carried only by the smallest majority; when it was suggested that all land transactions should be stopped, not only mortgages in the Bank of the Nobility, not only sales to the Peasant Bank, but buying and selling land itself, even gifts and inheritance of land—then obviously one trembled, gentlemen, trembled not for the interests of the landlord, but trembled for the condition and the destiny of the state (*applause of the Centre and the Right. Exclamation*: "*Bravo!*"). On such a foundation it is impossible to build a capitalist, a modern state" (293).

The landlord state "trembled" for its existence, "trembled" at the "voice" (and movement) of the peasant masses. These gentlemen cannot even imagine any capitalism that is not based on the preservation of landlordism, i.e., feudalist landownership. The "educated" Lvovs have not even heard that capitalism develops most widely, freely and rapidly when all private property in land is completely abolished!

For agitation among the masses, the study of extracts from the speeches of Shidlovsky, Bobrinsky, Lvov, Golitsyn, Kapustin and Co. is absolutely necessary. Up till now we have seen the autocracy almost exclusively when it was giving orders, and sometimes, rarely, publishing statements in the spirit of Ugryum-Burcheyev.[122] Now we have the open defence of the landlord monarchy and the Black-Hundred "constitution" by the organised representatives of the ruling classes, and this defence provides very valuable material for the awakening of those sections of the people who are politically unconscious or indifferent. Let us briefly note two particularly important circumstances. In the first place, when setting out their political programme, the Right constantly bring forward to their audience the living enemy against whom they are fighting. This enemy is the revolution. "Fear" of the revolution, which was so clearly expressed by the stupid Lvov, is no less clearly manifest in *all* who at every step recall the recent past with hatred, anger, and grinding of teeth. This direct posing of *all* questions on the basis of *counter-revolution*, this subordination of *all* arguments to one principal and root argument, the struggle against revolution, contains within itself a profound truth. And it makes the speeches of the Right incomparably more valuable material, both for the scientific analysis of the present situation and for purposes of agitation, than the speeches of the half-hearted and cowardly liberals. The unrestrained fury with which the Right attack the revolution, the end of 1905, the risings, the first two Dumas, shows better than any long speeches that the protectors of the autocracy see before them a *living* enemy, that they do not consider the struggle with the revolution ended, that the revival of the revolution looms before them every minute as a very real and immediate

threat. You don't fight a dead enemy in this way. You don't hate a dead enemy like this. The simple-minded Mr. Balakleyev naïvely expressed this common spirit of all the speeches of the Right. Saying that of course the ukase of November 9 could not he rejected, since it expressed the royal will, he declared at the same time: "Gentlemen of the Imperial Duma! We are living at a time of revolution which, in my profound conviction, has far from ended yet" (364). Mr. Balakleyev fears the "revolutionary origin" of the law of November 9; he is afraid it may inflame a new struggle. "We are going through a painful crisis," he said, "and how it will end no one knows. Imagination draws the most sombre pictures, but our duty is not to support sedition and discord among the people."

The second, very important, circumstance refers to the economic, and particularly the agrarian, programme of the Right. This is their defence of the private property in land of the *peasants*, a defence which is the keynote of all their speeches, including that of the arch-priest Mitrofanushka (Bishop Mitrofan), who spoke immediately after the reporter, evidently seeking to frighten the democratic but downtrodden village priests. Comically trying to overcome in himself the habit of playing the religious simpleton and of using the language of the seminary ("the village commune is a primordial phenomenon"), he mouthed such phrases as "Life develops in the direction of a greater and greater individuality of personality"; "We must recognise as useful the new pattern of life among our peasants on the model of the West-European farmers" (69).

It may be asked, why do the class of landlords and the class of capitalists so energetically defend, both in the Second and in the Third Dumas, the private property in land of the *peasants*? Only because such is the "latest government instruction"? Of course not. This instruction itself has been suggested and prompted by the Council of the United Nobility.[123] The landlords and capitalists know perfectly well what enemy they have to fight, they realise only too well that the *revolution has bound up* the victory of the landlords' interests with the victory of private property in land in general; the victory of peasant interests with the abolition of private property in land in

general, both landlords' and peasants' property. The combination of private property in the allotment lands with social property in the expropriated landlords' estates is a poor invention of the Cadets and the Mensheviks. *In reality* the struggle is whether the landlords will be the builder of the new Russia (this is impossible, except on the basis of private property in land of all kinds), or whether it will be the peasant masses (this is impossible in a semi-feudal country without destroying private property *both in* landlords' and *in* allotment lands).

Let us go on to the Cadets. Their speeches are distinguished from those of the Right and those of the Left by a striving to reconcile the irreconcilable, to straddle two stools. Only in that part of Mr. Milyukov's speech in which he spoke as a *historian*, and not as a *Cadet*, have we a splendid selection of facts on the history of the Council of the United Nobility—a summary which does credit to any *democrat*. But on the whole Shingaryov, Berezovsky, Milyukov, Bobyansky and Rodichev swallowed the bait of the Black-Hundred Mr. Shidlovsky, and with enormous zeal stuffed the heads of their audience with juridical casuistry, poured out phrases about "justice" according to Roman law ("for greater show" Rodichev, even inserted the Latin word *aequitas*! "*We*" did learn something in the university after all!), sank to contemptible boot-licking (Mr. Sningaryov certified his "respect" for Stolypin's lackey Lykoshin, and tried to prove that compulsory alienation of land was practised in countries where "the institution of private property is most sacredly observed"). All the Cadet speeches objecting to the law of November 9 struck a note of "caution". We Bolsheviks were accused of denigrating the Cadets by calling them liberal landlords. As a matter of fact, they are worse. They are liberal *placemen*. One cannot imagine a greater corruption of the *democratic* conscience of the masses than this pronouncing in the Duma, by the party of so-called "democrats", of speeches which *blunt the edge* of the struggle, which preach the "caution" of bureaucrats, which basely praise that plundering and enslavement of the peasants by the feudalist landlords known as "the Great Reform" of 1861!

To attack Stolypin for the "indiscreetness" of his agrarian

policy means to become a prostitute, to offer oneself for the post of *such* instruments of this policy as would be able to do *the very same job* "discreetly", i.e., carry out that same landlords' policy under the false flag of "constitutional democracy", carry it out not by force alone but also by deceiving the peasants. Here is one of the numerous Cadet statements which reveal precisely this sense of what they were saying. Mr. Berezovsky, whose speech was highly approved by the Cadet leader Mr. Milyukov (he called it "excellent"), declared:

"I am profoundly convinced that this Bill [the Cadet Land Bill] is far more advantageous for the landowners as well [not only for the peasants]: and I say this, gentlemen, knowing agriculture, engaged in it all my life and owning land myself. For cultured farming the Bill of the party of people's freedom would undoubtedly be more useful than the present system. One should not seize on the bare fact of compulsory alienation, get bitter about it, and call it an act of violence; one should look at what is proposed in our Bill, assess what it amounts to, and consider how this compulsory alienation is to be carried out [golden words, Mr. Berezovsky. Can you have become a Bolshevik?]. Take the Bill of the 42 members of the First Duma; it contained only [that's just it!] recognition that it was necessary in the first instance to subject to compulsory alienation those lands which were not being exploited by the owners themselves. Then the party of people's freedom supported the formation of local committees, which at a given time were to ascertain what lands should be subject to compulsory alienation, what should not be subject to it, and how much land the peasants needed to be satisfied. These committees were composed in such a way that half the members should be peasants and half non-peasants. [Speak out, Mr. Berezovsky, don't be ashamed! The truth can't be hidden anyhow: thanks to the obligatory appointment of a "neutral" chairman by the landlords' government, the landlords would always have a safe majority in the committees over the peasants—see Kutler's draft in Volume II of the Cadet *Agrarian Question*.] In view of this, the general concrete work in the localities, would of course have made it clear how much land was available for compulsory

alienation, how much land the peasants needed and, finally, the peasants themselves would see how far their just demands could be satisfied. Then all this would go through the Duma and the Council of State [just so!] and after being dealt with by them [i.e., after a second whittling-down of the "reform" by the new landlord-bureaucrat majority!] would pass up for the royal sanction [recall the consistent reduction of the size of allotments by similar high authorities in 1861]. The result of this systematic work would undoubtedly have been the genuine satisfaction of the real needs of the population and, linked with this, pacification and preservation of cultured estates, which the party of people's freedom never wished to destroy, except in case of extreme necessity" (143).

Mr. Berezovsky in October 1908 admitted *everything* the Bolsheviks had said in the summer of 1906 about the Cadets' Land Bill! In the First Duma the Cadets were publicly advertising the democratic exterior of their reform, while proving in private conversations with Trepov and his hangers-on its favourable character for the landlords. In the Third Duma the Cadets publicly advertise the landlord character of their reform, while demonstrating its democratic character in conversations held secretly from the police with those few simpletons who can still listen to grandmother's tales. The two-faced Janus turns his "faces" now one way, now another, according to the direction from which the wind blows. The "democrats" fall so low that they try to prove to the Black-Hundred diehards how inoffensive their actions and programmes are at a time of revolution!

Compare with this the speeches of the peasants. Take a typical Right-wing peasant, Storchak. He begins his speech by repeating in full the words of Nicholas II about "the sacred rights of property", the impermissibility of their "infringement", etc. He continues: "May God grant the Emperor health. He spoke well for the whole people" (295). And he finishes: "But if His Majesty said that there should be justice and order, then, of course, if I am sitting on 3 dessiatines of land, and next to me there are 30,000 dessiatines, that is not order and justice" (296)! Compare this monarchist with the monarchist Berezovsky. One is

an ignorant peasant, the other an educated almost-European. The first is as innocent as a babe unborn and amazingly ignorant politically. The link between the monarchy and "order", i.e., the disorder and injustice which protect the owners of 30,000 dessiatines, is not clear to him. The second is a skilled politician who knows all the ins and outs to Witte, Trepov, Stolypin and Co., and who has studied the niceties of European constitutions. The first is one of those millions who toil and moil all their life on 3 dessiatines, and whom economic realities *drive* into mass revolutionary struggle against the holders of 30,000 dessiatines. The second is one of the tens of thousands or at most one hundred thousand landlords who wants "peacefully" to keep his "cultured estate" by throwing a sop to the peasant. Is it not clear that the first *can* make a bourgeois revolution in Russia, *abolish* landlordism and set up a peasant republic (however much this word may frighten him now)? Is it not clear that the second *cannot but* hinder the struggle of the masses without which the victory of the revolution is impossible?

Those people who still cannot for the life of them understand what "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" means, should give some thought to this!

Storchak's agrarian programme is that same Land Bill of the 42 peasant deputies in the Third Duma about which we wrote in *Proletary*,* No. 22. Outwardly very modest, this Bill is *more Left* than the Cadet Bill, as the Cadets themselves admit. By demanding discussion of the reform under which the peasantry is to have land allotted to it by local committees elected by a democratic vote, this Bill *in effect* is a revolutionary document—since the discussion of land reform in the local areas by genuinely democratic elected institutions is absolutely incompatible with the maintenance in present-day Russia of the rule of the tsar and of landlordism. And the fact that, in a Black-Hundred Duma elected on the basis of an electoral law manipulated in favour of the landlords on the instructions of the united nobility, and at a time when the most violent

* See present, edition, Vol. 13, pp. 458-59.—*Ed.*

reaction and unbridled White Terror are rampant, *42 peasants* put their signatures to such a Bill in such a Duma demonstrates the revolutionary state of mind of the peasant mass in Russia of today better than any argument. Let the opportunists strive to prove the necessity of an alliance with the Cadets, the necessity of the proletariat coming closer together with the bourgeoisie in the bourgeois revolution: class-conscious workers will only be strengthened in their conviction, after reading the debates in the Third Duma, that a victorious bourgeois revolution in Russia is impossible without a joint onset by the worker and peasant masses, in spite of the waverings and betrayals of the bourgeoisie.

If Storchak, and the deputies who at bottom share his views—the priest Titov, Andreichuk, Popov IV and Nikityuk—express the revolutionary temper of the peasant mass unconsciously, spontaneously, afraid themselves not only to speak out, but even to think out what their words and proposals imply, the Trudoviks in the Third Duma express the spirit of the peasants' mass struggle outspokenly. Most valuable in this respect are the speeches of the Trudovik peasants, who state their views forthrightly, conveying the moods and aspirations of the masses with amazing precision and liveliness, mixing up programmes (some speak of their sympathy with the Bill of the 42 peasants, others of sympathy with the Cadets), but all the more strongly expressing what lies deeper than any programmes.

Take Kropotov, deputy from Vyatka Gubernia. "My electors told me that the law of November 9 is a landlords' law.... My electors put questions like this: Why is this being done by force? ... Why are our lands handed over to the rural superintendents[124]? ... The electors mandated me to say: You tell them in the Duma that we can't go on living like this.... And as soon as they start applying it [the law of November 9] in our district the new landlords, as our peasants call them, find their houses on fire" (71).... "All they care about is to reward the landlords.... Why is it in the public interest to take the last piece away from the poor man and give it to those who, as I put it, managed just by chance, under the law written by the government, to keep their land? Isn't it in the public interest that people should be forced to cultivate land that is lying idle—the

landlords' land, state, crown and monastery lands? ... 11 rubles 50 kopeks per dessiatine comes in from the peasant, and if, gentlemen, we were fair and imposed this tax equally on all, the land would really prove to be in the hands of the peasants, and no compulsory alienation would be needed. To be fair, there should be a single tax on the land, and then it will be in the hands of the working masses, and then no one will be envious: whoever doesn't want to work, won't pay" (73)....

What strength as yet untried in struggle, what a striving towards struggle is contained in this naïve speech! To avoid "compulsory alienation", Kropotov *in effect* proposes a measure which is tantamount to *confiscation* of the landed estates and nationalisation of *all* the land! That the "single tax" which this adherent of Henry George[125] proposes is tantamount to nationalisation of all the land, Kropotov does not realise; but that he is expressing the true aspirations of *millions*—of this there can be no shadow of doubt.

Take deputy Rozhkov, who begins by saying: "It is difficult for me, a village muzhik, gentlemen, to speak from this rostrum" (77). "The peasants expected from the Duma not the law of November 9, not a law which divides amongst us land we haven't got, but a law under which first our plots of land would have increased, and then division would have begun. The main principles of such a law were submitted on February 20, signed by 47 peasants, but up till now nothing has been done about it.... The rural superintendents are bosses of the land ... but the real masters of that land are tied down by a reinforced state of security.... We have no definite law in the country for purchase of land in order to make use of it ... which would say: don't buy it for use.... And lo and behold, on September 16, 1907, the Stavropol land committee decided that land could be bought only by a man possessing draught animals and agricultural implements. And here, gentlemen, in this very building, nearly half are landlords holding in bondage these men whom the land committee won't allow to buy land. Gentlemen, we know that these people are working for 60-70 rubles a year.... This poor toiler is doomed for ever to be a worker for the landlord, an eternal drudge for other

people, while behind his back his master will consider himself a cultured person."

Tomilov: "The only way out ... in our opinion, is this: the land should be redistributed at once, in all the village communes of Russia, on the basis of a census similar to those previously carried out; this census should establish the number of male persons as on November 3, 1905.

"The fond dream of the peasant is to get land and freedom, but we have heard that so long as the present government is in power, landed property is inviolable. (*Voices in the Centre*: "*Private property.*") Yes, private, noblemen's property. (*Voices in the Centre*: "*And yours too.*") As far as we are concerned, we are prepared to give up our allotments [there it is, the peasant *Vendée*, with which the so wise Plekhanov and Co. were frightening us at Stockholm, in the event that all the land was nationalised[126]!]. I will say that the peasants in any village are willing to give up their allotments, unit for unit, and to become equal. The statement of the representative of the Ministry amounts to this, that so long as power has not passed into the hands of the peasantry and the people generally, the peasants will not see either the land or political liberties. Thank you for your frankness, though we knew it already" (149)....

"And in 1905, when, under the leadership of the conscious elements, the peasants united together (*noise and laughter on the Right*) and said their grim word ... then the nobility began to say 'Why, you've got land, you've got your allotments. Go and divide up that little bone...'."

Petrov III: "Remember, gentlemen, the times of the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, and the protest of the peasant people which expressed itself in the movement under the leadership of Razin[127] (*voices on the Right*: "*Oho!*")....

The people most strongly expressed its demands in 1905. Then, too, poverty made the people come out into the streets and say their imperious say about what they needed" (187)....

"All the land must pass into equalised tenure of all the people.... I am of course an opponent of private property in land [the Vendée predicted by Plekhanov positively begins to extend!] and I say that the working people will not get an easier time until all the land passes into their hands" (204).... "I am absolutely convinced you will see once again

the depths of the sea of life disturbed. And then the saying of the Testament will come true: he who lifts the sword shall perish by the sword (*laughter on the Right*). The Trudovik group has not changed its ideals and has not changed its aspirations.... We ... say: all the land to those who work on it, and all power to the working people!" (206).

Merzlyakov: "The land must belong to those who till it.... Only there mustn't be any land racket in Russia, and the land should belong to those who till it by their own labour" (207). And so on.

Lack of space obliges us to quote no more. We shall mention only the names of the speakers who expressed the same ideas less clearly and strongly: Kondratyev, the priest Popov II, Bulat, Volkov II, Dzióbiński, Lachnicki (the last two making official statements on behalf of the Trudovik group).

What conclusions in relation to the agrarian programme of Social-Democracy follow from this attitude of the peasant deputies? All are agreed that the peasants invest the struggle against the feudal latifundia and all the survivals of serfdom with the utopias of petty-bourgeois socialism. This is expressed in the concluding section of our agrarian programme which was drafted by the Bolsheviks and accepted at Stockholm by the Mensheviks (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress).

But the question does not end there. Division of the land, municipalisation, nationalisation are all bourgeois-democratic reforms; but what system should the Social-Democrats support? Municipalisation, answer the Mensheviks headed by Plekhanov, since they got this programme adopted at Stockholm. Nationalisation of the peasant lands would arouse a Vendée, the Mensheviks flatly declared at Stockholm.

Since then, peasant deputies from all over Russia have spoken in three Dumas. Not a single group of peasant deputies has been won over to "municipalisation", which was invented specially in order "not to touch" the peasant lands. *All* the peasant Trudoviks in all three Dumas declared for nationalisation of all the land, expressing this demand sometimes by directly repeating the Trudoviks' programme, sometimes by an original restating of the "single tax",

sometimes by numerous declarations that "the land should go to those who till it", "we are prepared to give up our allotments", etc.

Real life has made a joke of "municipalisation" and the outcry about a "Vendée".

What is the economic basis for the supporting of nationalisation by all politically-conscious peasants? To answer this question, let us recall a statistical comparison made in the Duma by Comrade Belousov[128];

"Some 76 million dessiatines belong to 30,000 landlords (in European Russia), while 73 million dessiatines belong to 10 million peasant households with an allotment of 1 to 15 dessiatines.... There is only one conclusion possible—that four-fifths of the total number of households could double the size of their holding" (209). Even if one or other of these figures is challenged (we think that they cannot be challenged), no alteration in them can affect the crux of the matter, which is the following. In striving to double their holdings, the peasants cannot but strive for the complete fusion and mixing-up of allotment and non-allotment lands. The preservation of allotment lands as private property, the property as at present of the peasant households and communes, while the expropriated non-allotment lands are declared social ("municipal") property is an economic absurdity. It is the most stupid agrarian bimetallism, suited only for taking up space in programmes invented by intellectuals. The economy requires the fusion and mixing up of all lands. The economy is already uniting bits of allotment land with bits of landlords' land (by leasehold); and the elimination of feudalism is impossible without eliminating those distinctions in landowning, those bounds and barriers, which "municipalisation" artificially perpetuates. The economy requires a new landowning, a free landowning adapted to capitalism and not to the old "allotments", distributed and demarcated by bailiffs and official agents. This requirement of economic development is what the peasants express (without realising the capitalist nature of this development) when they declare for nationalisation. The old distinction of allotment and non-allotment landowning contradicts the requirements of capitalism, and it will inevitably be broken down, despite all the efforts of the

Menshevik municipalisers to prop it up. And the breaking-down of this barrier, the amalgamation, the mixing up, the fusion of all categories of lands for the new economy of the farmer, requires the abolition not only of landlords' property, but of all private property in land (the peasants think mistakenly that any citizen will till the soil; it will be tilled by every master, i.e., by the one who has the means to do it!).

Stolypin wants to wipe out all previous barriers of all previous forms of landowning. This desire is economically correct. Capitalism will inevitably put it into effect. The question is only whether this will be done at the expense of millions of peasant households (robbery under the law of November 9) or at the expense of the 30,000 biggest landlords. The latter method is impossible without nationalisation of the land in a bourgeois-democratic revolution. That is why in all the three Dumas all politically-conscious peasants supported nationalisation.

It remains for us to examine the speeches of the Social-Democrats in the Third Duma. Only two speakers of our group managed to speak (Gegechkori and Belousov) before a time limit was introduced. The others began refusing to speak, protesting against the "act of force" expressed in this restriction. Both the comrades mentioned did their duty properly. They pointed out the "aristocratic-bureaucratic spirit" of the government's policy; they said that the "statute of 1861 was feudalistic through and through"; that "hatred of the government" had sunk deep into the soul of the peasantry, which was demanding "land and freedom", and which had displayed in 1905 its "solidarity" and its capacity for "revolutionary action". Our Social-Democratic struggle for "confiscation of the latifundia and their transfer to the people" was correctly interpreted by the speakers of our Party, not in the spirit of petty-bourgeois utopias about "equalisation", "socialisation" and so forth, but as a measure to free the country from the yoke of serf-like bondage. The way Gegechkori and Belousov put the question was the way of a revolutionary Social-Democrat. "Might creates Right," concluded Comrade Belousov, "and in order to win Right we must gather our forces and organise them." Both speeches by the Social-Democratic spokesmen in the Third Duma

should be kept for handy reference by every member of the Party who carries on the work of propaganda and agitation. The formula for handing over the land proposed by the Social-Democratic group missed out only the demand that the land should be transferred without compensation. This would have been an important breach of our programme if it had been done deliberately. But Comrade Gegechkori, who read the formula, mentioned twice in his speech the necessity of "alienation without compensation"; therefore the omission can hardly be regarded as deliberate.

Proletary, No. 40,
December 1 (14), 1908
Signed: *N. L.*

Published according
to the text in *Proletary*

THE FIFTH (ALL-RUSSIAN) CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[129]

DECEMBER 21-27, 1908 (JANUARY 3-9, 1909)

THE FIFTH (ALL-RUSSIAN) CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.[129]

DECEMBER 21-27, 1908 (JANUARY 3-9, 1909)

1

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE PRESENT MOMENT AND THE TASKS OF THE PARTY

The present political situation is characterised by the following features:

(a) The old feudal autocracy is evolving towards a bourgeois monarchy which covers up absolutism by sham constitutional forms. The alliance of tsarism with the Black-Hundred landlords and the top commercial and industrial bourgeoisie has been openly solidified and recognised by the coup d'état of June 3 and the establishment of the Third Duma. Having of necessity finally taken the path of the capitalist development of Russia, and striving to keep to a path which would preserve the power and the revenues of the feudalist landlords, the autocracy is manoeuvring between that class and the representatives of capital. Their petty disputes are made use of for the maintenance of absolutism, which together with these classes is carrying on a furious counter-revolutionary struggle against the socialist proletariat and the democratic peasantry, who displayed their strength in the recent mass struggle.

(b) The agrarian policy of present-day tsarism is distinguished by the same bourgeois-Bonapartist character. Tsarism has lost all faith in the naïve devotion of the peasant masses to the monarchy. It seeks an alliance with the rich peasants, to whom it has given a free hand to plunder the countryside. The autocracy is making frantic efforts to break up all communal allotment landowning as speedily as possible, and to consolidate purely private landowning. Such a policy makes all the contradictions of capitalism in the countryside a hundred times more acute, and hastens

the division of the countryside into an insignificant minority of reactionaries and a revolutionary mass of proletarians and semi-proletarians.

(c) The liberal bourgeoisie headed by the Cadet Party, having taken the counter-revolutionary path at the very first mass actions in the revolution, continues to pursue that path, coming still closer to the Octobrists, and by its tsarist nationalist agitation—which expresses the growth of self-consciousness of the bourgeoisie as a class—is in fact doing a service to absolutism and the feudal-minded landlords.

(d) The peasant masses, as even their restricted and distorted representation in the Third Duma shows continue —in spite of all the persecutions of the democratic element in the countryside—to remain, all their wavering notwithstanding, on the side of a revolutionary-democratic agrarian upheaval which, by completely abolishing landlordism, would thereby ensure the most rapid, large-scale and free-development of productive forces in a capitalist Russia. The law of November 9 only hastens the division of the peasant masses into irreconcilably hostile and politically-conscious forces.

(e) The proletariat has sustained, and continues to sustain, the heaviest blows of all, both from the autocracy and from the rapidly uniting and aggressive capitalists. In spite of this, the proletariat in comparison with other classes preserves the greatest unity and the greatest loyalty to its class party, with which it was fused by the revolution. The proletariat is continuing the struggle for its class interests and deepening its socialist class-consciousness, remaining the only class capable of giving consistent leadership to a new revolutionary struggle.

(f) On the whole it is beyond doubt that the objective problems of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia remain unsolved. The continuing economic crisis, unemployment and famines prove that the latest policy of the autocracy cannot provide the conditions for the capitalist development of Russia. This policy inevitably leads to the deepening of the conflict between the democratic masses and the master classes, the growth of discontent among new sections of the population, the sharpening and deepening

of the political struggle between the different classes. In such an economic and political situation a new revolutionary crisis is inevitably coming to a head.

(g) The general sharpening of struggle on the world market due mainly to the changes in the industrial situation of Western Europe in the direction of a crisis, which has in 1908 taken the form of a depression, and due to the revolutionary movements in the East which herald the formation of national capitalist states, is intensifying competition, leading to more frequent international conflicts, thereby sharpening the class contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and making the general international situation more and more revolutionary.

Considering this state of affairs, the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. recognises that the principal tasks of the Party at the present time are:

(1) To explain to the mass of the people the meaning and importance of the latest policy of the autocracy and the role of the socialist proletariat which, while pursuing a class policy of its own, must give leadership to the democratic peasantry in the present political situation and in the coming revolutionary struggle.

(2) To thoroughly study and widely popularise the experience of mass struggle in 1905-07, which has provided indispensable lessons in revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics.

(3) To strengthen the R.S.D.L.P. in the form it was built up during the revolutionary epoch; to maintain the traditions of its unfaltering struggle, both against the autocracy and reactionary classes and against bourgeois liberalism; to struggle against deviations from revolutionary Marxism and against attempts, revealed among certain elements of the Party who had fallen under the influence of disintegration, to whittle down the slogans of the R.S.D.L.P. and to liquidate the illegal organisation of the R.S.D.L.P.

At the same time it should be borne in mind that only by promoting the transfer of Party functions to Social-Democratic workers themselves—a process which is already definitely materialising—and only by setting up and consolidating illegal Party organisations can the Party emerge on the right path of development.

(4) To assist in every way possible the economic struggle of the working class, in accordance with the resolutions of the London and Stuttgart Congresses.

(5) To use the Duma and the Duma rostrum for revolutionary Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation.

(6) First among immediate tasks comes prolonged effort to train up, organise and unite the class-conscious masses of the proletariat. Then, subordinated to this task, the work of organisation should be extended to the peasantry and the army, particularly in the form of printed propaganda and agitation—principal attention being given to the socialist education of the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements among the peasantry and in the army.

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2

DIRECTIVES FOR THE COMMITTEE ON QUESTIONS OF ORGANISATION

Whereas the draft resolutions submitted, and the debates on the question of organisation, have clearly revealed two basic tendencies in the R.S.D.L.P. on the question of the main direction in which the present organisational policy in general is to move,

the Conference instructs the Committee to base its work on the principles of that tendency which recognises that, for work among the masses—which remains as before the fundamental task of Social-Democracy—attention must be focussed on building up and strengthening the illegal Party organisation; and that only under the unfaltering influence of this organisation can all work among the masses, all control of the Duma group, all the activity of the Party around the Duma group, all use of legal and semi-legal organisations, be properly arranged, without any debasing of the class aims of Social-Democracy.

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January 6, 1909

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3

PRACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS ON VOTING FOR THE BUDGET BY THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA

FIRST VARIANT

Voting for the Budget as a whole is declared wrong in principle. The Conference is of the opinion that, as regards voting for particular items in the Budget, the Duma group should be guided by the principle of our programme that Social-Democrats firmly reject reforms involving tutelage of the police and the bureaucracy over the working classes. Therefore the general rule should be to vote against particular items of the Budget, for they nearly always bring in their train not only such tutelage but also downright coercion by the Black-Hundred reactionaries. In cases where some improvement of the conditions of the working people seems likely in spite of these circumstances, it is recommended that the deputies should abstain from voting, but should without fail make a statement setting forth the socialist position. Lastly, in those exceptional cases when the group deems it necessary to vote for a particular item, it is recommended that they should not do so without consulting representatives of the Central Committee and, if possible, the Party organisations in the capital cities.

SECOND VARIANT

On the question of the Budget the Conference considers that on principle it is wrong to vote for the Budget as a whole.

It is also wrong to vote for items of the Budget of the class state which sanction expenditure on instruments for the oppression of the masses (the armed forces, etc.)

In voting for reforms or for items of expenditure for cultural purposes, point of departure should be the principle of our programme that Social-Democrats reject reforms involving tutelage of the police and the bureaucracy over the working classes.

Therefore the general rule should be to vote against the so-called reforms and items of expenditure for so-called cultural purposes introduced in the Third Duma.

In special cases where, in spite of the general conditions, some improvement of the conditions of the working people is no more than probable, it is recommended that the deputies should abstain from voting and state their reasons for doing so.

Lastly, in exceptional cases, where there is no doubt that the workers will benefit, it is permissible to vote for a particular item, but it is recommended that the deputies should consult representatives of the Central Committee and Party and trade union bodies.

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1908 (January 7-8, 1909)

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First variant is published according to the pamphlet. Second variant is published according to the manuscript verified with the pamphlet

4

ADDENDUM TO THE RESOLUTION ON "THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA"

... at the same time recognises that the blame for the group's deviations does not rest on the group alone, for it has to work in the extremely difficult conditions of a reactionary Duma, but is shared to some extent by all the organisations of the Party and its Central Committee, which have not by far yet done all that was necessary and possible to organise the Party's work in the Duma on proper lines ...

Written December 25-26, 1908 (January 7-8, 1909)

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Published according to the manuscript

5

STATEMENT BY THE BOLSHEVIKS[130]

STATEMENT OF FACTS

With reference to Dan's statement about agreements between groups within the Bolsheviks' ranks, we place on record that our agreements are between Party people working within the Party and writing in the Party organs, whereas the Mensheviks, both in their resolution and in all their activities, enter into agreements between Party people and non-Party people who secretly work against the Party, liquidate it and carry on a policy of opportunism without precedent in any European Social-Democratic Party.

Written December 26, 1908 (January 8, 1909)

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany* XXV

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HOW THE SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONARIES SUM UP THE REVOLUTION AND HOW THE REVOLUTION HAS SUMMED THEM UP

We have often had occasion during the past year (1908) to discuss the current situation and trends among the bourgeois democrats in Russia. We have noted the attempts made with the aid of the Trudoviks to restore the *Osvobozhdeniye* League (*Proletary*, No. 32*); we have described the democratic stand taken by the peasantry and their representatives on the agrarian and other questions (*Proletary*, Nos. 21 and 40**); and we have shown by examples quoted from *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* the amazingly shallow thinking of the Socialist-Revolutionary group, which imagines that it is ultra-revolutionary (*Proletary*, No. 32). To make the picture complete we must now examine the official publications of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. In 1908, four issues of *Znamya Truda* were published (Nos. 9 to 13, No. 10-11 being a double number***), and a special Report from the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party on the First Party Conference and the fourth meeting of the Party Council, both held abroad last August. Let us examine this material.

"The party," say the S.R. Central Committee in their Report, "was faced with the task of summing up the results of that period of the great Russian revolution, now over, during which the town proletariat was the principal and

* See pp. 148-58 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 440-46 and the present volume, pp. 303-317.

*** Unfortunately the editorial office of *Proletary* was unable to obtain No. 12.

often almost the sole actor." That is very well said. It is a true statement of the case most unusual for the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Five lines further down, however, we read: "The triumph of the counter-revolution has merely strikingly confirmed the truth, which we never doubted from the very outset, that a successful Russian revolution will either be the work of a mighty alliance of the forces of the town proletariat and those of the toiling peasantry, or will not be brought about at all. So far this alliance has existed only as an idea, embodied in the Socialist-Revolutionary programme which was brought into being by the realities of Russian life. It scarcely began to come into existence. Its rebirth is a matter for the future...."

Now see how long the Socialist-Revolutionaries were able to stick to the truth! Anyone who is in the slightest degree familiar with the Socialist-Revolutionary and Social-Democratic programmes knows that they differ radically in the following: 1) the Social-Democrats declared the Russian revolution to be a *bourgeois* revolution; the Socialist-Revolutionaries denied this; 2) the Social-Democrats maintained that the proletariat and the peasantry were *distinct classes* in capitalist (or semi-feudal, semi-capitalist) society; that the peasantry is a class of petty *proprietors* that can "strike together" against the landlords and the autocracy, "on the same side of the barricades" with the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution, and that in *this* revolution it can, in certain cases, march in "alliance" with the proletariat, while remaining quite a separate class of capitalist society. The Socialist-Revolutionaries denied this. The main *idea* in their programme was not that an "alliance of the forces" of the proletariat and the peasantry was necessary, but that there was *no class gulf* between them, that no class distinction should be drawn between them, and that the Social-Democratic idea concerning the petty-bourgeois character of the peasantry, as distinct from the proletariat, is utterly false.

And now the Socialist-Revolutionaries are trying to slur over these two radical differences between the Social-Democrat and the Socialist-Revolutionary programmes with glib specious phrases! From the way these gentlemen sum up the revolution one would think that there had been no

revolution and no Socialist-Revolutionary programme. But, my dear sirs, there was a Socialist-Revolutionary programme, and the whole difference between it and the programme of the Social-Democrats was that the fundamental, theoretical section of the former was based on the denial of the petty-bourgeois character of the peasantry, the denial of any class distinction between the peasantry and the proletariat. There was a revolution, my dear sirs, and the chief lesson it taught was that in their open mass actions the peasantry displayed a class nature of their own, distinct from that of the proletariat, and proved themselves to be petty-bourgeois.

You pretend that you have not noticed this. You do see it, but are merely trying to ignore an unpleasant fact revealed by the revolution. You acted, not "in alliance" with the Trudoviks, but completely merged with them—and this at crucial moments when the open revolution reached its climax—the autumn of 1905 and the summer of 1906. The legal organs of the press at that time were Socialist-Revolutionary-Trudovik organs. Even when the Trudovik and Popular Socialist groups were formed, you were not in alliance, but in a bloc, i.e., practically merged with them in the elections to the Second Duma and in the Second Duma itself. Unlike the programme of the Trudoviks and Popular Socialists, your own programme *suffered defeat* in all the open and truly mass actions of the representatives of the peasantry. Both in the First and in the Second Dumas the overwhelming majority of the peasant deputies adopted the agrarian programme of the *Trudoviks* and *not* of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves, in their purely Socialist-Revolutionary publications, from the end of 1906 onwards, were obliged to admit that as a political trend the Trudoviks were *petty-bourgeois*, that underlying this trend were the "private-property instincts" of small proprietors (see the articles written by Mr. Vikhlayev and other Socialist-Revolutionaries against the Popular Socialists).

The question arises, whom do the Socialist-Revolutionaries wish to deceive by "summing up the results" of the revolution and *concealing* the fundamental and most important result in the process?

Why did the peasantry during the revolution form into a separate political party (or group)—the Trudovik party? Why did the Trudoviks and not the Socialist-Revolutionaries become the party of the peasant masses during the revolution? If the Socialist-Revolutionaries think this was accidental, it's no good talking about either results or programmes, for then instead of results and programmes we get chaos. If it was not accidental, but a result of the fundamental economic relations in modern society, then the correctness of the principal and cardinal point in the programme of the Russian Social-Democrats has been *proved by history*. The revolution has drawn in practice the class distinction between the peasantry and the proletariat that we Social-Democrats have always drawn in theory. The revolution has proved conclusively that a party, which aspires to be a mass party, a class party, in Russia, must *either* be Social-Democratic *or* Trudovik; for it is these, and only these, two trends that the masses themselves clearly marked out by their open actions during the most important and crucial moments. As the events of 1905-07 have proved, intermediate groups were never able to merge with the masses at any time or on any issue. And this also proved the bourgeois character of our revolution. Not a single historian, not a single sane politician, can now deny that the political forces in Russia are divided primarily between the socialist proletariat and the petty-bourgeois democratic peasantry.

"The alliance of the forces of the town proletariat and those of the toiling peasantry ... has so far existed only as an idea." This is an utterly confused and false phrase. The alliance of proletarian and peasant forces has not been merely an "idea", nor did it "scarcely begin to come into existence"; it was a characteristic feature of the whole of the first period of the Russian revolution, of all the great events of 1905-07. The October strike and the December insurrection on the one hand, the local peasant risings and the mutinies of soldiers and sailors on the other, represented that very "alliance of the forces" of the proletariat and the peasantry. It was unorganised, inchoate, often unconscious. The forces were inadequately organised, dispersed, without a central leadership that was really capable of leading,

and so forth. But it was undoubtedly an "alliance of the forces" of the proletariat and the peasantry, the main forces which breached the ramparts of the old autocracy. Unless this fact is understood, it is impossible to understand the "results" of the Russian revolution. The flaw in the conclusion drawn by the Socialist-Revolutionaries is that they say "*trudovoye*"* instead of *Trudovik* peasantry. This slight, negligible difference, a seemingly imperceptible difference, actually reveals the gulf that lies between the pre-revolutionary dreams of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the reality that the revolution finally brought to light.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries have *always* used the term *trudovoye* peasantry. The revolution revealed the political physiognomy of the present-day Russian peasantry and has proved it to be a *Trudovik* trend. In that case the Socialist-Revolutionaries were right, you will say? That is not so. History in its irony has preserved and perpetuated the Socialist-Revolutionaries' *term*, but gave it the *connotation* that was predicted by the Social-Democrats. On the moot question as to the petty-bourgeois nature of the labouring peasantry, the history of the revolution has shared the honours between us and the Socialist-Revolutionaries as follows: to them it gave the *word* and to us the *substance*. The labouring peasants, whom the Socialist-Revolutionaries lauded to the skies *before* the revolution, proved *during* the revolution to be such *Trudoviks* that the Socialist-Revolutionaries *had* to disown them! And we Social-Democrats can and *must* now prove that the peasantry is petty-bourgeois not only by using the analysis given in Marx's *Capital*,[131] not only by quotations from the Erfurt Programme,[132] not only by facts and figures from the economic researches of the Narodniks and from Zemstvo statistics, but by the behaviour of the peasantry in the Russian revolution in general and the facts concerning the composition and activities of the *Trudoviks* in particular.

No. We have nothing to complain of the way history has shared the honours between us and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

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* i.e., labouring.—*Ed.*

Znamya Truda, No. 13, p. 3, says: "Had the otzovists succeeded in turning the Social-Democrats back to their extreme militant principles, we would have lost some useful material for polemics, but we would have acquired an ally in consistent militant tactics." And a couple of lines earlier it says: "The struggle for freedom and socialism would only stand to gain if the Left wing took the lead both among the Cadets and among the Social-Democrats."

Very good, Messieurs Socialist-Revolutionaries! You want to pay compliments to our "otzovists" and "Lefts". Allow us, then, to return compliment for compliment. Permit us, too, to avail ourselves of "useful material for polemics".

"Let a number of parties, including the Cadets, Trudoviks and Social-Democrats, support the fiction that a constitutional system exists by their participation in the pasteboard travesty of a Duma" (*Znamya Truda*, ibid.).

So the Third Duma is a pasteboard travesty. This phrase alone is more than sufficient to show the abysmal ignorance of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Most esteemed directors of the central organ of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Third Duma is much *less* a pasteboard institution than the First and the Second Dumas were! Your failure to grasp this simple fact only confirms the correctness of what *Proletary* said about you in its article "Parliamentary Cretinism Inside Out". You are repeating word for word the common delusion of the vulgar bourgeois democrats, who try to persuade themselves and others that bad, reactionary Dumas are pasteboard institutions, while good, progressive Dumas are not.

As a matter of fact, the First and Second Dumas were pasteboard swords in the hands of the liberal-bourgeois intellectuals who wanted to scare the autocracy a little with the threat of revolution. The Third Duma is a real, not a pasteboard, sword in the hands of the autocracy and the counter-revolution. The First and Second Dumas were pasteboard Dumas because their decisions did not reflect the actual balance of material forces in the struggle of the classes in society, and were mere hollow words. The importance of these two Dumas lay in the fact that behind the front row of Cadet constitutional buffoons were clearly seen the

real representatives of that democratic peasantry and that socialist proletariat who were really making the revolution, fighting the enemy in an open mass struggle, but had not yet been able to crush him. The Third Duma is not a pasteboard Duma, for the simple reason that its decisions reflect the actual balance of material forces brought about by the temporary victory of the counter-revolution and are, therefore, not mere words but words converted into action. The importance of this Duma lies in the fact that it has given all the politically undeveloped elements of the people an object-lesson, showing the relation between representative institutions and the actual possession of state power. Representative institutions, even the most "progressive", are doomed to remain pasteboard institutions so long as the classes represented in them do not possess real state power. Representative institutions, however reactionary they may be, are not pasteboard if the classes represented in them do possess real state power.

To call the Third Duma a pasteboard travesty is an example of the extreme shallowness and extravagant revolutionary phrase-mongering that have so long been the specific distinguishing feature and the chief quality of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

Let us proceed. Is it true that the Third Duma is "the fiction of a constitutional system"? No, it is not. Only people ignorant of the elementary principles taught by Lassalle nearly half a century ago could say a thing like that in an official party paper. What does a constitution mean, most worthy members of that elementary propaganda circle known as the Socialist-Revolutionary Party? Does it mean that more "freedom" and better conditions of life exist for the "toiling people" with a constitution than without one? No, only the vulgar democrats think that. The essence of a constitution is that the fundamental laws of the state in general, and the laws governing elections to and the powers of the representative institutions, etc., express the actual relation of forces in the class struggle. A constitution is fictitious when law and reality diverge; it is not fictitious when they coincide. The constitution of Russia in the period of the Third Duma is *less* fictitious than it was in the periods of the First and Second Dumas. If this

conclusion arouses your ire, Messieurs "Socialists"-"Revolutionaries", it is because you do not understand what a constitution is, and cannot tell the difference between a fictitious and a class constitution. A constitution can be a Black-Hundred, landlords' and reactionary constitution, and yet be less fictitious than some "liberal" constitutions.

The trouble with the Socialist-Revolutionaries is that they are ignorant of Marx's historical materialism and Marx's dialectical method; they are wholly under the spell of vulgar bourgeois-democratic ideas. For them a constitution is not a new field, a new form of the class struggle, but an abstract blessing like the "legality", the "law and order", the "general good" of the liberal professors, and so on and so forth. In reality autocracy, constitutional monarchy and republic are merely different forms of class struggle; and the dialectics of history are such that each of these forms passes through different stages of development of its class content, and the transition from one form to another does not (in itself) at all eliminate the rule of the former exploiting classes under the new integument. For instance, the Russian autocracy of the seventeenth century with its Boyar Council and boyar aristocracy bears no resemblance to the autocracy of the eighteenth century with its bureaucracy, its ranks and orders of society, and its occasional periods of "enlightened absolutism"; while both differ sharply from the autocracy of the nineteenth century, which was compelled to emancipate the peasants "from above", although pauperising them in the process, paving the way for capitalism, introducing the principle of local representative institutions for the bourgeoisie. By the twentieth century this last form of semi-feudal, semi-patriarchal absolutism had also become obsolete. Owing to the growth of capitalism and the increase in the power of the bourgeoisie, etc., it became necessary to introduce representative institutions on a national scale. The revolutionary struggle of 1905 became particularly acute around the issue as to who was to convene the first all-Russian representative institution, and how. The December defeat settled this question in favour of the old monarchy; and in these circumstances the constitution could be nothing else than a Black-Hundred and Octobrist one.

In a new field, under institutions of the Bonapartist monarchy, at a higher stage of political development, the struggle is again beginning with the effort to overthrow the old enemy, the Black-Hundred monarchy. Can a socialist party refuse to make use in this struggle of the new representative institutions? The Socialist-Revolutionaries have not even the wit to pose such a question: they make shift with phrases, and nothing but phrases. Listen to this:

"At the present time we have no parliamentary channels of struggle—we have only non-parliamentary channels. This conviction must become deep-rooted everywhere, and we must relentlessly fight everything that prevents it from becoming so. Let us concentrate on non-parliamentary means of struggle!"

This Socialist-Revolutionary argument is based on the celebrated subjective method in sociology. Let the conviction become deep-rooted—and the trick is done! It never occurs to the subjectivists that convictions as to whether particular channels are available or not must be tested by objective facts. But let us look at the Report and the resolutions of the conference of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. We read: "...The sombre lull of the hard times, or rather, the time of social stagnation we are now passing through" (p. 4) ... "the consolidation of the reactionary social forces" ... "the fact that the energy of the masses is shackled" ... "among the intellectuals, the most impressionable section of the population, we see exhaustion, ideological confusion and the ebb of forces from the revolutionary struggle" (p. 6), and so on, and so forth. "In view of all this, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party must ... (b) disapprove, for tactical reasons, of schemes for partial mass actions which under present conditions may result in the fruitless waste of popular energy" (p. 7).

Who are the "*we*" in "we have only non-parliamentary channels of struggle"? Obviously a handful of terrorists, for none of the tirades quoted here contains even a hint of the *mass* struggle. "*The fact that the energy of the masses is shackled*" ... and "concentrate on non-parliamentary means of struggle"—this simple contrast shows us yet once

more how historically true it was to call the Socialist-Revolutionaries revolutionary adventurists.* Is it not adventurism for people to indulge in catchy phrases about concentrating on means of struggle which they themselves admit the masses are at present unable to apply? Is this not the old, old psychology of the intellectual in despair?

"Let us concentrate on non-parliamentary means of struggle." This slogan was correct in one of the most remarkable periods of the Russian revolution, the autumn of 1905. In repeating it uncritically at the present juncture the Socialist-Revolutionaries are acting like the hero of the popular fable who would persist in shouting the most inappropriate greetings. You have not understood, my dear sirs, *why* the boycott slogan was correct in the autumn of 1905, and in repeating it now, uncritically, unthinkingly, like a catchword learned off by heart, you are displaying, not revolutionariness, but just plain foolishness.

In the autumn of 1905 nobody said anything about "the fact that the energy of the masses was shackled". On the contrary, all parties agreed that the energy of the masses was seething. At that moment, the old regime offered a consultative parliament, obviously with the intention of splitting these seething forces and appeasing them, if only for a moment. At that time the slogan: "Concentrate on non-parliamentary means of struggle", was not the stock-phrase of a handful of ranters, but the battle-cry of men who really were at the head of the masses, at the head of millions of fighting workers and peasants. The fact that these millions responded to the call proved that the slogan was *objectively correct*, and that it expressed not merely the "convictions" of a handful of revolutionaries, but the actual situation, the temper and the initiative of the masses. Only ridiculous pedlars of politics can repeat this slogan and in the same breath say that "the energy of the masses is shackled".

And, since we have mentioned the ridiculous, we simply must quote the following gem from *Znamya Truda*. "Let us leave it [the government] tête-à-tête in the Duma with the Black Hundreds and with the party that obeys the latest

* See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 184-205.—*Ed.*

government order,* and take our word for it that if ever these spiders are capable of devouring each other, this is the very situation in which they will do so".... This "take our word for it" is inimitable and positively disarms an opponent. "Take our word for it", reader, that the leading articles in *Znamya Truda* are being written by a really sweet Socialist-Revolutionary school miss, who sincerely believes that the "spiders" will begin to "devour each other" if the opposition withdraws from the Third Duma.

The clause concerning the Cadets in the resolution on our attitude towards the non-proletarian parties adopted at the London Congress was most severely criticised by the Mensheviks. Scarcely less severe was their criticism of the clause which deals with the Narodnik or Trudovik parties. The Mensheviks tried to prove that we were indulgent with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, or were covering up certain sins which Marxists had long ago proved they were guilty of, and so forth. There were two reasons for the Mensheviks' vehemence on these points. One of them was their fundamental disagreement with us in our appraisal of the Russian revolution. The Mensheviks insist that the proletariat must make the revolution together with the Cadets, and not with the Trudovik peasantry against the Cadets. On the other hand, the Mensheviks don't understand that the open action of the masses and classes in the revolution has changed the situation and, in some cases, the character of the parties. Before the revolution the Socialist-Revolutionaries were *only* a group of intellectuals with Narodnik ideas. Would this description be correct after the revolution, or even after 1906? Obviously not. Only those who have learned nothing from the revolution can uphold the old view formulated in this way.

The revolution has *proved* that this group of intellectuals with Narodnik ideas are the extreme Left *wing* of an exceedingly broad and undoubtedly mass Narodnik or Trudovik trend, which expressed the interests and point of view of the peasantry in the Russian bourgeois revolution. This

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* Meaning the Octobrists.—*Ed.*

has been proved by the peasant insurrections, by the Peasant Union, by the Trudovik group in three Dumas, and by the free press of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks. But the Mensheviks have failed to understand this. They regard the Socialist-Revolutionaries from a *doctrinaire* point of view: like doctrinaires, they see the flaws in other people's doctrines, but do not see what real interests of real masses, which are a driving force in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, are expressed or concealed by those doctrines. The Socialist-Revolutionary doctrine is pernicious, fallacious, reactionary, adventurist, petty-bourgeois—cry the Mensheviks. Not one step further, not one word more; all else is the work of the devil.

Now that is where *your* mistake begins, we say to the Mensheviks. True, the Socialist-Revolutionary doctrine is pernicious, fallacious, reactionary, adventurist and petty-bourgeois. *But* these vices do not prevent this quasi-socialist doctrine from being the ideological vestments of a really revolutionary—and not compromising—bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in Russia. For the Socialist-Revolutionary doctrine is only a tiny rivulet in the Trudovik, i.e., peasant-democratic torrent. As soon as the open struggle of masses and classes begins, events immediately compel us all, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike, to recognise the fact, to admit the Socialist-Revolutionaries to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, establish closer relations with the Soviets of peasants', soldiers', post and telegraph workers', railwaymen's, etc., deputies, enter into election agreements with them against the liberals, vote with them in the Dumas against the liberals, and so forth. The revolution has not refuted our opinion of the Socialist-Revolutionaries but corroborated it. But in doing so it has not left the question in its previous shape and position; it has elevated the question to an incomparably higher plane. Previously the question was one only of comparing doctrines, ideologies and the policies of various groups; now it is a matter of comparing the historical activities of the classes and masses which follow this or a kindred ideology. Formerly the question was, is what the Socialist-Revolutionaries say correct? Are the tactics of this ideological organisation correct? Now the question has arisen, what, in effect, is the

behaviour of those sections of the people which consider themselves supporters of the Socialist-Revolutionaries or of ideas akin to theirs (the "labour principle", etc.)? The Mensheviks' error is due to their failure to understand this change that the revolution has brought about.

But apart from the reasons mentioned, this change is important also because it has strikingly revealed the relation of classes and parties. The lesson our revolution teaches is that only parties which have a definite class backing are strong and able to survive, whatever turn events may take. Open political struggle compels parties to establish closer relations with the masses, for without such ties parties are naught. Nominally, the Socialist-Revolutionaries are independent of the Trudoviks. *Actually*, however, during the revolution, they were *compelled* to join forces with the Trudoviks, on pain of being completely eliminated from the political arena. And it can safely be said that at the next rise of the revolutionary tide the Socialist-Revolutionaries (however loudly they may shout now about their complete independence) will again be obliged to join forces with the Trudoviks, or with similar organisations of the masses. The objective conditions of social life and the class struggle are more powerful than pious intentions and written programmes. From this aspect, which is the only correct one, the present rift between the Trudoviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries is merely evidence of the disintegration of the petty-bourgeois movement, of the lack of steadfastness on the part of the petty bourgeoisie, who are unable to band together in adverse conditions and who "drift apart". On the one hand, we have the Trudoviks—unorganised, unsteady, wavering, without any firm political line in the Third Duma, but undoubtedly springing from the masses, connected with the masses, expressing the needs of the masses. On the other hand we have a handful of Socialist-Revolutionary "otzovists", who have no ties with the masses, who are frantic with despair, losing faith in the mass struggle (see *Revolutsionnaya Mysl*) and concentrating on terrorism. The extreme opportunism of the Trudoviks (bearing in mind the stand of the revolutionary peasantry) and the extreme, purely verbal and meaningless, revolutionariness of the Socialist-Revolutionaries are two limitations of one and

the same petty-bourgeois trend, twin symptoms of the same "disease", viz., the instability of the petty bourgeoisie, their incapacity for systematic, persevering, staunch and concerted mass struggle.

These facts throw a new light on the present Duma tactics of the revolutionary parties and, in particular, on the question of otzovism. "We have no parliamentary channels of struggle," cry the boastful Socialist-Revolutionary intellectuals. Who are "we", gentlemen? Intellectuals *without the masses* have never had, and never will have, either parliamentary or non-parliamentary means of struggle of any importance. What masses followed or supported you yesterday, during the revolution? The Trudovik peasantry. Is it true that *they* have "no parliamentary means of struggle"? It is not true. Look at the debates on the agrarian question in the Third Duma. You will find that on this issue the Trudoviks undoubtedly voiced the needs of the masses. Consequently, the smart phrase of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is nothing more than empty phrase-mongering. In 1908, the peasant masses voiced *their* demands from the rostrum of the Duma, and did not engage in "non-parliamentary" action. That is a fact that no amount of "Left" screeching and the shouting of Socialist-Revolutionary-otzovist phrases can obscure.

What was the reason for this? Was it because the "conviction" that non-parliamentary channels are preferable was shaken? Nonsense. The answer is that in this period objective conditions had not yet caused widespread unrest among the masses or stirred them to direct action. If that is the case, and it certainly is so, it was the duty of every party that takes itself seriously to avail itself of *indirect* channels. The Socialist-Revolutionaries were unable to avail themselves of such channels—and what happened? Only that the Trudoviks made a very bad job of it, made a thousand times more mistakes than they would have done had they been guided by a party; they stumbled and fell very often. Out of touch with their class, with their masses, the Socialist-Revolutionaries "concentrated" on phrase-mongering; for *in practice* they did *nothing* at all in 1908 to promote "non-parliamentary means of struggle". This dissociation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries from their social roots

immediately begins to aggravate their besetting sin—extravagant, unbridled boasting and bragging, as a means of covering up their impotence. "Our Party can congratulate itself," we read on the first page of the Report ... election to the conference by "really existing [think of that now!] local party organisations" ... "unanimity of feeling was reached on all questions" ... "this was truly the attainment of unanimity" (ibid.), and so on and so forth.

It is not true, gentlemen. With these loud words you are trying to drown the voices of dissension which have been heard quite distinctly, both in *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* (spring 1908) and in issue No. 13 of *Znamya Truda* (November 1908). This ballyhoo is a sign of weakness. The non-party opportunism of the Trudoviks and the "party" boastfulness, isolation and phrase-mongering of the Socialist-Revolutionaries are two sides of the same medal, two extremes in the disintegration of *one and the same* petty-bourgeois stratum. It was not for nothing that during the revolution, when the struggle brought out all the different shadings, the Socialist-Revolutionaries tried, but tried in vain, to conceal their wavering between the Popular Socialists and the Maximalists.

The cart is in the ditch. The horses have slipped their harness. The coachman sits astride a milestone with his cap at a jaunty angle, and "congratulates" himself on his "unanimity". Such is the picture of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Such are the results of Socialist-Revolutionary otzovism, which has recalled a handful of intellectuals from the arduous, persevering, but the only really serious and fruitful work of educating and organising the masses, in order that they should indulge in loud and meaningless catchwords.

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ON THE ROAD

A year of disintegration, a year of ideological and political disunity, a year of Party driftage lies behind us. The membership of all our Party organisations has dropped. Some of them—namely, those whose membership was least proletarian—have fallen to pieces. The Party's semi-legal institutions created by the revolution have been broken up time after time. Things reached a point when some elements within the Party, under the impact of the general break-up, began to ask whether it was necessary to preserve the old Social-Democratic Party, whether it was necessary to continue *its* work, whether it was necessary to go "underground" once more, and how this was to be done. And the extreme Right (the liquidationist trend, so called) answered this question in the sense that it was necessary to legalise ourselves at all costs, even at the price of an open renunciation of the Party programme, tactics and organisation. This was undoubtedly an ideological and political crisis as well as an organisational one.

The recent All-Russian Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has led the Party out on to the road, and evidently marks a turning-point in the development of the Russian working-class movement after the victory of the counter-revolution. The decisions of the conference, published in a special Report issued by the Central Committee of our Party, have been confirmed by the Central Committee, and therefore, pending the next Congress, stand as the decisions of the whole Party. These decisions give a very definite answer to the question of the causes and the significance of the crisis, as well as the means of overcoming it. By working in the spirit of the conference

resolutions, by striving to make *all* Party workers realise clearly and fully the present tasks of the Party, our organisations will be able to strengthen and consolidate their forces for united and effective revolutionary Social-Democratic work.

The main cause of the Party crisis is indicated in the preamble of the resolution on organisation. This main cause is the wavering intellectual and petty-bourgeois elements, of which the workers' party had to rid itself; elements who joined the working-class movement mainly in the hope of an early triumph of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and could not stand up to a period of reaction. Their instability was revealed both in theory ("retreat from revolutionary Marxism": the resolution on the present situation) and in tactics (the "whittling down of slogans"), as well as in Party organisation. The class-conscious workers repelled this instability, came out resolutely against the liquidators, began to take the management and guidance of the Party organisations into their own hands. If this hard core of our Party was unable at the outset to overcome the elements of disunity and crisis, this was not only because the task was a great and difficult one amidst the triumph of the counter-revolution, but also because a certain indifference towards the Party showed itself among those workers who, although revolutionary-minded, were not sufficiently socialist-minded. It is precisely to the class-conscious workers of Russia that the decisions of the conference are addressed in the first place—as the crystallised opinion of Social-Democracy concerning the means of combating disunity and vacillation.

A Marxist analysis of present-day class relations and of the new policy of tsarism; an indication of the immediate aim of the struggle which our Party continues as before to set itself; an appreciation of the lessons of the revolution as regards the correctness of the revolutionary Social-Democrats' tactics; elucidation of the causes of the Party crisis; pointing out the role in combating it of the proletarian elements of the Party; solution of the problem of relations between the illegal and legal organisations; recognition of the necessity of utilising the Duma tribune and drawing up precise instructions for the guidance of

ПАРИЖЪ, Среда 28/10 Февраля 1909 г. № 2.

РОССІЙСКАЯ СОЦ.-ДЕМОКРАТІЧ. РАБОЧАЯ ПАРТІЯ. ПРОЛЕТАРІИ ВСѢХЪ СТРАНЪ, СОЕДИНЯЙТЕСЬ!

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ ОРГАНЪ РОССІЙСКОЙ СОЦІ-АЛЬДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОЙ РАБОЧЕЙ ПАРТІИ

СОЦІАЛЬДЕМОКРАТЪ

LE SOCIAL-DÉMOCRATE

Organe Central du Parti Social-Démocrate Ouvrier en Russie

На дорогу.

Front page of the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. — the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 2, January 28 (February 10), 1909, containing Lenin's article "On the Road"

Reduced

Front page of the Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P. — the newspaper Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 2, January 28 (February 10), 1909, containing Lenin's article "On the Road"

Reduced

our Duma group, linked with direct criticism of its mistakes—such was the principal content of the decisions of the conference, which provide a complete answer to the question of the party of the working class choosing a definite path in the present difficult period. Let us examine this answer more carefully.

The interrelation of classes in their political groupings remains the same as that which prevailed during the past period of direct revolutionary struggle of the masses. The overwhelming majority of the peasants cannot but strive for an agrarian revolution which would destroy semi-feudal landownership, and which cannot be achieved without the overthrow of tsarism. The triumph of reaction has borne down heavily on the democratic elements of the peasantry, which is incapable of forming a solid organisation; but despite all oppression, despite the Black-Hundred Duma, despite the extreme instability of the Trudoviks, the revolutionary mood of the peasant masses is clearly evidenced even by the debates in the Third Duma. The fundamental position of the proletariat in regard to the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia remains unaltered: to guide the democratic peasantry and to wrest it from the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie, the Cadet Party—which continues to draw closer and closer to the Octobrists notwithstanding petty private squabbles, and which recently has been striving to establish national-liberalism and to support tsarism and reaction by chauvinist agitation. The struggle goes on as before—says the resolution—for the complete abolition of the monarchy and the conquest of political power by the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry.

The autocracy, as hitherto, is the principal enemy of the proletariat and of all democratic trends. It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that it remains unchanged. The Stolypin "constitution" and Stolypin's agrarian policy mark a new stage in the break-down of the old, semi-patriarchal, semi-feudal tsarism, a new step towards its transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. The delegates from the Caucasus, who wished either to delete such a characterisation of the present situation altogether, or to substitute "plutocratic" for "bourgeois", were wrong. The autocracy has long been plutocratic; but it is only after the first stage

of the revolution, under the impact of its blows, that the autocracy is becoming bourgeois, both in its agrarian policy and its direct, nationally-organised alliance with certain strata of the bourgeoisie. The autocracy has been nursing the bourgeoisie for a long time now; the bourgeoisie, by means of the ruble, has long been winning its way to "the top", securing influence on legislation and administration, and a place beside the noble aristocracy. But the peculiar feature of the present situation is that the autocracy has been forced to set up a representative assembly for certain strata of the bourgeoisie, to balance between them and the feudalist-landlords, to form an alliance of these sections in the Duma; it has been forced to abandon all the hopes it had placed in the patriarchalism of the muzhik, and to seek support against the rural masses among the rich peasants, who are ruining the village commune.

The autocracy cloaks itself with pseudo-constitutional institutions, but at the same time its class essence is being exposed as never before, owing to the alliance concluded by the tsar with the Purishkeviches and the Guchkovs, and with no one else. The autocracy is attempting to take upon itself the fulfilment of those tasks of the bourgeois revolution which are objectively necessary—the setting-up of a representative assembly of the people which would really manage the affairs of bourgeois society, and the purging of the countryside of medieval, entangled and antiquated agrarian relations. But the practical results of these new steps taken by the autocracy are, so far, exactly nil, and this only shows more clearly than ever that other forces and other means are necessary for the fulfilment of the historical task. In the minds of millions of people inexperienced in politics, the autocracy was hitherto contrasted with popular representation in general; now, the struggle is narrowing its aims, and is more concretely defining its task as the struggle for power in the state, which determines the character and significance of representation itself. That is why the Third Duma marks a special stage in the break-down of the old tsarism, in the intensification of its adventurist character, in the deepening of the old revolutionary aims, in the widening of the field of struggle (and of the numbers taking part in the struggle) for these aims.

We must get over this stage. The present new conditions require new forms of struggle. The use of the Duma tribune is an absolute necessity. A prolonged effort to educate and organise the masses of the proletariat becomes particularly important. The combination of illegal and legal organisation raises special problems before the Party. The popularisation and clarification of the experience of the revolution, which the liberals and liquidationist intellectuals are seeking to discredit, are necessary both for theoretical and practical purposes. But the tactical line of the Party—which must be able to take the new conditions into account in its methods and means of struggle—remains unchanged. The correctness of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics, states one of the resolutions of the conference, is confirmed by the experience of the mass struggle in 1905-07. The defeat of the revolution resulting from this first campaign revealed, not that the tasks were wrong, not that the immediate aims were "utopian", not that the methods and means were mistaken, but that the forces were insufficiently prepared, that the revolutionary crisis was insufficiently wide and deep—and Stolypin and Co. are working to widen and deepen it with most praiseworthy zeal! Let the liberals and terrified intellectuals lose heart after the first genuinely mass battle for freedom, let them repeat like cowards: don't go where you have been beaten before, don't tread that fatal path again. The class-conscious proletariat will answer them: the great wars in history, the great problems of revolutions, were solved only by the advanced classes returning to the attack again and again—and they achieved victory after having learned the lessons of defeat. Defeated armies learn well. The revolutionary classes of Russia have been defeated in their first campaign, but the revolutionary situation remains. In new forms and by other ways, sometimes much more slowly than we would wish, the revolutionary crisis is approaching, coming to a head again. We must carry on with the lengthy work of preparing larger masses for that crisis; this preparation must be more serious, taking account of higher and more concrete tasks; and the more successfully we do this work, the more certain will be our victory in the new struggle. The Russian proletariat can be proud of the fact that in 1905, under its leadership, a nation

of slaves for the first time became a million-strong host, an army of the revolution, striking at tsarism. And now the same proletariat will know how to do persistently, staunchly and patiently the work of educating and training the new cadres of a still mightier revolutionary force.

As we have said, utilisation of the Duma tribune is an essential element of this work of education and training. The conference resolution on the Duma group indicates to our Party that road which comes nearest—if we are to seek instances in history—to the experience of German Social-Democracy at the time of the Anti-Socialist Law. The illegal Party must know how to use, it must learn how to use, the legal Duma group; it must train up the latter into a Party organisation equal to its tasks. The most mistaken tactics, the most regrettable deviation from consistent proletarian work, dictated by the conditions of the present period, would be to raise the question of recalling the group from the Duma (there were two "otzovists" at the conference, but they did not raise the question openly), or to refrain from directly and openly criticising its mistakes and from enumerating them in the resolution (as some delegates insisted at the conference). The resolution fully recognises that the group has committed mistakes for which it was not alone to blame, and which were quite similar to the inevitable mistakes of all our Party organisations. But there are other mistakes—departures from the *political line* of the Party. Since these departures occurred, since they were made by an organisation openly acting in the name of the whole Party, the Party was bound to declare clearly and definitely that these were deviations. In the history of West-European socialist parties there have been a number of instances of abnormal relations between the parliamentary groups and the Party; to this day these relations are quite often abnormal in the Latin countries, where the groups do not display sufficient Party spirit. We must from the very outset organise Social-Democratic parliamentarism in Russia on a different basis; we must at once establish team-work in this field—so that every Social-Democratic deputy may really feel that he has the Party behind him, that the Party is deeply concerned over his mistakes and tries to straighten out his path—so that every Party worker may take part in the general Duma work of the

Party, learning from the practical Marxist criticism of its steps, feeling it his duty to assist it, and striving to gear the special work of the group to the whole propaganda and agitation activity of the Party.

The conference was the first authoritative meeting of delegates from the biggest Party organisations to discuss the work of the Duma Social-Democratic group during the whole session. And the decision of the conference shows very clearly how our Party will shape its Duma work, how very exacting it will be in this field both to itself and to the group, how undeviatingly and consistently it proposes to work on developing genuinely Social-Democratic parliamentarism.

The question of our attitude to the Duma group has a tactical and an organisational aspect. In the latter respect the resolution on the Duma group is only the application of our general principles of organisational policy to a particular case, principles laid down by the conference in the resolution giving instructions on the question of organisation. The conference has recorded that two main tendencies exist in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on this question: one of them throws the weight of emphasis on the illegal Party organisation, the other—which is more or less akin to liquidationism—throws the weight of emphasis on the legal and semi-legal organisations. The point is that the present situation is characterised, as we have already pointed out, by a certain number of Party workers leaving the Party—especially intellectuals, but also some proletarians. The liquidationist trend raises the question as to whether it is the best, the most active elements that are abandoning the Party and choosing the legal organisations as their field of activity, or whether it is the "vacillating intellectualist and petty-bourgeois elements" that are leaving the Party. Needless to say, by emphatically rejecting and condemning liquidationism, the conference replied that it was the latter elements. The most proletarian elements of the Party, and those elements of the intelligentsia that were most consistent in principle and most Social-Democratic, remained true to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The desertions from the Party mean its purification, they mean getting rid of its least stable element,

of its unreliable friends, of its "fellow-travellers" (*Mitläufer*), who always joined the proletariat for a while and who were recruited from among the petty bourgeoisie or from among the "declassed", i.e., people thrown out of the orbit of some definite class.

From this evaluation of the principle of Party organisation logically follows the line of organisational policy adopted by the conference. To strengthen the illegal Party organisation, to create Party cells in all spheres of work, to set up first of all "entirely Party committees consisting of workers, even if their number be small, in each industrial enterprise", to concentrate the functions of leadership in the hands of leaders of the Social-Democratic movement from among the workers themselves—such is the task today. Needless to say, the task of these cells and committees must be to utilise all the semi-legal and, as far as possible, legal organisations, to maintain "close contact with the masses", and to direct the work in such a way that Social-Democracy responds to all the needs of the masses. Every Party cell and workers' committee must become a "base for agitation, propaganda and practical organising work among the masses", i.e., they must go where the masses go, and try at every step to push the consciousness of the masses in the direction of socialism, to link up every specific question with the general tasks of the proletariat, to transform every act of organisation into one of *class* consolidation, to win by dint of energy and ideological influence (not by their ranks and titles, of course) the leading role in all the proletarian legal organisations. Even if these cells and committees be very small at times, they will be linked together by Party tradition and Party organisation, by a definite class programme; and two or three Social-Democratic members of the Party will thus be able to avoid becoming submerged in an amorphous legal organisation and to pursue their *Party* line under all conditions, in all circumstances and in all kinds of situations, to influence their environment in the spirit of the whole Party, and not allow the environment to swallow them up.

Though mass organisations of one type or another may be dissolved, though the legal trade unions may be hounded out of existence, though every open act of workers' initiative

under a regime of counter-revolution may be ruined by the police on one pretext or another—no power on earth can prevent the concentration of masses of workers in a capitalist country, such as Russia has already become. One way or another, legally or semi-legally, openly or covertly, the working class will find its own rallying points; the class-conscious Party Social-Democrats will everywhere and always march in front of the masses, everywhere and always act together in order to influence the masses in the spirit of the Party. And Social-Democracy, which has proved in open revolution that it is the party of the class, the party that succeeded in leading millions in strikes, in the uprising of 1905, as well as in the elections of 1906-07, will now also be able to remain the party of the class, the party of the masses, the vanguard, which in the hardest times will not lose touch with the bulk of the army, but will be able to help the latter overcome these hard times, consolidate its ranks once more, and train more and more new fighters.

Let the Black-Hundred diehards rejoice and howl inside the Duma and outside it, in the capital and in the remote provinces, let the reaction rage—the ever so wise Mr. Stolypin cannot take a single step without bringing the precariously balancing autocracy nearer its fall, without creating a new tangle of political impossibilities and absurdities, without adding new and fresh forces to the ranks of the proletariat and to the ranks of the revolutionary elements of the peasant masses. A party which succeeds in consolidating itself for persistent work in contact with the masses, a party of the advanced class, which succeeds in organising its vanguard, and which directs its forces in such a way as to influence in a Social-Democratic spirit every sign of life of the proletariat—such a party will win no matter what happens.

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ON THE ARTICLE "QUESTIONS OF THE DAY"

The splendid article reprinted here from issue No. 7 of *Rabocheye Znamya*, the organ of the Central Industrial Region, is a reply to an otzovist article published in issue No. 5 of the same newspaper. The otzovist article was published for the purpose of discussion, with a note by the editors of *Rabocheye Znamya* stating that they disagreed with the author. The present article appeared in No. 7 without any comment, so we may take it that the editors agree with the views expressed.

We in *Proletary* have long been strongly opposing otzovism, and have definitely stated that otzovism—to the extent that it is evolving from a mere mood into a *trend*, a system of politics—is departing from revolutionary Marxism and breaking completely with the principles of Bolshevism. After the appearance of this article in the Moscow organ of the Bolsheviks, however, we must admit that we have not raised the question of otzovism sharply enough hitherto, and that we have underestimated the danger which threatened the principles of our Bolshevik wing on the part of those who wish to wed this otzovism to Bolshevism. We record the fact that Comrade Muscovite, the author of the article we reprint, has put the case as strongly, as definitely and with as firm regard for principle as we have done in private discussions with otzovists. Meeting living representatives of otzovism every day, witnessing locally practical examples of otzovist propaganda, which day by day threatens to depart still more from the path of revolutionary Social-Democracy, our Moscow organ was quite justified in presenting the issue in the sharp and uncompromising terms it did. *Either* revolutionary Marxism, i.e.—in Russia—Bolshevism; *or* otzovism, i.e.,

the renunciation of Bolshevism; this is how the Moscow comrade put the question. Thereby he fully supported the way we formulated the question in our preliminary arguments with the otzovist comrades before the general Party conference.

We are aware that some Bolshevik working men at present sympathise with otzovism, but in the majority of cases their "otzovism" is nothing more than a passing *mood*, fostered by the gross mistakes which our Duma group committed; and the remarks of the author of the article and ourselves do not, of course, apply to them. But inasmuch as otzovism is being erected into a theory, reduced to a complete system of politics—by a small group imagining itself to be the representative of "true" revolutionism—a relentless *ideological war* must be launched against it. The author of the article here reproduced is quite right when he defines the arguments of the otzovist in No. 5 of *Rabocheye Znamya* (whose article we reprinted in *Proletary*, No. 39) and the otzovist *trend* in general with its advocacy of a "labour congress", etc. as equivalent to *Menshevism turned inside out*. And he is even more right when he says that the *principles* which certain otzovists urge in support of their trend objectively—whether they are politically conscious of it or not—threaten to lead them to anarcho-syndicalism or to just plain anarchism.

Moscow's way of stating the issue shows how politically short-sighted—for all their good intentions—are those Bolsheviks who refuse to regard otzovism as a danger on grounds of *principle*, who view the matter *merely* as "disagreements on practical points", and who see in otzovism a "sound core", and not the germ of ideological liquidationism on the left. The Moscow comrade's article should convince them that in screening the otzovists ideologically, or even maintaining friendly neutrality towards otzovist ideas, they are bringing grist to the otzovist mill, *becoming their prisoners of war*, damaging the cause of Bolshevism.

Otzovism is *not* Bolshevism, but the worst political travesty of Bolshevism its worst political enemy could invent. There must be *absolute clarity* on this point. We think that all Bolsheviks, down to the smallest circle, should be perfectly clear in their minds what otzovism stands for, should study it thoroughly and ask themselves: is this

not obvious renunciation—under the flag of "revolutionariness" and "Leftism"—of the fine traditions of the old Bolshevism, as it came into being in the period before the revolution and in the fire of the revolution?

That is why we have initiated a discussion on these questions in *Proletary*. We have published *everything* that was sent to us, and reprinted all that Bolsheviks in Russia have written on the subject. So far, we have not rejected a *single* contribution to the discussion, and we shall continue to pursue the same course. Unfortunately, the otzovist comrades and those who sympathise with them have, so far, sent us little material, and, in general, have avoided making a frank and complete statement of their theoretical *credo* in the press. They prefer to talk "among themselves". We invite all comrades, otzovists and orthodox Bolsheviks alike, to state their views in the columns of *Proletary*. If necessary we shall publish these contributions in pamphlet form. Ideological clarity and consistency—this is what we need, particularly in these difficult times.

We shall leave it to the gentlemen of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party to play down their dissensions, and to congratulate themselves on their "unanimity" at a moment when people are justly saying about them: "You can find anything you like among them—from Popular-Socialist liberalism to liberalism with a bomb."

We shall leave the Mensheviks to their ideological hobnobbing with Cherevanin and Co. Let them practise their double dealing (renouncing Cherevanin in the German press, and embracing him in the Russian); let them cohabit with the ideological liquidators of the fundamental principles of revolutionary Marxism; let them play down their disagreements, and display all their virtuosity in the paste-pot art as they did in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (No. 10-11), where they "resolved" their differences with Plekhanov by the simple device of papering them over.[133]

Our supporters should not be afraid of an internal ideological struggle, once it is necessary. They will be all the stronger for it. It is our *duty* to bring our disagreements out into the open, the more so since, in point of fact, the whole Party is beginning to line up more and more with our trend. We call on our Bolshevik comrades for *ideologi-*

cal clarity and for the sweeping away of all backstairs gossip, from whatever source it may come. There are no end of people who would like to see the ideological struggle on momentous cardinal issues side-tracked into petty squabbles, like those conducted by the Mensheviks after the Second Congress. Such people must not be tolerated in the ranks of the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik working men should strongly discourage such attempts and insist on one thing, and one thing alone: *ideological clarity*, *definite opinions*, *a line based on principle*. Once this complete ideological clarity is achieved, all Bolsheviks will be able on matters of organisation to display the unanimity and solidarity that our wing of the Party has always displayed hitherto.

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THE AIM OF THE PROLETARIAN STRUGGLE IN OUR REVOLUTION

In the article printed above, Comrade Martov touches upon an extremely important question or, rather, series of questions concerning the aim the proletariat and the Social-Democrats are fighting for in our revolution. He touches upon the history of the discussion of these questions in our Party, upon their relation to the principles of Marxism and to Narodism and upon all the shades of opinion that have been expressed on the subject. He touches upon all aspects of the question, but does not clear up a single one of them. To come to the nub of the matter we must make a systematic survey of the question in all its aspects.

I

We shall begin with the history of the discussion of this question by the Russian Social-Democrats. It was brought up by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks at the beginning of 1905. The former answered it with the "formula": revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry (cf. *Vperyod*,[134] No. 14, April 12, 1905*). The latter flatly rejected this definition of the class content of a victorious bourgeois revolution. The Third (Bolshevik) Congress held in London in May 1905 and the Menshevik conference held at the same time in Geneva, officially expressed the views of the two sections of the Party. In keeping with the spirit of the times, both sections of the Party in their resolutions dealt, not with the theoretical and general

* See present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 293-303.—*Ed.*

question of the aim of the struggle and the class content of a victorious revolution in general, but with the narrower question of a provisional revolutionary government. The Bolshevik resolution read: "... The establishment of a democratic republic in Russia will be possible only as the result of a victorious popular uprising, whose organ will be a provisional revolutionary government.... Subject to the relation of forces and other factors which cannot be determined exactly beforehand, representatives of our Party may participate in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against all attempts at counter-revolution, and of defending the independent interests of the working class." The Menshevik resolution read: "... Social-Democracy must not set out to seize power or share it with anyone in the provisional government, but must remain the party of extreme revolutionary opposition."

It is evident from the above that the Bolsheviks themselves, at an all-Bolshevik Congress, *did not include* in their official resolution any such "formula" as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but stated *only* that it was permissible to participate in the provisional government, and that it was the "mission" of the proletariat to "play the leading role" (resolution on armed uprising). The ''formula'': "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry", given in the Bolshevik press before the Third Congress, was repeated in the pamphlet *Two Tactics** after that Congress, and it never entered anybody's head to accuse the Bolsheviks of saying one thing in their resolutions and another thing in their commentaries. It never entered anybody's head to demand that the resolutions of a mass party engaged in political struggle should tally, word for word, with the formulas giving a Marxist definition of the class content of a victorious revolution.

Another important conclusion to be drawn from our historical enquiry is this. In the spring of 1905 the *key issue* of the controversy for both sections of the Party was the *conquest of power* by the proletariat and the revolutionary classes in general, and neither section went into the question of what the relations between these classes conquering

* See present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 15-140.—*Ed.*

power might or should be. As we have seen, the Mensheviks reject both the seizing and the sharing of power. The Bolsheviks speak of the "leading role of the proletariat in the revolution" (resolution on the armed uprising) and say that Social-Democrats "may" participate in a provisional government; that the "independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which aims at the complete socialist revolution should be firmly safeguarded" (resolution on the provisional revolutionary government); that the revolutionary movement of the peasants should be "supported", that "the revolutionary-democratic content of the peasant movement should be cleared of reactionary impurities", that "the revolutionary consciousness of the peasants should be developed, and their democratic demands carried to their logical conclusion" (resolution on the attitude to be adopted to the peasant movement). The resolutions of the Bolshevik Congress of 1905 contain no other "formulas" on the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry.

Now let us take the draft resolutions of the two sections a year later, before the Stockholm Congress. These drafts are often forgotten or ignored in the press in general, and in our Party in particular. That is a great pity, for their significance in the history of the tactical principles of Social-Democracy is enormous. It is these draft resolutions which show what lessons the two sections of the Party drew from the experience of the struggles of October and December 1905.

The Bolsheviks in their draft resolution on the class aims of the proletariat write: "Only the proletariat can bring the democratic revolution to its consummation, the condition being that the proletariat, as the only thoroughly revolutionary class in modern society, leads the mass of the peasantry, and imparts political consciousness to its spontaneous struggle against landed proprietorship and the feudal state" (repeated in the draft resolution for the London Congress, see *Proletary*, No. 14, March 4, 1907*).

Thus the "formula" which the Bolsheviks here chose for themselves reads: the proletariat *leading* the peasantry. The Bolshevik resolutions contain no other formula to express the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the

* See present edition, Vol. 12, p. 139.—*Ed.*

proletariat and the peasantry. This fact cannot be too strongly emphasised, for it is in the hope of its being forgotten or ignored that Comrade Martov attempts to place the resolution adopted at the December Conference of 1908 in a totally false light.

The Mensheviks in their draft resolution (reprinted in Lenin's "Report", pp. 68-70, from *Partiiniye Izvestia*[135]) say that it is the task of the proletariat "to be the driving force of the bourgeois revolution". Please note: not the "leader", not the "guide", as the Bolshevik resolution says, but the "driving force". And among the tasks enumerated is that of "supporting by mass pressure such oppositional steps of the bourgeois democrats as do not clash with the demands in our programme, as may promote their fulfilment and become the point of departure for the further advancement of the revolution".

Thus, the difference between them is reduced by the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks themselves to the alternative: "leader" and "guide" of the revolution, who "leads" the peasantry, *or* "driving force of the revolution", which "supports" the various steps taken by the bourgeois democrats. We would add that the Mensheviks, who were the victors at the Stockholm Congress, *themselves withdrew* this resolution in spite of the protests and insistence of the Bolsheviks. Why did the Mensheviks do it? The reader will find the answer to this question when he reads the following passage from the same Menshevik draft resolution: "The proletariat can properly fulfil its task as the driving force of the bourgeois revolution only by organising itself while at the same time drawing more and more new sections of the town bourgeoisie and the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle, democratising their demands, stimulating them to organise and thereby paving the way for the victory of the revolution."

This is obviously a half-hearted concession to the Bolsheviks, for the proletariat is depicted not only as a driving force, but to some extent at least as a leader, since it "draws" and "stimulates" the peasantry and new sections of the town bourgeoisie.

To proceed. On the question of the provisional government, the Menshevik draft resolution reads: "In the event of a general revolutionary upsurge in the country, the

Social-Democrats must everywhere promote the formation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies, stimulate other revolutionary-democratic elements to form similar bodies, promote the union of all these bodies into general non-party organisations of popular revolutionary struggle, putting before them those general national tasks of the revolution which from the proletarian point of view can and should be fulfilled at the given stage of the revolution" (ibid., p. 91).

This forgotten draft resolution of the Mensheviks clearly shows that the experience of October-December 1905 completely bewildered the Mensheviks, who surrendered their position to the Bolsheviks. Indeed, is the passage quoted above compatible with the following point in the same draft: "The Social-Democrats must not set out to seize power and establish a dictatorship in the present bourgeois revolution" (p. 92)? This last proposition is quite consistent in principle, and (except where it refers to "sharing power") is an exact repetition of the resolution of 1905. But it hopelessly contradicts the lessons of October-December 1905 which the Mensheviks *themselves reduce to the union of all bodies* of the proletariat and "*other revolutionary-democratic elements*" into "general non-party organisations of popular revolutionary struggle"! If the Soviets of Workers' Deputies "unite" with *similar* revolutionary-democratic bodies into non-party organisations of popular revolutionary struggle, it is obvious that the proletariat *does* set out to "seize power and establish a dictatorship", that it *is taking part* in such seizure of power. The resolution itself says that "the main object" of the revolution is to "wrest political power from the hands of the reactionary government". Although shying at the words "seizure of power and dictatorship", and renouncing these terrible things in the most emphatic manner, the Mensheviks *were forced to admit* after 1905 that the "union" of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies with "similar" revolutionary-democratic bodies followed logically from the course of events, and that this *union* must result in the formation of "*general* non-party" (this is not quite correct; it should have read: non-party or inter-party) "organisations of popular revolutionary struggle". But this *general organisation* is nothing else than a provisional revolutionary government! Afraid to use the exact and direct term, the

Mensheviks replaced it by a *description*; but that does not alter matters. "An organ of popular revolutionary struggle", that "wrests political power" from the hands of the old government is nothing more nor less than a provisional revolutionary government.

While the Mensheviks had to take into account the lessons of October-December 1905 after much blundering and stumbling, the Bolsheviks arrived at their conclusions directly and clearly. The Bolshevik draft resolution on the provisional government declares: "In this open struggle [at the end of 1905] those elements among the local population who were capable of determined action against the old regime (almost exclusively the proletariat and the advanced sections of the petty bourgeoisie) were impelled by necessity to set up organisations which were in effect the rudiments of a new revolutionary authority—the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in St. Petersburg, Moscow and other cities, the Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies in Vladivostok, Krasnoyarsk, etc., the Railwaymen's Committees in Siberia and in the south, the Peasant Committees in Saratov Gubernia, the Revolutionary City Committees in Novorossiisk and elsewhere and, lastly, the elected rural bodies in the Caucasus and the Baltic region" (p. 92). The failure of these bodies was due to their disunited and rudimentary state, we read further, while the provisional revolutionary government is defined as the "organ of victorious uprising". The resolution goes on to say: "In order to carry the revolution through to victory, the proletariat is now faced with the urgent task of promoting, jointly with the revolutionary democrats, the unification of the insurrection and of forming a co-ordinating centre for this insurrection in the shape of a provisional revolutionary government." Then follows an almost verbatim repetition of the resolution passed by the Third Congress in 1905.

These quotations from the draft resolutions of the two sections before the Stockholm Congress enable us to put the question of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry on a concrete historical basis. Anyone who desires to give a clear and straightforward answer to this question must take into account the experience of the end of 1905. Those who evade examining this experience

will not only be ignoring material of the utmost value to a Russian Marxist. They will furthermore inevitably doom themselves to the "pettifogging" interpretation of formulas, to "slurring over" and "pasting over" (to use Comrade Martov's apt expression) disagreements on matters of principle and to that very unprincipled floundering on questions of the theory and practice of "dictatorship" that is expressed best of all by the formula: "The movement is everything, the ultimate aim—nothing."[136]

The experience of the end of 1905 has undoubtedly proved that "a general revolutionary upsurge in the country" produces special "organisations of popular revolutionary struggle" (according to the Menshevik formula) or "rudimentary organs of a new revolutionary authority" (according to that of the Bolsheviks). It is equally beyond doubt that in the history of the Russian bourgeois revolution these organs were created, first, by the proletariat, and secondly "by other revolutionary-democratic elements"; and a simple reference to the composition of the population of Russia in general, and of Great Russia in particular, will show that the peasantry represent the vast majority of these other elements. Lastly, no less beyond doubt is the historical tendency of these local bodies or organisations to amalgamate. The conclusion that inevitably follows from these undoubted facts is that a victorious revolution in present-day Russia *cannot be* anything but the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Nobody can get away from this inevitable conclusion, except by "pettifogging" and "pasting over" disagreements! If fragments of the question are not torn from their context, if town and country and the various localities are not artificially and arbitrarily separated, if the question of the composition of this or that *government* is not substituted for the question of the dictatorship of *classes*—in short, if the question is examined *as a whole*, then nobody can prove by concrete examples taken from the experience of 1905 that a victorious revolution could be anything else than the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

But before going any further, let us finish with the Party history of the "formula" we are examining. We have seen how the two sections precisely formulated their views in

1905 and in 1906. In 1907, on the eve of the London Congress, the Mensheviks first proposed one draft resolution on the attitude towards the bourgeois parties (*Narodnaya Duma*,[137] 1907, No. 12, March 24, 1907) and at the Congress itself they proposed another. The first draft talks about "combining" the actions of the proletariat with the actions of other classes; the second talks about "utilising" the movement of other classes "for the aims" of the proletariat, and about "support" by the proletariat of certain "oppositional and revolutionary steps" made by other classes, and about Social-Democrats entering into "agreements" with the liberal and democratic classes in "certain definite cases".

The Bolshevik draft, like the resolution adopted by the London Congress, says that the Social-Democrats should "compel them [the Narodnik or Trudovik parties "which more or less closely express the interests and the viewpoint of the broad mass of the peasants and the town petty bourgeoisie"] to side with the Social-Democrats against the Black Hundreds and the Cadets" and that the "joint actions following from this" should "serve only to promote a general onset". The resolution as adopted by the Congress differs from the Bolsheviks' draft in that it contains the additional words, inserted on the initiative of a Polish delegate: "in the struggle to carry the revolution through to victory". This, once again, most clearly reaffirmed the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry; for such a dictatorship *is* "joint action" by these classes, which have "*carried*, or are carrying, the revolution through to victory"!

II

We have only to take a general glance at the history of Party opinions on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry to see how much damage Comrade Martov has done himself by his talk about pettifogging and movements without a goal. Indeed, the first thing that this history shows is that the Bolsheviks themselves have *never*, either in their drafts or in their resolutions, inserted the expression or "formula"—"dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry". Nevertheless, up till now, *no one* has ever thought of denying that *all* the Bolshevik drafts

and resolutions between 1905 and 1907 are based *entirely* on the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. It would be absurd to deny it, for to do so would indeed be pettifoggery and an attempt to obscure the *real* issue with a mere quibbling over words. The proletariat which "*allies to itself*" the mass of the peasantry, said Lenin in *Two Tactics* (*Twelve Years*, p. 445*); the proletariat which "*leads*" the mass of the peasantry, says the draft resolution of the Bolsheviks in 1906; "joint actions" of the proletariat and the peasantry "in the struggle to carry the democratic revolution through to victory", says the resolution of the London Congress. Is it not obvious that the same idea runs through all these formulations, that this idea is precisely the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat *and* the peasantry, that the "formula", the proletariat *relying upon* the peasantry, *remains part and parcel* of that same dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry?

Comrade Martov tries his hardest to confute this latter proposition. He starts a discussion about the word "*and*". There is no "and"; the formula with "and" in it was rejected!—exclaims Comrade Martov. Don't dare now to put this "and" into unsigned articles in the Central Organ. Too late, too late, dear Comrade Martov: you should have addressed this demand to *all* the Bolshevik organs of the press during the *whole* period of the revolution. All of them, all the time, spoke about the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, and did so on the basis of resolutions which did not contain *this* "*and*". Comrade Martov has lost this battle of principle over the word "and"; and he has lost it not only because it was belated, but also because her majesty Logic has ruled that "allying to" *and* "leading" *and* "joint actions" *and* "relying upon" *and* "with the help of" (this last expression occurs in the resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Polish Social-Democrats[138]) all come within the meaning of the offending "and".

But the Bolsheviks objected to "relying upon", says Comrade Martov, continuing his debate on principles. Yes, they did object; not because it controverted the dictator-

* See present edition, Vol. 9, p. 100.—*Ed.*

ship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but because in Russian this "formula" does not sound very well. Usually, it is the weak who rely on the strong. The Bolsheviks are quite willing to accept word for word the Polish formula, "the proletariat *with the help* of the peasantry"—although perhaps it would have been better to say, "the proletariat leading the peasantry". One may argue about all these formulas, but to convert *such* an argument into a "debate on principles" is simply ridiculous. Comrade Martov's attempt to deny that "relying upon" is part of the concept of *joint* action is a model of pettifoggery. Comrade Martov quotes Dan, Axelrod and Semyonov as saying that the conquest of power "by the proletariat, relying upon the peasantry", means conquest of power by "the proletariat *alone*"; but this can only make the reader smile. If we were to say that Martov and Potresov, *relying upon* Cherevanin, Prokopovich and Co., have liquidated the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution, would anyone take that to mean that Martov and Potresov liquidated this idea *alone*, *without* Cherevanin, Prokopovich and Co.?

No, comrades, a discussion in the Central Organ should not be reduced to pettifoggery. Such methods will not help you to wriggle out of admitting the fundamental and undoubted fact that the majority of the R.S.D.L.P., including the Poles and the Bolsheviks, stand firmly for (1) recognition of the guiding role of the proletariat, the role of leader, in the revolution, (2) recognition that the aim of the struggle is the conquest of power by the proletariat assisted by other revolutionary classes, (3) recognition that the first and perhaps the sole "assistants" in this matter are the peasants. Those who want to discuss the real issue should try to challenge at least one of these three propositions. Comrade Martov has not examined a single one of them seriously. He forgot to tell his readers that *on each* of these three formulas the Mensheviks hold a view which the Party has *rejected*, and that Menshevism and Menshevism alone is the *delusion which the Party has rejected*! And that was what the Mensheviks' policy was during the revolution—a movement without a goal, and therefore *dependent* on the vagaries of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. And this was the case precisely because the Mensheviks did not know whether the

proletariat should aspire to be the leader, whether it should aspire to the conquest of power, and whether in doing so it should rely on the assistance of any other particular class. This ignorance inevitably dooms the Social-Democrats' policy to uncertainty, error, sacrifice of principle and dependence on the liberals.

The conference did not bury the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry", and did not authorise its elimination from the Party's vocabulary. On the contrary, the conference *endorsed* it, and took *another step* towards its fuller recognition. The London Congress recognised (1) the role of the proletariat as "leader in the bourgeois-democratic revolution", and (2) "joint actions" of the proletariat and the peasantry which were to "serve only for the purpose of a general onset", actions, too, by the way, for "carrying the revolution through to victory". All that remained was to recognise that the aim of the struggle in this revolution was the conquest of power by the proletariat and the peasantry. This the conference did in the formula: "The conquest of power by the proletariat, relying on the peasantry."

In saying this we do not in the least deny or play down the differences of opinion between the Bolsheviks and the Poles. The Polish Social-Democrats have every opportunity to voice these differences in their own publications in the Russian language, in the columns of the Bolshevik press, and in the Central Organ. The Polish Social-Democrats have already begun to avail themselves of this opportunity. If Comrade Martov achieves his object, and succeeds in bringing the Polish Social-Democrats into our dispute, each and all will see that we are at one with the Polish Social-Democrats against the Mensheviks on all essentials, and that we disagree only on minor points.

III

As for Trotsky, whom Comrade Martov has involved in the controversy of third parties which he has organised—a controversy involving everybody except the dissentient—we positively cannot go into a full examination of his views here. A separate article of considerable length would be needed for this. By just touching upon Trotsky's mis-

taken views, and quoting scraps of them, Comrade Martov only sows confusion in the mind of the reader, for scraps of quotations do not explain but confuse matters. Trotsky's major mistake is that he ignores the bourgeois character of the revolution and has no clear conception of the transition from this revolution to the socialist revolution. This major mistake leads to those mistakes on side issues which Comrade Martov *repeats* when he quotes a couple of them with sympathy and approval. Not to leave matters in the confused state to which Comrade Martov has reduced them by his exposition, we shall at least expose the fallacy of those arguments of Trotsky which have won the approval of Comrade Martov. A coalition of the proletariat and the peasantry "presupposes either that the peasantry will come under the sway of one of the existing bourgeois parties, or that it will form a powerful independent party". This is obviously untrue both from the standpoint of general theory and from that of the experience of the Russian revolution. A "coalition" of classes *does not at all* presuppose *either* the existence of any particular powerful party, *or* parties in general. This is only confusing classes with parties. A "coalition" of the specified classes *does not in the least* imply *either* that one of the existing bourgeois parties will establish its sway over the peasantry *or* that the peasants should form a powerful independent party! Theoretically this is clear because, first, the peasants do not lend themselves very well to party organisation; and because, secondly, the formation of peasant parties is an extremely difficult and lengthy process in a bourgeois revolution, so that a "powerful independent" party may emerge only towards the end of the revolution. The experience of the Russian revolution shows that "coalitions" of the proletariat and the peasantry were formed *scores and hundreds of times*, in the most diverse forms, without any "powerful independent party" of the peasantry. Such a coalition was formed when there was "joint action", between, say, a Soviet of Workers' Deputies and a Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, or a Railwaymen's Strike Committee, or Peasants' Deputies, etc. All these organisations were mainly *non-party*; nevertheless, every joint action between them undoubtedly represented a "coalition" of *classes*. In the course of this a peasant party took shape as an idea, in germ, com-

ing into being in the form of the Peasant Union of 1905,[139] or the Trudovik group of 1906—and *as* such a party grew, developed and constituted itself, the coalition of *classes* assumed different forms, from the vague and unofficial to definite and official political agreements. After the dissolution of the First Duma, for example, the following *three* calls for insurrection were issued: (1) "To the Army and Navy" (2) "To all the Russian Peasants", (3) "To the Whole People". The first was signed by the Social-Democratic group in the Duma and the Committee of the Trudovik group. Was this "joint action" evidence of *a coalition of two classes*? Of course it was. To deny it means to engage in pettifoggery, or to transform the broad scientific concept of a "coalition of classes" into a narrow, juridical concept, almost that—I would say—of a notary. Further, can it be denied that this joint *call* for insurrection, signed by the Duma deputies of the working class and peasantry, was accompanied by joint *actions* of representatives of both classes in the form of partial local insurrections? Can it be denied that a joint call for a general insurrection and joint participation in local and partial insurrections necessarily implies the joint formation of a provisional revolutionary government? To deny it would mean to engage in pettifoggery, to reduce the concept of "government" to something completely and formally constituted, to forget that the complete and formally constituted develop from the incomplete and unconstituted.

To proceed. The second call for insurrection was signed by the *Central Committee* (Menshevik!) of the R.S.D.L.P. and also the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary. Party, the All-Russian Peasant Union, the All-Russian Railwaymen's and the All-Russian Teachers' Unions, as well as by the Committee of the Trudovik group and the Social-Democratic group in the Duma. The third call for insurrection bears the signatures of the Polish Socialist Party and the Bund,[140] plus all the foregoing signatures except the three unions.

That was a fully constituted political coalition of parties and non-party organisations! That was "the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" *proclaimed* in the form of a threat to tsarism, in the form of a call to the whole

people, but not yet realised! And today one will hardly find many Social-Democrats who would agree with the Menshevik *Sotsial-Demokrat*[141] of 1906, No. 6, which wrote of these appeals: "In this case our Party concluded with other revolutionary parties and groups not a political bloc, but a fighting agreement, which we have always considered expedient and necessary" (cf. *Proletary*, No. 1, August 21, 1906 and No. 8, November 23, 1906*). A fighting agreement cannot be contraposed to a political bloc, for the latter concept embraces the former. A political bloc at various historical moments takes the form either of "a fighting agreement" in connection with insurrection, or of a parliamentary agreement for "joint action against the Black Hundreds and Cadets", and so on. The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has found its practical expression throughout our revolution in a thousand forms, from the signing of the manifesto calling upon the people to pay no taxes and to withdraw their deposits from the savings-banks (December 1905), or the signing of calls to insurrection (July 1906), to voting in the Second and Third Dumas in 1907 and 1908.

Trotsky's second statement quoted by Comrade Martov is wrong too. It is not true that "the whole question is, who will determine the government's policy, who will constitute a homogeneous majority in it", and so forth. And it is particularly untrue when Comrade Martov uses it as an argument against the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Trotsky himself, in the course of his argument, concedes that "representatives of the democratic population will take part" in the "workers' government", i.e., concedes that there will be a government consisting of representatives of the proletariat *and* the peasantry. On what terms the proletariat will take part in the government of the revolution is, quite another question, and it is quite likely that on this question the Bolsheviks will disagree not only with Trotsky, but also with the Polish Social-Democrats. The question of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes; however, cannot be reduced to a question of the "majority" in any particular revolutionary government, or of the terms

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 150-66 and 307-19.—*Ed.*

on which the participation of the Social-Democrats in such a government is admissible.

Lastly, the most fallacious of Trotsky's opinions that Comrade Martov quotes and considers to be "just" is the third, viz.: "even if they [the peasantry] do this ["support the regime of working-class democracy"] with no more political understanding than they usually support a bourgeois regime." The proletariat cannot count on the ignorance and prejudices of the peasantry as the powers that be under a bourgeois regime count and depend on them, nor can it assume that in time of revolution the peasantry will remain in their usual state of political ignorance and passivity. The history of the Russian revolution shows that the very first wave of the upsurge at the end of 1905, at once stimulated the peasantry to form a political organisation (the All-Russian Peasant Union) which was undoubtedly the embryo of a distinct peasant party. Both in the First and Second Dumas—in spite of the fact that the counter-revolution had wined out the first contingents of advanced peasants—the peasantry, now for the first time acting on a nation-wide scale in the Russian general elections, immediately laid the foundations of the Trudovik group, which was undoubledly the embryo of a distinct peasant party. In these embryos and rudiments there was much that was unstable, vague and vacillating: that is beyond doubt. But if political groups like this could spring up at the beginning of the revolution, there cannot be the slightest doubt that a revolution carried to such a "conclusion", or rather, to such a high stage of development as a revolutionary dictatorship, will produce a more definitely constituted and stronger revolutionary peasant party. To think otherwise would be like supposing that some vital organs of an adult can retain the size, shape and development of infancy.

In any case, Comrade Martov's conclusion that the conference agreed with Trotsky, of all people, on the question of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry in the struggle for power is an amazing contradiction of the facts, is an attempt to read into a *word* a meaning that was never discussed, not mentioned and not even thought of at the conference.

IV

Comrade Martov touches on Kautsky, and in doing so manages once more to pack so many inaccuracies in so few words that to answer him to the point we are obliged to tell the reader the whole story practically from the beginning.

The statement that "many, including Lenin in his preface to Kautsky's article on *Prospects*,* emphatically denied the bourgeois character of our revolution" is utterly false as also is the statement that Kautsky "has declared that the Russian revolution is not bourgeois". The facts are entirely different.

Plekhanov put questions to a number of representatives of the international Social-Democratic movement. His first question was about the "*general character*" of the Russian revolution, and the second was about "the attitude of the Social-Democratic Party towards the bourgeois democrats who are fighting in their own way for political liberty". In formulating the questions in this way Comrade Plekhanov committed two errors against Marxism. First, he confused the "general character" of the revolution, *its social and economic content*, with the question of the motive forces of the revolution. Marxists must not confuse these questions; they must not even *directly* deduce the answer to the second question from the answer to the first without a special concrete analysis. Secondly, he confused the role of the peasantry in our revolution with the role of the bourgeois democracy in general. Actually both the peasantry and the liberals are covered by the scientific term: "bourgeois democracy"; but the attitude of the proletariat towards these two varieties of "bourgeois democracy" must of necessity differ materially.

Kautsky immediately detected Comrade Plekhanov's errors and *corrected them* in his reply. As regards the social and economic content of the revolution, Kautsky did not deny its bourgeois character—on the contrary, he definitely recognised it. Here are Kautsky's statements relevant to the point as quoted in those same *Prospects* which have been so utterly garbled by Comrade Martov.

* See present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 408-13.—*Ed.*

"The present revolution [in Russia] in its effect on the countryside can lead only to the creation of a strong peasantry on the basis of private property in land, and thereby create as wide a gulf between the proletariat and the property-owning section of the rural population as exists already in Western Europe. Therefore one cannot imagine that the present Russian revolution would lead immediately to the introduction of the socialist mode of production, even if it temporarily gave the reins of government to the Social-Democrats" (p. 31 of the Russian translation edited by N. Lenin).

It was this passage that prompted the following words in Lenin's preface (p. 6, ibid.). "Needless to say, Kautsky *fully* agrees with the fundamental thesis of *all* Russian Social-Democrats that the peasant movement is *non-socialist*, that socialism cannot arise from small peasant production, etc." (Lenin's italics in the preface).

Comrade Martov's assertion that Lenin positively denied the bourgeois character of our revolution is positively at variance with the truth. Lenin says just the opposite. Kautsky definitely recognised that in its general character, i.e., in its social and economic content, our revolution is bourgeois.

Plekhanov's "first question"—wrote Kautsky in this article—"cannot, it seems to me, be given a simple answer, one way or the other. The time for bourgeois revolutions, i.e., revolutions in which the bourgeoisie is the motive force, has passed; it has passed for Russia too.... The bourgeoisie is not one of the motive forces of the present revolutionary movement in Russia, and that being the case, this movement cannot be called bourgeois" (p. 29). As the reader sees, Kautsky here makes it perfectly clear what he is discussing: he is perfectly clearly speaking of a bourgeois revolution, *not* in the sense of its social and economic content, *but* in the sense of a revolution "of which the bourgeoisie is the motive force".

To proceed. Kautsky corrected Plekhanov's second mistake by drawing a clear and definite distinction between "liberal" and peasant bourgeois democracy. Kautsky stated that "the revolutionary strength of Russian Social-Democracy lies in the community of interests of the industrial prole-

tariat and the peasantry", that "without the peasants we cannot now gain the victory in Russia" (p. 31). Apropos of the dull question of the word "*and*" which monopolises Comrade Martov's discussion of principle, it is interesting to note that in this same article, i.e., in 1906, Kautsky employs *on one and the same page* the expression "*rely*" ("on what class can the Russian proletariat rely?") and the expression: "*the alliance between the proletariat and other classes* in the revolutionary struggle must primarily be based on community of economic interests" (p. 30).

Perhaps Comrade Martov will accuse Karl Kautsky, will say that in 1906—in anticipation of the December 1908 Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.—Kautsky set out to "mislead the readers", to "slur over" and "paste over" the differences between the Bolsheviks and the Polish Social-Democrats, to "engage in pettifoggery", and so forth?

We may point out that, in advocating the idea of an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in the Russian bourgeois revolution, Kautsky is not proposing anything "new", but is entirely following in the footsteps of Marx and Engels. In 1848, Marx wrote in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*[142]: "The big bourgeoisie," i.e., the German bourgeoisie after March 18, 1848—"anti-revolutionary from the very outset, concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with reaction out of fear of the people, that is to say, the workers and the democratic, bourgeoisie" (see Volume III of Marx's *Collected Works* published by Mehring; so far only two volumes have appeared in Russian). "The German revolution of 1848," wrote Marx on July 29, 1848, "is a mere travesty of the French Revolution of 1789.... The French bourgeoisie of 1789 did not abandon its allies the peasants for a moment.... The German bourgeoisie of 1848 is betraying the peasants without the slightest compunction...."

Here in relation to a *bourgeois* revolution Marx is clearly contraposing the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie allied with reaction to the working class allied with the democraic bourgeoisie, i.e., primarily the peasantry. And this view can hardly be put down to the fact that Marx's socialist world-outlook had not fully crystallised at that time. Forty-four years later, in 1892, in his article, "Historical Materialism" (*Neue Zeit*, XI, Vol. I, published in Russian

in the symposium *Historical Materialism*) Engels wrote the following: "...In all the three great bourgeois risings [the Reformation and Peasant War in the sixteenth century in Germany, the English Revolution of the seventeenth century and the French in the eighteenth] the peasantry furnishes the army that has to do the fighting.... Had it not been for that yeomanry [in the English Revolution] and for the plebeian element in the towns, the bourgeoisie alone would never have fought the matter out to the bitter end, and would never have brought Charles I to the scaffold."[143]

Consequently, the specific feature of the Russian bourgeois revolution is merely that instead of the plebeian element of the towns taking second place as it did in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it is the proletariat which is taking first place in the twentieth century.

V

To conclude. Comrade Martov has touched on an extremely important question that deserves discussing very thoroughly in the columns of the Party's Central Organ. But it is not a question to "touch on", it must be examined in great detail, in the light not only of the teachings of Marx and Engels but also of the experience of the Russian Revolution of 1905-07.

The suggestion that the idea of a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry is the result of a Narodnik spell cast over the Social-Democrats can only provoke a smile. If that were true, the quasi-Marxists who argue in this way should first of all have accused Kautsky, Marx and Engels of falling under the Narodnik spell. In all the great bourgeois revolutions decisive victory could be achieved only by the proletariat (more or less developed) in alliance with the peasantry; and the same holds true for the bourgeois revolution in Russia. In the experience of 1905-07 the truth of this was given a *practical* demonstration by *every* important turn in events: for in practice all decisive actions, both "combative" and parliamentary, were actually "joint actions" of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Our Party holds firmly to the view that the role of the proletariat is the *role of leader* in the bourgeois-democratic revolution; that *joint actions* of the proletariat and the peasantry are essential to carry it through to victory; that unless *political power is won* by the revolutionary classes, victory is impossible. Rejection of these truths must inevitably doom Social-Democrats to vacillation, to "movement without a goal", to advocating casual agreements with complete disregard for principle, and in practice means falling captive to the Cadets, i.e., making the working class dependent upon the liberal-monarchist, counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

Sotsial-Demokrat, Nos. 3 and 4, March 9 (22) and March 21 (April 3), 1909
Signed: *N. Lenin*

Published according to the text in *Sotsial-Demokrat*

TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY[144]

The article headed "The Question of Organisation in the Russian Social-Democratic Party" printed in No. 79 of *Vorwärts* (I. Beilage, d. 3. IV. 1909) obliges us to address a strong protest to the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Labour Party. On behalf of the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, which has charged us to look after its affairs abroad, we ask the Executive Committee of the German S.D.P. to give careful attention to the extremely abnormal situation which has been created. The Central Organ of German Social-Democracy persistently ignores our formal statement that a special representative body of the C.C. exists abroad, and does not print the report about this institution and its address, which were sent to the paper a long time ago. At the same time *Vorwärts* prints a report "From a Comrade" and sets forth in this report an *official* Party event, namely the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., *without giving the official text* of the (two) resolutions of the conference on the question of organisation. By not giving the official Party resolutions the letter published in *Vorwärts* gives an entirely distorted version of the disputes and differences among the Russian Social-Democrats; what is more, the letter contains a covert factional polemic against the decisions of the conference. Such a form of polemics is liable more than ever to poison the already abnormal relations between the groups within the R.S.D.L.P. Such a form of polemics arouses particular irritation and resentment, while at the same time making

it more difficult to explain to the German comrades the real state of affairs and differences within our Party.

Therefore the Bureau Abroad of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. requests the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party to consider the question of reporting Russian differences in *Vorwärts*, and of the publication in *Vorwärts* of articles on Russian affairs, as well as official communications from the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. and official texts of Party resolutions adopted by the R.S.D.L.P.

The Bureau Abroad of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. asks the Executive Committee to adopt a decision as to whether Party life of the Russian Social-Democrats can be reported in *Vorwärts* without giving official information from their C.C. and the official texts of Party resolutions.

As regards the substance of the matter, the Bureau Abroad of the C.C. thinks it essential to point out—among the boundless number of distortions of the truth in this article—at least the following three *main* untruths; to enumerate *all* the misstatements would necessitate the writing of a pamphlet.

(1) The first resolution on the question of organisation adopted by the conference records the fact that in the R.S.D.L.P. there are *two* currents of opinion on the basic questions of organisation. In this resolution the Party condemns the current which is characterised as "liquidationist", i.e., in effect aiming at the destruction of the present R.S.D.L.P. Not only all the Bolsheviks and all the members of the Polish Social-Democratic Party voted for this resolution, but also two delegates from the Bund, out of the three Bundist delegates present.

(2) In the resolution on the assessment of the present situation, proposed by the Bolsheviks and adopted by the Party, it is pointed out at the very beginning that the old feudal autocracy is decaying, making a further step on the road of transformation into a bourgeois monarchy. The Mensheviks did not offer any draft of their own but voted against this resolution, moving the solitary amendment that the word "bourgeois" should be changed to "plutocratic".

(3) The representatives of the Social-Democrats of the Ukraine did not support and could not support the Mensheviks, because there were no representatives of the Ukraine

at the conference. As for the Polish Socialist Party being in agreement with the Mensheviks, this Party did not participate and could not participate in the conference, since this Party is not a member of the R.S.D.L.P. The proposal of the Mensheviks that the R.S.D.L.P. should amalgamate with this party was rejected by the conference in the form of a motion carried to call next business.

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A CARICATURE OF BOLSHEVISM

We have already given a general appraisal of "otzovism" and "ultimatumism" in *Proletary*, No. 42.* Concerning the resolution of the St. Petersburg otzovists (reprinted in this issue) which served as their platform during the election of delegates to the December Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (and *unfortunately* was not communicated to *Proletary* till *after* the conference) we have to repeat much of what was said there.

This resolution simply teems with fallacious, un-Marxian arguments. Practically every point in it is evidence of the immaturity of its authors' ideas or of their oblivion of the ABC of Social-Democracy. Point 1: "The first stage of the revolution is concluded...." What does that mean? That a stage in social and economic development is concluded? Probably not. The authors have in mind the end of the stage of direct revolutionary struggle of the masses. We must assume that the otzovists mean that, if we are not to impute to them something totally absurd. If that is the case, then they admit that present conditions are unfavourable for the direct revolutionary struggle of the masses. But although compelled by the force of circumstances to admit this, the otzovists are unable to *reason out* the conclusions that follow, and cannot, therefore, get their arguments to hang together. "Russia ... is moving towards a new revolutionary upswing".... Quite right! She is only *moving towards* an upswing, i.e., there is no upswing yet—that is what this means, both in logic and in grammar! It appears, however, that this still non-existing upswing is "characterised by

* See pp. 356-59 of this volume.—*Ed.*

a sharp conflict", etc. The result is utter nonsense. The otzovists are incapable of characterising the present. They "characterise" the future, which we are "moving towards", in order to cover up failure to understand the present. For instance, the "pauperised town petty bourgeoisie" jump into the picture from God knows where, and the reference to them is not backed by even an attempt at an analysis. Why the future upswing should be "characterised" by a sharp conflict of pauperised petty bourgeois is not evident at all. Nor does there appear to be any reason why the pauperised town petty bourgeoisie should be brought in just at this moment. Lumpen-proletarians are *sometimes* distinguished for their sharp conflicts, and *sometimes* for their amazing instability and inability to fight. The otzovists' ideas are utterly confused, and we are not surprised that at the conference of the R.S.D.L.P. *only two Bundists* voted with the *two* otzovists for the insertion of the reference to the "pauperised town petty bourgeoisie". Our opinion that otzovism is opportunism turned inside out has been magnificently borne out.

With whom will the sharp conflict take place? "With the ruling bloc of the big bourgeoisie and feudalist landlords." And not with the autocracy? The otzovists cannot distinguish absolutism, which is manoeuvring between these two classes, from the direct rule of the two classes; with the absurd result that the struggle against the autocracy drops out of the picture entirely.

"Secret work is going on to organise the forces...." The work of learning the lessons of experience, of digesting new lessons, of accumulating strength may be, and often is, performed in secret; but the organisation of forces cannot be performed in secret even when all work is driven underground. In 1901-03 the *organisation* of forces proceeded illegally, but not secretly. The otzovists are merely repeating scraps of parrot-phrases and garbling them in the process.

Point 2: "The solution of this conflict, in view of the strongly developed class antagonisms in Russia, will assume the form of a revolution".... Class antagonisms in Russia are less strongly developed than in Europe, which is not faced with the task of fighting autocracy. The otzovists fail to see that in trying to broaden their views they are coming closer to their antipodes, the opportunists.

"... of a revolution which will lead to an armed uprising...."

The otzovists have not yet told us anything distinctly about the *object* of the struggle, or about the present stage of development of the autocracy; but they make haste to tell us about the *means* of struggle in order to proclaim themselves "revolutionaries". This is childish, dear comrades, for you are showing us once again that you *have learnt by heart* scraps of good phrases, *without understanding* what they mean. The attitude of the revolutionary Social-Democrats towards insurrection was different in 1897, 1901, and in 1905. It was only after January 9, 1905 that they made it a key issue—although Russia, in 1897 and in 1901, was undoubtedly "moving towards upswing", towards a "sharp conflict" and towards "revolution". It is not enough to learn slogans by heart; one must also learn to judge the opportune moment to issue them. To advocate *one* of the means of struggle at a time when the "upswing" has not begun and "revolution", in the most strict and direct sense of the term, is still a matter of the future (and the otzovists speak of it *in the future*: "*will assume* the form of a revolution") means only to make oneself into a caricature of a revolutionary Social-Democrat. The resolution adopted by the conference speaks of a developing revolutionary crisis and of the aim of the struggle (conquest of power by the revolutionary classes); *more than this* cannot and should not be said at the *present time*.

How the mysterious "municipal reforms" got here, and represented as "radical reforms" at that, God only knows. Apparently the otzovists themselves do not know what this means.

Point 3: "In view of this, Social-Democracy as a consistently revolutionary party must put non-parliamentary action in the forefront."...

And yet there are people (the ultimatumists) who are so short-sighted that our disagreements with the otzovists seem to them differences only about practical matters, disagreements over the ways and means of applying a common line of tactics! In the summer of 1907 the disagreement over boycotting the Third Duma might have been regarded merely as a disagreement over methods, and the mistake of the boycottists merely as a mistake in choice of methods

in applying tactics with which all Bolsheviks were agreed. Today, in 1909, it is ridiculous even to suggest such a thing. The mistake of the otzovists and ultimatumists has developed into a deviation from the principles of Marxism. Just think: "*in view of this*", i.e., in view of the fact that we are "moving towards" an upswing, and that the conflict "will assume the form of a revolution", "in view of this" let non-parliamentary action be put in the forefront! Why, comrades, this is merely a jumble of words to cover up a monstrous confusion of ideas! Before you have even said a word about the Duma in your resolution, you have already concocted the conclusion: "in view of this" ... "non-parliamentary action"! In view of the fact that we do not understand the importance of the Duma and the tasks of the Party at a time when an upswing is maturing, we proclaim that struggle must be outside the Duma—that is the nonsense that the otzovists' case amounts to. They have repeated, without understanding them, scraps of arguments which the Bolsheviks advanced at a time when non-parliamentary action was not merely being proclaimed, but *carried on by the masses*; and repeated them at a time when they themselves consider "the first stage of the revolution concluded", i.e., that for the time being the conditions for direct mass action are absent.

They *have learned by heart* the sound proposition that work in the Duma must be subordinated to the interests and direction of the working-class movement outside the Duma, and repeat *scraps* of what they have learned irrelevantly, and in a garbled, scarcely recognisable form.

Instead of emphasising the necessity of continuing—in addition to work in the Duma—to devote maximum effort to persistent, prolonged and painstaking organisation and agitation among the masses outside the Duma—the otzovists, in company with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, raise a "revolutionary" yelp about "non-parliamentary action", making an onslaught, and so forth.

"Direct action is impossible at the present time," say the otzovists at the end of the resolution (Point 1), although at the beginning of it they *proclaimed* a non-parliamentary struggle. If this is not a caricature of Bolshevism, what is?

And work to carry the revolution through to complete victory".... First, the scrap of an idea about the means of struggle, then its object! ... "and for this purpose to organise the proletariat and the broad masses of the peasantry".... At a time like the present, when the first and foremost task is to strengthen and rebuild the semi-destroyed Party organisations, this is a mere phrase, comrades!

Point 4 is one of the gems of "otzovism". "The Party may employ only such forms of organisational and agitational action as do not obscure or weaken the revolutionary struggle"....

This, according to the "practical" ultimatumists, is the "practical" way of stating the issue! In 1909 the otzovists are *compelled to search for* theoretical justification and the quest inevitably bogs them down. "Only such forms of action as do not obscure..."—this is a broad hint at the work of the Social-Democrats in the Duma and at their utilisation of semi-legal and legal organisations. It appears, then, that there are some "forms of action" which obscure and others which do not. In order to save people who are unable to think the trouble of using their brains, let us draw up a list of "forms of action" and cross out those which "obscure"—now that will be real revolutionary tactics!

Take legal literature, for instance, dear comrades. Does this "form of organisational and agitational action" obscure, or does it not? Of course it does, under the Stolypin regime. Then it must be eliminated according to the otzovists, who do not know how to distinguish the *conditions* in which revolutionary Social-Democrats may resort to the *most varied forms* of action, and therefore talk nonsense. "The Party must pay special attention to the utilisation and reinforcement of existing organisations and the formation of new illegal, semi-legal and, where possible, legal organisations that could serve as its strongholds," declares the resolution of the conference, proposed and carried by the Bolsheviks. *This* resolution is as remote from otzovism as heaven is from earth. "Only *such forms* as do not obscure"—is just a hollow phrase: a mere "yelp", and not a revolutionary utterance. The formation of illegal Party "workers' committees" to *utilise* "semi-legal and, where possible, legal organisations"—these are the tactics of revolutionary

Social-Democrats who take into account what "forms of organisational and agitational action" are prescribed by the present situation, and who are able to display *methods* of genuine Social-Democratic activity in the most diverse "forms".

"Down with legal Social-Democratic literature" is a hollow phrase, impracticable and *therefore only to the advantage of the opportunists*—who are perfectly well aware that it is impracticable. It is difficult to draw a line between Social-Democrats who are ready to answer to the Party for their legal writings and non-Party literary hacks; but it is possible, and it provides a real line of activity for those who want to work with the Party. "Down with the legal Duma group, down with legal organisations"—these are hollow phrases *which are only to the advantage of the opportunists* who would be glad to rid themselves of Party control. To keep on exercising this control, "utilising" legal organisations, *rectifying* every mistake and tactical blunder committed by Social-Democrats—this is Party work, which we and all those who wish to-carry out the decisions of the conference will continue to do.

The end of Point 4: "strenuously opposing all deals between the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and the autocracy."

Ugh! The otzovists will insist on *inappropriately* repeating scraps of ideas drawn from Bolshevik literature. Really, comrades, you must try to make out what's what! In the period of the First and Second Dumas, the government was still groping its way towards such *deals*, while the Cadets were recommending deals to the people as slogans of "struggle" (slogans which misled even the Menshevik Social-Democrats). *At that time* a resolute struggle against any *deals* was really the slogan of the day, the task of the moment, the exposure of fraud. Today tsarism has found the way to conclude the deal, and has already done so, with those classes which the otzovists themselves refer to as a "bloc"; and moreover no one is deceived by the deal which has been concluded in the Third Duma. To make the task of "strenuously opposing *all deals*" the pivot of our agitation today means making oneself a caricature of Bolshevism.

Point 5: "Our Duma cannot be regarded as a parliament working in an environment of political liberty, and with a measure of freedom for the class struggle of the proletariat, but is merely a deal between tsarism and the big bourgeoisie".... This contains two mistakes. It is wrong to say "*not* a parliament *but* a deal", for quite a number of the world's parliaments are nothing more than a deal between the bourgeoisie (at various stages of development) and various survivals of medievalism. We had to, and did, fight to prevent Russia's first parliament from being a Black-Hundred and Octobrist parliament, but once it became such in spite of our efforts—and history obliged us to pass through this stage—it is childish to try to exorcise this unpleasant reality with exclamations and declamations. Secondly: according to the authors of the resolution, if there is a "measure of freedom" then it is a "parliament"; if not, it is a "fraud". This is a vulgar-democratic view, worthy of a Cadet but not of a Marxist. Under the Third Duma there is much less freedom than there was under the Second; but the Third Duma is a *less* fictitious parliament, because it *more truly reflects* the actual relation between the state authority and the present ruling classes. As long as power is in the hands of the tsar and the feudalist landlords, there can be no other parliament in bourgeois Russia. It might befit Cadets to try to brush this bare truth under the carpet, but not Social-Democrats.

Point 6, by way of an exception, is correct. But this is precisely an exception which proves the reverse rule, because ... because on this point the otzovists are expounding, not their own ideas, but the ideas of the anti-otzovists who carried the resolutions at the conference.

Conclusions. Point (a) "The Duma being ... a deal ... and a weapon of the counter-revolution".... Quite right! ..."only serves to bolster up the autocracy".... This "only" is wrong. The autocracy has staved off its downfall by organising such a Duma in time: but it has not been strengthened thereby, rather on the contrary, advanced in its decay. The Duma, as a "screen", is more effective than many an "exposure", because for the first time, on a thousand and one issues, it reveals tsarism's dependence on the counter-revolutionary sections of society; it is for the first

time demonstrating *en grand* how close is the alliance between Romanov and Purishkevich, between tsarism and the "Union of the Russian People", between the autocracy and the Dubrovins, the Iliodors and the Polovnyovs.

That the Duma sanctions the crimes of tsarism is beyond doubt; but it is the sanction of particular classes, on behalf of particular class interests, and it is the duty of the Social-Democrats precisely to use the Duma rostrum to reveal these instructive truths of the class struggle.

"The eight months' proceedings of the Third Duma have shown that the Social-Democrats cannot make use of it."

Here is the very essence of otzovism, the error of which our "ultimatumists" are only covering up, confusing the issue by their ridiculous equivocation—that since we have spent so much energy on creating a Duma group, we must not recall it lightly!

There is a straightforward question, and evasions won't do: have these eight months' proceedings proved that it is possible to make use of the rostrum of the Duma, or not? The otzovists' reply is wrong. In spite of the immense difficulties involved in Party *guidance* of the Duma group, it has beyond question *proved the possibility* of making use of the Duma as a platform. To be daunted by difficulties and mistakes is timidity; it is intellectual "yelping", whereas what we want is patient, consistent and persistent proletarian effort. Other socialist parties in Europe encountered even greater difficulties at the beginning of their parliamentary activity, and made many more mistakes, but they did not shirk their duty. They succeeded in overcoming the difficulties and in correcting their mistakes.

(b) "Our Duma group ... persistently pursuing opportunist tactics, could not and cannot be a staunch and consistent representative of the revolutionary proletariat."

The grandest truths can be vulgarised, otzovist comrades, the noblest aims can be reduced to mere *phrase-mongering*—and that is what you are doing. You have degraded the fight against opportunism into mere phrase-mongering, and are thereby only playing into the hands of the opportunists. Our Duma group has made and is making mistakes, but by its very work it has proved that it "could and can" staunchly and consistently represent the proletariat—*could and can*,

when we, the Party, guide it, help it, appoint our best men to lead it, draw up directives, and draft speeches, and explain the harmful and fatal effects of taking advice from the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia who, not only in Russia but *all over the world*, *always* gain easy access to all kinds of institutions on the parliamentary fringe.

Have the courage to admit, comrades, that we have as yet done far too little to provide this *real* guidance of the work of the Duma group, to help it with *deeds*. Have the courage to admit that we *can* do ten times as much in this direction, if we succeed in strengthening our organisations, consolidating our Party, bringing it closer to the masses, creating Party media exercising a constant influence on large sections of the proletarians. That is what we are working for, that is what everybody must work for who wants to fight opportunism in deeds and not in words.

The otzovists have reduced the struggle against opportunism in the Duma group to a mere phrase. They have learned words by rote without understanding the difference between anarchist and Social-Democratic criticism of opportunism. Take the anarchists. They all pounce on every mistake every Social-Democratic member of parliament makes. They all shout that *even* Bebel once made a speech in an almost patriotic spirit, once took up a wrong stand on the agrarian programme, and so on and so forth. True, even Bebel made opportunist mistakes in his parliamentary career. But what does this prove? The anarchists say that it proves that all the workers' M.P.s should be recalled. The anarchists rail at the Social-Democratic members of parliament and refuse to have anything to do with them, refuse to do anything to develop a proletarian party, a proletarian policy and proletarian members of parliament. And in practice the anarchists' phrase-mongering converts them into the truest accomplices of opportunism, into the reverse side of opportunism.

Social-Democrats draw quite a different conclusion from their mistakes—the conclusion that *even* Bebel could not become Bebel without prolonged Party work in training up real Social-Democratic representatives. They need not tell us, "We have no Bebels in our group." Bebels are not born. They have to be made. Bebels don't spring fully formed like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, but are created by the Party

and the working class. Those who say we have no Bebels don't know the history of the German Party: they don't know that there was a time, under the Anti-Socialist Law, when August Bebel made opportunist blunders and that the Party corrected him, the Party guided Bebel.*

(c) "The continued presence of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma ... can only do harm to the interests of the proletariat ... lower the dignity and influence of the Social-Democrats." To show how "quantity passes into quality" in these preposterous exaggerations, and how anarchist phrases *grow out* of them (irrespective of whether our otzovist comrades desire it or not), we need only refer to Belousov's speech during the 1909 budget debate. If *such* speeches are considered as "harmful", and not as proof that the rostrum of the Duma can and must be utilised, then our disagreement ceases to be a mere difference of opinion about the character of a speech, and becomes a disagreement concerning the fundamental principles of Social-Democratic tactics.

(I) "Launch a wide campaign ... for the slogan: 'Down with the Third Duma'" ....

We have already said in *Proletary*, No. 39, that this slogan, which for a time appealed to some anti-otzovist workers, is *wrong*.** It is either a Cadet slogan, calling for franchise reform under the autocracy, or a repetition of words learned by rote from the period when liberal Dumas were a screen for counter-revolutionary tsarism, designed to prevent the people from seeing clearly who their real enemy was.

(II) "Recall ... the Duma group; this will emphasise both ... the character of the Duma and the revolutionary tactics of the Social-Democrats."

This is a paraphrase of the proposition advanced by the Moscow otzovists, that the recall of the Duma group will emphasise that the revolution is not dead and buried. Such a conclusion—we repeat the words of *Proletary*, No. 39, "emphasises" only the *burial* of those Social-Democrats who

* We hope to deal with this illuminating history and with *its* condemnation of German trends akin to our otzovists in a separate article.

** See pp. 286-302 of this volume.—*Ed.*

are capable of arguing in this way. They *bury* themselves thereby as Social-Democrats; they lose all feeling for genuine proletarian revolutionary work; and for that reason they are so painfully contorting themselves to "emphasise" their revolutionary phrases.

(III) "Devote all efforts to organisation and preparation ... for open ... struggle [and therefore renounce open agitation from the rostrum of the Duma!] ... and to propaganda", etc., etc.

The otzovists have forgotten that it is unseemly for Social-Democrats to refuse to conduct *propaganda* from the rostrum of the Duma.

At this point they give us the argument repeated by some ultimatumists, that "there is no sense in wasting energy on hopeless work in the Duma, let us use *all our forces* more productively". This is not reasoning, but sophistry, which—again irrespective of whether the authors desire it or not—leads to anarchist conclusions. For in *all* countries the anarchists, pointing to the mistakes committed by Social-Democratic members of parliament, argue that it is "a waste of time to bother with bourgeois parliamentarism" and call for the concentration of "all these forces" on organising "direct action". But this leads to disorganisation and to the shouting of "slogans" which are futile because they are isolated, instead of conducting work in every field on the widest possible scale. It only seems to the otzovists and ultimatumists that their argument is new, and applies *only* to the Third Duma. But they are wrong. It is a common argument heard all over Europe, and it is *not* a Social-Democratic argument.

Thus, otzovism and ultimatumism are a caricature of Bolshevism. What gave rise to this caricature? Of course, the fallacies of Bolshevism as a whole, the Menshevik hastens to declare. Such a conclusion, undoubtedly, is very "profitable" for the Mensheviks. Unfortunately for them, however, objective facts do not corroborate, but refute it. The objective facts are that in the development not only of Bolshevism, but of Russian Marxism *in general*, there was a period when Marxism was caricatured, and that Russian

Marxism grew strong and developed in struggle with these growing pains, pains which accompanied the expansion of its sphere of influence. Russian Marxism was born at the beginning of the eighties of the last century in the works of a group of political emigrants (the Emancipation of Labour group).

But Marxism did not become a trend of Russian social thought and a constituent part of the working-class movement in Russia until the middle of the nineties of the last century, when a "wave" of Marxian literature and of a Social-Democratic working-class movement arose in Russia. And what happened? This wave carried with it a *caricature of Marxism* in the shape of Struvism on the one hand and *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism and Economism on the other. Marxism grew and matured because it did not conceal the disagreements in its ranks, did not play the diplomat (as the Mensheviks do with Maslov, Cherevanin, Kuskova, Prokopovich, Valentinov, Yermansky and Co.), but waged a victorious *campaign* against the caricature, which had been engendered by the deplorable conditions of Russian life and the turning-point in the historical development of socialism in Russia. And Bolshevism will grow up and become strong, making no attempt to conceal the *incipient* distortion of its principles by a caricature engendered by the deplorable conditions of Russian life and the turning-point in the counter-revolutionary period, but openly explaining to the masses into what a bog the otzovists and ultimatumists would lead the Duma group and the Party.

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THE "LEFTWARD SWING" OF THE BOURGEOISIE AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT

The question of the "leftward swing" of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie has long become a standing feature in the columns of our legal press. It has been noted and acknowledged that the Octobrist press has a regular periodic grumble against the "agrarian" (read: feudalist-landlord) Duma and against the corresponding policy of tsarism. It has been noted and acknowledged that quite a number of local and national associations of merchants and industrialists—from provincial stock exchange committees to the "Board of Congresses of Representatives of Commerce and Industry"—have in recent years, and particularly of late, been voicing their dissatisfaction with this pro-landlord policy. There have been descriptions of the Moscow "fraternisation of millions with science", to wit, the private conferences of Moscow's and St. Petersburg's money-bags—Krestovnikov, Goujon, Volsky and others—with the Cadet professors and writers—Manuilov, Struve, Kiesewetter and Co. One need hardly add that the liberal press, including the Menshevik publications, seize on every piece of news of this kind and blazon forth with a thousand variations the rebirth and renovation of liberalism.

This sensational "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie has been reflected in the "political" steps of the tsarist government and in speeches in the Duma. Mr. Timiryazev, darling of the Russian merchants and at the same time an old bureaucrat, has been appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry. On March 13 he made a big "programme" speech in the Duma—such ministerial speeches are called programme speeches in all the arch-reactionary bourgeois and ordinary

bourgeois parliaments in the world "just for show". As a matter of fact the tsarist Minister outlined no programme at all, and merely contented himself, as usual, with meaningless courtesies to the capitalists and threats to the working class, of course combining these threats with stereotyped hypocritical expressions of "sympathy". On March 19 these affectionate exchanges of the Minister with the leaders of capital were repeated in Moscow, where Timiryazev and Krestovnikov exchanged friendly speeches at a meeting of the Moscow Stock Exchange Association. "Russia is sick, but with proper care her malady is not dangerous, and will soon pass," said Krestovnikov, welcoming the highly-esteemed Timiryazev. While Timiryazev, thanking the highly-esteemed Krestovnikov, signified on behalf of the government its benevolent consent to "care for" the patient with the tried Stolypin remedies of the "transition period".

The question arises, what are the objective causes of this "leftward swing" of the bougeoisie, and what is its class significance? In the periodical *Vozrozhdeniye*[145] (No. 1-2) Comrade Martov, with a clarity and directness not very usual for this writer, answers this question in an article entitled "The 'Leftward Swing' of the Bourgeoisie". "Experience has shown," he writes, "that if economic development has ripened for a precisely bourgeois reformation and the bourgeoisie is unable to become its driving force, this only means that the social change cannot be completed until the further development of the class in question makes it the driving force." And elsewhere: "Those who assumed that the Constitution now in force represents a more or less organic union of the nobility with the bourgeoisie as equally 'counter-revolutionary factors' may regard phenomena of the kind indicated above [i.e., the "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie] merely as minor episodes, not necessarily connected with the general trend of social development.... These isolated phenomena may have a symptomatic importance only in the eyes of those who were certain *a priori* that the course of social development is inexorably leading the Russian bourgeoisie, as a class, into sharp opposition to the regime ... of June 3."

Compare with this the declaration of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, No. 12: "We agree also with the proposal of the

Caucasians [i.e., Dan, Axelrod and Semyonov at the last conference of the R.S.D.L.P.] to speak to the Russian monarchy not as 'bourgeois' but as 'plutocratic', for this amendment refutes the fundamentally false assertion of the Bolshevik resolution that Russian tsarism is beginning to voice the class interests of the bourgeoisie."

Here we have the political theory of Menshevism complete with all its conclusions. If our revolution is bourgeois, it cannot be completed until the bourgeoisie becomes its driving force. The "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie proves that it is becoming such a driving force, and there can be no question of calling it counter-revolutionary. Tsarism in Russia is becoming plutocratic, not bourgeois. Obviously the logic of this is to advocate the pursuance of opportunist tactics by the workers' party in our bourgeois revolution, the tactics of support to the liberals by the proletariat, as opposed to the tactics which allot to the proletariat allying to itself the peasantry, the leading role in the bourgeois revolution—which it must play in spite of the vacillations and betrayals of liberalism.

The Menshevik tactics stand revealed as a falsification of Marxism, as a camouflaging of anti-Marxist content with "Marxist" phraseology. The method of reasoning underlying these tactics is not that of Marxists but of liberals dressed up as Marxists. To be convinced of this we have only to cast a cursory glance at the history and results of the bourgeois revolution in Germany. In *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* Marx wrote about the causes of the defeat of the revolution in 1848: "The big bourgeoisie, anti-revolutionary from the very outset, concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with reaction out of fear of the people, that is to say, the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie."[146] This was Marx's point of view, and it is shared by all the German Marxists in their estimate of 1848 and the subsequent tactics of the German bourgeoisie. The counter-revolutionary nature of the big bourgeoisie did not prevent it from "going left", for instance, in the period of the constitutional conflict of the sixties, but inasmuch as the proletariat did not take independent and strong action, the result of this "leftward swing" was not a revolution but only a timid opposition that impelled the monarchy to become more and more

bourgeois, and did not destroy the alliance of the bourgeoisie with the Junkers, i.e., the reactionary landlords.

That is how the Marxists look at it. The liberals, on the contrary, take the view that the workers, with their immoderate demands, their unreasonable revolutionariness their ill-timed attacks on liberalism, prevented the success of the cause of liberty in Germany by precipitating their possible allies into the arms of reaction.

It is quite obvious that our Mensheviks are using Marxist words to disguise their falsification of Marxism, and to disguise their own defection *from* Marxism *to* liberalism.

Both in France after 1789 and in Germany after 1848 the monarchy undoubtedly made "a further step towards its transformation into a bourgeois monarchy". It is equally certain that the bourgeoisie became counter-revolutionary after both these revolutions. Does this mean that after 1789 in France and after 1848 in Germany the basis for a "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie, and for a subsequent bourgeois revolution, had disappeared? Of course not. The French bourgeoisie, for all its counter-revolutionariness "moved left", for example, in 1830, and the German in 1863-64. Inasmuch as the proletariat did not take independent action, inasmuch as it did not win political power even for a short time with the help of the revolutionary sections of the bourgeoisie, the "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie did not lead to revolution (Germany) and led only to further steps in the transformation of the monarchy into a bourgeois monarchy. To the extent that the proletariat did act independently, and won political power in alliance with the revolutionary sections of the bourgeoisie, overthrowing the old regime (as was the case in France more than once in the nineteenth century), the "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie proved to be the prologue to a new bourgeois revolution.

This is the ABC of history that our Mensheviks have forgotten and distorted, adopting the point of view of the liberals: there will be no bourgeois revolution in Russia until the bourgeoisie becomes the driving force! This is an abject failure to understand the dialectics of history and the lessons of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, there will be no bourgeois revolution in Russia until the proletariat, in alliance with the revolutionary elements

of the bourgeoisie (i.e., with the peasantry in our case), becomes an independent driving force, operating in spite of the vacillations and betrayals of the unstable and counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

It was not it the reign of Nicholas II, dear Menshevik comrades, but in that of Alexander II that Russian tsarism began to be transformed into a "plutocratic" monarchy, "*began* to voice the class interests of the bourgeoisie". But it could never have voiced them had there been no independent class *organisation* of the bourgeoisie. The revolution of 1905 has raised us to a higher stage, and the old struggle is being renewed on a plane of more advanced political relations. The Third Duma is the politically constituted, national alliance of the political *organisations* of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie. Tsarism is making an attempt to solve objectively-necessary historical problems with the help of the *organisations* of these two classes. Will it succeed in the attempt?

No. It turns out that the solution of such a problem has not only defied a plutocratic tsarism, which had no national representation of the "upper" classes to fall back on, but it defies even a semi-bourgeois tsarism assisted by a Black-Hundred-bourgeois Duma. The Duma is helping it to solve the problem. But this help *is proving* inadequate. The "leftward swing" of the bourgeoisie is due precisely to the *objective* fact that, in spite of Stolypin's doctoring of tsarism, its bourgeois evolution is *not working out*. Just as before 1905, in the period when tsarism knew nothing of representative institutions, the "leftward swing" of the landlords and the marshals of nobility was a symptom of maturing crisis, so in 1909, in the period when tsarism has given national representation to the Krestovnikovs, the "leftward swing" of these money-bags is a *symptom* that "the objective tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia remain unsolved", and that "the *main* factors which brought about the Revolution of 1905, continue to operate" (the conference resolution on the present situation).

The Mensheviks confine their argument to the fact that the revolution in our country is bourgeois and that our bourgeoisie is "going left". But stopping there means converting Marxism, a "guide to action", into a dead letter;

it means falsifying Marxism and virtually adopting the point of view of liberalism. There can be a bourgeois revolution without a single complete victory of the proletariat, when the result is the gradual conversion of the old monarchy into a bourgeois and bourgeois-imperialist monarchy (for instance, Germany). There can be a bourgeois revolution with a number of independent actions by the proletariat, producing both complete victories and heavy defeats, when the result is a bourgeois republic (for instance, France).

The question arises: has Russian history decided in favour of one path or the other? The Mensheviks do not understand this question, they are afraid to raise it, they avoid it, not realising that by avoiding it they are actually dragging in their policy at the tail of the liberal bourgeoisie. We are of the opinion that Russian history has not yet answered this question, that it will be answered by the struggle of the classes in the next few years, that the first round of our bourgeois revolution (1905-07) has proved beyond doubt that our bourgeoisie is utterly unstable and counter-revolutionary, proved that our proletariat is capable of being the *leader* of a victorious revolution, proved the capacity of the democratic masses of the peasantry to help the proletariat make this revolution victorious.

And here again we come up against the purely liberal point of view of the Mensheviks regarding our *Trudovik* peasantry. The Mensheviks say the Trudoviks are full of petty-bourgeois utopias, their fight for the land is a fight in the name of the absurd and reactionary slogans of socialisation of land or equalised land tenure; "consequently" the Trudovik fight for the land *weakens* the fight for freedom, the victory of the Trudoviks would be a reactionary victory of countryside over town. That is the gist both of Martynov's reasoning in No. 10-11 of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* and of Martov's arguments in the symposium *The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*.

Such an estimate of the Trudovik peasantry is just as outrageous a distortion of Marxism as the discourses on the bourgeois revolution quoted above. It is doctrinairism at its worst when a Marxist is unable to grasp the *actual* significance of a revolutionary struggle against the whole system of contemporary landed proprietorship, under the

integument of a Narodnik *doctrine* which really is absurd, visionary and reactionary when viewed as a socialist doctrine. The Mensheviks display incredible blindness and ignorance of the dialectics of Marxism when they fail to see that, the conditions of life of the Russian peasantry being what they are, its bourgeois-democratic revolutionary spirit could not be ideologically expressed otherwise than in the form of "belief" in the sovereign virtue of land equalisation. "What formally may be economically incorrect, may all the same be correct from the point of view of world history."[147] Our Mensheviks have never been able to understand these words of Engels. While exposing the *falsity* of the Narodnik *doctrine*, they closed their eyes like pedants to the *truth* of the contemporary struggle in the contemporary bourgeois revolution, which is expressed by these quasi-socialist doctrines.

But we say: resolute struggle against the quasi-socialist doctrines of the Trudoviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and Co., and frank, firm recognition of the *alliance* between the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry in the *bourgeois* revolution. The victory of this revolution will dissipate like a puff of smoke the doctrine of the sovereign virtue of land equalisation, but the masses of the peasantry in the present struggle express by this doctrine the breadth, strength, courage, enthusiasm, sincerity and invincibility of their historic action which heralds a Russia cleansed of each and every survival of feudalism.

The bourgeoisie is going left, down with Trudovik utopianism, long live support of the bourgeoisie—argue the Mensheviks. The bourgeoisie is going left, we shall say: that means new powder is accumulating in the powder-magazine of the Russian revolution. If today the Krestovnikovs are saying "Russia is sick", it means that tomorrow the socialist proletariat will go into action, leading the democratic peasantry, and will say: "We shall cure her!"

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THE ATTITUDE OF THE WORKERS' PARTY TO RELIGION

Deputy Surkov's speech in the Duma during the debate on the Synod estimates, and the discussion that arose within our Duma group when it considered the draft of this speech (both printed in this issue) have raised a question which is of extreme importance and urgency at this particular moment. An interest in everything connected with religion is undoubtedly being shown today by wide circles of "society", and has penetrated into the ranks of intellectuals standing close to the working-class movement, as well as into certain circles of the workers. It is the absolute duty of Social-Democrats to make a public statement of their attitude towards religion.

Social-Democracy bases its whole world-outlook on scientific socialism, i.e., Marxism. The philosophical basis of Marxism, as Marx and Engels repeatedly declared, is dialectical materialism, which has fully taken over the historical traditions of eighteenth-century materialism in France and of Feuerbach (first half of the nineteenth century) in Germany—a materialism which is absolutely atheistic and positively hostile to all religion. Let us recall that the whole of Engels's *Anti-Dühring*, which Marx read in manuscript, is an indictment of the materialist and atheist Dühring for not being a consistent materialist and for leaving loopholes for religion and religious philosophy. Let us recall that in his essay on Ludwig Feuerbach, Engels reproaches Feuerbach for combating religion not in order to destroy it, but in order to renovate it, to invent a new, "exalted" religion, and so forth. Religion is the opium of the people—this dictum by Marx is the corner-stone of the whole Marxist outlook

on religion.[148] Marxism has always regarded all modern religions and churches, and each and every religious organisation, as instruments of bourgeois reaction that serve to defend exploitation and to befuddle the working class.

At the same time Engels frequently condemned the efforts of people who desired to be "more left" or "more revolutionary" than the Social-Democrats to introduce into the programme of the workers' party an explicit proclamation of atheism, in the sense of declaring war on religion. Commenting in 1874 on the famous manifesto of the Blanquist fugitive Communards who were living in exile in London, Engels called their vociferous proclamation of war on religion a piece of stupidity, and stated that such a declaration of war was the best way to revive interest in religion and to prevent it from really dying out. Engels blamed the Blanquists for being unable to understand that only the class struggle of the working masses could, by comprehensively drawing the widest strata of the proletariat into conscious and revolutionary social *practice*, really free the oppressed masses from the yoke of religion, whereas to proclaim that war on religion was a political task of the workers' party was just anarchistic phrase-mongering.[149] And in 1877, too, in his *Anti-Dühring*, while ruthlessly attacking the slightest concessions made by Dühring the philosopher to idealism and religion, Engels no less resolutely condemns Dühring's pseudo-revolutionary idea that religion should be prohibited in socialist society. To declare such a war on-religion, Engels says, is to "out-Bismarck Bismarck", i.e., to repeat the folly of Bismarck's struggle against the clericals (the notorious "Struggle for Culture", *Kulturkampf*, i.e., the struggle Bismarck waged in the 1870s against the German Catholic party, the "Centre" party, by means of a police persecution of Catholicism). By this struggle Bismarck only *stimulated* the militant clericalism of the Catholics, and only injured the work of real culture, because he gave prominence to religious divisions rather than political divisions, and diverted the attention of some sections of the working class and of the other democratic elements away from the urgent tasks of the class and revolutionary struggle to the most superficial and false bourgeois anti-clericalism. Accusing the would-be ultra-revolutionary Dühring of wanting to repeat Bismarck's

folly in another form, Engels insisted that the workers' party should have the ability to work patiently at the task of organising and educating the proletariat, which would lead to the dying out of religion, and not throw itself into the gamble of a political war on religion.[150] This view has become part of the very essence of German Social-Democracy, which, for example, advocated freedom for the Jesuits, their admission into Germany, and the complete abandonment of police methods of combating any particular religion. "Religion is a private matter": this celebrated point in the Erfurt Programme (1891) summed up these political tactics of Social-Democracy.

These tactics have by now become a matter of routine; they have managed to give rise to a new distortion of Marxism in the opposite direction, in the direction of opportunism. This point in the Erfurt Programme has come to be interpreted as meaning that we Social-Democrats, our Party, *consider* religion to be a private matter, that religion is a private matter for us as Social-Democrats, for us as a party. Without entering into a direct controversy with this opportunist view, Engels in the nineties deemed it necessary to oppose it resolutely in a positive, and not a polemical form. To wit: Engels did this in the form of a statement, which he deliberately underlined, that Social-Democrats regard religion as a private matter *in relation to the state*, but not in relation to themselves, not in relation to Marxism, and not in relation to the workers' party.[151]

Such is the external history of the utterances of Marx and Engels on the question of religion. To people with a slapdash attitude towards Marxism, to people who cannot or will not think, this history is a skein of meaningless Marxist contradictions and waverings, a hodge-podge of "consistent" atheism and "sops" to religion, "unprincipled" wavering between a r-r-revolutionary war on God and a cowardly desire to "play up to" religious workers, a fear of scaring them away, etc., etc. The literature of the anarchist phrasemongers contains plenty of attacks on Marxism in this vein.

But anybody who is able to treat Marxism at all seriously, to ponder over its philosophical principles and the experience of international Social-Democracy, will readily see

that the Marxist tactics in regard to religion are thoroughly consistent, and were carefully thought out by Marx and Engels; and that what dilettantes or ignoramuses regard as wavering is but a direct and inevitable deduction from dialectical materialism. It would be a profound mistake to think that the seeming "moderation" of Marxism in regard to religion is due to supposed "tactical" considerations, the desire "not to scare away" anybody, and so forth. On the contrary, in this question, too, the political line of Marxism is inseparably bound up with its philosophical principles.

Marxism is materialism. As such, it is as relentlessly hostile to religion as was the materialism of the eighteenth-century Encyclopaedists or the materialism of Feuerbach. This is beyond doubt. But the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels goes further than the Encyclopaedists and Feuerbach, for it applies the materialist philosophy to the domain of history, to the domain of the social sciences. We must combat religion—that is the ABC of *all* materialism, and consequently of Marxism. But Marxism is not a materialism which has stopped at the ABC. Marxism goes further. It says: We must *know how* to combat religion, and in order to do so we must explain the source of faith and religion among the masses *in a materialist way*. The combating of religion cannot be confined to abstract ideological preaching, and it must not be reduced to such preaching. It must be linked up with the concrete practice of the class movement, which aims at eliminating the social roots of religion. Why does religion retain its hold on the backward sections of the town proletariat, on broad sections of the semi-proletariat, and on the mass of the peasantry? Because of the ignorance of the people, replies the bourgeois progressist, the radical or the bourgeois materialist. And so: "Down with religion and long live atheism; the dissemination of atheist views is our chief task!" The Marxist says that this is not true, that it is a superficial view, the view of narrow bourgeois uplifters. It does not explain the roots of religion profoundly enough; it explains them, not in a materialist but in an idealist way. In modern capitalist countries these roots are mainly *social*. The deepest root of religion today is the socially downtrodden condition

of the working masses and their apparently complete helplessness in face of the blind forces of capitalism, which every day and every hour inflicts upon ordinary working people the most horrible suffering and the most savage torment, a thousand times more severe than those inflicted by extraordinary events, such as wars, earthquakes, etc. "Fear made the gods." Fear of the blind force of capital—blind because it cannot be foreseen by the masses of the people—a force which at every step in the life of the proletariat and small proprietor threatens to inflict, and does inflict "sudden", "unexpected", "accidental" ruin, destruction, pauperism, prostitution, death from starvation—such is *the root* of modern religion which the materialist must bear in mind first and foremost, if he does not want to remain an infant-school materialist. No educational book can eradicate religion from the minds of masses who are crushed by capitalist hard labour, and who are at the mercy of the blind destructive forces of capitalism, until those masses themselves learn to fight this *root* of religion, fight *the rule of capital* in all its forms, in a united, organised, planned and conscious way.

Does this mean that educational books against religion are harmful or unnecessary? No, nothing of the kind. It means that Social-Democracy's atheist propaganda must be *subordinated* to its basic task—the development of the class struggle of the exploited *masses* against the exploiters.

This proposition may not be understood (or at least not immediately understood) by one who has not pondered over the principles of dialectical materialism, i.e., the philosophy of Marx and Engels. How is that?—he will say. Is ideological propaganda, the preaching of definite ideas, the struggle against that enemy of culture and progress which has persisted for thousands or years (i.e., religion) to be subordinated to the class struggle, i.e., the struggle for definite practical aims in the economic and political field?

This is one of those current objections to Marxism which testify to a complete misunderstanding of Marxian dialectics. The contradiction which perplexes these objectors is a real contradiction in real life, i.e., a dialectical contradiction, and not a verbal or invented one. To draw a hard-and-

fast line between the theoretical propaganda of atheism, i.e., the destruction of religious beliefs among certain sections of the proletariat, and the success, the progress and the conditions of the class struggle of these sections, is to reason undialectically, to transform a shifting and relative boundary into an absolute boundary; it is forcibly to disconnect what is indissolubly connected in real life. Let us take an example. The proletariat in a particular region and in a particular industry is divided, let us assume, into an advanced section of fairly class-conscious Social-Democrats, who are of course atheists, and rather backward workers who are still connected with the countryside and with the peasantry, and who believe in God, go to church, or are even under the direct influence of the local priest—who, let us suppose, is organising a Christian labour union. Let us assume furthermore that the economic struggle in this locality has resulted in a strike. It is the duty of a Marxist to place the success of the strike movement above everything else, vigorously to counteract the division of the workers in this struggle into atheists and Christians, vigorously to oppose any such division. Atheist propaganda in such circumstances may be both unnecessary and harmful—not from the philistine fear of scaring away the backward sections, of losing a seat in the elections, and so on, but out of consideration for the real progress of the class struggle, which in the conditions of modern capitalist society will convert Christian workers to Social-Democracy and to atheism a hundred times better than bald atheist propaganda. To preach atheism at such a moment and in such circumstances would only be playing *into the hands* of the priest and the priests, who desire nothing better than that the division of the workers according to their participation in the strike movement should be replaced by their division according to their belief in God. An anarchist who preached war against God at all costs would in effect be helping the priests and the bourgeoisie (as the anarchists always do help the bourgeoisie *in practice*). A Marxist must be a materialist, i.e., an enemy of religion, but a dialectical materialist, i.e., one who treats the struggle against religion not in an abstract way, not on the basis of remote, purely theoretical, never varying preaching, but in a concrete way, on the basis of the class struggle

which is going on *in practice* and is educating the masses more and better than anything else could. A Marxist must be able to view the concrete situation as a whole, he must always be able to find the boundary between anarchism and opportunism (this boundary is relative, shifting and changeable, but it exists). And he must not succumb either to the abstract, verbal, but in reality empty "revolutionism" of the anarchist, or to the philistinism and opportunism of the petty bourgeois or liberal intellectual, who boggles at the struggle against religion, forgets that this is his duty, reconciles himself to belief in God, and is guided not by the interests of the class struggle but by the petty and mean consideration of offending nobody, repelling nobody and scaring nobody—by the sage rule: "live and let live", etc., etc.

It is from this angle that all side issues bearing on the attitude of Social-Democrats to religion should be dealt with. For example, the question is often brought up whether a priest can be a member of the Social-Democratic Party or not, and this question is usually answered in an unqualified affirmative, the experience of the European Social-Democratic parties being cited as evidence. But this experience was the result, not only of the application of the Marxist doctrine to the workers' movement, but also of the special historical conditions in Western Europe which are absent in Russia (we will say more about these conditions later), so that an unqualified affirmative answer in this case is incorrect. It cannot be asserted once and for all that priests cannot be members of the Social-Democratic Party; but neither can the reverse rule be laid down. If a priest comes to us to take part in our common political work and conscientiously performs Party duties, without opposing the programme of the Party, he may be allowed to join the ranks of the Social-Democrats; for the contradiction between the spirit and principles of our programme and the religious convictions of the priest would in such circumstances be something that concerned him alone, his own private contradiction; and a political organisation cannot put its members through an examination to see if there is no contradiction between their views and the Party programme. But, of course, such a case might be a rare exception even in Western

Europe, while in Russia it is altogether improbable. And if, for example, a priest joined the Social-Democratic Party and made it his chief and almost sole work actively to propagate religious views in the Party, it would unquestionably have to expel him from its ranks. We must not only admit workers who preserve their belief in God into the Social-Democratic Party, but must deliberately set out to recruit them; we are absolutely opposed to giving the slightest offence to their religious convictions, but we recruit them in order to educate them in the spirit of our programme, and not in order to permit an active struggle against it. We allow freedom of opinion *within* the Party, but to certain limits, determined by freedom of grouping; we are not obliged to go hand in hand with active preachers of views that are repudiated by the majority of the Party.

Another example. Should members of the Social-Democratic Party be censured all alike under all circumstances for declaring "socialism is my religion", and for advocating views in keeping with this declaration? No! The deviation from Marxism (and consequently from socialism) is here indisputable; but the significance of the deviation, its relative importance, so to speak, may vary with circumstances. It is one thing when an agitator or a person addressing the workers speaks in this way in order to make himself better understood, as an introduction to his subject, in order to present his views more vividly in terms to which the backward masses are most accustomed. It is another thing when a writer begins to preach "god-building", or god-building socialism (in the spirit, for example, of our Lunacharsky and Co.). While in the first case censure would be mere carping, or even inappropriate restriction of the freedom of the agitator, of his freedom in choosing "pedagogical" methods, in the second case party censure is necessary and essential. For some the statement "socialism is a religion" is a form of transition from religion to socialism; for others, it is a form of transition *from* socialism to religion.

Let us now pass to the conditions which in the West gave rise to the opportunist interpretation of the thesis: "religion is a private matter". Of course, a contributing influence are those general factors which give rise to opportunism as a whole, like sacrificing the fundamental interests

of the working-class movement for the sake of momentary advantages. The party of the proletariat demands that *the state* should declare religion a private matter, but does not regard the fight against the opium of the people, the fight against religious superstitions, etc., as a "private matter". The opportunists distort the question to mean that the *Social-Democratic* Party *regards* religion as a private matter!

But in addition to the usual opportunist distortion (which was not made clear at all in the discussion within our Duma group when it was considering the speech on religion), there are special historical conditions which have given rise to the present-day, and, if one may so express it, excessive, indifference on the part of the European Social-Democrats to the question of religion. These conditions are of a twofold nature. First, the task of combating religion is historically the task of the revolutionary bourgeoisie, and in the West this task was to a large extent performed (or tackled) by bourgeois democracy, in the epoch of *its* revolutions or its assaults upon feudalism and medievalism. Both in France and in Germany there is a tradition of bourgeois war on religion, and it began long before socialism (the Encyclopaedists, Feuerbach). In Russia, because of the conditions of our bourgeois-democratic revolution, this task too falls almost entirely on the shoulders of the working class. Petty-bourgeois (Narodnik) democracy in our country has not done too much in this respect (as the new-fledged Black-Hundred Cadets, or Cadet Black Hundreds, of *Vekhi*[152] think), but rather *too little*, in comparison with what has been done in Europe.

On the other hand, the tradition of bourgeois war on religion has given rise in Europe to a specifically bourgeois *distortion* of this war by anarchism—which, as the Marxists have long explained time and again, takes its stand on the bourgeois world-outlook, in spite of all the "fury" of its attacks on the bourgeoisie. The anarchists and Blanquists in the Latin countries, Most (who, incidentally, was a pupil of Dühring) and his ilk in Germany, the anarchists in Austria in the eighties, all carried revolutionary phrasemongering in the struggle against religion to a *nec plus ultra*. It is not surprising that, compared with the anarch-

ists, the European Social-Democrats now *go to the other extreme*. This is quite understandable and to a certain extent legitimate, but it would be wrong for us Russian Social-Democrats to forget the special historical conditions of the West.

Secondly, in the West, *after* the national bourgeois revolutions were over, *after* more or less complete religious liberty had been introduced, the problem of the democratic struggle against religion had been pushed, historically, so far into the background by the struggle of bourgeois democracy against socialism that the bourgeois governments *deliberately* tried to draw the attention of the masses away from socialism by organising a quasi-liberal "offensive" against clericalism. Such was the character of the *Kulturkampf* in Germany and of the struggle of the bourgeois republicans against clericalism in France. Bourgeois anti-clericalism, as a means of drawing the attention of the working-class masses away from socialism—this is what preceded the spread of the modern spirit of "indifference" to the struggle against religion among the Social-Democrats in the West. And this again is quite understandable and legitimate, because Social-Democrats had to counteract bourgeois and Bismarckian anti-clericalism by *subordinating* the struggle against religion to the struggle for socialism.

In Russia conditions are quite different. The proletariat is the leader of our bourgeois-democratic revolution. Its party must be the ideological leader in the struggle against all attributes of medievalism, including the old official religion and every attempt to refurbish it or make out a new or different case for it, etc. Therefore, while Engels was comparatively mild in correcting the opportunism of the German Social-Democrats who were substituting, for the demand of the workers' party that the *state* should declare religion a private matter, the *declaration* that religion is a private matter for the Social-Democrats themselves, and for the Social-Democratic Party, it is clear that the importation of this German distortion by the Russian opportunists would have merited a rebuke a *hundred times* more severe by Engels.

By declaring from the Duma rostrum that religion is the opium of the people, our Duma group acted quite correctly,

and thus created a precedent which should serve as a basis for all utterances by Russian Social-Democrats on the question of religion. Should they have gone further and developed the atheist argument in greater detail? We think not. This might have brought the risk of the political party of the proletariat exaggerating the struggle against religion; it might have resulted in obliterating the distinction between the bourgeois and the socialist struggle against religion. The first duty of the Social-Democratic group in the Black-Hundred Duma has been discharged with honour.

The second duty—and perhaps the most important for Social-Democrats—namely, to explain the class role of the church and the clergy in supporting the Black-Hundred government and the bourgeoisie in its fight against the working class, has also been discharged with honour. Of course, very much more might be said on this subject, and the Social-Democrats in their future utterances will know how to amplify Comrade Surkov's speech; but still his speech was excellent, and its circulation by all Party organisations is the direct duty of our Party.

The third duty was to explain in full detail the *correct* meaning of the proposition, so often distorted by the German opportunists, that "religion is a private matter". This, unfortunately, Comrade Surkov did not do. It is all the more regrettable because in the earlier activity of the Duma group a mistake had been committed on this question by Comrade Belousov, and was pointed out at the time by *Proletary*. The discussion in the Duma group shows that the dispute about atheism has screened from it the question of the proper interpretation of the celebrated demand that religion should be proclaimed a private matter. We shall not blame Comrade Surkov alone for this error of the entire Duma group. More, we shall frankly admit that the whole Party is at fault here, for not having sufficiently elucidated this question and not having sufficiently prepared the minds of Social-Democrats to understand Engels's remark levelled against the German opportunists. The discussion in the Duma group proves that there was in fact a confused understanding of the question, and not at all any desire to ignore the teachings of Marx; and we are sure that the error will be corrected in future utterances of the group.

We repeat that on the whole Comrade Surkov's speech was excellent, and should be circulated by all the organisations. In its discussion of this speech the Duma group demonstrated that it is fulfilling its Social-Democratic duty conscientiously. It remains to express the wish that reports on discussions within the Duma group should appear more often in the Party press so as to bring the group and the Party closer together, to acquaint the Party with the difficult work being done within the group, and to establish ideological unity in the work of the Party and the Duma group.

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CLASSES AND PARTIES IN THEIR ATTITUDE TO RELIGION AND THE CHURCH

The debates in the Duma on the Synod estimates, then on the restoration of rights to persons who have left holy orders and, finally, on the Old-Believer communities, have provided very instructive material characterising the attitude of the Russian political parties towards religion and the Church. Let us make a general survey of this material, dwelling mainly on the debates on the Synod estimates (we have not yet received the verbatim reports of the debates on the other questions mentioned above).

The first and most obvious conclusion that emerges from the Duma debates is that militant clericalism in Russia not only exists, but is clearly gaining ground and becoming more organised. On April 16, Bishop Metrophanes stated: 'The first steps in our Duma activities pursued the explicit end that we who have been honoured by the votes of the people, should here in the Duma stand above party divisions and form a single group of the clergy, which should throw light on all sides from its ethical point of view.... What is the reason why we have failed to achieve this ideal situation? ... The fault for this lies with those who are sharing these benches with you [i.e., with the Cadets and the "Left"], namely, those clerical deputies who belong to the opposition. They were the first to lift their voice and say that this was neither more nor less than the emergence of a clerical party, and that this was extremely undesirable. Of course, there is no such thing as clericalism among the Russian Orthodox clergy—we never had a tendency of that kind, and in seeking to form a separate group we were pursuing purely ethical and moral ends. But now, gentlemen, when,

as a result of this discord introduced in our brotherly midst by the Left deputies, there followed disunity and division, now you [i.e., the Cadets] blame it on us."

Bishop Metrophanes in his illiterate speech let the cat out of the bag: the Left, don't you see, are guilty of having dissuaded some of the Duma priests from forming a special "moral" (this term is obviously more suitable for hoodwinking the people than the word "clerical") group!

Almost a month later, on May 13, Bishop Eulogius read in the Duma "the resolution of the Duma clergy": "The overwhelming majority of the Duma Orthodox clergy considers" ... that in the interests of the "leading and dominant position of the Orthodox Church" neither freedom of preaching for the Old-Believers, nor the unauthorised functioning of Old-Believer communities, nor the using of the title of priest by Old-Believer clergymen, are permissible. "The purely moral point of view" of the Russian priests stands fully revealed as clericalism pure and simple. "The overwhelming majority" of the Duma clergy, in whose name Bishop Eulogius spoke, probably consisted of 29 Right and moderately Right priests in the Third Duma, and possibly also included 8 priests belonging to the Octobrists. The opposition had probably been joined by 4 priests belonging to the Progressist and Peaceful Renovation groups, and one belonging to the Polish-Lithuanian group.

What is then the "purely moral and ethical point of view of the overwhelming majority of the clergy in the Duma" (the June-the-Third Duma, one should add)? Here are a few excerpts from the speeches: "All I say is that the initiative for these [i.e., Church] reforms must come from within the Church, not from without, not from the state and, of course, not from the Budget Commission. After all, the Church is a divine and eternal institution, its laws are immutable, whereas the ideals of state life, as we know, are subject to constant modifications" (Bishop Eulogius, April 14). The orator recalled "a disturbing historical parallel": the secularisation of Church property under Catherine II. "Who can vouch that the Budget Commission, which this year expressed the desire to put them [the Church funds] under state control will not express next year the desire to deposit them in the State Treasury, and then fully to transfer their

management from the Church authorities to the civil or state authorities?... The Church statutes say that since a bishop is entrusted with Christian souls, then all the more should Church property be entrusted to him.... Today before you [deputies of the Duma] stands your spiritual mother, the holy Orthodox Church, not merely as before representatives of the people, but also as before its spiritual children" (ibid.)

This is pure clericalism. The Church is above the state as the eternal and divine is above the temporal and earthly. The Church cannot forgive the state for secularising Church property. The Church demands a leading and dominant position. In its eyes the Duma deputies are not only—or rather not so much—representatives of the people as "spiritual children".

These are not officials in cassocks, as the Social-Democrat Surkov called them, but *feudalists* in cassocks. Defence of the Church's feudal privileges, outspoken support of medievalism—that is the essence of the policy pursued by the majority of the Third Duma clergy. Bishop Eulogius is by no means an exception. Gepetsky also vociferates against "secularisation" which he calls an intolerable "wrong" (April 14). The priest Mashkevich fulminates against the *Octobrist* report for seeking "to undermine the historic and canonical foundations on which our Church life has rested and must rest ... to push the life and activities of the Russian Orthodox Church off the canonical path on to the path where ... the true princes of the Church—the bishops—will be obliged to give up almost all their rights, inherited-from the apostles, to secular princes.... This is nothing but ... an encroachment on somebody else's property and on the rights and possessions of the Church.... The speaker is leading us towards the destruction of the canonical order of Church life; he seeks to subordinate the Orthodox Church and all its economic functions to the Duma, an institution composed of the most diverse elements in our country, of religious creeds both tolerated and not tolerated" (April 14).

The Russian Narodniks and liberals have long been comforting themselves, or rather deceiving themselves, with the theory" that in Russia there is no basis for militant clericalism, for a struggle of "the princes of the Church" with

the temporal power, and so forth. Our revolution has dispelled this illusion, as it did a number of other Narodnik and liberal illusions. Clericalism existed in a hidden form, so long as autocracy existed intact and inviolate. The all-powerful police and bureaucracy concealed from the gaze of "society" and the people the class struggle in general, and the struggle waged by the "feudalists in cassocks" against the "base rabble" in particular. But the first breach which the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry made in the feudalist autocratic regime laid bare what had been hidden. As soon as the proletariat and the advanced elements of the democratic bourgeoisie began to make use of the political liberty, the freedom to organise the masses, which they had won at the end of 1905, the reactionary classes, too, reached out for independent and open organisations. Under absolute autocracy they did not organise, and did not come out too much in the open, not because they were weak, but because they were strong; not because they were incapable of organisation and political struggle, but because at that time they did not yet feel any real need for independent class organisation. They did not believe in the possibility of a mass movement against the autocracy and the feudalists in Russia. They fully relied on the knout being sufficient to keep the rabble down. But the first wounds inflicted on autocracy compelled the social elements which supported it and needed it to come out into the open. It was no longer possible to use *only* the old knout in fighting masses that had been capable of causing the events of January 9, the strike movement in 1905, and the October-December revolution. It became necessary to build up independent political organisations; it became necessary for the Council of the United Nobility to organise Black Hundreds and engage in the most irresponsible demagogy; it became necessary for "the princes of the Church—the bishops"—to organise the reactionary clergy into an independent force.

A typical feature of the Third Duma, and of the Third-Duma period of the Russian counter-revolution is, indeed, that this organisation of the reactionary forces has come out into the open, has begun to develop on a nation-wide scale and has demanded a special Black-Hundred bourgeois "parliament". Militant clericalism has shown its true colours;

and from now on Russian Social-Democracy will have to act again and again as an observer of, and participant in, the clashes between the clerical and the anti-clerical bourgeoisie. If our general task is to assist the proletariat to unite into a special class, capable of separating from bourgeois democracy, one component of this task is the use of every means of propaganda and agitation, including the rostrum of the Duma, to explain to the masses the distinctions between socialist and bourgeois anti-clericalism.

The Octobrists and Cadets who have come out in the Third Duma against the extreme Right, the clericals, and the government, have eased this task for us immensely by providing an object-lesson of the attitude of the bourgeoisie towards the Church and religion. The legal press of the Cadets and the so-called Progressists is at present devoting special attention to the question of the Old-Believers, to the fact that the Octobrists as well as the Cadets have taken a stand against the government, and to the fact that they have, albeit in a small way, "adopted the course of reform" promised on October 17. What interests us most is the principle involved in this question, i.e., the attitude of the bourgeoisie in general, including the elements who claim the title of Democratic Cadets, towards religion and the Church. We must not allow a relatively minor question—the Old-Believers' conflict with the dominant Church, and the conduct of the Octobrists who are tied up with the Old-Believers, and are partly even dependent on them financially (*Golos Moskvy*[153] is said to be financed by the Old-Believers)—make us lose sight of the root question, that of the interests and policy of the bourgeoisie as a class.

Take a look at the speech delivered by Count Uvarov, an Octobrist in his general views, but who has left the Octobrist group. Speaking after the Social-Democrat Surkov, he started by refusing to deal with this question from the standpoint of principle, as the workers' deputy had done. Uvarov merely attacks the Synod and the Procurator-General for their unwillingness to give the Duma any information on certain Church revenues and on the expenditure of parish funds. Kamensky, the official spokesman of the Octobrists, approaches the question from the same standpoint (April 16), and demands that parishes should be revived

"for the purpose of strengthening the Orthodox faith". Kapustin, the so-called "Left-wing Octobrist", elaborates on this idea. "If we turn to the life of the people," he exclaims, "to the life of the rural population, we observe today, here and now, a sad fact: religious life is tottering, the greatest and sole foundation of the people's moral principles is tottering.... What can replace the concept of sin, what can replace the dictates of conscience? Surely, they cannot be replaced by the concept of class struggle and the rights of this or that class. That is a tragic concept which has taken root in our everyday life. Therefore, if religion is to survive as a foundation of morality, if it is to be within reach of the whole population, it is necessary that the bearers of this religion should enjoy the proper authority...."

The spokesman of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie wishes to strengthen religion, he wishes to enhance the influence of religion on the masses, realising that it is inadequate and out of date, realising even the harm caused to the ruling classes by "officials in cassocks", who are *lowering* the authority of the Church. The Octobrist is fighting against the excesses of clericalism and of police tutelage *in order to strengthen* the influence of the Church on the masses, in order to replace at least some means of addling the wits of the people, which are too crude, too out of date, too threadbare to achieve their object, by more refined and improved means. Police religion is no longer adequate for befuddling the masses: give us a more cultured, more up-to-date, more skilful religion, one that will be effective in a self-governing parish—that is what capital is demanding of the autocracy.

And the Cadet Karaulov *fully* subscribes to this same point of view. This "liberal" renegade (who gradually "evolved" from the Narodnaya Volya* to the Right-wing Cadets) screams his protest against the "denationalisation of the Church, understanding this to mean the exclusion of the masses of the people, of the laity, from the building of the Church". He finds it "*shocking*" (literally so!) that the masses are "losing faith". He raises an outcry, quite in the style of Menshikov,[154] because the "immense intrinsic value of the

* See Note 99.—*Ed.*

Church is being depreciated ... to the great detriment not only of the cause of the Church, but of that of the state as well. He qualifies as "words of gold" the loathsome hypocrisy of the zealot Eulogius on the theme that "the task of the Church is eternal, immutable, hence, it is not possible to link up the Church with politics". He protests against the alliance of the Church with the Black Hundreds *for the sole reason* that the Church may, "with greater might and glory than today, fulfil its grand and holy mission in a Christian spirit of love and freedom".

Comrade Belousov did well to have a good laugh at these "lyrical words" of Karaulov's from the Duma rostrum. However, such ridicule is very far from being adequate. It had to be made clear—and at the first convenient opportunity this should be done from the Duma rostrum—that the standpoint of the Cadets is absolutely identical with that of the Octobrists, and merely expresses the efforts of "cultured" capital to bamboozle the people with religious narcotics by more refined methods of Church deception than the ones now practised by the rank-and-file Russian priests who are still living in the past.

To keep the people in spiritual bondage, there must be the closest possible alliance of the Church and the Black Hundreds, said the "wild landlord" and the old Derzhimorda[155] through their spokesman Purishkevich. You are wrong gentlemen, retorts the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie through their spokesman Karaulov: with such methods you will only make the people turn away from religion for good. Now let us go about it in a more clever, more artful more ingenious way: let us remove the too stupid and crude agent of the Black Hundreds, declare war on "denationalisation of the Church", and inscribe on our banner Bishop Eulogius's "words of gold" to the effect that the Church is above politics. Only in this way shall we be able to fool at least some of the backward workers, and especially of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, and be able to help the renovated Church to fulfil its "grand and holy mission of retaining the masses of the people in spiritual bondage.

Our liberal press, not excluding the newspaper *Rech*, has concentrated of late on censuring Struve and Co. for their

authorship of the symposium *Vekhi*. But Karaulov, the official spokesman of the Cadets in the Duma, has done a superlative job of exposing all the vile hypocrisy of these remonstrances, and these repudiations of Struve and Co. What Karaulov and Milyukov conceal, Struve reveals. The liberals blame Struve *only* for having imprudently blurted out the truth, for showing his hand too openly. The liberals, who censure *Vekhi* and go on supporting the Cadet Party, are most shamelessly deceiving the people—condemning imprudently outspoken *words*, and going on *doing* the very *things* that go with those words.

There is little to say about the conduct of the Trudoviks in the Duma during the debate on the questions under review. As always, a noticeable difference was revealed between the peasant Trudoviks and the intellectual Trudoviks to the disadvantage of the latter, because of their excessive readiness to follow the Cadets. True, Rozhkov, a peasant, revealed in his speech his complete lack of political consciousness; he, too, repeated the Cadet platitudes about the Union of the Russian People helping not to reinforce but to destroy faith. He was unable to suggest any programme. On the other hand, when he began in his artless manner to tell the naked, unvarnished truth about the levies collected by the clergy, about the extortions of the priests, about how, in addition to charging money for conducting a marriage ceremony, they demand "a bottle of vodka, snacks, and a pound of tea, *and sometimes things that I am even afraid to talk about from this rostrum*" (April 16, verbatim report, p. 2259)—this was more than the Black-Hundred Duma could stand. A wild howl arose from the benches of the right. "This is scandalous, this is outrageous!" shouted the Black Hundreds, realising that this simple peasant's speech about extortions, listing the scale of "fees" charged for religious rites, was more likely to revolutionise the masses than any amount of theoretical or tactical anti-religious and anti-Church declarations. Thereupon the band of diehard defenders of autocracy in the Third Duma intimidated their flunkey—the Duma Chairman Meyendorff—and compelled him to rule that Rozhkov must sit down (the Social-Democrats, joined by some Trudoviks, Cadets and others, handed in a protest against this action of the Chairman).

Although the speech delivered by the peasant Trudovik Rozhkov was extremely unsophisticated, it provided an excellent demonstration of the abyss dividing the hypocritical, deliberately reactionary defence of religion by the Cadets, and the primitive, unconscious, matter-of-fact religiousness of the peasant, whose living conditions give rise—against his will and unconsciously—to a truly revolutionary resentment against extortions, and to readiness for a resolute fight against medievalism. The Cadets are the representatives of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, which is intent on renovating and strengthening religion against the people. The Rozhkovs are the representatives of revolutionary bourgeois democracy, a democracy that is undeveloped, lacking political consciousness, downtrodden, lacking independence, disunited—yet fraught with an all but inexhaustible reservoir of revolutionary energy in the fight against the landlords, the priests, and the autocracy.

Rozanov, a Trudovik intellectual, came close to the Cadets far less unconsciously than Rozhkov. Rozanov could mention disestablishment of the Church as a demand of the "Left", but could not refrain from reactionary, petty-bourgeois phrases about "amending the electoral law in the sense that the clergy should be excluded from participation in the political struggle". The revolutionary spirit, which finds a spontaneous outlet in a typical, average peasant when he begins to tell the truth about how he lives, vanishes in the case of a Trudovik intellectual, to be replaced by hazy and sometimes actually vile phrases. For the hundredth and thousandth time we see the truth confirmed that only if they follow the proletariat's lead will the Russian peasant masses be able to overthrow the oppressive and killing yoke of the feudal-minded landlords, the feudalists in cassocks, the feudal-minded supporters of the autocracy.

The Social-Democrat Surkov, representing the workers' party and the working class, was the only person in the Duma to raise the debates to the truly high level of principle, and said without beating about the bush what the attitude of the proletariat is towards the Church and religion, and what should be the attitude in this matter of all consistent and vigorous democrats. "Religion is the opium of the people.... Not a farthing of the people's money to these mur-

derous enemies of the people who are drugging the people's minds"—this straightforward, bold and outspoken battle-cry of a socialist resounded like a challenge to the Black-Hundred Duma, and met with the response of millions of proletarians, who will spread it among the masses and who will know how to translate it into revolutionary action when the time comes.

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CONFERENCE OF THE EXTENDED EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PROLETARY*[156]

JUNE 8-17 (21-30), 1909

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REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE OF THE EXTENDED EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PROLETARY*

Elsewhere in this issue the reader will find the text of the resolutions adopted at the recent conference of the extended Editorial Board of *Proletary*. The conference was constituted as follows: four members of the *Proletary* Editorial Board, three representatives of the Bolsheviks working in local organisations—St. Petersburg. Moscow regional (Central Russia) and the Urals—and five Bolshevik members of the Central Committee.

The debates which developed at the conference are unquestionably of great importance to the whole Party. They defined more exactly and, to some extent, more completely, that line of policy which the leading organ of the Bolshevik section of the Party has been systematically pursuing in recent times and which, of late, has aroused a number of attacks by some of our comrades who consider themselves Bolsheviks. The necessary explanation took place at the conference, at which the opposition was represented by two comrades.

In view of all this the editors of *Proletary* will make every effort to prepare and publish the fullest possible minutes of the conference. In the present report however we simply want to deal briefly with those points which, if interpreted in a certain way, might give rise—and are already giving rise among comrades abroad—to misapprehensions. The comprehensive and explicitly formulated resolutions of the conference really speak for themselves; the minutes of the conference will provide enough material for a thorough understanding of the resolutions as a whole. The purpose of this report is chiefly to point out the implications

of the decisions and resolutions *for members of the Bolshevik section*.

We shall start with the resolution "On Otzovism and Ultimatumism".

That part of the resolution which is directed expressly against otzovism encountered no serious objections on the part of the representatives of the opposition at the conference. Both these representatives admitted that otzovism, inasmuch as it was shaping into a definite trend, was deviating further and further from Social-Democracy, that some representatives of otzovism, notably its recognised leader Comrade St.,[157] have even managed to acquire a "certain tinge of anarchism". The conference *unanimously* recognised that a persistent and systematic struggle against otzovism as a trend was imperative With ultimatumism matters were different.

Both representatives of the opposition at the conference called themselves ultimatumists. And both of them, in a written statement submitted when the resolution was being voted on, declared that they were ultimatumists, that the resolution proposed to repudiate ultimatumism, that this would mean repudiating themselves, which was something they could not subscribe to. Later, when several other resolutions were adopted against the votes of the opposition, the two representatives of the opposition stated in writing that they considered the resolutions of the conference irregular, that, in adopting them, the conference was declaring a split in the Bolshevik section, and that they would not submit to these resolutions or put them into practice. Later we shall dwell in greater detail on this incident, because it formally completed the breakaway of one of the representatives of the opposition, Comrade Maximov, from the extended editorial board of *Proletary*. Here we want to approach it from another angle.

In assessing ultimatumism, just as, incidentally, in assessing that consistent ultimatumism which goes by the name of otzovism, we have unfortunately to deal not so much with writings as with legend. Neither ultimatumism nor otzovism have yet found expression in any more or less integral "platform". So ultimatumism must be considered in its only concrete expression—the demand that the Social-

Democratic group in the Duma be presented with an *ultimatum* to act in a strict Party spirit and obey all the instructions of the Party centres, or else give up their mandates. To maintain, however, that such a description of ultimatumism is *quite* correct and accurate is, apparently, wrong. And for the following reason. Comrade Marat, one of the two ultimatumists who attended the conference, stated that this description did not apply to him. He, Comrade Marat, admitted that there had been a great improvement lately in the work of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, and that he did not intend to present an ultimatum to it now, immediately. He merely thought that the Party should bring pressure to bear on the Duma group by every possible means, the afore-mentioned ultimatum being one of them.

It is of course possible to get along with ultimatumists like *this* within one and the same wing of the Party. *Such* an ultimatumist is bound to reduce his ultimatumism to zero as the work of the Duma group improves. *Such* ultimatumism does not preclude but, on the contrary, implies prolonged work of the Party with and on the Duma group, prolonged and persistent work of the Party in the sense of skilfully making use of activity in the Duma for the purpose of agitation and organisation. Since there are clear signs of an improvement in the activities of the Duma group, work must be continued perseveringly and persistently in the same direction. Ultimatumism will *thereby* gradually lose its objective meaning. In the case of *such* Bolshevik ultimatumists a split is out of the question. In their case it is scarcely justifiable even to draw the line of demarcation prescribed in the resolution "On Otzovism and Ultimatumism" and in the resolution "The Tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party". *Such* ultimatumism is nothing more than a shade of opinion in formulating and settling one definite practical question; there is no marked difference of principle here.

The ultimatumism which the resolution describes as an ideological trend in the Party which Bolshevism must disown, is a different thing. This ultimatumism—and it undoubtedly exists—rules out prolonged work on the Duma group by the Party and its central bodies, it rules out prolonged, patient Party activity among the work-

ers in the sense of skilfully utilising the wealth of agitational material provided by the Third Duma. This ultimatumism rules out *constructive*, *creative* Party work on the Duma group. This ultimatumism has only one weapon—the *ultimatum* which the Party must hang over the head of its Duma group like the sword of Damocles, and which the R.S.D.L.P. must accept as a substitute for all that experience in the genuinely revolutionary use of parliamentarism which the Social-Democrats in Western Europe have accumulated by dint of long persistent *practice*. To draw a line between *that* ultimatumism and otzovism is impossible. They are linked inseverably by their common spirit of *adventurism*. And Bolshevism, as the revolutionary trend in Russian Social-Democracy, must dissociate itself from one and the other alike.

But what do we mean, what did the conference mean by this "dissociation"? Are there any grounds for asserting that the conference proclaimed *a split in the Bolshevik section*, as some representatives of the opposition would have us believe? There are no such grounds. The conference stated in its resolutions that tendencies were beginning to appear within the Bolshevik section which run counter to Bolshevism with its specific tactical principles. In our Party Bolshevism is represented by the Bolshevik *section*. But a section is not a party. A party can contain a whole gamut of opinions and shades of opinion, the extremes of which may be sharply contradictory. In the German party, side by side with the pronouncedly revolutionary wing of Kautsky, we see the ultra-revisionist wing of Bernstein. That is not the case within a section. A section in a party is a group of *like-minded persons* formed for the purpose primarily of influencing the party in a definite direction, for the purpose of securing acceptance for their principles in the party in the purest possible form. For this, real *unanimity of opinion* is necessary. The different standards we set for *party* unity and *sectional* unity must be grasped by everyone who wants to know how the question of the internal discord in the Bolshevik section really stands. *The conference did not declare a split in the section*. It would be a profound mistake for any local functionary to understand the resolutions of the conference as an instruction to expel *otzovist-minded* workers, let

alone bring about an immediate split in organisations where there are otzovist elements. We warn local functionaries in all seriousness against such actions. Otzovism, as a coherent, *independent trend* does not exist among the *mass* of the workers. The attempts of the otzovists at self-determination and a complete statement of their views lead inevitably to syndicalism and anarchism. Persons who advocate these trends with any persistence exclude themselves automatically from section and Party alike. To put otzovist-*minded workers*' *groups* in this category, however large these groups may be, would be absurd. This kind of otzovism is largely a result of being uninformed about the work of the Duma group. The best way to combat *this kind* of otzovism is, first, wide publicity among the workers to keep them fully informed on the work of the Duma group and, secondly, to afford the workers opportunities to come into regular contact with the group and influence it. Otzovist sentiment in St. Petersburg, for instance, could be counteracted to a large extent by arranging a number of talks between our comrades in the Duma and the workers of St. Petersburg. Thus all efforts should be concentrated on avoiding an *organisational split* with the otzovists. Any *ideological* campaign against otzovism and its kindred doctrine syndicalism, conducted more or less persistently and consistently, would soon make all talk of an organisational split absolutely superfluous or, at worst, result in a few otzovists or groups of otzovists *breaking away* from the Bolshevik section and the Party.

That, incidentally, was how matters stood at the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*. Comrade Maximov's ultimatumism proved to be utterly irreconcilable with the Bolshevik line, which was formulated once again by the conference. After the resolutions on key issues were adopted he declared that he considered them irregular, although they had been carried by ten votes to two, some of them against a single dissentient vote (Maximov's) with one abstention (for example, the resolution "On Otzovism and Ultimatumism" as a whole). At this the conference passed a resolution disclaiming all responsibility for the political actions of Comrade Maximov. The thing was clear: once Comrade Maximov flatly rejected all the resolutions on key issues adopted by such a large majority of the confer-

ence, he had to realise that there was not between the conference and himself that *unanimity of opinion* which is an elementary condition for the existence of a *section* within a *party*. But Comrade Maximov did not stop there: he emphatically declared not only that he had no intention of carrying out these resolutions, *but that he would not submit to them*. The conference had no choice but to disclaim all responsibility for the political activities of Comrade Maximov. In doing so, however, it declared (see the statement of the St. Petersburg delegate M. T.[158] and others) "that the question here is not of a split in the section but of Comrade Maximov's breakaway from the extended editorial board of *Proletary*".*

We also find it necessary to draw all the attention of Party comrades to other resolutions of the conference: "The Tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party", and "The Attitude to Duma Activities Among the Other Fields of Party Work". The important thing here is correctly to understand the formulation of the question of the "Party line" of the Bolsheviks, and of the attitude to legal opportunities in general and to the Duma as a platform in particular.

Our immediate task is to preserve and consolidate the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The very fulfilment of this great task involves one extremely important element: the combating of both varieties of *liquidationism*—liquidationism on the right and liquidationism on the left. The liquidators on the right say that no illegal R.S.D.L.P. is needed, that Social-Democratic activities should be centred exclusively or almost exclusively on legal opportunities. The liquidators on the left go to the other extreme:

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* Comrade Marat also made a statement to the effect that he would not *carry out* the resolutions of the conference, but would *submit to them*. In a special statement, Comrade Marat made the reservation that, while he recognised the necessity of a comradely ideological struggle against otzovism, he did not believe that the struggle should take organisational forms or that it involved a split in the Bolshevik section. As to the question *in general* of an *organisational* split, it is evident from the conference resolution ("On the Party School Set up Abroad at X—"[159]) that a step towards a split was made in this case by the otzovists and the adherents of god-building,[160] because this school is undoubtedly an attempt to form a new *ideological and organisational centre* for a new section of the Party.

legal avenues of Party work do not exist for them, illegality at any price is their "be all and end all". Both, in approximately equal degree, are liquidators of the R.S.D.L.P., for without methodical judicious combination of legal and illegal work in the present situation that history has imposed upon us, the "preservation and *consolidation* of the R.S.D.L.P." is inconceivable. Liquidationism on the right, as we know, is rampant particularly in the Menshevik section, and partly in the Bund. But among the Mensheviks there have lately been significant signs of a return to partyism, which must be welcomed: "the minority of the [Menshevik] section",[161] to quote the conference resolution, "after running the full gauntlet of liquidationism, are now voicing their protest against it, and seeking anew solid party ground for their activities."*

What then are the tasks of the Bolsheviks in relation to this as yet small section of the Mensheviks who are fighting against liquidationism on the right? The Bolsheviks must undoubtedly seek *rapprochement* with this section of the membership, those who are Marxists and partyists. There is no question whatever of sinking our tactical differences with the Mensheviks. We are fighting and shall continue to fight most strenuously against Menshevik deviations from the policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Nor, needless to say, is there any question of the Bolshevik section dissolving its identity in the Party. The Bolsheviks have done a good deal to entrench their positions in the Party, but much remains to be done in the same direction. The Bolshevik section as a definite ideological trend in the Party must exist as before. But one thing must be borne firmly in mind: the responsibility of "preserving and consolidating" the R.S.D.L.P., of which the resolution of the conference speaks, now rests primarily, if not entirely, on the Bolshevik section. All, or practically all, the *Party* work in progress, particularly in the localities, is now being shouldered by

* By the "split in the Editorial Board" of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* the resolution has in mind Comrade Plekhanov's resignation from that body, to which Plekhanov himself says he was driven by nothing more nor less than the liquidationist tendencies of the Editorial Board.

the Bolsheviks. And to them, as firm and consistent guardians of Party principle, now falls a highly important task. They must enlist in the cause of *building up the Party* all elements who are fitted to serve it. And in this hour of adversity it would be truly a crime on our part not to extend our hand to pro-Party people in other groups, who are coming out in defence of Marxism and partyism against liquidationism.

This stand was recognised by the great majority at the conference, including all the representatives of the Bolsheviks from the local organisations. The opposition wavered, hesitating to take a definite stand, either for or against us. Yet it was for this line that Comrade Maximov accused the conference of "betraying Bolshevism", of adopting the Menshevik point of view, etc. We had only one reply to make to this: "Say that publicly in the press, before the whole Party membership and the whole Bolshevik section, and the sooner the better; that will enable us once again to expose the true value of your 'revolutionariness', the true nature of your 'protection' of Bolshevism."

We ask comrades to take note of the conference resolution on "The Attitude to Duma Activities, etc." We have already indicated above how intimately the question of "legal opportunities" is bound up with liquidationism of various shades. To fight liquidationism on the left is just as imperative now as to fight liquidationism on the right. The parliamentary cretinism, which would reduce the whole Party organisation to a congregation of workers at the shrine of "legal opportunities", and of Duma activities in particular, is as profoundly alien to the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy as the otzovism that cannot understand the value of legal opportunities *to the Party*, *in the interests of the Party*. In the conference resolutions the use of legal opportunities *for the benefit of the Party* is regarded as being of immense importance. But nowhere in these resolutions are legal opportunities and their use treated as an end in itself. They are everywhere placed in direct *association* with the aims and methods of illegal activity. And this *association* deserves particular attention at the present time. Certain *practical* suggestions are given on this score in the resolution. But they are only *suggestions*. Broadly speaking,

it is not so much now a question of what place "legal opportunities" should occupy among other fields of *Party* work, but of *how* to utilise them with greatest benefit to the Party. During its long years of work underground, the Party has accumulated enormous experience in illegal work. This cannot be said of the other sphere—the use of legal opportunities. Here the Party, *and the Bolsheviks in particular*, have not been active enough. More attention, more initiative and more effort must be turned to making use of this field than has hitherto been the case. We must *learn* to utilise legal opportunities, learn just as zealously as we have been learning to use illegal methods of work. And it is for the purpose of using the legal opportunities for the benefit of the Party that the conference calls upon all to whom the interests of the R.S.D.L.P. are dear to *put their shoulder to the wheel*.

Our attitude to illegal Party work remains unchanged, as of course it must. Our main task is to preserve and consolidate the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and everything else must be subordinated to it. Only after this consolidation has been achieved shall we be able to utilise these same legal opportunities in the interests of the Party. The utmost attention must be paid to those workers' groups which are being formed in the industrial centres, which must take over, and are gradually taking over, the general direction of Party work. All our efforts in all fields of our activity should be aimed at making real Social-Democratic Party cadres out of these groups. Only on this basis is it really possible to preserve and consolidate the Russian Social-Democratic-Labour Party.

Supplement to *Proletary*, No. 46,
July 3 (16), 1909

Published according
to the Supplement

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF THE TASKS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS IN THE PARTY, JUNE 11 (24)

I think it unnecessary to reply for the hundredth and thousandth time to Comrade Maximov on the question at issue, i.e., to repeat that in breaking away from us he is creating a faction of caricature Bolsheviks or godly otzovists. All this has already been said, printed, chewed over and emphasised in *Proletary*. And I only say: speak out, say *in print* what you have been saying here within four walls—and then, and only then, shall we get an ideological struggle instead of the unseemly bickering that has been going on here for more than three days. Say in print that we are "neo-Bolsheviks", "neo-*Proletary*-ists" "in the new *Iskra* sense", i.e., virtually, Mensheviks, that we "have made two steps back", that we "are destroying the most precious heritage of the Russian revolution—Bolshevism". Say these things, which I have taken down from your speech, *in print*, and we shall show the public yet once more that you do answer to the type of a caricature Bolshevik. Say *in print* that we—I quote your words again—"will die a political death as prisoners of Plekhanov in the event of a new upsurge", that we "will win in the event of a protracted period of reaction", say this *in print*, and we shall, for the benefit of the Party, elucidate once more the difference between Bolshevism and "godly otzovism". But since you refuse (in spite of our direct challenges, *beginning from August* 1908, when you were formally requested at a meeting of the editorial board to come forward with a pamphlet, to express your views in a



The first page of Lenin's manuscript
"Speech on the Question of the Tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party",
June 11 (24), 1909

Reduced

pamphlet), since you refuse to fight *openly*, but continue your intrigue within the Party, we *must* get an open statement from you by directly *removing you* from our section (not from the Party but from our section of it), removing you for the sake of an ideological struggle which will teach the Party a great deal.

First published in 1934
in the book *Minutes*
of the Conference
Extended Editorial Board
of "Proletary"

Published according
to the manuscript

SPEECH AND DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE TASKS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS IN RELATION TO DUMA ACTIVITY

We are coming to the end of the debate, and I don't think there is any need to fix it in a special resolution, because we need to be careful with that. The thing was after all to thrash the matter out among ourselves. In reply to Vlasov[162] on the use of legal opportunities, I will read a draft resolution:

"The Bolshevik Centre resolves: in order *in practice* to achieve—and to achieve in a *revolutionary* Social-Democratic spirit and direction—the objects now recognised by all Bolsheviks of making use of all 'legal opportunities', all legal and semi-legal organisations of the working class in general and the Duma rostrum in particular, the Bolshevik section must definitely and clearly put before itself the aim of securing at any cost the training up of a body of experienced Bolsheviks, specialised in their job and firmly established in their particular *legal* post (trade unions; clubs; Duma committees, etc., etc.)."

Vlasov stated that this refers to the leaders. This is not the case. The trouble is that in our Bolshevik section the view prevails that such specialists are not required. Our forces are few: they must be utilised and allotted to the legal functions, and made responsible for carrying out these functions in the name of the section. If we speak of setting up Party cells, we must know how to do it. I have drafted a resolution on agitation by leaflets:

"Having discussed the question of the Bolsheviks' tasks in relation to Duma activity, the Bolshevik Centre resolves to draw the attention of all local organisations to the im-

portance of agitation by leaflets (in addition to the local and regional press) which spread among the masses information about the Duma work of the Social-Democrats and give direction to this work. Subjects for such leaflets might be indications of questions to be highlighted from the Duma rostrum, the summing up of the Social-Democrats' activity in the Duma and the grouping of the different parties, outlines of propagandist speeches on these questions, analysis of the political significance of particularly important Social-Democratic speeches in the Duma, pointing out omissions or inaccuracies in Social-Democratic Duma speeches, and extracts from these speeches giving practical conclusions important for propaganda and agitation, etc., etc."

And I have also roughed-out in the form of a resolution the points on the question of our attitude to Duma activity which were discussed at the private meeting[163]:

"II. The difference between the revolutionary Social-Democratic use of the Duma and the reformist (or more broadly, opportunist) use can be described by the following indications, which do not pretend to be complete.

"From the standpoint of the external relations, so to speak, of the Duma Social-Democratic group, the difference between the revolutionary Social-Democratic use of the Duma and opportunist use consists in the following: the necessity to combat the tendency on the part of deputies and very often of the bourgeois intellectuals surrounding them—a tendency natural in all bourgeois society (and in Russia during a period of reaction especially)—to make parliamentary activity the basic, most important thing of all, an end in itself. In particular it is essential to make every effort that the group should carry on its work as one of the functions subordinated to the interests of the working-class movement as a whole, and also that the group should be in constant contact with the Party, not drawing apart from it but implementing Party views, the directives of Party congresses and the central institutions of the Party.

"From the standpoint of the internal content of the group's activity, it is essential to bear the following in mind. The aim of the activity of the parliamentary Social-Democratic group differs in principle from that of *all* other political parties. The aim of the proletarian party is not to do

deals or haggle with the powers that be, not to engage in the hopeless patching-up of the regime of the feudalist-bourgeois dictatorship of counter-revolution, but to develop in every way the class-consciousness, the socialist clarity of thought, the revolutionary determination and all-round organisation of the mass of the workers. Every step in the activity of the Duma group must serve this fundamental aim. Therefore more attention must be paid to promoting the aims of socialist revolution from the Duma rostrum. Efforts must he made to ensure that speeches should more often be heard from the Duma rostrum propagandising the fundamental conceptions and aims of socialism, namely, of scientific socialism. Then, in the conditions of continuing bourgeois-democratic revolution, it is extremely important that the Duma group should systematically combat the torrent of counter-revolutionary attacks on the 'liberation movement', and the prevalent tendency (both on the part of the outright reactionaries and of the liberals, especially the Cadets) to condemn the revolution and discredit it, its aims, its methods, etc. The Social-Democratic group in the Duma must bear high the banner of the revolution, the banner of the advanced class, leader of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.

"Furthermore it is essential to point out a task of the Duma Social-Democratic group, which is exceptionally important at the present time, namely, that of participating energetically in all discussions of labour legislation. The group must utilise the rich parliamentary experience of the West-European Social-Democrats, taking special care to avoid the opportunist distortion of this aspect of its activity. The group must not whittle down its slogans and the demands of our Party's minimum programme, but draft and introduce its Social-Democratic Bills (and also amendments to Bills of the government and the other parties), in order to unmask to the masses the hypocrisy and falseness of social-reformism, in order to draw the masses into independent economic and political mass struggle, which alone can bring real gains to the workers or transform half-hearted and hypocritical 'reforms' under the existing system into strong-points for an advancing working-class movement towards the complete emancipation of the proletariat.

"The Duma Social-Democratic group and the whole Social-Democratic Party should take the same stand towards reformism within Social-Democracy, which is the latest product of opportunist vacillation.

"Finally, revolutionary Social-Democratic use of the Duma should differ from opportunist use in that the Social-Democratic group and the Party are bound to explain to the masses in every possible way the class character of all bourgeois political parties, not confining themselves to attacks on the government and outright reactionaries, but exposing both the counter-revolutionary nature of liberalism and the waverings of petty-bourgeois peasant democracy."

Written June 12-13 (25-26), 1909
First published in 1934 in the book
Minutes of the Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of "Proletary"

Text of the speech published according to the book; text of the draft resolution according to the manuscript

RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EXTENDED EDITORIAL BOARD OF *PROLETARY*

1

ON OTZOVISM AND ULTIMATUMISM

The slogan of boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the First Duma issued by the revolutionary wing of our Party played a great revolutionary role at the time, and was taken up with enthusiasm by all the most active and most revolutionary sections of the working class.

The direct revolutionary struggle of the broad masses was then followed by a severe period of counter-revolution. It became essential for Social-Democrats to adapt their revolutionary tactics to this new political situation, and, in connection with this, one of the exceptionally important tasks became the use of the Duma as an open platform for the purpose of assisting Social-Democratic agitation and organisation.

In this rapid turn of events, however, a section of the workers who had participated in the direct revolutionary struggle was unable to proceed at once to apply revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics in the new conditions of the counter-revolution, and continued simply to repeat slogans which *had been* revolutionary in the period of open civil war, but which now, if merely repeated, might retard the process of closing the ranks of the proletariat in the new conditions of struggle.

On the other hand, in the conditions of this painful crisis, in an atmosphere of decline in the revolutionary struggle, of apathy and dejection even among a section of the workers, at a time when the workers' organisations were being suppressed and when the strength of their resistance

to disintegrating influences was inadequate, there has developed among a section of the working class an attitude of indifference towards the political struggle in general, and of a particularly marked lack of interest in the work of Social-Democrats in the Duma.

It is in such conditions that so-called otzovism and ultimatumism may meet with temporary success among these sections of the proletariat.

The proceedings of the Third Duma, which openly flouts the needs of the workers, work up an otzovist mood among these strata of the workers, who, owing to their inadequate Social-Democratic training, are as yet unable to understand that these proceedings of the Third Duma enable the Social-Democrats to make use of that representative assembly of the exploiting classes in a revolutionary manner, in order to expose to the broadest sections of the people the real nature of the autocracy and of all the counter-revolutionary forces, as well as the need for revolutionary struggle.

Another contributing factor to this otzovist mood among this stratum of the workers has been the exceedingly grave errors committed by the Duma Social-Democratic group, especially during the first year of its activity.

Recognising that this otzovist mood has a detrimental effect on the socialist and revolutionary training of the working class, the Bolshevik wing of the Party considers it necessary:

(a) *in regard to these strata of the workers*: to persevere in the work of Social-Democratic training and organisation, to explain systematically and persistently the utter political futility of otzovism and ultimatumism, the real significance of Social-Democratic parliamentarism and the role of the Duma as a platform for the Social-Democrats during a period of counter-revolution;

(b) *in regard to the Duma Social-Democratic group and Duma work in general*: to establish close connections between the Duma group and the advanced workers; to render it every assistance; to see that the whole Party supervises and brings pressure upon it, *inter alia*, by openly explaining its mistakes; to ensure in practice that the Party guides its activities as a Party organ; and in general that the Bolsheviks carry out the decisions of the recent Party conference on

this matter; for only the increased attention of working-class circles to the activities of the Duma Social-Democratic group, and their organised participation in the Duma activities of the Social-Democrats, will be effective in straightening out the tactics of our Duma group;

(c) *in regard to the Right wing of the Party*, which is dragging the Duma group on to an anti-Party road and thereby tearing it away from the workers' vanguard to wage a systematic, irreconcilable struggle against it, and to expose these tactics as fatal to the Party.

* * *

In the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution a number of elements joined our Party, attracted not by its purely proletarian programme, but chiefly by its gallant and energetic fight for democracy; these elements adopted the revolutionary-democratic slogans of the proletarian party, but without connecting them with the entire struggle of the socialist proletariat as a whole.

Such elements, not sufficiently imbued with the proletarian point of view, have also been found in the ranks of our Bolshevik wing of the Party. In this period of social stagnation such elements more and more reveal their lack of Social-Democratic consistency. Coming as they do into ever sharper contradiction with the fundamentals of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics, they have been creating, during the past year, a trend that seeks to give shape to a theory of otzovism and ultimatumism, but in reality only elevates to a principle and intensifies false notions about Social-Democratic parliamentarism and the work of Social-Democracy in the Duma.

These attempts to create a complete system of otzovist policy out of an otzovist mood lead to a theory which in substance expresses the ideology of political indifference on the one hand, and of anarchist vagaries on the other. For all its revolutionary phraseology, the theory of otzovism and ultimatumism in practice represents, to a considerable extent, the reverse side of constitutional illusions based on the hope that the Duma itself can satisfy certain urgent needs of the people. In essence, it substitutes petty-bourgeois tendencies for proletarian ideology.

No less harmful to the Social-Democratic cause than open otzovism is so-called ultimatumism (i.e., that tendency which on principle renounces the utilisation of the Third Duma rostrum, or which tries to justify its failure to carry out this duty by considerations of expediency, and in striving for the recall of the Social-Democratic group from the Duma, abandons the prolonged work of training the Duma group and straightening its line in favour of presenting to it an immediate ultimatum). Politically, ultimatumism at the present time is indistinguishable from otzovism, and only introduces still greater confusion and disunity by the disguised character of its otzovism. The attempts of ultimatumism to assert its direct connection with the tactics of boycott practised by our wing of the Party during a particular stage of the revolution, merely distort the true meaning and character of the boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the First Duma, which was quite correctly applied by the overwhelming majority of our Party. By their attempt to deduce, from the particular cases in which the boycott of representative institutions was applied at this or that moment of the revolution, that the policy of boycott is the distinguishing feature of Bolshevik tactics, even in a period of counter-revolution, ultimatumism and otzovism demonstrate that these trends are in essence the reverse side of Menshevism, which preaches indiscriminate participation in all representative institutions, irrespective of the particular stage of development of the revolution, irrespective of whether a revolutionary upsurge exists or not.

All the attempts made so far by otzovism and ultimatumism to lay down principles on which to base their theory have inevitably led to denial of the fundamentals of revolutionary Marxism. The tactics proposed by them inevitably lead to a complete break with the tactics of the Left wing of international Social-Democracy as applied to present-day Russian conditions, and result in anarchist deviations.

Otzovist-ultimatumist agitation has already begun to cause unquestionable harm to the working-class movement and to Social-Democratic work. If it continues, it may become a threat to Party unity, for this agitation has already given rise to such ugly phenomena as the alliance between otzovists and Socialist-Revolutionaries (in St. Petersburg)

for the purpose of preventing help for our Party representatives in the Duma; likewise to public speeches at workers' meetings jointly with avowed syndicalists.

In view of all this, the extended editorial board of *Proletary* declares that Bolshevism as a definite trend within the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has nothing in common with otzovism and ultimatumism, and that the Bolshevik wing of the Party must most resolutely combat these deviations from the path of revolutionary Marxism.

2

THE TASKS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS IN THE PARTY

In the period of decisive triumph of counter-revolution which followed the dissolution of the Second Duma, force of circumstances dictated that all Party activities should be concentrated on the following task: to preserve the Party organisation built up in the years of the high tide of the proletarian struggle, despite all the efforts of reaction, and notwithstanding the great depression in the proletarian class struggle, i.e., to preserve it as an organisation which consciously takes its stand on the basis of orthodox Marxism, and which unites all the "national" Social-Democratic organisations for the purpose of carrying out a single revolutionary Social-Democratic line of tactics.

In the course of this two years' struggle for the Party and partyism, it became quite clear that, on the one hand, the Party had dissociated itself from the elements that had penetrated it as a result of the specific conditions of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and that, on the other hand, the revolutionary Social-Democrats had been further consolidated. On the one hand, the former fellow-travellers of Social-Democracy took quite definite shape—those fellow-travellers, who, on leaving the Party, transferred all their activities into various legal organisations (co-operatives, trade unions, educational societies, advisory committees for the Duma group), where they not only did not carry out the policy of the Party but, on the contrary, fought the Party and strove to wrest these organisations away from it and pit them against the Party. Making a fetish of legality,

and elevating to a principle the narrow forms of activity imposed by the temporary decline of and state of disunity in the working-class movement, these elements—avowed liquidators of the Party—quite obviously took their stand upon the ground of theoretical and tactical revisionism. That the closest connection exists between liquidationism in organisation (the struggle against Party institutions) and the ideological struggle against Marxist theory and the fundamental principles of the programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, has now most clearly been revealed and proved by the entire history of the efforts to force an opportunist policy on our Duma group by its intellectual advisers, as well as by the entire course of the struggle between the liquidators and the partyists within the legal workers' organisations and in the workers' groups of the four congresses: of the People's Universities,[164] of the co-operatives,[165] of women[166] and of factory medical officers.[167]

On the other hand, the Left wing of the Party, to whose lot it fell to lead the Party during this period of the decisive triumph of the counter-revolution, theoretically recognised and in practice applied the tactics of expediently combining illegal with legal Party work. This applies to all the Party work with the Duma group and all the Party work in the legal and semi-legal proletarian organisations. It is precisely these forms of work—forms enabling the illegal Party to influence more or less broad masses—that have been brought to the fore by the peculiar conditions of the present historical situation, in addition to the main forms of Party work. It is in these forms of activity that the Party in practice comes into conflict with liquidationism and deals it heavy blows. It is on this ground also that Social-Democrats belonging to various groups of the Party have been and are being drawn together.* And here, finally, on the very same questions of Party tactics and organisation in the con-

* The resolutions on the trade unions and the co-operatives, and a number of resolutions on Duma activities, carried *unanimously* by the Central Committee. Support for the Party line by the overwhelming majority at the recent All-Russian Conference. The experience of conducting the Central Organ, the workers' groups of the said congresses, etc.

ditions of the Third Duma period, the Bolshevik section openly disavows the pseudo-revolutionary, unstable, non-Marxist elements, which, under cover of so-called otzovism, have been opposing the new forms of Party activity.

At the present time, outlining the basic tasks of the Bolsheviks, the extended editorial board of *Proletary* states:

(1) that in the further struggle for the Party and partyism, the task of the Bolshevik section, which must remain the foremost champion of partyism and of the revolutionary Social-Democratic line in the Party, is to give active and all-round support to the Central Committee and the Central Organ of the Party. In the present period of the re-grouping of Party forces, only the central institutions of the Party can serve as the strong and authoritative representa ive of the Party line, around which all genuinely partyist and genuinely Social-Democratic elements can be rallied;

(2) that in the Menshevik camp of the Party, whose official organ, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, is fully controlled by the Menshevik liquidators, the minority of this faction, having explored the path of liquidationism to the very end, is already raising its voice in protest against that path and is again seeking a party basis for its activities (the letter of the "Vyborg" Mensheviks* in St. Petersburg, the split among the Mensheviks in Moscow, the split in the editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, the corresponding division in the Bund, etc.);

(3) that in such circumstances the task of the Bolsheviks, who will remain the solid vanguard of the Party, is not only to continue the struggle against liquidationism and all the varieties of revisionism, but also to establish closer contact with the Marxist and partyist elements of the other groups, dictated by common aims in the struggle for the preservation and consolidation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

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* The Mensheviks in Vyborg District of St. Petersburg.—*Ed.*

3

AGITATION FOR A BOLSHEVIK CONGRESS OR BOLSHEVIK CONFERENCE SEPARATE FROM THE PARTY

Considering:

that the Bolshevik wing, ever since Party unity was restored, has always aligned and rallied the adherents of its political line on issues which have already become the subject of a general Party discussion, and always on the basis of an ideological campaign fought on the general Party arena for its own particular solution of such questions—parallel platforms, discussion in the Party cells, and at general Party congresses;

that this is the only sure way both to rally really like-minded members and to draw into the wing all really kindred elements;

that for the attainment of our main object, to exert such an influence on the Party that the policy of revolutionary Social-Democracy shall triumph once and for all in the Party, the alignment of the Bolshevik, solely on the general Party arena is the only right and proper procedure;

that any other procedure, the procedure of calling special Bolshevik conferences and congresses, would inevitably split the Party from top to bottom and would deal an irreparable blow to the section which took the initiative in bringing about such a total split in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party,

the extended editorial board of *Proletary* resolves:

(1) To warn all its supporters against agitating for a special Bolshevik congress, as such agitation would lead objectively to a Party split and might radically impair the position which revolutionary Social-Democracy has won in the Party.

(2) To hold the next conference of Bolsheviks at the same time as the regular Party conference, the supreme assembly of the wing as a whole to be an assembly of its supporters at the next Party congress.

(3) In view of the urgent outstanding issues agitating the Party and members of its Bolshevik wing, the Bolsheviks on the Central Committee are instructed to press for a speediest possible general Party conference (to be called in two or three months) and then for a speediest possible Congress.

4

THE PARTY SCHOOL BEING SET UP ABROAD AT X-—

After considering the question of the school at X—, the extended editorial board of *Proletary* is of the opinion that the organisation of this school by the promotion group (which includes Comrade Maximov, a member of the extended editorial board) has from the outset been proceeded with over the heads of the editorial board of *Proletary* and been accompanied by agitation against the latter. The steps so far taken by the promotion group make it perfectly clear that under the guise of this school a new centre is being formed for a faction breaking away from the Bolsheviks. The sponsors of this school, acting over the heads of the general centres, have contacted numerous committees in Russia, organised an independent fund and collections, and are appointing their own organisers, without even informing the editorial board of *Proletary* or the general Party centre.

While it recognises that with the present dearth of experienced Party workers a properly constituted and genuinely Party school, even if located abroad, might be of some help; to local organisations in training up useful Party functionaries from among the workers, and while it considers for its part that everything must be done to render such assistance to local organisations as the condition of our organisation will allow, the extended editorial board, on the evidence of the whole line of conduct of the initiators of the school at X—, declares that the aims pursued by these initiators are not aims common to the Bolshevik wing as a whole, as an ideological trend in the Party, but are the private aims of a group with a separate ideology and policy. In view of the dissensions revealed within our ranks on the subject of otzovism, ultimatumism, the attitude to the propaganda of god-building and the internal Party tasks of the Bolsheviks in general; and in view of the fact that the initiators and organisers of the school at X— are one and all representatives of otzovism, ultimatumism and god-building, the extended editorial board of *Proletary* declares that the ideological and political physiognomy of this new centre is quite clearly defined.

In view of this, the extended editorial board of *Proletary* declares that the Bolshevik wing can bear no responsibility for this school.

5

THE BREAKAWAY OF COMRADE MAXIMOV

Considering:

that unanimity on principles and tactics between ten members of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*, on the one hand, and Comrade Maximov, on the other, has manifestly proved to be absent on all points of the agenda; that, furthermore, there have lately been actions on Comrade Maximov's part tending also to violate the organisational unity of the Bolshevik wing; that, lastly, Comrade Maximov gave a negative answer to the question whether he would abide by the decisions of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* and carry them out,

the extended editorial board of *Proletary* henceforth disclaims any responsibility for the political actions of Comrade Maximov.

Supplement to *Proletary*, No. 46, July 3 (16), 1909

Published according to the Supplement

THE LIQUIDATION OF LIQUIDATIONISM

In a special supplement to the present issue of *Proletary* the reader will find a report on the conference of the Bolsheviks and the text of the resolutions adopted there.* Our purpose in the present article is to assess the importance of this conference and the breakaway of a small group of the Bolsheviks which took place there, from the standpoint both of our wing and of the R.S.D.L.P. as a whole.

The last two years, roughly from the coup d'état of June 3, 1907, up to the present time, have been a period of drastic change, of grave crisis in the history of the Russian revolution and in the development of the working-class movement in Russia and of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held in December 1908 reviewed the present political situation, the condition and prospects of the revolutionary movement and the tasks of the party of the working class in the present period. The resolutions passed by the conference are a permanent asset to the Party, and the Menshevik opportunists who sought to criticise them at all costs, only succeeded in betraying the glaring futility of their "criticism" which was unable to offer any intelligent, integral and systematic solution of the problems as an alternative to the one given in the resolutions.

But that was not all. The conference played an important roll in the life of our Party by indicating the existence of *new ideological groupings* in both wings—the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. The struggle between these sections

* See pp. 425-51 of this volume.—*Ed.*

can be said without exaggeration to have filled the whole history of the Party, both on the eve of the revolution and during the revolution. Therefore the new ideological groupings are an event of great importance in the life of the Party, an event whose lessons all Social-Democrats should study, understand and digest, if they are to take an intelligent stand on the new issues which this new situation raises.

These new ideological groupings may be briefly described as the appearance of liquidationism on both the extreme flanks of the Party and as the struggle being waged against it. By December 1908 liquidationism stood fully revealed among the Mensheviks, but at that time the fight against it was conducted almost exclusively by others (the Bolsheviks, the Polish and Lettish Social-Democrats, a section of the Bundists). The pro-Party Mensheviks, Mensheviks who were opposed to liquidationism, had barely begun to emerge as a trend at that time, and were not at all united or open in their criticism. Among the Bolsheviks both sections were clearly defined and acted openly, namely, the overwhelming majority of orthodox Bolsheviks, who were firmly opposed to otzovism and secured the adoption of their point of view in all the resolutions of the conference, and the otzovist minority who advocated their views as a separate group, and received frequent support from the ultimatumists who wavered between them and the orthodox Bolsheviks. That the otzovists (and the ultimatumists, too, insofar as they are coming round to the otzovist viewpoint) are Mensheviks inside out, liquidators of a new type, has been repeatedly asserted and demonstrated in *Proletary* (see especially issues Nos. 39, 42, and 44*). Thus among the Mensheviks the overwhelming majority were liquidators, and the protest and struggle of the pro-Party men against them were barely beginning to manifest themselves; while among the Bolsheviks the orthodox elements were completely dominant, but an otzovist minority were acting openly. Such was the situation within the Party at the December All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.

* See pp. 286-302, 356-59 and 383-94 of this volume.—*Ed.*

What is this liquidationism, then? What brought it into being? Why is it that the otzovists (and the god-builders of whom we shall say a few words later) are also liquidators, Mensheviks inside out? In a word, what is the social meaning and the social significance of the new ideological grouping within our Party?

Liquidationism in the narrow sense of the word, the liquidationism of the Mensheviks, consists ideologically in negation of the revolutionary class struggle of the socialist proletariat in general, and denial of the hegemony of the proletariat in our bourgeois-democratic revolution in particular. This denial of course takes various forms, and occurs more or less consciously, sharply and consistently. As an example we might mention Cherevanin and Potresov. The former gave such an assessment of the role of the proletariat in the revolution that the *whole* editorial board of *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, even before the split that took place in it (i.e., both Plekhanov and Martov-Dan-Axelrod-Martynov) had to repudiate Cherevanin, although it did so in a very discreditable form. It repudiated the consistent liquidator in *Vorwärts* to the Germans *without publishing its statement in "Golos Sotsial-Demokrata" for the benefit of Russian readers*! In the article which he contributed to the *Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*, Potresov liquidated the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the Russian revolution so successfully that Plekhanov left the liquidationist editorial board.

In respect of organisation, liquidationism means denying the necessity for an illegal Social-Democratic Party, and consequently renouncing the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, leaving its ranks. It means fighting the Party in the columns of the legal press, in legal workers' organisations, in the trade unions and co-operative societies, at congresses attended by working-class delegates, etc. The history of any Party organisation in Russia during the last two years teems with examples of liquidationism on the part of the Mensheviks. As a particularly glaring example of liquidationism, we have already referred (*Proletary*, No. 42, reprinted in the pamphlet *The All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in December 1908*) to the case where the

Menshevik members of the Central Committee made a deliberate attempt to *wreck the Central Committee of the Party*, and stop the functioning of this institution. The almost complete breakdown of the illegal Menshevik organisations in Russia is borne out by the fact that the "Caucasian delegation" at the recent Party conference consisted entirely of residents abroad, while the editorial board of "*Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*" was confirmed (at the beginning of 1908) by the Central Committee of the Party as a separate literary group, totally unconnected with any organisation functioning in Russia.

The Mensheviks do not weigh up the implications of all these manifestations of liquidationism. They either conceal them or are baffled by them, at a loss to understand the significance of certain facts, floundering in minutiae, vagaries and personalities, unable to draw general conclusions, unable to grasp the meaning of what is going on.

And the meaning of it is that, in a period of bourgeois revolution, the opportunist wing of the workers' party, at times of crisis, disintegration and collapse, is bound to be either out-and-out liquidationist or liquidator-ridden. In a period of bourgeois revolution the proletarian party *is bound* to have a following of petty-bourgeois *fellow-travellers* (what is known as *Mitläufer* in German) who are least capable of digesting proletarian theory and tactics, least capable of holding their own in time of collapse, most likely to carry opportunism to its extreme. Disintegration has set in—and the mass of Menshevik intellectuals, Menshevik writers, have virtually turned liberal. The intelligentsia has swung away from the Party—and *consequently* disintegration has been most complete in the Menshevik organisations. Those Mensheviks who sincerely sympathised with the proletariat and the proletarian class struggle, with proletarian revolutionary theory (and there have always been such Mensheviks who justify their opportunism in the revolution on the grounds that they are anxious to miss no changes in the situation, no convolutions in the complex historical process) found themselves "in the minority once more", in a minority among the Mensheviks, without the determination to fight the liquidators and without the strength to succeed if they tried. But the opportunist fellow-travellers move further

and further to liberalism. Plekhanov becomes exasperated with Potresov, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* with Cherevanin, the Moscow Menshevik workingmen with the Menshevik intellectuals, *and so forth*. The pro-Party Mensheviks, the orthodox Marxists among the Mensheviks, are beginning to break away and, by the logic of things, by becoming *pro-Party*, they draw nearer to the Bolsheviks. And it is our duty to understand this situation, everywhere and in every way to separate the liquidators from the pro-Party Mensheviks, to make closer contact with the latter, not by glossing over differences in principle, but by building up a really united workers' party in which differences of opinion should not stand in the way of the common effort, the common drive, the common struggle.

But are petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers of the proletariat the exclusive property of the Menshevik wing? No. We have already pointed out in *Proletary*, No. 39,* that they are to be found also among the Bolsheviks, as testified by the entire mode of argument of the consistent otzovists, the whole character of their attempts to justify "new" tactics. No sizable section of a mass workers' party could, by the nature of things, avoid during a time of bourgeois revolution taking on a certain number of "fellow-travellers" of diverse shadings. This is inevitable even in the most highly developed capitalist countries, after the completion of a bourgeois revolution, for the proletariat is ever in contact with the most varied sections of the petty bourgeoisie and is constantly being recruited and replenished from them. There is nothing abnormal or terrible in this, *if* the proletarian party is able thoroughly to absorb these foreign bodies, to control and not be controlled by them, and is able to see in good time that some of these elements really are foreign bodies, and that in certain conditions one must clearly and openly dissociate oneself from them. In this respect the difference between the two wings of the R.S.D.L.P. is that the Mensheviks turned out to be in thrall to the liquidators (i.e., the "fellow-travellers"), proof of which is to be found among the Mensheviks themselves, being supplied both

* See pp. 286-302 of this volume.—*Ed.*

by their Moscow adherents in Russia, and abroad by Plekhanov's repudiation of Potresov and *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*; while in the case of the Bolsheviks the liquidationist elements—the otzovists and god-builders—proved to be a small minority from the outset, were rendered harmless from the outset, and were ultimately pushed aside.

That otzovism is Menshevism inside out, that it also leads inevitably to liquidationism, only of a slightly different kind, there can be no doubt. It is not, of course, a matter of personalities or particular groups, but of an objective general tendency—to the extent that otzovism ceases to be a mere state of mind and seeks to evolve into a separate trend. The Bolsheviks stated quite definitely before the revolution, first, that their aim was not to create a separate trend in socialism but to apply to the new conditions of our revolution the basic principles of international revolutionary orthodox Marxist Social-Democracy; secondly, they would do their duty even should it consist in an onerous, slow, humdrum daily grind, if history, after the issue of the struggle and after all opportunities for revolutionary action were exhausted, should condemn us to plod along the by-paths of an "autocratic constitution". The least attentive reader will find these statements in the Social-Democratic literature of 1905. They are of immense importance as a solemn obligation of the whole Bolshevik wing of the Party, a deliberate choice of path. In order to fulfil this obligation to the proletariat, it was necessary to take patiently in hand and re-educate those who had been attracted to Social-Democracy by the days of liberty (there even appeared a type of "Social-Democrat of the days of liberty"), who were attracted chiefly by the vehemence, revolutionary spirit and "vividness" of our slogans, but, who, though militant enough to fight on revolutionary holidays, lacked the stamina for workaday struggle under the reign of counter-revolution. Some of these elements were gradually drawn into proletarian activities and assimilated the Marxist world-outlook. The others only memorised a few slogans without grasping their meaning, could only repeat old phrases and were unable to adapt the old principles of revolutionary Social-Democratic tactics to the changed conditions. Their several destinies are graphically illustrated by the evolution of those who

wanted to boycott the Third Duma. In June 1907 they were the majority among the Bolsheviks. But *Proletary* campaigned continuously against the boycott. Events verified this policy and a year later the otzovists were *in the minority* among the Bolsheviks (14 votes against 18 in the summer of 1908) in the Moscow organisation, which had been the stronghold of "boycottism". A year later, when the error of otzovism had been abundantly and repeatedly demonstrated, the Bolshevik wing—and here lies the significance of the recent Bolshevik conference—finally liquidated otzovism and ultimatumism, the thin end of otzovism, finally liquidated this peculiar form of liquidationism.

So let none accuse us of causing a "new split". In the Report on our conference we explain our aims and our attitude in detail. We did everything possible, we left nothing untried, to persuade the dissenting comrades: we were at it for over eighteen months. But as a wing, i.e., a union of like-minded people in the Party, we cannot work without unanimity on fundamental issues. To break away from a wing is not the same as breaking away from the Party. The people who have broken away from our wing in no way lose the possibility of working in the Party. Either they will remain "free lances", i.e., outside any wing, and the general environment of Party work will draw them in. Or they will try to form a new group—as is their legitimate right, if they wish to advocate and develop their own special shade of opinion and tactics—in which case the *whole Party* will very soon see the practical manifestation of those *tendencies*, the ideological implications of which we have tried to assess above.

The Bolsheviks have to lead the Party. To do so they must know their course, they must stop hesitating, they must stop wasting time on persuading waverers, and fighting dissentients in their own ranks. Otzovism and ultimatumism, the thin end of otzovism, are incompatible with the work which the present circumstances require of revolutionary Social-Democrats. During the revolution we learned to "speak French", i.e., to introduce into the movement the greatest number of rousing slogans, to raise the energy of the direct struggle of the masses and extend its scope. Now, in this time of stagnation, reaction and disintegration, we

must learn to "speak German", i.e., to work slowly (there is nothing else for it, until things revive), systematically, steadily, advancing step by step, winning inch by inch. Whoever finds this work tedious, whoever does not understand the need for preserving and developing the revolutionary principles of Social-Democratic tactics *in this phase too*, *on this bend of the road*, is taking the name of Marxist in vain.

Our Party can make no headway unless it decisively liquidates liquidationism. And liquidationism does not only mean the direct liquidationism of the Mensheviks and their opportunist tactics. It also includes Menshevism inside out. It includes otzovism and ultimatumism, that are impeding the Party in the fulfilment of its immediate task, in which lie all the unique peculiarities of the present time, the task of utilising the Duma rostrum and turning all the semi-legal and legal organisations of the working class into coigns of vantage. The same goes for god-building and the defence of god-building tendencies which are radically at variance with the principles of Marxism. And the same applies to incomprehension of the Party tasks of the Bolsheviks, which in 1906 and 1907 consisted in *overthrowing* the Menshevik Central Committee, as a body which *lacked the support* of the majority of the Party (not only the Poles and Letts, but even the Bundists were against the Central Committee, which was purely Menshevik at the time)—and which now consist in patiently training up partyist elements and knitting them together, in building up a really united and strong proletarian party. The Bolsheviks prepared the ground for partyism by their implacable struggle against the anti-Party elements in 1903-05 and in 1906-07. Now the Bolsheviks must *build the Party*, build the Party out of their wing, build up the Party by utilising the vantage-ground gained in the inner-Party struggle.

Such are the tasks of our wing of the Party in the present political situation and the general position of the R.S.D.L.P. as a whole. They are set forth once more and developed in particular detail in the resolutions of the recent Bolshevik Conference. The ranks have been re-formed for a new struggle. The changed conditions have been taken into ac-

count. The road has been chosen. Let us go forward along it and the revolutionary Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia will begin rapidly to build up into a force which no reaction will shake, and which will stand at the head of all the fighting classes of the people in the next round of our revolution.*

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* *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, No. 15, and *Otkliki Bunda*, No. 2[168] have recently appeared. In these publications there is once again piled up a heap of choice specimens of liquidationism, which will need analysing and evaluating in a separate article in the next issue of *Proletary*.

THE TSAR VISITS EUROPE AND MEMBERS OF THE BLACK-HUNDRED DUMA VISIT ENGLAND

Half a century ago Russia's reputation as an international gendarme was firmly established. In the course of the last century our autocracy rendered no small support to various reactionary causes in Europe even to the point of crushing by downright military force the revolutionary movements in neighbouring countries. One has only to recall the Hungarian campaign of Nicholas I, and the repeated repressions of Poland, to understand why the leaders of the international socialist proletariat from the forties onward denounced tsarism so often to the European workers and European democrats as the chief mainstay of reaction in the whole civilised world.

Beginning with the last three decades or so of the nineteenth century, the revolutionary movement in Russia gradually altered this state of affairs. The more tsarism was shaken by the blows of the growing revolutionary movement at home, the weaker it became as the enemy of freedom in Europe. But in the meantime another international reactionary force had taken definite shape in Europe—the bourgeois governments, which had witnessed insurrections by the proletariat, had realised that a life-and-death struggle between labour and capital was inevitable, and would welcome any adventurer or brigand on the throne for the sake of joining forces against the proletariat. And when, at the beginning of the century, the war with Japan and the Revolution of 1905 dealt powerful body-blows to tsarism, the international bourgeoisie rushed to the rescue, supporting it with milliards in loans and moving heaven and earth to localise the revolutionary conflagration and restore "order"

in Russia. One good turn deserves another. Tsarism had helped the counter-revolutionary bourgeois governments of Europe more than once in their struggle against democracy. Now the bourgeoisie of Europe, which had become counter-revolutionary in relation to the proletariat, helped tsarism in its fight against the revolution.

The allies are celebrating victory. Nicholas the Bloody is going to Europe to pay his respects to the monarchs there and to the President of the French Republic. The monarchs and the President are excitedly preparing to do the honours to the leader of the Black-Hundred counter-revolution in Russia. But victory fell to these noble knights of Black-Hundred and bourgeois reaction not because their enemy was destroyed, but because its forces were split, because the proletariat does not mature simultaneously in all countries. The victory fell to the united enemies of the working class at the cost of postponing the decisive battle, at the cost of widening and deepening the source which—more slowly perhaps than we would wish, but nonetheless surely—is multiplying the numbers of the proletarians, increasing their solidarity, steeling them in struggle, schooling them in operations against the united enemy. This source is capitalism, which awakened the quondam patriarchal "patrimony" of the aristocratic Romanovs, and which is now awakening the Asian states, one after another.

The allies are celebrating victory. Yet every celebration of Nicholas the Bloody and the leaders of the bourgeois European governments is accompanied, echo-like, by the voice of the revolutionary masses of the workers. "We have crushed the revolution," cry Nicholas and Wilhelm, Edward and Fallières, shaking hands with each other under the protection of a bristling shield of bayonets or a long line of warships. "We shall overthrow you all together," replies the revolution like an echo, through the lips of the leaders of the class-conscious proletariat of all countries.

Nicholas the Bloody leaves Russia. He is accompanied by the words of a Social-Democratic member of the Black-Hundred Duma, who voices the republican convictions of all the class-conscious workers of Russia and reminds him of the inevitable downfall of the monarchy. Nicholas arrives in Sweden. He is feted in the royal palace. He is greeted by

soldiers and spies. He is met by the speech of the leader of the Swedish workers, the Social-Democrat Branting, who protests against the dishonouring of his country by the visit of this butcher. Nicholas goes to England, to France, to Italy. Kings and courtiers, ministers and policemen make ready to do him honour. Labour makes ready to meet him—by a meeting of protest in England, a demonstration of popular indignation in France, a general strike on the day which is darkened by his arrival in Italy. Socialist members of parliament in all three countries—Thorne in England, Jaurès in France, Morgari in Italy—have already responded to the call of the International Socialist Bureau, and have declared to the whole world the hatred and contempt which the working class entertains for Nicholas the Pogromist, Nicholas the Hangman, the Nicholas who is now crushing the people of Persia and flooding France with Russian spies and *agents provocateurs*.

The "respectable" bourgeois press in all these countries is in a frenzy of rage, not knowing what of abuse to use next for the actions of the socialists, what to do next to support the ministers and presidents who have ruled socialists out of order for their speeches. But their frenzy is in vain. The parliamentary representatives of the proletariat cannot be gagged; meetings cannot be stopped in really constitutional countries; the fact cannot be concealed, either by self-deception or by the deception of others, that the Russian tsar dare not appear in public whether in London, Paris or Rome.

The grand celebration of the leaders of international reaction, their celebration of the suppression of the revolution in Russia and Persia, *has been ruined* by the unanimous and courageous protest of the socialist proletariat of all the European countries.

And on the background of this protest by the socialists from St. Petersburg to Paris, from Stockholm to Rome, this protest against the tsarist autocracy in the name of the revolution and its principles, all the more glaring does the despicable servility to tsarism on the part of our Russian liberals stand out. Several members of the Black-Hundred Duma, ranging from the moderate Rights to the Constitutional-Democrats, headed by the Chairman of the Duma,

are visiting England. They pride themselves on the fact that they represent the majority in the Duma, its real Centre, without the extreme Right or the extreme Left. They are posing as the representatives of a "constitutional" Russia, singing the praises of the "renovated" order and the adored monarch who has "granted the people" a Duma. There they are, like the swelling frog in Krylov's fable,[169] puffing themselves up as victors over the Black-Hundred reaction which, to hear them talk, wants to abolish the "constitution" in Russia. At a luncheon, given by the Lord Mayor, Mr. Milyukov, leader of the "Constitutional-*Democratic*" (no joke!) Party declared in his speech: "So long as there is a legislative chamber in Russia controlling the budget, the Russian opposition will remain His Majesty's Opposition, and not an opposition to His Majesty" (St. Petersburg News Agency telegram of June 19, old style). In its leading article of June 21 bearing the Khlestakovian[170] title "Europe and Renovated Russia", *Golos Moskvy*, mouthpiece of the Octobrist Party, warmly applauds the utterances of the Cadet leader, declaring that his "moderately constitutional" speech "marks perhaps a turning-point in Cadet policy, a renunciation of the abortive tactics of creating opposition for the sake of opposition".

The police rag *Rossiya* (June 23) devotes a leading article to Milyukov's speech, in which it quotes the "famous" phrase about His Majesty's Opposition, and declares: "Mr. Milyukov in England has undertaken certain responsibilities on behalf of the Russian opposition. If he fulfils his pledge he will render a service to his country for which he will be forgiven no small number of his former transgressions." Your services are rewarded, gentlemen of the Cadet Party. *Vekhi* in general, and Struve in particular, have been commended by Antonius of Volhynia, the "Lord Bishop" of the Black-Hundred zealots; Milyukov, the leader of your party, has been commended by a venal police rag of a newspaper. Your services are rewarded!

It remains for us to remind the reader that we have been exposing the Cadets as Octobrists at heart ever since 1906, when gimcrack "victories" in the Duma turned the heads of many a selfishly-naïve and disinterestedly-naïve person.

We have also to remind the reader that the *purpose* of tsarism's game, now being played so conspicuously in the Third Duma, was exposed by us *over twenty months* ago in *Proletary*, Nos. 19 and 20 (November 1907) when we reviewed the results of the elections to the Third Duma. In the Third Duma as we said, and as was said in the resolution of the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in November 1907 *two* majorities are possible: the one consisting of Black-Hundred deputies and Octobrists, the other consisting of Cadets and Octobrists—and *both* of them are counter-revolutionary. "Such a situation in the Duma," states the resolution adopted at that time by the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats (published in *Proletary*, No. 19) and the resolution of the Third All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (*Proletary*, No. 20), "is exceedingly favourable for a double political game being played by both the government and the Cadets."*

This analysis of the situation has now been *fully* corroborated, showing the short-sightedness of those who were ready again and again to proclaim Social-Democratic "support" for the Cadets.

The Cadets are fighting the Octobrists not as opponents of their principles, but as *competitors*. The voter must be "won"—we declare ourselves the party of "the people's freedom". Our "respectability" must be proved—we boost the Maklakovs in the Third Duma, we tell Europe through Milyukov that we are "His Majesty's Opposition". And that is all that Stolypin, the faithful servant of Black-Hundred tsarism needs. Let the Black-Hundred tsarist gang run the country, let them and only them actually decide all the really important questions of policy. But "we" need the Octobrist-Cadet majority for play-acting, to "represent" us in Europe, to facilitate the raising of loans, to "correct" the excesses of the Black Hundreds, to dupe simpletons with "reforms"... that are corrected by the Council of State.

His Majesty knows *his* Opposition. The Cadet Opposition know *their* Stolypin and *their* Nicholas. The simple technique of European parliamentary hypocrisy and chicanery has come easily to both our liberals and our ministers. Both

* See present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 138 and 144.—*Ed.*

are apt students of the methods used by the bourgeois reactionaries of Europe.

On both of them the socialist proletariat of Russia, in growing unity with the socialist proletariat of the whole world, declares unremitting revolutionary war.

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M. LYADOV'S LETTER TO PROLETARY[171]

We gladly give space to Comrade Lyadov's public statement, and have only the following to say to him:

To observe the traditions of Bolshevism—the orthodox Marxist trend in the R.S.D.L.P.—is of course splendid, Comrade Lyadov. But to observe this tradition means, for one thing, protecting Bolshevism from its caricature. But the contortions of otzovism and god-building—as we have proved at length in a number of articles, and as has now been officially recognised by the Bolshevik section—are nothing more than a caricature of Bolshevism.

As regards the "revolutionary ethics" to which Comrade Lyadov appeals, we may calmly leave him to square this account with his own conscience—but as for his "standpoint in principle", it is high time that Comrade Lyadov and those who share his views should state it openly to the whole Party, because, so far, we have only their word for it that they have something more to offer than otzovism and god-building.

In conclusion we express the confident hope that Comrade Lyadov, who has worked for so many years in the ranks of revolutionary Social-Democracy, will not stay very long with the new faction of god-building otzovists, or, as they are called for short, "the godly otzovists", but will return to the Bolshevik ranks.

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A LETTER TO THE ORGANISERS OF THE PARTY SCHOOL ON CAPRI

August 18, 1909

Dear Comrades!

I have just received your invitation. The curriculum of the school, which (curriculum) you say you enclose, I have not received.

My attitude to the school on the Island of Capri is expressed in the resolution of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* (*Proletary*, No. 46, and supplement*). If you have not seen *Proletary* and the supplements to *Proletary*, and the special letter on the school circulated to Bolshevik members of the Party in the form of a printed leaflet, the editorial board will be pleased to send you all these materials. On the point in question, I must inform you that my opinion of the school on Capri, as the enterprise of a *new* faction in our Party—a faction with which I do not sympathise—does not, of course, imply any refusal to deliver lectures to comrades who have been sent from Russia by local organisations. Whatever the views of these comrades, I shall always be glad to give them a series of lectures on questions of interest to Social-Democrats. Of course I shall not go to Capri to lecture, but shall willingly do so in Paris. If only from the financial point of view it would be cheaper for the nine comrades from Russia (I take the figure communicated by Comrade Leva, whose name is not unknown to you) to come to Paris than for three lecturers (I have heard about your proposal to Leva and Innokenty[172]) to travel from

* See pp. 450-51 and 452-60 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Paris to Capri. Apart from financial considerations there are quite a number of reasons incomparably more important, which you undoubtedly understand, why Paris is the place for a real Party school abroad. In any case, I can assure you that the editorial board of *Proletary* would do everything in its power to organise the lectures you desire in Paris.

With Social-Democratic greetings, *N. Lenin*

P. S. You forgot to send the official address of the school.

Published in 1909 in the leaflet "The Question of the Party School"

Published according to the manuscript

DRAFT LETTER OF THE BOLSHEVIK CENTRE TO THE COUNCIL OF THE SCHOOL ON CAPRI[173]

The Executive Commission of the Bolshevik Centre is extremely glad to receive the statement of the "*Council* of the Party School on Capri" of August 16, 1909, that it has no objection to "*ideological control*" by the B.C.

But in order to decide whether the B.C. can undertake this control and make it effective, whether it can give help to the school in the form of lecturers and funds as the Council writes, it is necessary to know in detail all about the school. But the B.C. knows *nothing in detail* about it.

While the *Council of the school could discuss* (as it writes) the attitude of the school to the B.C., knowing the B.C.'s views from printed resolutions and from *Proletary*, knowing the composition of the B.C. from its former members, the B.C. itself is not in a position to *discuss* the question of its attitude to the request from the Council of the school: for the B.C. knows nothing about (1) the *Council* of the school, (2) the *executive commission* of the school, (3) the school's *curriculum* (the executive commission of the school promised to send it, but did not do so), (4) the present composition of the *lecturers* at the school and (5) *students* at the school, (6) the present *funds* of the school, (7) how long the *course* is expected to last, (8) to what extent the students are tied down to the particular place in which the school is being held, i.e., the Island of Capri, (9) whether the students of the school could come to Paris (about which three members of the B.C. wrote to them in their own name), for what period, etc.

Without possessing such information, the B.C. at the present stage can only say one thing: the B.C. is ready to give

every help in the form of literature and lectures to all members of Social-Democratic organisations functioning in Russia, as well as to *all* comrades *delegated* by those organisations, in acquiring a Social-Democratic outlook on the world; and it does not refuse financial aid within the limits of its possibilities, and after discussion of this question in connection with aid to local organisations.

The B.C. herewith officially forwards to the *Council* of the school (1) a file of *Proletary*, Nos. 39-46, (2) the B.C.'s letter about the school (printed), (3) the resolutions of the B.C.

With Social-Democratic greetings,
The Executive Commission of the
Extended Editorial Board of "Proletary"

Written between August 5 and 17 (18 and 30), 1909

First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany XXV*

Published according to the manuscript

A LETTER TO COMRADES JULIUS, VANYA, SAVELY, IVAN, VLADIMIR, STANISLAV AND FOMA, STUDENTS AT THE CAPRI PARTY SCHOOL

August 30, New Style, 1909

Dear Comrades,

After receiving the curriculum of the school and two letters, in the last of which you ask my reasons for declaring the school to be a new faction, I consider it my duty to explain my view to you once more. "That there is anything factional behind this school is the purest fiction," you write. "A hegemony over the school is inconceivable, for we are the majority on the Council."

I maintain that this is a clear case of self-deception on your part. Whether or not you are being accused of "downright factionalism" is quite beside the point; so is the question of who has the majority on the Council. The point is that the school has been organised (1) on the initiative of the new faction, (2) exclusively with the funds of the new faction, (3) in a place where *only* lecturers from the new faction are present, (4) in a place where lecturers from other sections of the Party, with very rare exceptions, *cannot be present*.

These conditions are not of your making. You are powerless to change them. But these conditions *predetermine* the character of the school, so much so that no good intentions on your part, no decisions of your Council, can make a jot of difference.

In any school, the most important thing is the ideological and political trend of the lectures. What determines the trend? The *lecturing personnel*, entirely and exclusively.

You understand perfectly well, comrades, that "control", "leadership", "curricula", "rules", etc., as applied to the lecturing personnel are just so many meaningless words. No control, no curricula, nor anything of that sort, can make the studies take any other trend than that determined by the lecturing personnel. And *no* self-respecting organisation in the world, no section or group *will undertake* to share responsibility for a school whose trend is already predetermined by the lecturing personnel, if that trend is hostile.

Now look at the lecturing personnel, the factor that has determined the character of the school and its trend. You comrades signed your names in the letter which you sent to me, but the one that you sent to the Central Committee (I received a copy, together with the curriculum of the school) on behalf of the pupils and *lecturers* is not signed by any of the lecturers. Hence I cannot claim to know exactly who the lecturers are. But I know enough to form an opinion about them as a body.

The local organisations in the Central Industrial Region have written us from Russia that the most energetic, if not the only agitator for the Capri school, was Comrade Stanislav, who had already been chosen as one of the lecturers by certain Social-Democratic groups who had heard him read a paper. This Comrade Stanislav is a most ardent otzovist and "critic" of Marxism in philosophy. I need only remind you (1) how he lambasted Kautsky in his well-known booklet on philosophy, (2) how at the Party Conference in December 1908 he formed an otzovist faction with the St. Petersburg otzovist Vs., (3) how the article by "Worker"—an otzovist—edited by him and published in *Rabocheye Znamya*, No. 5, was, *on the admission* of *Rabocheye Znamya* itself, imbued with *anarchistic* ideas.

Next, look at the lecturers you now have over there in Capri. There are no Bolsheviks among them, while all the adherents of the new faction (the faction of the advocates of otzovism and god-building) are represented almost in full. I will not be very far wrong if I say that you see Comrades Maximov, Lunacharsky, Lyadov and Alexinsky among the lecturers at Capri. That is the identical group of comrades who have formed an opposition to *Proletary* ever since the spring of 1908, agitated against it in Russia and abroad

displayed (or supported) tendencies to form a separate faction at the Party Conference in December 1908, and ultimately broke away completely as a separate faction.

To deny that this entire group of comrades are agitating against *Proletary*, supporting and defending the otzovists, would be flouting facts which are known to every member of the Party. To deny that the Island of Capri has found fame even in general Russian literary circles as the literary centre of god-building, would be deriding facts. The whole Russian press reported long ago that Lunacharsky was preaching the word of god-building from the Island of Capri; Bazarov helped him in Russia. Bogdanov has advocated similar philosophical views in a dozen books and articles published by the legal press in Russia, and a dozen papers read abroad. I was on Capri in April 1908 and told all these three comrade that my views on philosophy were unconditionally opposed to theirs (I proposed at the time that our common resources and energies should be used on counterblasting the Menshevik-liquidationist version of the history of the revolution with a *Bolshevik history of the revolution*, but these Capriotes turned down my proposition, preferring to disseminate their own special philosophical views rather than to work for the common cause of the Bolsheviks). The majority of your lecturers on Capri are writers, yet *not one* of them has made a *single* attack in *the press* on the god-building propaganda of Lunacharsky and Bazarov.

If, in spite of all this, you comrades write that it is a "misapprehension" and a "gross" one on my part to think that the school has any association with god-building and otzovism, because "such aims were never contemplated here in this school, and were even out of the question", I can only wonder at your extraordinary naïveté. I repeat: the *real* character and trend of the school is determined not by the good intentions of the local organisations, not by decisions of the "Council" of students, not by "curricula" and so forth, but by the *lecturing personnel*. And since the lecturing personnel is and has been determined entirely by membership of the new faction, it is simply ridiculous to deny the factional character of the school.

To finish with the question of the lecturing personnel, I shall draw your attention to one more fact communicated

to me by Comrade Innokenty, which shows how obvious to *everyone* in the Party is the thing you are trying to deny, namely: the separatist factional character of the Capri school. Shortly before the last meeting of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*, Comrade Maximov in Paris approached *Trotsky* and invited him to become a lecturer at the school on Capri. Trotsky told this to Comrade Innokenty, saying: "If this is a Party affair I shall be glad to take part in it; if it is a private concern run by the Capri literati—Maximov, Lunacharsky and Co.—I shall have nothing to do with it." Innokenty replied: "Wait for the decisions of the editorial board of *Proletary*, I'll see that you get them." Thus, even a man like Trotsky, who does not belong to our group, understood immediately (as any Party functionary would, with any experience) that to organise a school on Capri is tantamount to *hiding it away from the Party*, to connecting the school beforehand with a special faction—the new one.

Now I shall go on to the question of Paris. I told you in my letter that if you are really interested in having lectures from myself and my comrades-in-idea you should come to Paris. You reply: "Considering the expense, travelling to Paris is quite unreasonable."

Let us see which of us is really being unreasonable.

You went to Capri via Vienna. If you go back the same way you will have to make a detour to Paris from Northern Italy, then straight on to Vienna. This will involve in all probability an additional expense of 60 francs per person (I am judging by the fact that a ticket to Paris from Geneva, where I lived for a long time, costs 30 francs). Your letter is signed by eight persons, one of whom declares that he "will have no further correspondence", which obviously means that he is not even interested in hearing my talks. That leaves seven comrades. Expenses $= 7 \times 60 = 420$ francs.

You invited four lecturers from Paris (Leva, myself, Grigori and Innokenty). Travelling expenses from Paris to Capri and back—about 140 francs. Total $4 \times 140 = 560$ francs.

It will be *cheaper* for the eight students to come to Paris than to send the four lecturers to Capri.

But the financial aspect, as I have already told you in my last letter,* is not by any means the most important. Think: for whom is it easier to choose a place—the visiting students, or the local lecturers? You went abroad specially to attend the school. That means there can be nothing to prevent you from going where there is a large number of lecturers, where it is possible to organise things on real Party lines.

But the lecturers *cannot* leave the Party centre to go to the Island of Capri. I shall speak for myself. I cannot leave my editorial work on *Proletary*. I cannot leave my editorial work on the Central Organ. I cannot leave my work on the Promotion Commission for the Duma Social-Democratic group, which has its headquarters in Paris. I have to speak at the *Proletary* club in the working-class districts of Paris, where hundreds and thousands of Russian workers are living, and so on. It is absolutely impossible for Party writers to leave Paris to go to Capri.

But for the school, as a Party concern, Bolshevik lecturers are not the only important factor. Paris is the largest emigrant centre, where papers are regularly read in public under the auspices of *all* Party trends, where debates are held and all kinds of study circles are conducted, where there are two or three quite decent Russian libraries, where there are scores of Social-Democratic organisers with long experience of activity in the Party, and so on and so forth. Three Russian Social-Democratic newspapers are published in Paris. In a word, it is clear, as clear as daylight, to anyone who knows anything at all about life abroad, that anyone who goes to Paris to study Social-Democracy is going where he can learn it properly. Anyone who goes to Capri is going there to study a *separatist* factional "*science*".

Whoever holds a school in Paris is holding a real Party school. Whoever holds a school on the Island of Capri is *hiding the school away from the Party*.

The school on Capri is a school *deliberately hidden away from the Party*.

Absolutely no control, no "ideological leadership" of the *Capri* school is possible either by the Central Committee

* See pp. 468-69 of this volume.—*Ed*.

to which you appeal today, or by the editorial board of *Proletary* to which you appealed yesterday. To speak of control and ideological leadership here is idle talk. No one would think of doing such an absurd thing as to send Party "inspectors" to Capri to superintend the school; to send real Party lecturers to Capri (with the rarest exceptions) *is out of the question* at any time. The local organisations in Russia may not have known this, but the organisers of the school *knew it perfectly well*. That was just why they organised the school on Capri—to *mask* its factional character and to hide it away from the Party.

Take the Russian Social-Democrats, eminent for their knowledge of the labour movement abroad, who do not belong to any factions: Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg (Germany), Ch. Rappoport (France), Rothstein (England). Take unattached Social-Democratic writers like Ryazanov, and you will see at once (unless you deliberately close your eyes in order not to see) that they could in the majority of cases, with a bit of effort from the Party, read lectures in Paris; while to go to Capri is absolutely out of the question for them. The money which the organisers of the school have thrown away in sending people to study and lecture in such a remote foreign spot as Capri would have been *quite sufficient* to organise readings by at least some of these lecturers in Paris.

Further, take the new groupings among the Social-Democrats, groupings which it is so important that the Russian comrades should know about (the struggle between the pro-Party element and the liquid1ationists in the Bund; the struggle between the Bolshevik section of the Letts and the Menshevik; between the Polish Social-Democratic Party and the Left wing of the P.S.P.; the split in Menshevism, Plekhanov's publication of his *Dnevnik*, exposing the liquidationism of Potresov and the official Mensheviks; the attempts to create a "revolutionary Menshevism", and so on). It is *impossible* to study these important Party events properly in Capri. In Paris there is every possibility of learning the state of affairs at first hand, and not by mere hearsay.

Take finally the syllabus of the Capri school. Of the four sections, one (the third) is headed: "The Philosophy of the Proletarian Struggle". In the international Social-Democrat-

ic movement there are tens and hundreds (if not thousands) of syllabuses for propaganda classes of the same type. But *nowhere* will you find: "The Philosophy of the Proletarian Struggle". There is the philosophical materialism of Marx and Engels, but nowhere is there the "Philosophy of the Proletarian Struggle". And no Social-Democrat in Europe will understand what it is all about. The only people who will understand are those who are conversant with the works of the philosophers Stanislav (A. Volsky), Bogdanov, Lunacharsky and Bazarov. Before teaching the "Philosophy of the Proletarian Struggle", such a philosophy must be invented. To invent this *special* philosophy, which swears more and more often by the word "proletarian" the further away it is from the proletarian world-outlook, has been and is the occupation only of the above-mentioned group of members of the new faction.

To conclude. If you comrades insist on your unwillingness, to come to Paris (assuring me at the same time that you want to hear my lectures), this will be conclusive proof that not only the lecturers but some of the students at the Capri school have been infected with the sectarianism of the new god-building-otzovist faction.

With Social-Democratic greetings, *N. Lenin*

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NOTES

[1] The article "*On to the Straight Road*" was published as an editorial in the newspaper *Proletary*, No. 26.

Proletary (*The Proletarian*)—an illegal newspaper founded by the Bolsheviks after the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party; it was published from August 21 (September 3), 1906 to November 28 (December 11), 1909 under the editorship of Lenin. *Proletary* was published as the organ of the Moscow and St. Petersburg committees of the R.S.D.L.P., and, for a time, as that of the Moscow Area, the Perm, Kursk and Kazan committees. The paper was virtually the Central Organ of the Bolsheviks. Altogether fifty issues were put out—the first twenty in Finland, the rest abroad, in Geneva and Paris. The newspaper published over a hundred articles and other items by Lenin.

During the Stolypin reaction *Proletary* played an important role in preserving and strengthening the Bolshevik organisations.

At the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in January 1910 the conciliators succeeded in obtaining a decision to close down the newspaper. p. 15

[2] *The Duma*—a representative body, which the tsarist government was compelled to convene as a result of the revolutionary events of 1905. Formally the Duma was a legislative body, but actually it had no real power. Elections to the Duma were non-direct, unequal and non-universal. The electoral system was rigged against the working classes and the non-Russian nationalities inhabiting Russia, while considerable numbers of workers and peasants had no vote at all. Under the electoral law of December 11 (24), 1905, the vote of a landlord was equivalent to 3 votes of representatives of the town bourgeoisie, to 15 votes of the peasants, and to 45 votes of the workers. The First Duma (April-July 1906) and the Second Duma (February-June 1907) were dissolved by the tsarist government. After carrying out the coup d'état of June 3, 1907, the government issued a new electoral law which still further curtailed the rights of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie of the towns and ensured the complete domination of the reactionary bloc of the landlords and big capitalists in the Third (1907-12) and Fourth (1912-17) Dumas. p. 17

[3] *Coup d'état of June 3* (*16*), *1907*—a reactionary act by which the government dissolved the Second Duma and altered the electoral

law. The new law greatly increased representation of the landlords and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in the Duma and considerably reduced the already meagre representation of the workers and peasants. The law deprived most of the indigenous population of Asian Russia of the franchise and reduced by half the number of deputies returned by Poland and the Caucasus. The Third Duma, which was elected on the basis of this law and which assembled in November, 1907, was a Duma of Black Hundreds and Cadets.

The coup d'état of June 3 ushered in the Stolypin reaction, which became known as "the Third-of-June regime". p. 17

[4] *Central Organ of the R.S.D.L.P.*—the illegal newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, published from February 1908 to January 1917. Fifty-eight issues appeared. Issue No. 1 came out in Russia, but thereafter the paper was published abroad, first in Paris, then in Geneva. The editorial board of the Central Organ, in accordance with a decision of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., was made up of representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Polish Social-Democrats. Over eighty articles and other items by Lenin were published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*. On the editorial board Lenin carried on a struggle for a consistent Bolshevik policy. Some of the board members (Kamenev and Zinoviev) adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the liquidators and tried to side-track Lenin's line. The Menshevik editors, Martov and Dan, sabotaged the work of the editorial board while at the same time openly defending the liquidators in *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. Lenin's uncompromising fight against the liquidators led to Martov and Dan retiring from *Sotsial-Demokrat* in June 1911. From December 1911 onwards *Sotsial-Demokrat* was edited by Lenin. p. 17

[5] *Bezzaglavtsi*—from the title of the journal *Bez Zaglaviya* (*Without a Title*)—were organisers of, and contributors to, the journal published in St. Petersburg in 1906 by S. N. Prokopovich, Y. D. Kuskova, V. Y. Bogucharsky, and others. The journal openly advocated revisionism, supported the Mensheviks and liberals, and opposed an independent proletarian policy. Lenin called the group "pro-Menshevik Cadets or pro-Cadet Mensheviks". p. 19

[6] *Zemstvo*—the name given to the local government bodies formed in the central provinces of tsarist Russia in 1864. They were dominated by the nobility and their powers were limited to purely local economic problems (hospital and road building, statistics, insurance, etc.). Their activities were controlled by the Provincial Governors and by the Ministry of the Interior, which could rescind any decisions of which the government disapproved. p. 20

[7] *Rabocheye Znamya* (*Worker's Banner*)—an illegal Bolshevik newspaper, organ of the Regional Bureau of the Central Industrial Region, of the Moscow and Moscow Area Committees of the R.S.D.L.P. Appeared in Moscow from March to December 1908. Seven issues were published. p. 20

[8] *Anti-Socialist Law* was introduced in Germany in 1878. Under this law all organisations of the Social-Democratic Party, the mass labour organisations and the labour press were banned, socialist literature was confiscated and the Social-Democrats were persecuted. Under pressure of the mass labour movement this law was repealed in 1890. p. 21

[9] *The Black Hundreds*—monarchist gangs formed by the tsarist police to fight against the revolutionary movement. They assassinated revolutionaries, organised attacks on progressive intellectuals, and carried out anti-Jewish pogroms. p. 21

[10] *Rech* (*Speech*)—a daily newspaper, central organ of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 1906. It was closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on October 26 (November 8), 1917. p. 22

[11] *Russkoye Gosudarstvo* (*The Russian State*)—a government newspaper founded by S. Witte published in St. Petersburg from February 1 (14) to May 15 (28), 1906. p. 22

[12] *The Stockholm Congress*—the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., was held in Stockholm on April 10-25 (April 23-May 8) 1906. It was attended by 112 voting delegates representing 57 local organisations of the Party, and 22 delegates with a consultative voice. In addition there were representatives from the national Social-Democratic parties of Poland and Lithuania, Latvia and the Bund. Many Bolshevik organisations had been smashed up by the government after the armed uprising of December 1905 and were unable to send their delegates to the Congress. The Mensheviks had a majority (albeit a small one) at the Congress.

Lenin spoke at the Congress on the agrarian question, the current situation, the tactics in regard to the elections to the Duma, the armed uprising and other issues.

The preponderance of Mensheviks at the Congress determined the character of its decisions. On a number of questions the Congress adopted Menshevik resolutions (the agrarian programme, the attitude towards the Duma, etc.).

The Congress adopted Lenin's formulation of Clause 1 of the Party Rules dealing with Party membership It admitted to membership of the R.S.D.L.P. the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisation of Poland and Lithuania and the Lettish S.D.L.P., and laid down the conditions on which the Bund could join the R.S.D.L.P.

The Central Committee elected at the Congress consisted of three Bolsheviks and seven Mensheviks. The editorial board of the Central Organ was formed entirely of Mensheviks.

The work of this Congress was analysed by Lenin in his Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 317-82). p. 22

[13] *Cadets*—members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the Russian liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie. The Cadet Party was founded in October 1905, its membership consisting of representatives of the bourgeoisie, Zemstvo functionaries from among the landlords, and bourgeois intellectuals. Among the more prominent Cadet leaders were P. N. Milyukov, S. A. Muromtsev, V. A. Maklakov, A. I. Shingaryov, P. B. Struve and F. I. Rodichev. The Cadets called themselves the "party of the people's freedom" in order to mislead the working masses. In reality they never went beyond the demand for a constitutional monarchy. Their main task they considered to be the fight against the revolutionary movement, and they aimed at sharing the power with the tsar and the feudalist landlords.

During the First World War the Cadets actively supported the tsarist government's foreign policy of conquest. During the bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917 they tried to save the monarchy. In the bourgeois Provisional Government, where they held key positions, they pursued a counter-revolutionary policy opposed to the interests of the people but favourable to the U. S., British and French imperialists. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution the Cadets were the sworn enemies of the Soviet power and participated in all armed counter-revolutionary actions and the campaigns of the interventionists. When the interventionists and whiteguards were defeated the Cadets fled the country and continued their anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity from abroad. p. 22

[14] *Trudovik politics* (from the word *trud*—"labour")—this refers to the Trudovik group of petty-bourgeois democrats formed from peasant deputies to the First Duma in April 1906. At the start of the Duma proceedings this group united 107 deputies. In the Second Duma the Trudoviks had 104, in the Third 14 and in the Fourth 10 deputies. The Trudoviks demanded the abolition of all class and national restrictions, the democratisation of the Zemstvo and urban self-governing bodies, and the introduction of universal suffrage in the elections to the Duma. Their agrarian programme was based on the Narodnik principles of equalised land tenure—the establishment of a distributable land fund consisting of state, crown, and monastery lands as well as privately-owned lands where they exceeded an established *trudovoy*, or labour, norm; compensation was envisaged for alienated land under private ownership. The implementation of the agrarian reform was to be entrusted to the local peasant committees. p. 22

[15] *Gurko, V. I.*—Deputy Minister of the Interior. p. 26

[16] Lenin quotes from K. Marx's afterword to the second edition of Volume One of *Capital* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 456). p. 33

[17] *Böhm-Bawerk, E.*—an Austrian bourgeois economist. p. 34

[18] "*Revolutionary syndicalism*"—a petty-bourgeois semi-anarchist trend that made its appearance in the labour movement of a number of West-European countries at the close of the nineteenth century.

The syndicalists saw no need for the working class to engage in political struggle, they repudiated the leading role of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. They believed that by organising a general strike of the workers the trade unions (in France—syndicats) could, without a revolution, overthrow capitalism and take over control of production. p. 38

[19] *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Voice of the Social-Democrat*)—a newspaper, organ of the Menshevik liquidators, published from February 1908 to December 1911, first in Geneva and later in Paris. p. 40

[20] *Die Neue Zeit*—the theoretical journal of the German Social-Democratic Party, published in Stuttgart from 1883 to 1923. Up to October 1917 it was edited by Karl Kautsky, and subsequently by Heinrich Cunow. Several works by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels were published in this journal for the first time, among them Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* and Engels's *Contribution to the Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891*. Engels often gave pointers to the editors of *Die Neue Zeit* and criticised the journal for its deviations from Marxism. Prominent leaders of the German and international labour movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contributed to the journal, among them August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Paul Lafargue, and G. V. Plekhanov. Beginning with the middle nineties after the death of Engels, the journal regularly published articles by revisionists, including a series of articles by Eduard Bernstein "Problems of Socialism", inaugurating a revisionists' crusade against Marxism. During the First World War (1914-18) the journal took a Centrist stand and virtually supported the social-chauvinists. p. 45

[21] *Dumbadze, I. A.*—a Black-Hundred general of the tsarist army. As military chief of the town of Yalta he was conspicuous for his brutal treatment of the peaceful population.

The Riga Museum—torture-chamber of the Riga Police Investigation Department where prisoners under examination were cruelly tortured. When the practices of the police were exposed in the press the tsarist government tried to deny the charges by declaring that the instruments of torture kept by the police had been collected "for museum purposes". As a result of this "explanation" the torture-chamber became known as "the Riga museum". p. 46

[22] *The law of December 11* (*24*), *1905*—an electoral law for elections to the First Duma. Under this law the electorate was divided into four curias, namely, agricultural (landlords), urban (bourgeoisie),

peasant and worker curias. The vote of a landlord was equivalent to 3 votes cast by the urban bourgeoisie, to 15 peasant votes, and to 45 workers' votes. The electoral law gave to a handful of landlords and capitalists an overwhelming preponderance in the Duma. p. 46

[23] This refers to Engels's introduction to Marx's pamphlet *The Class Struggles in France* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, pp. 118-38). p. 47

[24] *Streltsov, R. Y.*—a Social-Democrat, a revisionist. p. 47

[25] *Frankfurter Zeitung*—a German bourgeois newspaper, published in Frankfort-on-Main from 1856. p. 48

[26] *Octobrists*—members of the League of October Seventeenth, a party formed in Russia after the promulgation of the tsar's manifesto of October 17, 1905. It was a counter-revolutionary party representing the interests of the big bourgeoisie and landlords who engaged in capitalist farming. Its leaders were the well-known industrialist and Moscow house owner A. I. Guchkov and the big landowner M. V. Rodzyanko. The Octobrists unreservedly supported the tsarist government's home and foreign policies. p. 48

[27] *The Party of Peaceful Renovation*—a bourgeois-landlord counter-revolutionary organisation. Founded in 1906 by amalgamation of the Left Octobrists with the Right Cadets. Lenin called the Party of Peaceful Renovation "the Party of Peaceful Plunder". p. 48

[28] This refers to the talks between the Cadets and Trepov, Deputy Minister of the Interior, concerning the possibility of setting up a Cadet Ministry. p. 48

[29] This article was written by Lenin to acquaint the Polish Social-Democrats with the differences that existed within the R.S.D.L.P. and was published in their journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 2, in April 1908.

Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny—a journal published in Cracow from 1902 to 1904 and from 1908 to 1910 by the Polish Social-Democrats with the close participation of R. Luxemburg. p. 50

[30] *Stolichnaya Pochta* (*Metropolitan Post*)—a daily newspaper, published in St. Petersburg from October 1906 to February 1908. At first the organ of the Left Cadets, it became, after February 1907, the mouthpiece of the Trudovik group. It was banned by the tsarist government. p. 50

[31] Cf. Marx, Engels, Lenin, *Zur deutschen Geschichte*, Bd. II, Hlb. I, S. 625-28. "Mai bis October". Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1954. p. 51

[32] *Socialist-Revolutionaries* (S.R.s)—a petty-bourgeois party in Russia, which arose at the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902 as a result of the amalgamation of various Narodnik groups and cir-

cles (Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries, Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, etc.). The newspaper *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (*Revolutionary Russia*) (1900-05) and the journal *Vestnik Russkoi Revolutsii* (*Herald of the Russian Revolution*) (1901-05) became its official organs. The S.R.s did not see the class distinctions between the proletarian and the small proprietor. They glossed over the class differentiation and antagonisms within the peasantry, and repudiated the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. Their views were an eclectic mixture of the ideas of Narodism and revisionism; they tried as Lenin put it, to "patch up the rents in the Narodnik ideas with bits of fashionable opportunist 'criticism' of Marxism" (see present edition, Vol. 9, p. 310). The tactics of individual terrorism, which the S.R.s advocated as the basic method of struggle against the autocracy, caused great harm to the revolutionary movement and made it difficult to organise the masses for the revolutionary struggle.

The agrarian programme of the S.R.s envisaged the abolition of private landownership and the transfer of the land to the village communes on the basis of the "labour principle", "equalised" land tenure, and the development of co-operatives. There was nothing socialist in this programme, which the S.R.s described as a programme for "socialising the land". In analysing this programme, Lenin showed that if commodity production and private farming on commonly-owned land were preserved, the rule of capital could not be eliminated nor the labouring peasantry delivered from exploitation and ruin. He also showed that co-operatives functioning under the capitalist system could not save the small peasant, since they only served to enrich the rural bourgeoisie. At the same time Lenin pointed out that the demand for equalised land tenure, though not socialist, was historically progressive, revolutionary-democratic in character, inasmuch as it was aimed against reactionary landlordism.

The Bolshevik Party exposed the S.R.s' attempts to pose as socialists; it waged a hard fight against the S.R.s for influence over the peasantry, and revealed the harmful effect which their tactics of individual terrorism had on the working-class movement. At the same time, on definite conditions, the Bolsheviks entered into temporary agreements with the S.R.s in the struggle against tsarism.

The fact that the peasantry did not constitute a homogeneous class accounted for the political and ideological disunity and organisational confusion among the S.R.s, and for their constant wavering between the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Already during the first Russian revolution the Right wing of the S.R.s split away from the Party and formed the legal Labour Popular Socialist Party, which held views close to those of the Cadets; the Left wing became the semi-anarchist league of "Maximalists". During the Stolypin reaction the Socialist-Revolutionary Party experienced a complete ideological and organizational break-up, and the First World War saw most S.R.s adopt social-chauvinist views.

After the victory of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1917 the S.R.s, together with the Mensheviks and Cadets, formed the mainstay of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois-landlord Provisional Government, and the leaders of this party (Kerensky, Avxentyev and Chernov) were members of this government. The S.R. Party refused to support the peasants' demand for the abolition of landlordism, and indeed, stood for its maintenance. Socialist-Revolutionary ministers in the Provisional Government sent punitive expeditions against the peasants who had seized landed estates.

At the end of November 1917 the Left wing of the S.R.s founded an independent party. To retain their influence among the peasant masses, they recognised the Soviet power formally and entered into an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but soon turned against the Soviets.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the S.R.s carried on counter-revolutionary subversive activities, vigorously supported the interventionists and whiteguard generals, took part in counter-revolutionary plots, and organised terrorist acts against Soviet statesmen and Communist Party leaders. After the Civil War they continued their activities against the Soviet state within the country and among the whiteguard émigrés. p. 52

[33] *The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in London between April 12 and 27 (April 20 and May 10), 1905. The Congress was organised and convened by the Bolsheviks under the direction of Lenin. It was the first Bolshevik Congress.

The agenda, drawn up by Lenin, was as follows: (I) *Report of the Organising Committee*. (II) *Questions of Tactics*: (1) the armed uprising; (2) the attitude towards the government's policy on the eve of and during the revolution (this point was devoted to two questions: a. attitude towards the government's policy on the eve of the revolution; b. the provisional revolutionary government); (3) the attitude towards the peasant movement. (III) *Questions of Organisation*: (4) the relations between the workers and the intellectuals within the Party organisations; (5) the Party Rules. (IV) *Attitude Towards Other Parties and Trends*: (6) attitude towards the breakaway group of the R.S.D.L.P.; (7) attitude towards the non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations; (8) attitude towards the liberals; (9) practical agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries. (V) *Internal Questions of Party Life*: (10) propaganda and agitation. (VI) *Delegates' Reports*: (11) report of the Central Committee; (12) reports of delegates from the local committees. (VII) *Elections*: (13) elections; (14) standing order for publication of the proceedings and decisions of the Congress, and for the assumption of office by the newly elected functionaries.

On all the basic issues dealt with by the Third Congress Lenin had written the draft resolutions, which he substantiated in articles published in the newspaper *Vperyod* prior to the Congress. Lenin spoke at the Congress on the question of the armed uprising, on the participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary

government, on the attitude towards the peasant movement, on the Party Rules, and on a number of other questions. The proceedings of the Congress record 138 speeches and motions made by Lenin.

The Congress amended the Party Rules: (a) it adopted Lenin's wording of Clause I; (b) it defined precisely the rights of the Central Committee and its relations with the local committees; (c) it modified the organisational structure of the Party's central bodies: in place of the three centres (the Central Committee, the Central Organ, and the Council of the Party) the Congress established a single competent Party centre—the Central Committee.

On the work and the significance of the Third Party Congress see Lenin's article "The Third Congress" (present edition, Vol. 8, pp. 442-49) and his book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (see present edition Vol. 9, pp. 15-140).

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[34] *The Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in London between April 30 and May 19 (May 13 and June 1), 1907. It was attended by 336 delegates having a vote and consultative voice, of whom 105 were Bolsheviks, 97 Mensheviks, 57 Bundists, 44 Polish Social-Democrats, 29 Lettish Social-Democrats and 4 "non-factionals". The Bolsheviks were backed by the Poles and the Letts and had a stable majority at the Congress. The Bolshevik delegates included Lenin, Voroshilov, Dubrovinsky, Stalin, Shahumyan and Yaroslavsky.

The Congress discussed the following questions: (1) Report of the Central Committee. (2) Report of the Duma group and its organisation. (3) Attitude towards the bourgeois parties. (4) The Duma. (5) The "labour congress" and the non-party workers' organisations. (6) The trade unions and the Party. (7) Guerrilla actions. (8) Unemployment, economic crisis, and lock-outs. (9) Organisational questions. (10) The International Congress in Stuttgart (First of May, militarism). (11) Work in the army. (12) Miscellanea. One of the basic questions dealt with at the Congress was that of the policy to be adopted towards the bourgeois parties. Lenin delivered the report on this question. The Congress adopted Bolshevik resolutions on all fundamental issues. It elected a Central Committee consisting of 5 Bolsheviks, 4 Mensheviks, 2 Polish and 1 Lettish Social-Democrats. Alternate members elected to the Central Committee consisted of 10 Bolsheviks, 7 Mensheviks, 3 Polish and 2 Lettish Social-Democrats.

The Congress was a big victory of Bolshevism over the opportunist wing of the Party—the Mensheviks. On the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. see Lenin's article "The Attitude Towards Bourgeois Parties" (present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 489-509).

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[35] *Boyevism*—from the Russian word *boyevik*, a member of the revolutionary fighting squads, who, during the revolutionary struggle, used the tactics of armed action, helped political prisoners to escape, expropriated state-owned funds for the needs of the revolution,

removed spies and *agents provocateurs*, etc. During the Revolution of 1905-07 the Bolsheviks had special fighting squads. See present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 409-18. p. 57

[36] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 104-05 and 107. p. 59

[37] *Polish Socialist Party* (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*)—a reformist nationalist party founded in 1892. In 1906 the Party split into the P.S.P. Left wing and P.S.P. chauvinist Right wing. p. 61

[38] *The Zemstvo campaign* was conducted by bourgeois liberals, members of the Zemstvos, between the autumn of 1904 and January 1905. The campaign consisted of a series of conferences, public meetings and banquets at which speeches were made and resolutions passed in support of moderate constitutional demands. p. 63

[39] *Dubasov, F. V.*—Governor-General of Moscow who crushed the armed uprising of December 1905. p. 64

[40] *The Vyborg Manifesto* or "the Vyborg Appeal" was issued by members of the First Duma "To the people from the people's representatives". It was adopted on July 9-10 (22-23), 1908, at a meeting in Vyborg at which about 200 deputies, most of them Cadets, assembled after the dissolution of the First Duma. The appeal called upon the people to offer "passive resistance" to the government by refusing to pay taxes and furnish recruits until the tsar had announced new elections to the Duma. In September 1906 the Congress of the Cadet Party openly admitted that the use of "passive resistance" was "impracticable". p. 64

[41] *Osvobozhdeniye League*—a liberal-monarchist organisation founded abroad by P. Struve in 1904. The *Osvobozhdeniye* people were supporters of a constitutional monarchy and endeavoured to strike a bargain with the tsarist government, concealing their struggle against the revolution under the false guise of democracy. Eventually they formed the core of the Cadet Party. p. 65

[42] *The rising in the Sveaborg fortress* (near Helsingfors), which started during the night of July 17-18 (30-31),1906 broke out spontaneously and prematurely, being largely provoked by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. On receiving information about the situation in Sveaborg and the possibility of an armed uprising, the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. decided on the urgent dispatch of a delegation to Sveaborg authorised to secure a postponement of the action or, if this could not be achieved, to take the most active part in leading the uprising. The text of the decision was written by V. I. Lenin. Finding it impossible to prevent spontaneous action, the Bolsheviks headed the uprising. Its leaders were lieuten-

ants A. P. Yemelyanov and Y. L. Kohansky, members of the military organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. Seven of the ten artillery companies took an active part in the uprising. The insurgents put forward the slogans of overthrow of the autocracy, freedom for the people, and the transfer of the land to the peasants. The working class in Finland gave active support to the insurgents. On July 18 (31) a general strike was declared in Helsingfors, which eventually spread to other towns. The uprising lasted three days, but the general lack of preparation had its effect, and on July 20 (August 2), after the fortress had been subjected to a naval bombardment, the Sveaborg rising was crushed. Its participants were court-martialled, forty-three men being executed and some hundreds sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment. p. 65

[43] *The Land Bill of the 104 members of the Duma* was introduced by the Trudoviks at the 13th session of the Duma on May 23 (June 5) 1906. The Bill made it the object of land legislation "to work towards the establishment of a system under which all the land with its mineral wealth and waters would belong to the whole people, the land needed for agriculture to be given over only to the use of those who cultivate it with their own labour" (*The Duma in Russia. Documents & Materials*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1957 p. 172). For this purpose the demand was put forward for creating 'a national distributable land fund' consisting of all state, crown, monastery and church lands. Landed estates and other privately-owned lands were to be forcibly alienated to this fund where the size of the respective holdings exceeded the labour standard established for the given locality. Certain compensation was allowed for alienated privately-owned lands. Allotment lands and small private holdings were to be retained for a time by their owners. The Bill also provided for the eventual gradual transfer of these lands to the national fund. The agrarian reform was to be carried out by local committees elected by democratic vote. These demands expressed the interests of the well-to-do peasants, who feared immediate and complete abolition of private ownership of the land and stood for compensation for alienated lands. Lenin remarked that the Bill of the 104 "is permeated with the small proprietor's fear of being too radical, of drawing too large a mass of poor people into the movement" (see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 469). Despite its inconsistent and utopian character, the "Bill of the 104", as Lenin pointed out, was a platform of struggle for converting the well-to-do section of the enslaved peasantry into free farmers. p. 66

[44] Lenin has in mind the "*Draft of the Fundamental Land Law*" signed by 33 deputies (mostly Trudoviks) of the First Duma. This Bill was drafted with the help of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and expressed their views on the agrarian question. The "Bill of the 33" demanded the immediate and complete abolition of private landownership and proclaimed the equal right of all citizens to use the land and the principle of communal land tenure with equalised

reallotment on the basis of subsistence and labour norms. In comparison with other Bills of the Trudoviks, the "Bill of the 33" was more drastic in that it demanded the immediate abolition of private landownership and confiscation of the landed estates without compensation.

Introduced into the Duma on June 6 (19), 1906, the "Bill of the 33" met with furious resistance on the part of the Cadets and was rejected by 140 votes to 78. p. 66

[45] *The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century* was written by Lenin in 1908 for an encyclopaedic dictionary issued by Granat Bros. Ltd., but was not published for censorship reasons. This work first appeared in Moscow in 1918 as a separate booklet issued by *Zhizn i Znaniye* Publishers.

In writing this booklet Lenin made use of statistical returns and tables on the agrarian question contained in his works *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* and *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07* (see present edition, Vol. 3, p. 21-607 and Vol. 13, pp. 217-429). p. 69

[46] This refers to the book *Statistics of Landownership for 1905. Returns for 50 Gubernias of European Russia*. Published by the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of the Interior, St. Petersburg, 1907. p. 71

[47] This refers to N. A. Rubakin's article "Our Ruling Bureaucracy in Figures", published in the newspaper *Syn Otechestva* (*Son of the Fatherland*) No. 54, April 20 (May 3), 1905. p. 75

[48] The categories of peasants here listed by Lenin existed in tsarist Russia as survivals of feudal and semi-feudal relations.

Chinsh peasants—peasants who enjoyed the right of *chinsh*—the right of perpetual inheritance of the land—and paid almost invariable quit-rent, called *chinsh*. This form of relations existed mainly in Poland, Lithuania, Byelorussia, and parts of the Ukraine bordering on the Black Sea.

Rezeshi—small land proprietors in Moldavia and Bessarabia.

Teptyars—neo-Bashkirs, settlers from the Urals and the Volga region. p. 77

[49] This refers to *The Collection of Statistical Data for Saratov Gubernia. Vol. I, Saratov Uyezd*. Saratov, published by the Saratov Gubernia Zemstvo, 1883. p. 77

[50] *Gift-land peasants*—former serfs who, at the time of the Reform of 1861, received from their landlords as a gift (without having to pay redemption money) miserable allotments amounting to a quarter of the "top" or "statutory" allotment established by law for the given locality. All the rest of the lands that had constituted the peasant allotments before the Reform were seized by the landlord,

who kept his "gift-land peagants", forcibly dispossessed of their land in a state of economic bondage even after serfdom was abolished.

Full owners—former landlords' peasants who had redeemed their allotments before the specified date and had the right to own the land as private property. These were a comparatively small category of the most well-to-do element in the countryside.

State peasants with communal holdings had no private property rights on the land, which they used on the basis of communal landownership.

State peasants with quarter holdings—descendants of former servicemen (children of the boyars, Cossacks, streltsi, dragoons, soldiers, etc.) who guarded the southern and south-eastern borderlands of Muscovy. The Tsar of Muscovy rewarded them for their services with an endowment of a *quarter* lot (half a dessiatine) of land on which they settled in "single households" (hence their name *odnodvortsi*). They enjoyed the right of communal landownership as well as their quarter holdings.

These *odnodvortsi*, being freemen, for a long time held an intermediate position between the nobles and the peasants, and had the right to acquire serfs. Under Peter the Great they were turned into state peasants and their land became the property of the state. Actually, however, the state peasants with quarter holdings disposed of their lands as their own private property. In this they differed from the state peasants with communal holdings, who had no right to buy, sell or bequeath their land.

State peasants who formerly were landlords' serfs—a category of peasants purchased by the state from private owners or presented to the state, etc. Although regarded as state peasants, they enjoyed fewer rights. They were given equal rights in 1859, on the eve of the Reform of 1861, but certain distinctions still remained.

Free tillers—a category of peasants freed from serfdom under the law of February 20, 1803 which allowed landlords to give the peasants their freedom with land on the landlords' own terms. p. 77

[51] *The village commune* in Russia was the communal form of peasant use of the land, characterised by compulsory crop rotation, and undivided woods and pastures. Its principal features were collective liability (compulsory collective responsibility of the peasants for making their payments in full and on time, and the performance of various services to the state and the landlords), the regular reallotment of the land with no right to refuse the allotment given, the prohibition of its purchase and sale.

The landlords and the tsarist government used the village commune to intensify feudal oppression and to squeeze redemption payments and taxes out of the people. p. 78

[52] This refers to the abolition of serfdom in Russia in 1861. p. 78

[53] This refers to the book: *Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Russischen Reiches und der angränzenden Länder Asiens*. Auf Kosten der Kai-

serl. Akademie der Wissenschaften herausgegeben von K. E. Baer und Helmersen, St. Petersburg, 1845. p. 82

[54] The full title of the book is *Freely Hired Labour on Private Landowner Farms and the Movement of Workers According to a Statistical and Economic Survey of Agriculture and Industry in European Russia*. Compiled by S. A. Korolenko, St. Petersburg, 1892 (*Agricultural and Statistical Information Based on Material Obtained from Farmers*, Issue V). p. 85

[55] *Skopshchina*—the name given in the southern parts of Russia to a type of rent in kind on terms of bondage, the tenant paying the landlord a share of the crop *s kopny* (per corn-shock), and usually fulfilling miscellaneous labour services in addition. p. 88

[56] *Wild landlord*—a type of landlord described by Saltykov-Shchedrin in his satirical fairy-tale published in English under the title of "Wild Gentleman". p. 90

[57] Lenin refers to the following books:

1) V. Orlov, *Forms of Peasant Landownership in Moscow Gubernia*, Moscow, published by Moscow Gubernia Zemstvo, 1879 (*Statistical Returns for Moscow Gubernia*, Vol. 4, Issue I);

2) V. Trirogov, *The Village Commune and the Poll-Tax* (*Collected Investigations*), St. Petersburg, 1882;

3) Johannes Keussler, *Zur Geschichte und Kritik des bäuerlichen Gemeindebesitzes in Russland*, Teil 1-3, 1876-87;

4) V. V., *The Peasant Commune* (cf. *Results of Economic Investigation of Russia According to Zemstvo Statistical Data*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1892).

V. V.—pseudonym of V. P. Vorontsov, an ideologue of liberal Narodism of the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. p. 93

[58] *Registered souls*—the male population of feudal Russia who were subject to the poll-tax (chiefly peasants and urban petty bourgeois), for which purpose special censuses ("registrations") were held beginning from 1718. The last, tenth, "registration" was made in 1857-59. Redistribution of the land within the village communes took place in a number of districts on the basis of these registration lists. p. 93

[59] *Severny Vestnik* (*Northern Herald*)—a literary, scientific, and political journal of a liberal trend, published in St. Petersburg from 1885 to 1898. In its early years the journal published articles by the Narodniks N. K. Mikhailovsky, S. N. Yuzhakov, V. P. Vorontsov, S. N. Krivenko, and others. From 1891 the journal virtually became the organ of the Russian symbolists and decadents and preached idealism and mysticism. p. 94

[60] This refers to N. Karyshev's book *Peasant Rentings of Non-Allotment Land* (cf. *Results of the Economic Investigation of Russia According to Zemstvo Statistical Data*, Vol. II, Dorpat, 1892). p. 97

[61] *Nik.—on*—pseudonym of N. F. Danielson, an ideologue of liberal Narodism of the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. p. 99

[62] *Winter hiring*—the hiring of peasants for summer work by landlords and kulaks in the winter, when the peasants were badly in need of money and forced to accept extortionate terms. p. 100

[63] This refers to *Evaluation Returns on Peasant Landownership in Zemlyansk, Zadonsk, Korotoyak and Nizhnedevitsk Uyezds*. Supplement to vols. III, IV, V and VI of *Statistical Returns for Voronezh Gubernia*, Voronezh, published by the Voronezh Gubernia Zemstvo, 1889. p. 109

[64] D. N. Zhbankov's sketch "Women's Country" was published in the book *Data for Statistics of Kostroma Gubernia*, Issue 8, Kostroma, published by the Kostroma Gubernia Statistical Committee, 1891. p. 111

[65] *Vestnik Yevropy* (*European Messenger*)—a monthly journal published in St. Petersburg from 1866 to the summer of 1918. It presented the views of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie, and beginning with the nineties waged a systematic struggle against Marxism. p. 116

[66] These data are given in the book *Combined Returns for Samara Gubernia*, Vol. 8, Issue 1, Samara, published by the Samara Gubernia Zemstvo, 1892. p. 121

[67] This refers to M. S. Uvarov's article "The Influence of Industry Employing Migratory Workers on the Sanitary Conditions of Russia" published in *Vestnik Obshchestvennoi Gigieny, Sudebnoi i Prakticheskoi Meditsiny* (*Journal of Public Hygiene and Forensic and Practical Medicine*) in July 1896. p. 122

[68] Lenin is quoting figures from the article "Peasant Industries in European Russia" by N. F. Rudnev, published in *Symposium of the Saratov Zemstvo*, Nos. 6 and 11, 1894. p. 123

[69] This refers to the book *Agricultural Labourers and the Organisation of Sanitary Supervision over Them in Kherson Gubernia*, by N. I. Tezyakov, Kherson, published by the Kherson Gubernia Zemstvo Board, 1896. p. 125

[70] Lenin quotes figures from N. A. Blagoveshchensky's book *Combined Zemstvo House-to-House Census Economic Returns. Vol. I. Peasant Farming*, Moscow, 1898. p. 134

[71] Cf. K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 173-87. p. 138

[72] *Gesindeordnung*—"Regulation for Servants", 1854. One of numerous laws in Prussia depriving farm labourers of all civil rights. Under this law the mere attempt of labourers to organise a strike was punishable with imprisonment. p. 140

[73] This refers to the uprisings in Sveaborg (see present edition, Note 42) and Kronstadt. The uprising of sailors and soldiers in Kronstadt started on July 19 (August 1), 1906, after news had been received of the uprising in Sveaborg. In the spring and summer of 1906, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, preparations had gone forward for an armed uprising of workers, soldiers and sailors in Kronstadt. These preparations, however, were considerably complicated by the arrest on July 9 (22) of most of the members of the military and workers' organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. Nevertheless, with the support of the St. Petersburg Committee and its representative, D. Z. Manuilsky, the Bolsheviks went forward with their preparations for an armed uprising, while at the same time rebuffing the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had been provoking a premature uprising. When the spontaneous Sveaborg rising broke out the preparations for an armed uprising in Kronstadt had not been completed, but in view of the events in Sveaborg the uprising in Kronstadt had to be begun prematurely. The Bolsheviks took the lead in order to make the action as organised as possible. At a prearranged signal the struggle was started almost simultaneously by minemen, sappers, soldiers of the electric-mine company, and sailors of the First and Second Naval Divisions, who were joined by some of the armed workers. The government, however, had received information from *agents provocateurs* of the time fixed for the uprising, and had prepared in advance for the fight. Another factor that worked against the uprising was the disruptive activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. By the morning of July 20 (August 2) the uprising was suppressed.

The St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. passed a decision on July 20 (August 2) to carry out a political general strike in support of the Kronstadt and Sveaborg risings, but on news being received the next day that the uprising had been suppressed this decision was revoked.

The tsarist Government took savage reprisals against the insurgents. More than 2,500 participants in the Kronstadt uprising were arrested. Sentenced by courts martial, 36 men were executed, 130 were sent to penal servitude, 316 were imprisoned and 935 transferred to corrective battalions. p. 148

[74] *Revolutsionnaya Mysl* (*Revolutionary Thought*)—the organ of a group of S.R.s, published abroad from April 1908 to December 1909. Six issues appeared. p. 149

[75] *Znamya Truda* (*Banner of Labour*)—central organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published in Paris from July 1907 to April 1914. p. 149

[76] *Iskra* (*Spark*)—the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper, founded by Lenin in 1900. After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. the Mensheviks seized control of *Iskra*. From November 1903, beginning with issue No. 52, *Iskra* became the mouthpiece of the Mensheviks. From then on the "old" *Iskra* was referred to in the Party as the Lenin, Bolshevik *Iskra*, and the "new" *Iskra* as the Menshevik, opportunist *Iskra*. p. 153

[77] *January 9, 1905*—the day on which, by order of the tsar, the troops fired on a peaceful procession of St. Petersburg workers headed by the priest Gapon, who marched to the Winter Palace to present a petition to the tsar. This massacre of unarmed workers started a wave of mass political strikes and demonstrations all over Russia under the slogan "Down with the autocracy!" The events of January the Ninth marked the beginning of the 1905-07 Revolution. p. 153

[78] *The Plehve regime*—the harsh political regime introduced in Russia in 1902 by the Minister of the Interior, V. K. Plehve, with the object of combating the revolutionary movement. p. 154

[79] The Autoabstract *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the Russian Revolution* is a brief summary of the book *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07* (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-431). Lenin wrote the Autoabstract in order to acquaint the Polish Social-Democrats with the differences of opinion existing in the R.S.D.L.P. on the agrarian question. It was published in the journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 6, August 1908. p. 158

[80] *John*—the Menshevik P. P. Maslov. p. 162

[81] *Vendée*—a department in western France where the backward peasantry began a counter-revolutionary uprising against the republic at the close of the eighteenth century, during the French bourgeois revolution. The uprising was led by the Catholic clergy, the nobility and émigré royalists, and had the support of England.
Vendée became a synonym for reactionary rebellion and hotbeds of counter-revolution. p. 162

[82] *Kostrov*—leader of the Caucasian Mensheviks N. N. Zhordania. p. 162

[83] *Obrazovaniye* (*Education*)—a literary, popular-scientific, and sociopolitical monthly published in St. Petersburg from 1892 to 1909. There were Social-Democrats among its contributors between 1902 and 1908. p. 163

[84] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 803-04. p. 164

[85] *Zarya* (*Dawn*)—a Marxist scientific and political journal published in Stuttgart in 1901-02 by the *Iskra* editorial board. Four issues appeared in all.

Zarya published Lenin's writings: "Casual Notes", "The Persecutors of the Zemstvo and the Hannibals of Liberalism", the first four chapters of "The Agrarian Question and the Critics of Marx'" (under the title "Messrs. the 'Critics' on the Agrarian Question"), "Review of Home Affairs", and "The Agrarian Programme of Russian Social-Democracy". p. 169

[86] *Zhizn* (*Life*)—a monthly journal published in St. Petersburg from 1897 to 1901 and abroad in 1902. From 1899 the journal was the organ of the "legal Marxists". p. 169

[87] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 792-93, 788-91, 787-88. p. 170

[88] Ibid., pp. 777-82. p. 171

[89] See K. Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 173-87. p. 171

[90] Lenin is quoting from a letter of K. Marx to L. Kugelmann dated April 12, 1871 (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, p. 319). p. 178

[91] *Przegląd*—see Note 29. p. 178

[92] *Lyakhov, V. P.*— a colonel in the tsarist army, commander of the Russian troops who crushed the national-revolutionary movement in Persia in 1908. p. 183

[93] *L'Humanité*—a daily newspaper founded by Jean Jaurès in 1904 as the organ of the French Socialist Party. Shortly after the split in the Party at the December 1920 Congress and the formation of the French Communist Party the newspaper became the Central Organ of the Communists. The newspaper is being published in Paris to this day. p. 186

[94] This note was published in the newspaper *Proletary* as an afterword to the article "Pyotr Maslov Corrects Karl Marx's Rough Notes" (see *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07*, present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 300-07. p. 189

[95] *Famusov*—a character from Griboyedov's comedy *Wit Works Woe*. p. 190

[96] See Lenin's article "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart" (present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 75-81 and 82-93). p. 192

[97] *Balalaikin*—a character in Saltykov-Shchedrin's *A Modern Idyll*; a liberal windbag, adventurer and liar. p. 202

[98] From the poem by N. A. Nekrasov "Who Can Be Happy and Free in Russia". p. 205

[99] *Narodnaya Volya* (*The People's Will*)—an illegal organisation of the revolutionary-minded Narodnik intellectuals founded in 1879 with the object of fighting the autocracy. It existed up to the second half of the eighties. p. 208

[100] This article was written by Lenin in connection with a workers' meeting held in Berlin on September 7 (20),1908, to protest against the growing menace of war. The article was intended for issue No. 36 of the newspaper *Proletary*, but was not published. p. 210

[101] *Vorwärts*—the central organ of the German Social-Democrats. It began to appear in 1876 and was edited, among others, by Wilhelm Liebknecht. Engels made use of its columns for fighting all manifestations of opportunism. From the middle of the nineties after the death of Engels, *Vorwärts* began regularly to carry articles of the opportunists, who predominated in German Social-Democracy and in the Second International. p. 212

[102] This refers to the decision of the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. published in "From the Party" column of the newspaper *Proletary*, No. 36, October 3 (16), 1908. The St. Petersburg Committee called upon the Social-Democratic students' groups to dissociate themselves from the appeal of the Joint Students' Council and subordinate the student movement to the aims of Social-Democracy in the nation-wide struggle against tsarism. p. 217

[103] *The Berlin Treaty*—an agreement endorsed on July 13, 1878, by the Congress of representatives of the governments of Russia, Britain, Austro-Hungary, Germany, France, Italy and Turkey after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. p. 223

[104] *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*)—a daily newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1868 to October 1917. At first moderately liberal, it became in 1876 the mouthpiece of reactionary circles among the aristocracy and bureaucracy. It was opposed to the bourgeois-liberal as well as the revolutionary movement. From 1905 onwards it was an organ of the Black Hundreds. Lenin called it a specimen of the venal press. p. 225

[105] *Pugachov*, *Yemelyan*—leader of the peasant war in Russia in 1773-75. p. 225

[106] *The International Socialist Bureau*—the executive body of the Second International, consisting of representatives of the socialist parties of all countries and established by decision of the Paris Congress of the Second International in September 1900. The representatives of the Russian Social-Democrats elected to the I.S.B. were G. V. Plekhanov and B. N. Krichevsky. From 1905 onwards Lenin was a member of the Bureau as a representative of the R.S.D.L.P. He waged a determined fight within the Bureau

against the opportunism of the leaders of the Second International. The I.S.B. ceased to function in 1914. p. 231

[107] The foreign publications referred to are:

La Tribune Russe—the bulletin of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published in Paris in French from January 1904 to December 1909, and from October 1912 to July 1913. In 1904 it appeared as a fortnightly, and after that as a monthly.

Russisches Bulletin—published in Berlin by a group of Mensheviks from 1907 to 1916. p. 231

[108] *The Bureau Abroad of the Central Committee* was set up by the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in August 1908 in the capacity of the Party's agency abroad, subordinated to the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee.

Soon after the Central Committee plenary meeting in January 1910 the Bureau Abroad came under the control of a liquidationist majority and became a rallying centre for anti-Party forces. The liquidationist tactics of the Bureau Abroad compelled the Bolsheviks in May 1911 to recall their representative (Alexandrov—N. A. Semashko). Later the representatives of the Polish and Lettish Social-Democrats were recalled.

In January 1912 the B.A.C.C. discontinued its activities. p. 232

[109] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 409-73, 490-91. p. 236

[110] *Zionist Socialists* (*Zionist Socialist Workers' Party*)—a petty-bourgeois Jewish national organisation formed in 1904. The Zionist socialists sought to isolate the Jewish workers from the revolutionary struggle of the international proletariat and advocated an agreement with the bourgeoisie in working for the creation of a Jewish state. p. 242

[111] *The Socialist Jewish Labour Party*—a petty-bourgeois nationalist organisation founded in 1900. The programme of the S.J.L.P. was based on a demand for national autonomy for the Jews—the establishment of extraterritorial Jewish parliaments with powers to decide questions relating to the political organisation of the Jews in Russia. The S.J.L.P. stood close to the S.R.s and together with them fought against the R.S.D.L.P. p. 242

[112] *Skvortsov, A. I.*— a bourgeois-economist, author of a number of works on agriculture. Lenin criticised Skvortsov's views repeatedly in his writings (see present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 198, 474-77 and Vol. 3, p. 54. p. 247

[113] See K. Marx, *Capital,* Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, p. 746. p. 248

[114] This article was written in reply to P. Maslov's article published in September 1908 in issue No. 7 of *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*,

the journal of the Polish Social-Democrats, under the heading "On the Question of the Agrarian Programme. (An Answer to Lenin.)" Maslov attacked the Bolshevik programme expounded by Lenin in his Autoabstract, *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the Russian Revolution* (see pp. 158-80 of this volume) and defended the agrarian programme of the Mensheviks. p. 255

[115] See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Der Gesetzentwurf über die Aufhebung der Feudallasten" and "The Anti-Kriege Circular". p. 261

[116] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 438-39. p. 272

[117] *Otzovists* (from the Russian word *otozvat*—recall)—the name given to a group of the Bolsheviks (Bogdanov, Pokrovsky, Lunacharsky, Bubnov and others), who demanded that the Social-Democratic deputies in the Third Duma should be recalled and that work in the legal organisations should be stopped. In 1908 the otzovists formed a group of their own and waged a struggle against Lenin. They emphatically refused to sit in the Duma and work in the trade unions, co-operative societies and other mass legal and semi-legal organisations of the workers. They strove to shut themselves up within the framework of the illegal organisation, to tear the Party away from the non-Party masses and expose it to the attacks of reaction. Lenin called the otzovists "liquidators of a new type" and "Mensheviks inside out".

A variety of otzovism was ultimatumism. The ultimatumists differed only in form from the otzovists. They proposed that an ultimatum should first be presented to the Social-Democratic group in the Duma and if it was not complied with, the Social-Democratic deputies should be recalled from the Duma.

Ultimatumism was virtually otzovism in disguise. Lenin called the ultimatumists "shams-faced otzovists".

In the spring of 1909 the otzovists, ultimatumists and the god-builders formed a promotion group to organise an anti-Party school on the Island of Capri (Bogdanov, Alexinsky, Lunacharsky and others). Actually this group was the centre of the anti-Party faction of otzovists, ultimatumists, and god-builders.

A meeting of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* held in June 1909 adopted a decision that "Bolshevism, as a definite tendency in the R.S.D.L.P., has nothing in common with otzovism or ultimatumism" and called upon the Bolsheviks to resolutely combat this defection from revolutionary Marxism. Bogdanov (Maximov), the guiding spirit of otzovism, was expelled from the ranks of the Bolsheviks. p. 286

[118] *Boulangism*—a reactionary chauvinist movement in France in the late nineteenth century, so named after General Boulanger who headed it.

By criticising the policy of the ruling party of moderate Republicans and pretending to oppose the Monarchists, Boulanger

sought to win popularity among the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat and to use their dissatisfaction with the government for his own careerist purposes. Boulanger was in secret contact with the Monarchists, from whom he received subsidies.

The Boulangist movement was not supported by the masses and broke up. p. 295

[119] The elections to the Duma were indirect and had several stages. They were conducted separately for various groups of the population known as curias—they were the landowner, urban, peasant and worker curias.

At the final stage of the election campaign the electors of all the curia gathered at a Gubernia Election Meeting where the election of deputies to the Duma took place. The number of deputies from each curia was fixed beforehand. Thus, if all the electors of a worker curia nominated a Social-Democrat, the rest of the participants in the Gubernia Election Meeting, were obliged to vote for him. p. 297

[120] "*Well-informed persons*"—a group of intellectuals who acted as advisers to the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma. Most of them were liquidators and revisionists, such as A. N. Potresov and S. N. Prokopovich. Taking advantage of the fact that the leaders of the Bolshevik Party were working underground and were unable to take a legal part in the activities of the Duma group, the "well-informed persons" tried to direct the group's activities into anti-Party channels, as a result of which arose the question of dispensing with their services. p. 297

[121] *Rossiya* (*Russia*)—a Black-Hundred police-ridden daily, published in St. Petersburg from 1905 to 1914. In 1906 it became the official organ of the Ministry of the Interior. p. 299

[122] *Ugryum-Burcheyev*—a type of dull narrow-minded dignitary described by Saltykov-Shchedrin in his story *History of a Town*. p. 305

[123] *Council of the United Nobility*—a counter-revolutionary organisation of feudalist landlords. It was established in May 1906 at the First Congress of Delegates of Gubernia Assemblies of the Nobility, and existed up to October 1917. The chief aim of this organisation was to defend the autocratic regime, the big landed estates and the privileges of the nobility. The Council was headed by Count A. A. Bobrinsky, Prince N. F. Kasatkin-Rostovsky, Count D. A. Olsufyev, V. M. Purishkevich and others. Lenin called it a "council of united feudalists". The Council of the United Nobility was really a semi-governmental body that dictated to the government legislative measures for protecting the interests of the feudalists. A great many of the Council's members belonged to the Council of State and the leading centres of the Black Hundreds. p. 306

[124] *Rural superintendent* (*zemsky nachalnik*)—an administrative office instituted by the tsarist government in 1889 to strengthen the authority of the landlords over the peasants. The rural superintendents were appointed from among the local landed nobility and were granted very great powers—not merely administrative, but also judicial—with regard to the peasants. p. 311

[125] *Henry George*—an American bourgeois economist and publicist, whose views were criticised by K. Marx in his letter of June 20, 1881 to F. Sorge, and by F. Engels in his preface to the American edition of his book *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 414-17). p. 312

[126] This refers to Plekhanov's speech at the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. where he was co-reporter on the question of revision of the agrarian programme. Speaking against nationalisation of the land, Plekhanov said: "To make nationalisation harmless we must find a guarantee against restoration; and there is not, nor can there be, any such guarantee. Recall the history of France; recall the history of England; in each of these countries, the wide sweep of the revolution was followed by restoration. The same may happen in our country; and our programme must be such that in the event of its application, the harm that may be caused by restoration may be reduced to a minimum." (Minutes of the Fourth [Unity] Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., Moscow, 1959, Russ. ed., pp. 59-60.) p. 313

[127] *Razin, Stepan*—outstanding leader of the peasant revolt in Russia in 1667-71 against feudal oppression and serfdom. p. 313

[128] The draft of Belousov's speech on the agrarian question was written by Lenin. The statistical comparisons and figures quoted by Belousov were taken from Lenin's books, not yet published at the time, namely, *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07* (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 217-429) and *The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century* (see pp. 69-147 of this volume). p. 315

[129] *The Fifth* (*All-Russian*) *Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.* was held in Paris on December 21-27, 1908 (January 3-9, 1909) and was attended by delegates from such major Party organisations as those of St. Petersburg, the Urals, the Caucasus, Moscow and the Central Industrial Region, as well as from the Polish Social-Democratic Party and the Bund. There were sixteen voting delegates, of whom 5 were Bolsheviks, 3 Mensheviks, 5 Polish Social-Democrats and 3 Bundists. The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. was represented by Lenin.

The Conference discussed the following questions: (1) The reports of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P., of the C.C. of the Polish

Social-Democratic Party, of the C.C. of the Bund, and of the R.S.D.L.P. organisations of St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region, the Urals and the Caucasus; (2) The present political situation and the tasks of the Party; (3) The Social-Democratic group in the Duma; (4) Questions of organisation in connection with the changed political conditions; (5) Affiliation in the local areas with the non-Russian organisations; (6) Affairs abroad; and Miscellanea.

Lenin made a report at the Conference "On the Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party" and speeches on the Duma group, on the organisational and other questions. The Bolsheviks at the Conference waged a struggle against two forms of opportunism within the Party, namely, "against the *liquidators*, the direct opportunists of the Party, and against the *otzovists*, the disguised enemies of the Party". On Lenin's motion the Conference condemned liquidationism and called upon all Party organisations to resolutely combat attempts to liquidate the Party. The Conference is dealt with also in Lenin's article "On the Road" (see pp. 345-55 of this volume). p. 319

[130] This heading has been given by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 329

[131] See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959, pp. 763-93. p. 334

[132] *The Erfurt Programme*—the-programme of German Social-Democracy adopted at the Congress in Erfurt in October 1891. p. 334

[133] This alludes to Plekhanov's statement announcing his resignation from the editorial board of the liquidators' newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*. It was printed in No. 10-11 of this newspaper, which was being prepared for release. After further talks with Plekhanov the statement was withdrawn and the mention of it in the "contents" was pasted over. This did not put an end to the conflict, however. In May 1909 (issue No. 14), *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* published a letter from Plekhanov informing readers that he had officially resigned from the editorial board. p. 358

[134] *Vperyod* (*Forward*)—an illegal Bolshevik weekly, published in Geneva from December 22, 1904 (January 4, 1905) to May 5 (18), 1905. Eighteen issues were put out. The newspaper's organiser, manager, and ideological guide was Lenin. Other members of the editorial board were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and A. V. Lunacharsky.

The outstanding role which the newspaper played in combating Menshevism, restoring partyism, and formulating and elucidating the tactical issues posed by the rising revolution was acknowledged in a special resolution of the Third Party Congress, which recorded a vote of thanks to the editorial board. p. 360

[135] *Partiiniye Izvestia* (*Party News*)—a newspaper, the organ of the United Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., published illegally in

St. Petersburg on the eve of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Party. Two issues were put out: on February 7 (20) and March 20 (April 2), 1906. The editorial board was set up on a parity basis comprising editors from the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary* and from the Menshevik newspaper the new *Iskra*. Bolshevik members of the editorial board, among others, were Lenin and Lunacharsky. After the Fourth Congress of the Party *Partiiniye Izvestia* closed down. p. 363

[136] "The movement is everything, the ultimate aim—nothing"—the formula advanced by E. Bernstein, leader of the extreme opportunist wing of the German Social-Democrats and the Second International, and the theoretician of revisionism and reformism. p. 363

[137] *Narodnaya Duma* (*People's Duma*)—a Menshevik daily published in St. Petersburg in March-April 1907. p. 367

[138] This refers to the resolution on the political situation within the country and the tasks of the Party, adopted at the Sixth Congress of the Social-Democrats of Poland and Lithuania, held in Praga (a suburb of Warsaw) in December 1908.

The Congress repelled liquidationist tendencies and confirmed that the chief task of Social-Democracy was to fight for the conquest of political power by the proletariat with the help of the revolutionary peasantry. p. 368

[139] *All-Russian Peasant Union*—a revolutionary-democratic organisation founded in 1905. Its programme and tactics were elaborated at its first and second congresses held in Moscow in August and November 1900. The Union demanded political liberty and the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly. It adopted the tactics of boycott of the First Duma. Its agrarian programme called for the abolition of private landownership and for the transfer of monastery, church, crown and state lands to the peasants without compensation. The Union pursued a vacillating middle-of-the-road policy. While demanding abolition of the landed estates, it agreed to partial compensation for the landlords. The Peasant Union was subjected to police persecutions from the moment it came into existence. It finally broke up at the beginning of 1907. p. 372

[140] *The Bund* (*The General Jewish Workers Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia*) was formed by a founding congress of Jewish Social-Democratic groups held in Vilna in 1897; it was an association mainly of semi-proletarian Jewish artisans in the western regions of Russia. The Bund joined the R.S.D.L.P. at the First Congress (1898) "as an autonomous organisation, independent only in respect of questions affecting the Jewish proletariat specifically". (*The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences, and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Moscow, 1954, Part I, p. 14, Russ. ed.)

The Bund brought nationalism and separatism into the working-class movement of Russia. Its Fourth Congress, held in April 1901, resolved to alter the organisational relations with the R.S.D.L.P. established by the latter's First Congress. The resolution said that the Congress regarded the R.S.D.L.P. as a federation of national organisations and that the Bund should be treated as a member of that federation.

After the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. had rejected its demand that it be recognised as the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the Bund left the Party. In 1906 the Bund re-entered the R.S.D.L.P. on the basis of a resolution of the Fourth (Unity) Congress.

Within the R.S.D.L.P. the Bundists persistently supported the opportunist wing of the Party (the Economists, Mensheviks and liquidators) and opposed the Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. The Bund countered the Bolsheviks' programmatic demand for the right of nations to self-determination by a demand for cultural-national autonomy.

During the period of the Stolypin reaction (1907-10), it adopted a liquidationist stand and was active in forming the August anti-Party bloc. During the First World War (1914-18) it adopted the position of the social-chauvinists. In 1917 it supported the bourgeois Provisional Government and fought on the side of the enemies of the October Socialist Revolution. In the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the Bund leadership joined forces with the counter-revolution. At the same time a change was taking place among the rank and file of the Bund in favour of collaboration with the Soviet power. In March 1921 the Bund decided to dissolve itself, and some of its members joined the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) according to general procedure. p. 372

[141] *Sotsial-Demokrat* (*Social-Democrat*)—an illegal newspaper, organ of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., published in St. Petersburg from September 17 (30) to November 18 (December 1), 1906. Seven issues were put out. The editorial board was controlled by the Mensheviks. p. 373

[142] *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* was published in Cologne from June 1 1848 to May 19, 1849 under the management of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The Editor-in-Chief was Marx. Under the blows of reaction the newspaper closed down after issue No. 301.

Here Lenin quotes from the articles by K. Marx and F. Engels "Die Berliner Debatte über die Revolution" and "Der Gesetzenwurf über die Aufhebung der Feudallasten" published in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* on June 14 and July 30, 1848. p. 377

[143] See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 104-05. p. 378

[144] The manuscript has no heading. This heading has been supplied by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. p. 380

[145] *Vozrozhdeniye* (*Revival*)—a journal of the Menshevik liquidators published in Moscow from December 1908 to July 1910. p. 394

[146] See K. Marx und F. Engels, "Die Berliner Debatte über die Revolution". p. 397

[147] Lenin is quoting from Engels's "Preface to the First German Edition" of K. Marx's work *The Poverty of Philosophy* (see K. Marx *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 12-13). p. 401

[148] See K. Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right*. Introduction. (K. Marx and F. Engels, *On Religion*, Moscow, 1957, p. 42.) p. 403

[149] See F. Engels, "Flüchtlings-Literatur. II. Das Programme der Blanquisten". p. 403

[150] See F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 434-37. p. 404

[151] This refers to F. Engels's preface to K. Marx's pamphlet *The Civil War in France* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1958, p. 479). p. 404

[152] *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*)—a Cadet collection of articles by N. Berdayev, S. Bulgakov, P. Struve, M. Herschensohn and other representatives of the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie, published in Moscow in 1909. In their articles on the Russian intelligentsia these writers tried to discredit the revolutionary-democratic traditions of the best representatives of the Russian people, including Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, they vilified the revolutionary movement of 1905 and thanked the tsarist government for having, "with its bayonets and jails", saved the bourgeoisie from "the popular wrath". The writers called upon the intelligentsia to serve the autocracy. Lenin compared the programme of the *Vekhi* symposium in point of both philosophy and journalism with that of the Black-Hundred newspaper *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*, calling the symposium "*an encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy*", "nothing but a flood of reactionary mud poured on democracy". p. 410

[153] *Golos Moskvy* (*Voice of Moscow*)—a daily newspaper, organ of the Octobrists—a counter-revolutionary party of the big industrial bourgeoisie and big landlords. Published in Moscow from 1905 to 1915. p. 418

[154] *Menshikov, M. O.* (1859-1919)—a reactionary journalist, one of the editors of the Black-Hundred newspaper *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*).—*Ed.* p. 419

[155] *Derzhimorda*—the name of a policeman in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General* typifying an insolent, brutal bully and oppressor. p. 420

[156] *Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of "Proletary"* was held in Paris on June 8-17 (21-30), 1909 and was attended by nine members of the Bolshevik Centre (elected by the Bolshevik section of the Fifth [London] Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1907) headed by Lenin, and representatives of the St. Petersburg, Moscow Regional and Urals organisations.

The Conference was called to discuss the conduct of the otzovists and ultimatumists. It dealt with the following questions: (1) otzovism and ultimatumism; (2) god-building tendencies among the Social-Democrats, (3) the attitude to Duma activities among the other fields of Party work; (4) the tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party; (5) the Party school being set up abroad (on Capri); (6) agitation for a Bolshevik congress or a Bolshevik conference separate from the Party; (7) the breakaway of Comrade Maximov; and other questions.

The Conference was guided by Lenin, who delivered speeches on all the principal questions of the agenda. Otzovism and ultimatumism were represented and defended at the Conference by A. Bogdanov (Maximov) and V. Shantser (Marat). Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, and Tomsky took a conciliatory stand.

The Conference condemned otzovism and ultimatumism, which were qualified as "liquidationism from the left". Bogdanov, the guiding spirit of otzovism and ultimatumism, was expelled from the ranks of the Bolsheviks. The Conference also condemned god-building and decided to combat it vigorously and expose its anti-Marxist nature.

The headings to Lenin's speeches published in this volume have been given by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. p. 425

[157] *St.—Stanislav Volsky*—A. V. Sokolov, leader of the Moscow otzovists. p. 428

[158] *M. T.*—M. P. Tomsky. p. 432

[159] *On the Party School Set Up Abroad*—an anti-Party school set up by Bogdanov (Maximov), Alexinsky and Lunacharsky on Capri (Italy) in 1909 with the assistance of Maxim Gorky. The school was the factional centre of the otzovists, ultimatumists and god-builders, who united to fight Bolshevism.

Under the guise of pro-Party activities the Bogdanovites got some of the local Social-Democratic organisations to send thirteen students to attend the school.

The school existed about four months (August-December). In November 1909 some of the students headed by the worker N. Y. Vilonov emphatically dissociated themselves from the Bogdanovites when the factional nature of this school became clear to them. They sent to the editors of *Proletary* a protest against the anti-Party activities of the lecturers, for which they were expelled from the school. On Lenin's invitation they came to Paris, where they attended a cycle of lectures including lectures by Lenin:

"The Present Moment and Our Tasks" and "The Agrarian Policy of Stolypin". In December 1909 the group of students who remained on Capri formed, together with the lecturers, the anti-Party group "Vperyod".

The conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary* condemned the Capri school, which it qualified as "the new centre of a faction that was breaking away from the Bolsheviks". p. 432

[160] *God-building*—a religious-philosophical literary trend, hostile to Marxism, which in the period of Stolypin reaction arose among a section of the Party intellectuals who had moved away from Marxism after the defeat of the Revolution of 1905-07.

The god-builders (Lunacharsky, Bazarov and others) advocated the creation of a new "socialist" religion and tried to reconcile Marxism with religion. At one time Maxim Gorky supported them. An extended meeting of the editorial board of *Proletary* condemned god-building and declared in a special resolution that the Bolshevik group in the Party had nothing in common with "such a distortion of scientific socialism".

The reactionary nature of god-building was exposed by Lenin in his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (see present edition, Vol. 14) and in his letters to Gorky in February-April 1908 and November-December 1913. p. 432

[161] This refers to the *pro-Party Mensheviks*, headed by Plekhanov, who came out against the liquidators during the years of reaction. In December 1908 Plekhanov resigned from the editorial board of the liquidators' newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, and in 1909 he resumed publication of *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Social-Democrat's Diary*) for the purpose of fighting liquidationism. While adhering to Menshevism, the Plekhanovites at the same time stood for preserving and strengthening the illegal Party organisation, and consented to form a bloc with the Bolsheviks for that purpose. In 1909 groups of pro-Party Mensheviks were formed in Paris, Geneva, San Remo, Nice and other cities. In St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Kiev and Baku many Menshevik workers came out against the liquidators in favour of a revival of the illegal R.S.D.L.P.

Lenin called on the Bolsheviks to seek closer alignment with the pro-Party Mensheviks, saying that an agreement with them was possible on the basis of a struggle for the Party against liquidationism, "without any ideological compromises, without any glossing over of tactical and other differences of opinion *within the limits* of the Party line" (see present edition, Vol. 16, p. 101). The pro-Party Mensheviks participated with the Bolsheviks in the local Party committees, and contributed to the Bolshevik publications: *Rabochaya Gazeta* (*Workers' Gazette*), *Zvezda* (*Star*), and the Central Organ of the Party *Sotsial-Demokrat*. Lenin's tactics of alignment with the Plekhanovites, which were supported by the majority of the Menshevik workers in Russia, helped to ex-

tend the influence of the Bolsheviks in the legal organisations of the workers and oust the liquidators from them.

At the end of 1911 Plekhanov broke the bloc with the Bolsheviks. On the pretext of combating "factionalism" and a split in the R.S.D.L.P. he tried to reconcile the Bolsheviks with the opportunists. In 1912 the Plekhanovites, together with the Trotskyists, the Bundists and the liquidators, came out against the decisions of the Prague Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 433

[162] *Vlasov*—A. I. Rykov. p. 438

[163] The private meeting—a meeting of Leninist Bolsheviks called by Lenin on the eve of the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*. Lenin gave the meeting full information concerning the state of affairs in the Bolshevik section and the struggle against the otzovists, the ultimatumists and the god-builders. The theses contained in Lenin's report formed the basis for the resolutions adopted by the conference of the extended editorial board. p. 439

[164] *The First All-Russian Congress of Members of People's Universities' Associations* was held in St. Petersburg on January 3-6 (16-19), 1908. During the debate on the question of the activities and organisation of the people's universities the workers' group of the congress, headed by the Bolsheviks, introduced motions demanding that the workers' organisations be represented on the boards of the people's universities with the right to take part in arranging the curricula, choosing desirable lecturers on the social sciences, and recognition of the right of every nationality to give tuition in the native language. The congress rejected these demands as being outside the competence of the congress, after which the workers' representatives walked out. p. 447

[165] *The First All-Russian Congress of Representatives of Co-operative Societies* was held in Moscow on April 16-21 (April 29-May 4), 1908. It was attended by 824 delegates, about fifty of whom were Social-Democrats (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks). Reports were delivered at the congress on the international co-operative movement, on the role and tasks of the co-operative movement, on the legal status of the consumer societies in Russia and other matters.

Despite the resistance of the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks formed a Social-Democratic group at the congress and headed the fight of the representatives from the trade unions and workers' co-operatives against the bourgeois co-operators, who were in the majority at the congress. After a number of speeches by spokesmen of the workers, the police imposed a ban on speeches that touched on questions of the class struggle, the trade unions, aid to workers during strikes and lock-outs, the co-operative press and propaganda, and even the election of a congress bureau and the periodicity of congresses, the police officer attending the proceedings being instructed to arrest immediately anyone "who made socialist speeches

or motions". As a demonstration of protest against this the congress was closed. p. 447

[166] *The First All-Russian Women's Congress* was held in St. Petersburg on December 10-16 (23-29), 1908. Among its delegates were many women workers. Under pressure of the latter the congress adopted resolutions on combating alcoholism, on the position of the peasant woman, on labour protection for women and children, on producers' co-operatives, and on equal rights for Jews. On the main issue—that of the political and civic status of women in the modern community—the women workers submitted a motion demanding universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot without distinction of sex, race and religion. The presiding committee of the congress refused to read out the motion and replaced it by one drafted in a liberal-bourgeois spirit. The women workers walked out as a demonstration of protest. p. 447

[167] *The First All-Russian Congress of Factory Medical Officers and Representatives of Manufacturing Industry* convened on the initiative of the Moscow Society of Factory Medical Officers was held in Moscow on April 1-6 (14-19), 1909. Among its delegates were 52 workers elected by the trade unions chiefly of the big industrial centres (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Baku, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, etc.).

According to its sponsors, the congress was to have been a "festival of reconciliation" between workers and capitalists. The Bolsheviks, however who formed a majority of the working-class delegates, succeeded in getting the workers at the congress to take a class, proletarian line, despite the opposition of the liquidationist elements. Speaking on the concrete questions of sanitary and medical arrangements at the factories, the worker delegates exposed the ideas of "class peace" and social reform, and put forward demands based on the programme of the Marxist party. These speeches were of great political significance and had repercussions throughout the country. Especially lively were the debates on the questions of sanitary inspection arrangements (the Bolsheviks' draft resolution on this point was carried) and of the election of the factory inspection by the workers.

The congress was unable to finish its work. After the police had demanded that no questions liable "to excite class struggle" should be touched on in the debates, and after they had forbidden the motion on the housing question to be put to the vote (since "it mentioned socialism and socialisation of the land") and forbidden some of the worker delegates including the Duma Deputy I. P. Pokrovsky, from continuity their speeches, all the workers and some of the doctors walked out of the congress hall. In view of this the presiding committee decided to close the congress. p. 447

[168] *Otkliki Bunda* (*Echoes of the Bund*)—a non-periodical organ of the Bund's Committee Abroad, published in Geneva from March 1909 to February 1911. Five issues were put out. p. 460

[169] The reference is to Krylov's fable "The Frog and the Ox". p. 464

[170] *Khlestakov*—the chief character in Gogol's comedy *The Inspector-General*, typifying the unrestrained braggart and liar. p. 464

[171] This comment was published in the form of a note to M. N. Lyadov's letter to *Proletary* in which he expressed disagreement with the decisions of the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*. p. 467

[172] *Leva*—M. K. Vladimirov; *Innokenty*—I. F. Dubrovinsky. p. 468

[173] Lenin wrote this draft letter in reply to that of the Council of the otzovist-ultimatumist school on Capri addressed to the Bolshevik Centre (the extended editorial board of *Proletary*) soliciting aid for the school in the form of lecturers and funds.

The manuscript has no heading. The present heading has been given by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. p. 470

THE LIFE AND WORK OF V. I. LENIN

Outstanding Dates
(*March 1908-August 1909*)

1909

March 19 (*April 1*)	Lenin's article "On to the Straight Road" is published as a leader in *Proletary*, No. 26.
March 26 (*April 8*)	Lenin's article "On the 'Nature' of the Russian Revolution" is published as a leader in *Proletary*, No. 27.
Not later than April 3 (*16*)	Lenin finishes his article "Marxism and Revisionism" for the symposium *Karl Marx* (*1818-1883*).
Between April 6 and 18 (*April 19 and May 1*)	Lenin at the request of Gorky visits him on the Island of Capri where he tells Bogdanov and Lunacharsky of his difference with them on questions of philosophy.
April 16 (*29*)	Lenin's articles "On the Beaten Track!" and "A Bloc of the Cadets and the Octobrists?" are published in *Proletary*, No. 29.
April 24 (*May 7*)	Lenin gives a lecture in Geneva on the subject of "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution and Its Probable Future".
April	Lenin's article "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution" is published in the Polish journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 2.
May 1	Lenin delivers a lecture in Paris on the character of the Russian revolution at a meeting organised by the Bureau of the Paris Social-Democratic group.
Beginning of May	Lenin takes part in the session of the Bureau of the Paris Social-Democratic group at which it is decided to help the Social-Democrats arrested in Switzerland in connection with the expropriation at Tiflis.

May 10 (23) — *Proletary*, No. 30, publishes Lenin's articles "Cadets of the Second Generation" (leading article) and "The Assessment of the Russian Revolution" (reprinted from the Polish journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 2).

May — Lenin works at the British Museum on his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

May-first half of June — Lenin writes "Ten Questions to a Lecturer" as points for the speech of I. F. Dubrovinsky (Innokenty) at the lecture by A. Bogdanov in Geneva.

June 18 (July 1) — Lenin finishes his work *The Agrarian Question in Russia Towards the Close of the Nineteenth Century* for the Encyclopaedic Dictionary being published by Granat Brothers. Owing to the censorship, the work was not published at the time, and appeared as a separate booklet only in 1918.

Lenin writes to V. V. Vorovsky in Odessa on the sharpening of philosophical differences and the maturing of a split with the Bogdanov group.

June — On Lenin's suggestion, a discussion on otzovism is started in *Proletary*.

July 2 (15) — Lenin's article "Some Features of the Present Collapse" is published as a leading article in Proletary, No. 32.

July 5 (18) — Lenin finishes the Autoabstract of his book: *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the Russian Revolution* (printed in the Polish journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 6, August 1908).

July 23 (August 5) — Lenin's articles "Inflammable Material in World Politics" (leader), "Bellicose Militarism and the Anti-Militarist Tactics of Social-Democracy" and "How Pyotr Maslov Corrects the Rough Drafts of Karl Marx" are published in *Proletary*, No. 33.

August 11-13 (24-26) — Lenin takes part in the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Geneva; exposes the attempt of the Mensheviks to liquidate the C.C. and replace it by an information bureau; is elected on behalf of the Bolsheviks to the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ.

August — At a meeting of the editorial board of *Proletary* Lenin challenges Bogdanov to set forth his views openly in the press.

September 11 (*24*) — Lenin's article "Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution" is published as a leader in *Proletary*, No. 35.

Between September 25 and October 2 (*October 8 and 15*) — Lenin's article "Marxism and Revisionism" is published in the symposium *Karl Marx* (*1818-1883*), put out in St. Petersburg.

September 27 (*October 10*) — Lenin participates in the work of the conference of socialist journalists in Brussels.

Lenin attends the international meeting devoted to the struggle of the proletariat to preserve peace held at the Maison du Peuple in Brussels.

September 28 (*October 11*) — Lenin takes part in the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels, criticises Kautsky's resolution on the admission to the International of the British Labour Party, and opposes the admission of the Zionist socialists to the Russian subsection of the International.

September 29 (*October 12*) — Lenin attends the meeting of the international conference of socialist M. P.s in Brussels.

September — Lenin writes the preface to his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

Before October 3 (*16*) — Lenin writes his article "British and German Workers Demonstrate for Peace" for *Proletary*, No. 36.

October 3 (*16*) — Lenin's article "The Student Movement and the Present Political Situation" is published as a leader in *Proletary*, No. 36.

October 14 (*27*) — In a letter to A. I. Yelizarova Lenin tells her that he has finished his work on the book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, and asks her to provide a reliable address where he can send the manuscript.

October 16 (*29*) — Lenin's articles "Events in the Balkans and in Persia", "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau" and "P. Maslov in Hysterics" are published in *Proletary*, No. 37.

October 28 (*November 10*) — Lenin rejects the Mensheviks' offer to contribute to the proposed Menshevik symposium.

October-November — Lenin's article "Some Remarks on the 'Reply' by P. Maslov" is published in the Polish journal *Przegląd Socjaldemokratyczny*, No. 8-9.

October-December	Lenin directs preparations for the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.
November 1 (14)	Lenin's article "The Assessment of the Present Situation" is published in *Proletary*, No. 38.
Before November 4 (17)	Lenin sends the manuscript of his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* to a secret address for legal publication in Moscow.
November 13 (26)	Lenin's articles "How Plekhanov and Co. Defend Revisionism" and "Two Letters" are published in *Proletary*, No. 39.
Between November 29 and December 1 (December 12 and 14)	Lenin and Krupskaya move from Geneva to Paris where *Proletary* is now to be published.
December 1 (14)	Lenin's article "The Agrarian Debates in the Third Duma" is published in *Proletary*, No. 40.
December 21 (January 3, 1909)	Lenin takes part in the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. in Paris.
December 21-27 (January 3-9, 1909)	Lenin takes part in the work of the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in Paris reports on "The Present Moment and the Tasks of the Party", moves a draft resolution on this question and proposes amendments to draft resolutions on other questions.
December 27-29 (January 9-11, 1909)	Lenin takes part in the plenary meeting of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. at which the resolutions of the Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. are confirmed.
December	Lenin gives a lecture in Paris on the present situation in Russia.

1909

Beginning of the year	Lenin gives lectures on philosophy at a Bolshevik study group in Paris.
January 7 (20)	Lenin's article "How the Socialist-Revolutionaries Sum Up the Revolution and How the Revolution Has Summed Them Up" is published in *Proletary*, No. 41.

January 22 (*February 4*)	Lenin speaks in Paris on the political situation in Russia.
January 28 (*February 10*)	Lenin's article "On the Road" is published as a leader in the newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 2.
February 1 (*14*)	At a meeting of the editorial board of *Proletary* Lenin demands an open attack by the board on the god-building preached by Lunacharsky.
February 12 (*25*)	Lenin's comment on the article "Questions of the Day", directed against otzovism, is published in *Proletary*, No. 42.
February 17-23 (*March 2-8*)	Lenin is on holiday at Nice.
March 5 (*18*)	Lenin speaks in Paris at a meeting of political emigrants on the Paris Commune of 1871.
March 9 and 21 (*March 22, and April 3*)	Lenin's article "The Aim of the Proletarian Struggle in Our Revolution" is published in Nos. 3 and 4 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.
March 10 or 11 (*23 or 24*)	Lenin sends a "Supplement to Chapter Four. Section 1. From What Angle did N. G. Chernyshevsky Criticise Kantianism?" to Moscow for his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.
Not earlier than March 23 (*April 5*)	On behalf of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. Lenin sends a protest to the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party against the distortion by *Vorwärts* of the essence of the differences among the Russian Social-Democrats.
April 4 (*17*)	Lenin's article "A Caricature of Bolshevism" is published in the Supplement to *Proletary*, No. 44.
April 8 (*21*)	Lenin's article "The 'Leftward Swing' of the Bourgeoisie and the Tasks of the Proletariat" is published in *Proletary*, No. 44.
Between April 29 and May 4 (*May 12 and 17*)	Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy* is published in Moscow.
End of April-first half of June	Lenin makes preparations for the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*.

FROM MARX TO MAO NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION

May 8 (21) — Lenin speaks in Paris at the *Proletary* club on the subject of "Religion and the Workers' Party".

May 13 (26) — Lenin's article "The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion" is published as a leader in *Proletary*, No. 45.

June 4 (17) — Lenin's article "Classes and Parties in Their Attitude to Religion and the Church" is published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 6.

Not later than June 7 (20) — Lenin holds a private meeting of members of the editorial board of *Proletary* with representatives from local Social-Democratic organisations, in which he reports on the state of affairs in the Party.

June 8-17 (21-30) — Lenin presides over the conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*, takes part in the discussion, moves amendments to the resolutions and submits draft resolutions on particular questions.

On the main questions the conference adopted Lenin's resolutions.

July 3 (16) — "Report on the Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of *Proletary*", written by Lenin, is published in a Supplement to *Proletary*, No. 46.

July 11 (24) — Lenin's articles "The Tsar Visits Europe and Members of the Black-Hundred Duma Visit England" (leader) and "The Liquidation of Liquidationism" are published in *Proletary*, No. 46.

July — In a talk with the Secretary of the Russian section of the Central Committee Lenin gives instructions on the struggle against provocateurs who worm their way into Party organisations.

End of July-August — Lenin goes away on holiday with his family (N. K. Krupskaya, her mother and M. I. Ulyanova) to the village of Bonbon (department of Seine-et-Marne) near Paris.

August 5 (18) — In a letter to the organisers of the Capri school Lenin declines to give lectures at the school, and invites the students to come to Paris to attend lectures by Bolshevik lecturers.

In a letter to the Business Commission of the Bolshevik Centre Lenin objects to any aid being given to Trotsky for the publication of his newspaper *Pravda* in Vienna.

Middle of August — Lenin sends to the Bureau Abroad of the Central Committee a secret circular he has received from the International Socialist Bureau regarding organisation of meetings of protest against the imperialist aggressive policy of the Spanish Government in Morocco.

August 17 (30) — In a reply to the students at the Capri school, Lenin explains the anti-Party character of the school, repeats his refusal to deliver lectures in it and invites them to come to Paris.

August — Lenin takes part in the work of the Promotion Commission for the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma.

Summer — Lenin visits Paul Lafargue and discusses his book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* with him.

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В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕНИЯ

Том 15

На английскот языке